Brave Little Belgium: the Belgian Army in the Great War > On the Yser
The Westhoek landscape
We should now examine the landscape in which the Belgian army found itself at the conclusion of the battle. It would spend almost four years in the sector, during which time the position of the front line barely altered.
The general landscape of the area, which is known as the Westhoek, is quite
vast, flat, and open. The water table is high, much of the land below sea-level.
(It is a myth that it is reclaimed polder land). For many miles in either
direction from the Yser, the country is devoid of high ground, and even small
height offers an advantage in terms of observation for the occupier, but
easily delineated by the observed.
Behind the Belgian lines, small towns and villages, identifiable at a great distance by the church spires, fulfilled roles as billets, hospitals, dumps and command posts. Most significant places were Veurne, some 5 miles behind Nieuwpoort, and Houtem the operational HQ for many units. La Panne was not only where the King chose to remain, but became a large hospital centre and training area, as did much of the dune coastline towards Dunkerque.
Running through this flat land is the River Yser, which for much of its length
had been made into a canal with towpaths on embankment dykes some 4 to 6
feet higher than the land. The river varied in width, in places some 35 yards
from towpath to towpath, and was much too deep to wade.
Front line positions
Immediately adjacent to the sea, where the Yser estuary opens and runs alongside
the fishing and seaside town of Nieuwpoort, the front line ran some half a mile
east of the river. Positions in both front and rear ran through dunes. This
sector was not held by the Belgians until quite late in the war.
The floodlands continued down to Diksmuide, and on occasion beyond the town.
The Belgians held the railway embankment, which was only some 6 feet above
normal ground level. They continually reinforced it, so that by mid 1917,
it was virtually one continuous length of concrete shelter and machine
gun post. In front of the embankment, on the west bank of the river, certain
farms and hillocks which remained above the water level were occupied as
outposts – some by Germans,
others by Belgians. These posts were completely isolated. Men and material
often had to be brought up by boat, although there were continual attempts
to build and maintain duckboard tracks above the water level. Key posts
for the Belgians were at the Reigersvliet farm, and at the ruined church
at Oud Stuivekenskerke. Both afforded excellent observation over the German
posts towards Tervate, which could enfilade the Belgian positions; both
were the target of regular shelling.
At Diskmuide, which was reduced to ruin during the Belgian and French efforts
to maintain a bridgehead, were two extraordinary front-line features. Just to
the north of the town, on the west bank, the Belgians held a cul-de-sac trench,
right on the river bank. It could extend no more, as it was continued on the
same bank by a German trench. The Germans also held the opposite bank, and the
complete dominance they had over this particular part of the Belgian line justified
its name of the Dodengang. Just beyond the barricade, two large petroleum tanks
were the site of vicious raid and counterattack.
Beyond the ruined road bridge, on the town bank of the river, lay the ruins
of a large vegetable oil processing plant. Ground to dust by four years of shelling,
the heap of tangled constructional steel, machinery and brickwork of the Minoterie
always stood high over the Belgian lines some 35 yards away on the opposite
bank.
South of Diksmuide, the line was beyond the limit of the floodwater and assumed
a more familiar aspect. Built up as breastworks rather than being entrenched,
the opposing lines snaked south to the next canal junction at Drie Grachten,
and then along the Ieperlee canal past Steenstraat, meeting the British lines
at Boesinghe. For much of the war this sector was held by the French.
Overall then, while the Yser positions were such that they were unlikely to
be attacked by surprise, they were unpleasant to occupy, difficult to maintain
and supply, and in certain spots of extreme danger. Equally, the efforts that
had to be made by either side to raid or attack the enemy positions were prodigious,
requiring careful preparation and skilful command. Men literally floundering
in water make for easy targets.
Strategic dilemma
There is little doubt that the Belgian army was shattered by the end of November
1914. It had lost at least 75,000 men and all of its usual sources of supply,
and had precious few (and as yet untrained) volunteers in reserve. Quite
undeservedly, the French high command held the Belgians in little regard,
and they –
soon joined by the British – made numerous attempts to break up the Belgian
units and place them under foreign command, all of which were resisted by King
Albert.
Albert and his loyal followers, who as far as I can see were more likely to
be found among the command of the army still in Belgium than in the exiled Government
in Le Havre, faced a strategic dilemma.
The Belgian position was unique. Violation of neutrality had raised important
questions for them. Had Germany’s action altered their international status?
Was their position of neutrality now irrelevant? The King’s view, shared
by Foreign Minister Baron Beyens, was that neutrality was not abolished by
the aggression to which the country had been subjected. She was still a neutral,
lawfully defending her independence and entitled to the privileges conferred
upon neutral states by Article 10 of the fifth Hague Convention. The activities
of the Belgian army could not, according to international law, be considered
as hostile acts. Belgium therefore occupied a privileged position and could
in theoy claim for special reparations for the damage inflicted. Chancellor
von Bethmann-Hollweg had publicly recognized this right in August 1914, and
Albert and his advisors decided not to alter the diplomatic status of the country
before the conclusion of peace.
When the representatives of Great Britain, France and Russia signed the Pact
of London on September 5th, 1914, undertaking not to engage in separate negotiations
with the enemy, Belgium abstained from taking action to avoid binding the country
to any engagement which would have placed her on the same footing as the belligerents.
Belgium remained determined not to undermine its position of neutrality, and
resisted Allied clamour for post-Victory expansion and profit at German expense.
Proper restitution of what was theirs yes; vengeance no. Of course, not all
Belgians felt this way: there were at times the most preposterous claims; that
Belgium should vastly increase her pre-war empire; that there was never a better
time to expand the Belgian navy, and so on. Albert, however, held firmly to
the moral high ground, and while it drove his Allies quite mad with frustration,
it won him undying affection from the Belgian people.
Albert developed a quite realistic view of the Western Front very early in the
war. He did not believe that a breakthrough would be possible, nor that the
German army could be defeated by sideshows. At the same time, he saw it as a
duty not to expend the lives of the precious few troops that Belgium could provide
in what he saw therefore as futile and uncoordinated attempts to do so. As far
as he was concerned, a defensive strategy alone could lead the Allies to successful
results. Albert guessed that with his army squandered Belgium could no longer
expect a place at the table when it finally came to the peace that would determine
the restitution of the country.
To the Allies, this looked, particularly at the most desperate times, unhelpful
and defeatist. It took some time for the French military leaders to fully understand
this attitude, and to realize that Albert was just as determined as they to
throw his all into the struggle when no other alternative remained. An example
of his logic was expressed to Sir Douglas Haig, in May 1917 when Albert was
asked to co-operate in the forthcoming offensive in Flanders.
‘Since the King has had no opportunity, in previous consultations, to
express an opinion on the operation to which the Belgian army is asked to take
part, he feels obliged to give his advice… He considers that the operation
has no chance of success, because, owing to the weakness of activity of the
Eastern Front, the enemy has never been able to concentrate so many units on
the Western Front. An attempt to break through has besides been made recently
with over a hundred Divisions on ground favourable for an attack. This attempt
having failed, it is scarcely to be hoped that the projected operation could
succeed with inferior forces and on ground far less favourable and which can
be partially inundated. The invasion of the greatest part of Belgian territory
and the lack of reserves resulting from it, besides the King’s duty to
prevent any useless losses among his men, would compel him to decline all participation
in an operation which, in his opinion, is bound to fail. However, in order
to maintain harmony between the Allied Armies, if they persist in their resolution,
he is prepared to agree to the co-operation of the Belgian army under the following
conditions. (The conditions that followed were that the army should remain
under his exclusive command; that the French should take over a part of his
line to enable a strengthening of the assault sector; and that the Belgians
should attack from the Diksmuide area only when progress realized by the British
had rendered their intervention advisable).’
This could have been a copy of advice Albert gave to his Allies on perhaps 10
other occasions.
Something of a surprise
It will be a surprise to many that the size of the Belgian army actually grew
throughout the war. No fewer than 120,000 men found their way to the ranks,
by escaping to the west as the Germans advanced, or via Holland. Many joined
from the Belgian Congo and elsewhere. The size of the Field Army was raised
to 150,000 in 1917, allowing the Belgians to extend their front from 13 to 24
miles.
Similarly, although virtually all of its domestic production capacity was lost,
Belgium was quite soon able to supply its own military needs, by establishing
dedicated factories in France and England, employing 22,000 skilled Belgian
workers. By 1917, the factories in exile produced all of the field gun ammunition,
rifles and trench mortars used by the army. Behind the lines, the Belgians became
self-sufficient in bread and beer supplies, as well as in uniforms and other
equipment. Queen Elisabeth was personally heavily involved in the establishment
of hospitals at La Panne, Veurne and elsewhere.
From the end of the Battle of the Yser until the launch of the final advance late in 1918, the Belgian army fought no large-scale offensives. It fought a successful although costly defence alongside the French in April 1915, which I do not intend to cover. Nor shall I talk about the highly successful Belgian effort in the final advance from the Yser line late in 1918. Instead, I will concentrate on the ordinary war of defence in the static positions between these great events, as illustrative of the task of the army for the greater part of the war. Given just a few minutes, I can not do justice to the years of small-scale raiding and other local actions, but I would like to highlight three actions that took place within earshot of the British in the salient, as illustrative of what took place here and why Belgian casualties along the Yser were not less than 40,000.
Belgian raids at the Minoterie
The context of this action was that the Allies had begun in early 1917 to discuss
in earnest a major offensive in Flanders, with the Belgian army playing a part
to the North of Ypres. It was quickly realized that the German bastion at the
Minoterie would have to be neutralized if the advance through the Diksmuide
sector was to succeed. In the event, the British advance in the Langemarck area
did not succeed in penetrating to the Houthulst area until late in October,
so a large Belgian operation here did not materialize. However, it was decided
that the clearance of the Minoterie position remained a priority, to relieve
the Belgian position at Diksmuide and provide a good base for a future attack
in the area.
An assessment was made of the weight of artillery necessary to give the attacking
infantry a chance: in total, it was reckoned that some 42,000 shells including
15,000 of the heaviest caliber would have to fall accurately, over a period
of perhaps 4 days. That equates to a mimumum of 7 shots per minute hitting the
Minoterie and the German trenches and blockhouses in the vicinity.
Three well-planned raids took place, on 26th and 28th October, and 4th November.
In each case, Belgian infantry of General Drubbel’s 2nd Division
crossed the river by boat at night, and at places the Belgian engineers
rapidly constructed plank bridges. Other men crossed 2km further downstream,
and attacked from the east. A section of the Special Brigade of the Royal
Engineers provided gas support to all of these raids. Each time, the Belgians
penetrated into the Minoterie labyrinth, caused damage and took prisoners,
at relatively little cost. No doubt this kept the Germans on their toes,
but the raids had virtually no effect on the overall position. Each time
too, the German artillery inflicted serious damage to the positions along
the far bank.
The defence of Merkem
A quotation from the British Official History, concerning 17th April, 1918,
a day when the BEF was under pressure on the Lys and in the Salient, having
lost Bailleul and the Messines Ridge. ‘The palm of honour on this
day must be awarded to the Belgians. At dawn, the Germans opened a violent
bombardment on the whole Belgian line, and this was followed at 8am by
an assault from Houthulst Forest. It fell on the right of the line, the
six-mile front held by the 10th and 3rd Divisions, between Langemark and
Lake Blankaart.
By 1pm, in the right sector between the railway and Draai bank, the enemy had
captured some of the advanced posts; but before dark these had been recaptured
by counter-attacks covered by very effective artillery fire, to which the British
II Corps contributed. The shattered remains of the attackers withdrew, pursued
by the fire of the Belgian machine guns.
In the left sector, the line was penetrated at De Kippe, and the enemy began
to roll up the Belgian line to the south, at the same time reinforcing the
6th Bavarian Division which broke through. Two strongpoints north of Draaibank,
however still held out, and the fire of these troops brought the attack to
a stop about mid-day. From 9.45am onwards, the Belgians launched counter-attacks
south of Lake Blankaart; after heavy fighting De Kippe was recaptured and by
evening the whole Belgian line had been re-established. No less than 20 officers,
759 other ranks, and 60 machine guns were captured from the Germans. The German
attack from Houthulst Forest, on which Crown Prince Rupprecht relied to get
the offensive going again, had failed completely’.
In the generally little-understood assault on the Lys in April 1918, this defence
is surely noteworthy.
Three men lost at De Stampkot
A typical small-scale Belgian raid took place at a position called De Stampkot,
about half a mile north of the present-day location of the Gas Memorial, along
the banks of the Ieperlee Canal, on 26th March 1917, when British eyes were
gazing in the Arras direction.
Two platoons of the 23rd Line Regiment were selected to move into the German
front line, under the protection of a box barrage, specifically to take prisoners
for identification. The raid proceeded smoothly and prisoners were duly taken,
at a loss of only three men. However, this tiny action, and the three men, have
entered into Belgian folklore and mythology, and have become an icon for Flemish
nationalism.
The story concerns two brothers, Edward and Frans van Raemdonck, who came from
a small, typically Flemish town called Temse, not far from Hasselt. They joined
up in 1914 as volunteers, and after years of good front-line service, they were
both Sergeants. Edward was a sportsman, a good comrade and leader. He had been
decorated as a result of earlier actions. Frans was the intellectual, much taken
to reading. They had joined up with a number of friends, one of whom was Clemens
de Landtsheer.
As the months of the war passed by, Frans became first disillusioned and homesick
then increasingly aggressively pro-Flemish. He grew bitterly resentful at the
insensitive treatment of the Flemish troops by the French-dominated command.
His correspondence to de Landtsheer, who along with others shared Frans views,
is a primary source of information about the Franco-Flemish politics in the
army. This group began a trench newspaper in 1916, called De Vlaamsche Stem
(the Flemish Voice). Gradually, this came to the notice of high command, who
condemned it as pro-German and anti-Belgian. Eventually it was banned. In reaction,
the group formed a political party, called the Frontbeweging, an increasingly
staunch and nationalist group.
Frans was ordered to take his section into the raid, along with one of his
NCOs, Corporal Aime Fievez, a French speaker from Calonne. He agreed to meet
up with Edward at one of the plank bridges over the canal, when he came back.
As the men began to return from the raid, Frans did not return. Edward became
deeply concerned and went out in daylight to find him. He too did not return.
A few days later, men in the front line saw a sunlight glint on something in
no man’s land, and a small party was sent to investigate. They found
three bodies: the brothers van Raemdonck and Corporal Fievez. Acting under
standing orders the party were not allowed to take extra risks by bringing
the bodies in, but covered them in a shallow grave where they were found.
The Belgian army remained on the Yser until September 1918, when in line with
the British 2nd Army it made great advances through Flanders. The King and Queen
were received to marvelous public welcomes in Bruges and Brussels. But the struggle
was not over, for the country had to face up to a colossal effort to rebuild.
During the twenties and thirties, the legacy of the years on the Yser was unfortunately
a mythology that underpins Belgian politics to this day. Let me begin by returning
to the story of the brothers Van Raemdonck.
The mythology of Gebroeders van Raemdonck
Shortly after the burial of the three casualties of the Stampkot raid, one of their friends, Oscar Dambre (who came from Vlamertinge), wrote an article about their loss for Ons Vaderland, the official trench newspaper of the Frontbeweging. Dambre had taken part in the Stampkot raid, but was not among the burial party. He said that the brothers were found in each other’s arms, near to Fievez. It was when he read the paper that Clemens de Landtsheer first heard of the death of the brothers. He in turn, after making further enquiries, re-wrote the story in Onze Temschenaars. The story was gradually embellished by others as an example of perfect brotherhood and comradeship; Flemish brotherhood. To the pro-Flemish, the myth that developed was that Frans was carrying a wounded Fievez to safety when Edward arrived, and they were killed thus in each others arms. To the pro-Belgian, it was Fievez who was carrying Frans.
This myth persisted and grew. In September 1918, a small memorial was built
on the site where the bodies were recovered.
In 1920, army veterans began an organization called the Ijzerbedevaart, which
literally means the Yser Pilgrimage. De Landtsheer and the Flemish nationalists
were very influential in establishing the organization, which among other
events began to hold an annual remembrance parade. The second one was held
at the grave site, with members of the Van Raemdonck family among the 3000
in attendance.
Belgian authorities decreed in 1924 that all scattered graves should be brought
into the military cemeteries. All three bodies were exhumed at De Stampkot and
re-interred at Westvleteren. (This was not a common practice, as at this period
well over half of the bodies thus handled were removed to a cemetery in their
home town). The plot, however, remained marked, and a larger memorial was built
in 1933 which remains to this day.
Myth and counter-myth remain. As recently as 1969, a pro-Fievez pamphlet was
published.
The Ijzerbedevaart
A Flemish memorial tower was opened in 1932 on the banks of the Yser, opposite
the Minoterie position. It portrays what had become the symbolism of the
Ijzerbedevaart by this time, AVV-VVK (Alle voor Vlaanderen, Vlaanderen
voor Kristus). The bodies of several key Flemish figures were moved into
the crypt, with much nationalist pomp; among them the bodies of the brothers.
Fievez remains in Westvleteren. The tower was destroyed by Walloon separatists
in March 1946, and a larger one
– in Flemish defiance – built on the site.
King Albert and Belgium in world politics
What are we to make of King Albert, and his influence on the war? A hero to
the Belgians, regardless of their language, he was eventually to overcome French
prejudice and was given overall command of the Flanders advance in 1918. His
resistance to committing Belgian troops to the support of what he saw as foolhardy
attacks were balanced by wholehearted commitment when it came to urgent defence.
His desperate act of flooding the Yser fields, and his staunch adherence to
the position of neutrality and independence of the Allies had been the lynchpin
of the military strategy on the left flank of the Western Front. Indeed, the
Allies had formally accepted the independent position of Belgium, and redeclared
their upholding of the 1839 treaties, in the declaration of Saint Adresse, made
in February 1916.
It must surely be said that his ambition of maintaining a Belgian foothold in
Belgium, not wasting his few troops, and regaining the country without it being
laid wholly to waste were achieved. But his disappointment must have been of
the extreme when Belgium was thoroughly disregarded at the Versailles peace
talks. Perhaps in relation to the very major issues facing the Versailles delegates,
the traditional position of Belgium and the legal reparations due to her were
of small consequence. Perhaps it was all rather old hat. There were after all
the questions regarding the League of Nations, and the new countries, to be
solved. The King did not expect to sit at the conference table, but he did expect
his representatives to be invited. They were not. The Belgian delegation were
given precisely three hours to state their case, and were not invited when questions
concerning Belgium were discussed by the Big Four.
Albert died in 1934, as a result of a motor accident. His funeral route in Brussels
was lined by Great War veterans, most wearing the Yser medal. It is significant
that his greatest memorial is not in Brussels, but along the river bank at Nieuwpoort.
Perhaps a re-awakening
The Yser battlefields, place of pilgrimage, are compact and full of interest.
Here are a very few of the more noteworthy spots.
In very recent times, a small explosion of publishing – in Flemish –
of histories and personal reminiscence has taken place. In addition, there
are some very active Belgian groups involved in battlefield archaeology, of
the Great War battle areas in Belgium, not just those where the Belgian army
stood.
I think this is overdue. The men of the Belgian army played a decisive role
early in the war, and both the strategic direction of the army and the dogged
performance in defence on the Yser are worth our continued admiration, attention
and understanding.