War Office, May, 1917.
The following Despatch has been received by the Secretary of State
for War from H.B.M.'s High Commissioner for Egypt covering a Despatch
from the Acting Sirdar and Governor-General of the Sudan relative
to the military operations in Darfur from the occupation of El
Fasher to the conclusion of hostilities : —
SIR,—
The Residency, Cairo, 11th April, 1917.
I have the honour to forward for the information of the Secretary
of State for War a Despatch received from the Acting Sirdar and
Governor-General of the Sudan dealing with the events in Darfur
from the time of the occupation of El Fasher on May 23rd, 1916,
up to the conclusion of the operations which resulted in the death
of Ali Dinar. The operations referred to therein having taken
place before I assumed the position of High Commissioner in Egypt,
I am in a position personally to endorse the satisfaction expressed
by the Acting Sirdar and Governor-General at the manner in which
the operations in Darfur have been brought to a successful conclusion.
I consider that especial credit is due to Lt.-Col. Kelly, D.S.O.,
for his conduct of the operations, as also to Major (now temp.
Brig.-General) Huddleston, D.S.O., M.C., for his active pursuit
of the enemy, resulting in death of Ali Dinar.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
REGINALD WINGATE,
General
Khartoum, 5th April, 1917.
YOUR EXCELLENCY,—
In continuation of Your Excellency's Despatch, dated August 8th,
1916, on the Military Operations in Darfur, I have the honour
to forward for the information of the Secretary of State for War
a further Despatch dealing with the events in Darfur from the
time of the occupation of El Fasher on May 23rd, 1916, up to the
conclusion of the Operations which resulted in the death of Ali
Dinar.
Whilst it was hoped that the signal victory at Beringia marked
the close of what might called major operations, the work of the
troops was not yet concluded. The Sultan fled from El Fasher on
the morning of May 23rd in a south-westerly direction towards
Jebel Marra. Colonel Kelly found that, owing to the complete exhaustion
of the transport animals, the absence of supplies, and the waterless
nature of the country in front of him, it was impossible for him
to follow up the victory of Beringia. The length of his line of
communication and the necessity for housing his troops, owing
to the approaching rains, wisely decided him to confine himself
to the occupation of the oapital, and, while getting into touch
with the inhabitants, to await the result of negotiations with
the Sultan which had been initiated by the arrival of three envoys
on May 29th bearing a letter from him containing an offer of surrender.
The offer was accepted with certain reservations, and negotiations
continued with the Sultan till the 1st August, when, as it was
seen he was not acting in good faith, they were broken off. The
country to which he and his followers had fled was known to be
extremely unhealthy; it was therefore hoped that his forces would
dwindle away by attrition, and this hope proved to have some foundation.
In June a report was received that
a fight had taken place between Ali Dinar and some of his followers
who wished to desert him. Both sides lost heavily, and the deserters
subsequently surrendered to the Government. At this time it was
calculated that Ali Dinar had some 1,000 armed men with him. With
this force he was unable to undertake any offensive action against
our troops at El Fasher, but was sufficiently powerful to raid
such inhabitants in his neighbourhood as did not yield to his
demands for supplies.
During August, as Ali Dinar's raids
became more marked, Colonel Kelly came to the conclusion that
it was necessary to try and confine his sphere of activities to
the west side of Jebel Marra. To effect this he decided, as soon
as the country dried up sufficiently to allow of the passage of
troops, to form two strong posts; one to the northern and the
other to the southern end of the Jebel Marra range of hills at
Kebkebia and Dibbis, 105 and 130 miles respectively distant from
El Fasher. Kebkebia was occupied without opposition early in September
by 468 rifles, Eastern Arab Corps, with 6 maxims, under Major
W. H. McCowan, D.S.O., Cameron Highlanders. The efficiency of
this step was immediately made apparent by a complete cessation
of raids in this district.
To Dibbis Colonel Kelly despatched, early in October,
a force consisting of 200 rifles, 13th Sudanese and Camel Corps,
with 4 maxims and 2 guns, under Major H. J. Huddleston, D.S.O.,
M.C., Dorsetshire Regiment. On arrival there on the 13th October
a force of the enemy, estimated at 150 rifles and 1,000 native
levies, under the command of Zacharia—the eldest son of
Ali Dinar—was encountered. The enemy, who was completely
surprised, fled in disorder after a short skirmish There were
no casualties on either side. On the 15th October Ali Dinar again
opened negotiations with Major Huddleston with, a view to surrendering;
these overtures led to nothing, and were only intended as a means
of gaining time.
On October 24th Colonel Kelly increased Major Huddleston's force
by 100 rifles of the 13th Sudanese, under Captain H. T. R. S.
Wright, Manchester Regiment (since deceased). During the latter
half of October deserters from All Dinar's force informed Major
Huddleston that the followers of the Sultan, who were suffering
from smallpox and starvation, had no fight left in them. Ali Dinar
was himself at this time at Kulme, some 50 miles west of Dibbis.
On October 29th Major Huddleston received a report that Ali Dinar's
chief leaders had told him that they would fight no more, and
that if he refused to surrender they would do so, and would await
the arrival of the Government troops at Kulme. Major Huddleston,
seeing from the number of surrenders which were taking place that
the morale of Ali Dinar's men was really seriously affected, decided
to advance against Kulme without awaiting further reinforcements.
Accordingly on November 1st he advanced
with 2 guns, 4 maxims and 250 rifles, and, moving rapidly on Kulme,
arrived there at mid-day, November 3rd, meeting with but slight
opposition and no casualties. One hundred rifles, 300 camels and
some horses were captured here, and several of the chief men came
in and surrendered. By November 5th the surrenders and captures
at Kulme amounted to: —
342 rifles.
2,500 rounds ammunition.
300 camels.
6,000 head of cattle.
700 Ibs. ivory.
70 horses.
Two hundred men and 300 women also gave themselves up, including
two sisters of the Sultan and several small children. These surrenders
were important, as they clearly proved the demoralization of the
Sultan's troops, and showed that he himself was practically a
fugitive with no power.
On the afternoon of November 5th, Major Huddleston organised a
pursuit with the following troops, all of whom he mounted on horses
captured from the enemy, or belonging to friendly Arabs:—-
One gun,
Four maxims,
150 rifles.
The remainder of his force was left in occupation of Kulme.
Ali Dinar had fled towards Giuba, about 30 miles S.W. of Kulme,
where he was surprised at dawn on November 6th. The surprise was
complete. The enemy had not even taken the precaution of placing
any outposts, and fire was opened unobserved on his camp at 500
yards range. The Sultan and his followers of some 40 or 50 rifles,
thus rudely awakened, fled in every direction. Four enemy dead
were picked up, and the dead body of the Sultan was found about
one mile from camp, shot through the head. As the result of this
dashing pursuit and attack there was no further opposition.
The Northern Column, under Major D. Mills. Hampshire Regiment,
greatly assisted in hunting down the fugitives, who were endeavouring
to escape north. By November 23rd
the remaining chief leaders had surrendered unconditionally. The
newly acquired Province of Darfur, with the exception of the N.W.
corner, may now be said to be pacified.
A strong patrol of Camel Corps, under Major T. B. Vandeleur, D.S.O.,
Royal Irish Regiment, has been despatched to this district to
work in co-operation with our French Allies. It is hoped that
the presence of the Anglo-French forces will bring home to the
lawless Ouraan and Bedayat tribes who inhabit that portion of
the country the necessity for curbing their propensities for brigandage
and have the effect of eventually bringing them under some sort
of control.
In conclusion, I would beg to point out the magnitude of the task
of feeding and supplying the El Fasher garrison and lines of communication,
some 450 miles from rail-head, throughout the summer months. In
this stretch two waterless belts of 100 miles each had to be crossed.
The work was carried out without a hitch, and reflects the greatest
credit on the officers engaged on the Lines of Communication.
The troops at El Fasher suffered considerably from fever, more
especially the Egyptian Artillery. The most excellent feeling
prevailed between the troops and the inhabitants, and amicable
relations were quickly established.
When all have worked so well, it is a most difficult task to single
out individuals. [List of those meriting mention follows]
I have the honour to be,
Your Excellency's humble obedient servant,.
L. O. F. Stack, Major-General.
Acting Sirdar of the Egyptian Army
and
Acting Governor-General of the Sudan
General Sir Reginald Wingate,
G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.,
His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner for
Egypt, Cairo.
