Khartoum,
8th August, 1916.
SIR,—I have the honour to forward for the information of
the Secretary of State for War my Despatch on the military operations
in Darfur, together with a brief report on the services of the
Egyptian Army and the Sudan Administration since the outbreak
of war in Europe.
Before describing the military operations in the Sudan arid in
Darfur which the Egyptian Army has been required to carry out,
I desire to refer to the cordial relations—mutually advantageous,
I venture to think, to all parties— that have existed between
the late Commander- in-Chief of the British forces in Egypt (Lieutenant-General
Sir John Maxwell), his successor (General Sir Archibald Murray),
Sir Ian Hamilton (whilst in command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary
Force), and myself. On the one hand it has been the privilege
of the Egyptian Army and the members of the Sudan Administration
to render assistance, both in personnel and in material, to supply
the many and urgent demands connected with the military operations
in Egypt and the Dardanelles. On the other hand the promise of
reinforcements, should they be required in the Sudan, from the
British Army in Egypt, relieved me of much anxiety. Fortunately
it has hitherto proved unnecessary to requisition assistance from
Egypt other than by the temporary loan of a section of the Royal
Flying Corps, several Special Service Officers, and some mechanical
transport and other details, the value of which I have most gratefully
acknowledged in connection with the operations in Darfur.
The following patrols, involving military operations on a minor
scale, have been successfully carried out in the Sudan since the
outbreak of the European War. In these operations, the necessity
for which has been generally due to the native unrest consequent
on the war and to anti-Government propaganda, only units of the
Egyptian Army have been employed.
LOKOIA PATROL.
The Lokoia tribes of Jebels Lyria and Luch, in Mongalla Province,
openly defied the Government, and in January, 1915, a patrol,
consisting of a half-company of the 9th Sudanese, one and a half
companies of the Equatorial Battalion, and a detachment of the
Medical Corps, under Major C. C. MacNamara, the Royal Irish Rifles,
was despatched against them. The patrol successfully achieved
its purpose, with but slight casualty to our troops.
JEBEL MlRl PATROL.
Fiki Ali, the powerful Mek (or chief) of Jebel Miri, in the Nuba
Mountains province, assumed a hostile attitude towards the Government,
and his disaffection constituted a menace to the peace of the
whole of the province. In April, 1915, the following force, under
the command of Major H. J. Huddleston, the Dorset Regiment, was
rapidly concentrated at Kadugli: —
1 Squadron of Cavalry.
1 Camel Maxim Section.
3 Companies of Camel Corps.
1 Company 7th Battalion.
1 1/2 Companies 11th Sudanese.
A total of 46 officers and 1,007 rank and file. On April 20th
and the two ensuing days our troops attacked Jebel Tuluk and the
surrounding hills, which were strongly held by Fiki Ali and his
tribesmen. The attack was completely successful, and the enemy
were driven out of their stronghold, a large number of prisoners
being captured. Fiki Ali, with his immediate following, succeeded
in effecting his escape, but after being hunted from place to
place for several months eventually was compelled to surrender.
MONGALLA PATROL.
The inhabitants of Jebels Imatong, Lafite, and Garia refused to
obey Government orders, and a force consisting of 1 Section of
Artillery. 1/2 Company 9th Sudanese, 3 Companies Equatorial Battalion,
under the command of Major D. Percy-Smith, D.S.O., the Middlesex
Regiment, was despatched from Torit in February, 1916, to punish
these recalcitrant tribesmen and to restore order. These operations
lasted till the 13th March, when the rebels sent in peace envoys
and agreed to submit.
The following small patrols were despatched in connection with
tribal disturbances and incipient revolt against Government authority:
—
December, 1914.
To restore order and protect friendly tribesmen in the Duk Fadiat
district of Mongalla province.
To punish the Nuer tribesmen of the Lau district of the Bahr el
Ghazal province, who had made an unprovoked attack on a mission
station.
February, 1915.
To punish raiders in the Zeraf valley of the Upper Nile province
(Guweir Nuer patrol).
March, 1915.
To punish the recalcitrant Sheikh of Abujok (Sobat-Pibor district).
August, 1915.
To reinforce Government authority in the Torit district of Mongalla
province.
December, 1915.
To quell an incipient revolt, engineered by a local witch-doctor,
amongst the Dumjol Dinkas of the Upper Nile province.
To demonstrate Government authority in the Fauwil (Nuer)- district
of the Uppey Nile province.
January, 1916.
To restore order amongst the natives of the Tabi Hills (Nuba Mountains
province).
In addition to the foregoing, those sections of the frontier which
were especially exposed to raids have been constantly patrolled.
Throughout the winter of 1914-1915, and during the following summer,
a complete system of land patrols along the Eastern (Red Sea)
littoral was carried out by Camel Corps and Police, and proved
very efficacious in preventing the establishment of hostile communications
with the Arabian coast. Great credit is due to Major (temporary
Lieutenant-Colonel) C. E. Wilson, Governor and Commandant of Troops
in the Red Sea Province, for his excellent organisation of these
patrols.
Similarly, on the Western frontier, some six hundred miles of
desert frontier was observed by aj chain of Arab posts, which
stretched from west of Haifa, in the north, to the S.W. limits
of Kordofan, and afforded a measure of protection alike from Furs,
Tuareg and Senussist raiders. In May last a small regular mounted
force was also despatched to Dongola, whilst the Dongola and Halfa-Shellal
reaches of the river were patrolled by gunboats, the former manned
by Egyptian Army Artillerymen and the latter by a detachment from
the Royal Navy. These patrols, although generally outside the
sphere of active military operations, required a considerable
organisation, and entail arduous service by the personnel employed.
They have given proof on several occasions of their efficiency.
Military Operations in Darfur.
The Darfur Sultanate formed one of the chain of autonomous kingdoms
extending across the centre of Africa, of which Abyssinia is now
the sole independent survival. In 1874 its territory was invaded
by Zubeir Pasha from the south and by Ismail Pasha Ayub from the
east, and the Sultan—Ibrahim "Garrad," a lineal
descendant of the famous Abd el Rahman el Rashid, Sultan of Darfur
and Kordofan (1785-1799), who corresponded with Napoleon Bonaparte
in Egypt—was deposed, and the whole country annexed to the
Egyptian Sudan. The Egyptian domination in Darfur was subsequently
overthrown by the Mahdist revolt, and the region was partially
administered by a series of Dervish "Emirs" until after
the battle of Omdurman (1898), when Ali Dinar, also a descendant
of Abd el Rahman el Rashid, escaped from the Khalifa and fled
to El Fasher, where he succeeded in establishing his authority.
In 1899 Ali Dinar, with the sanction of the then Sirdar (Lord
Kitchener), assumed the government of the Sultanate, and was subsequently
appointed the Sudan Government agent in Darfur, and required to
pay a light tribute, which was rendered annually from June, 1901,
up to the outbreak of the present war. The knowledge of the local
conditions in Darfur possessed by the Inspector-General (Baron
Sir R. von Slatin), who for many years was the chief intermediary
between the Government and the Sultan, greatly facilitated the
establishment of good relations; and Ali Dinar's attitude and
disposition were generally satisfactory until questions arose
concerning the western boundary of Darfur and the overlordship
of certain frontier districts. There are good grounds for the
belief that the delay in arriving at a settlement-of these questions
reacted very unfavourably upon the Sultan's attitude and caused
him to lend a willing ear to enemy propagandists and anti-Government
intrigues, the effect of which it was difficult to counteract
owing to the Sultan's refusal to allow a European to visit his
capital or to enter Darfur.
Modern Darfur has a population of probably under 1,000,000. The
internal politics of the Sultanate were complex and variable,
but can be briefly described as follows:—The "slave
" army of the Sultan, some 10,000 in number, and armed for
the most part with firearms, was the supporter of the status quo,
and formed the real basis of the Sultan's authority. Ali Dinar's
domestic policy had proved detrimental to the interests of the
Arabs, who were, generally speaking, passively disloyal to him,
or, as in the case of the Rizeigat tribesmen of S.W. Darfur, openly
hostile to his domination. The sedentary inhabitants of Central
Da-rfur, including the natives of the district eventually traversed
by the expeditionary force, chiefly desired to be left undisturbed,
but were disposed to welcome the advent of a more lenient and
enlightened administration. At the same time any diminution of
Government prestige redounded to the credit of the Sultan, and
the smallest victory over our troops would have been sufficient
to bring large numbers of natives—instigated by fanaticism
and the prospect of loot— to his standards.
On receipt of the news of war between Great Britain and Turkey,
Ali Dinar assumed publicly, for the first time, a defiant attitude,
which was followed, in April 1915, by a formal renunciation of
his allegiance to the Sudan Government and a declaration of his
adhesion to the cause of our enemies, with whom he was already
in close communication via the Senussi. In December 1915 the situation
became so threatening that a small force of Camel Corps was hastily
despatched to Nahud to protect this important trade centre and
as a warning to the Sultan against the execution of his threats
of an offensive against the loyal Rizeigat tribe. This move of
troops on our side of the frontier was answered by the prompt
reinforcement of the Sultan's detachments at Jebel el Hilla, and
it became evident that preparations by the Sultan for an invasion
of Sudan territory were being pushed forward and that active hostilities
could no longer be avoided. I accordingly ordered the concentration
at Nahud of a force of all arms under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel
P. V. Kelly, 3rd Hussars (attached Egyptian Army), composed of
the following units: —
2 companies Mounted Infantry.
2 batteries (six 12 pounder Mountain Guns and two maxims) Artillery.
1 Maxim battery and (Mule) section.
5 companies Camel Corps.
6 companies Sudanese Infantry (Xlllth and XlVth battalions).
2 companies Arab Infantry (Arab Battalion).
3 companies Egyptian Infantry (IVth Battalion), with the necessary
medical and departmental units and details.
A total of about 2,000 of all ranks.
Letters from the Sultan and other information from Darfur, received
whilst this concentration was being carried out, brought further
confirmation of the enemy's designs, and, after personally visiting
Nahud early in March 1916, I instructed Colonel Kelly to cross
the frontier and to occupy the well-centres at Jebel el Hella
and Um Shanga. These two places commanded the first permanent
water supplies to the west of Nahud and on the road to El Fasher,
and their occupation by our troops not only afforded a means of
securing our natives living between Nahud and the border from
molestation, but was also an essential preliminary to any further
operations in Darfur territory.
On the 16th March the independent
mounted troops (Mounted Infantry scouts, " A " battery,
maxim battery, five companies Camel Corps) left Nahud, and, advancing
via Wad Banda, crossed the Darfur boundary and occupied Um Shanga,
where an enemy observation
post was dispersed on the morning of the 20th idem. It had been
intended to push on to Jebel el Hella the same afternoon, but
this proved impossible owing to the scarcity of water and inadequate
watering facilities at Um Shanga. Colonel Kelly was accordingly
faced with the alternative of returning at once to Nahud or of
carrying out the further advance with such portion of his force
as it was possible to water during the 21st, on the evening of
which day the main body from Nahud was due to arrive, with only
two days' water supply in hand at Wad Banda. In view of the grave
objections involved by the adoption of the former alternative,
Colonel Kelly decided to accept the risks attendant on an advance
with a reduced force to Jebel el Hella, and sent instructions
to the main body to remain at Wad Banda. Accordingly a flying
column, composed of Mounted Infantry scouts, 2 guns, 8 maxims,
and 240 Camel Corps, left Um Shanga at dawn on the 22nd. Its progress
was but slightly opposed by enemy scouts until within four miles
of Jebel el Hella, when an enveloping movement by some 800 Fur
horsemen was prevented by our fire. Some two miles further on
a considerable enemy concentration was located by the guns and
maxims in a wooded valley to the left of our square, whence the
enemy were subsequently seen to debouch and scatter in all directions.
The column reached the wells at Jebel el Hella at 2.15 p.m. without
further opposition, and a reconnoitring party was despatched thence
to Lugud Wells, two miles distant. These latter wells were occupied
in strength on the 26th, by which time the rest of the Field Force
had arrived from Nahud, and was distributed according to the capacities
of the various local water supplies at Um Shanga and Jebel el
Hella. In the course of these operations the enemy are reported
to have lost twenty killed and wounded: our casualties were insignificant.
The occupation of Jebel el Hella in a great measure restored our
prestige in the Western Sudan and diminished the immediate menace
of raids upon our tribesmen. It was, however, clear that the dispersal
of Ali Dinar's main army would prove the sole effective guarantee
to the security of the Western Sudan, and that we should therefore
be in a position to undertake further and more extensive military
operations at the first favourable opportunity.
The main Fur army, estimated at between 4,000 and 6,000 riflemen,
well supplied with ammunition, and an unknown number of auxiliaries
armed with spears, remained at El Fasher, whither the Sultan recalled
most of his provincial garrisons, other than those with whom our
troops had been engaged, and who had been withdrawn to Burush
and Um Kedada, where they were slightly reinforced. It was also
probable that the Sultan would not risk a serious engagement with
our troops at a distance from his capital, and intended to keep
his army intact and concentrated at El Fasher until the advent
of the rains, when the state of the country would be favourable
to guerilla warfare and to raids upon our extended line of communications.
The immediate problem with which Colonel Kelly had to deal was
concerned with the provision of the requisite water and other
supplies for the troops and convoys operating in the country,
at this time of the year almost waterless and denuded of food
supplies, which extends for nearly 300 miles to the west of railhead
at El Obeid. On the establishment of regular communications and
the rapid convoy of supplies over this inhospitable tract depended
the safety of the force actually in Darfur and the course of all
future military operations. I therefore conceived the plan of
supplementing the camel transport, on which the troops in the
field would have to rely throughout, by a mechanical transport
service from rail-head to Nahud; and ordered a number of motor
vehicles to be ready against the time that a make-shift motor
road could be prepared. At the same time preliminary surveys and
preparations were made with a view to the construction of a motor-road,
capable of bearing light mechanical transport, from Rahad (on
the railway) via Taweisha to El Fasher, a distance of about 460
miles, which will eventually bring the latter town to within four
days' journey of the railway.
At the beginning of April minor enemy
concentrations were reported at Burush, Um Eisheishat and Um Kedada,
whilst a small force which had been previously posted at Taweisha,
on our left flank, was withdrawn to Tulu. A reconnaissance in
force of the country as far west as Abiad was therefore undertaken
with a view (1) to supplement the water supply available for our
troops and the increasing number of transport animals—a
pressing necessity; (2) to disperse the enemy forces at Burush
and Um Kedada; and (3) by denying to the enemy the important wells
at Abiad, to secure in its entirety the main, and until the advent
of the rains, the only practicable line of communication between
Nahud and El Fasher.
On 3rd April a force composed of
2 companies Mounted Infantry, 4 guns, 6 maxims, and the Xlllth
Sudanese left Jebel el Hella and occupied Burush, whence a Fur
Cavalry patrol was driven out, at midday. Our advance on Um Kedada
on the day following was opposed by some 700 of the enemy, a section
of whom were well entrenched in front of the wells, but were driven
off by our guns. On the 8th April the reconnaissance was continued
to Abiad, which was reached on the morning of the 9th idem and
had been evacuated by the enemy on the previous evening. A detachment
of four companies of Sudanese Infantry with 4 guns was left at
this place, where they successfully beat off enemy attacks on
the 14th and 19th April. By the end of the month the whole Line
of Communications was adequately garrisoned, with strong detachments
at Abiad, Um Kedada, Burush, Lugud, Jebel el Hella and Um Shanga,
and preparations for a further and final phase of the operations
could be proceeded with without fear of serious disturbance by
enemy attacks.
During the month a complete system of intelligence and observation
posts was also organised along the frontier from Gabr el Dar (Bar
Homr) and Hafir Ogr, in S.W. Kordofan, to Shebb, W.N.W. of Haifa.
Two hundred and sixty native " friendlies," armed with
Remington rifles, were employed on this duty in Kordofan alone,
under the direction of El Miralai (Colonel) Beshir Bey Kembal,
whilst an additional 200 men of the Kababish tribe, under their
Nazir (or head sheikh) AH el Tom, were detailed to occupy Jebel
Meidob, in N.E. Darfur, as a special observation post to watch
the Arbain road between Darfur and the northern (Senussist) oases.
My original scheme of operations, which was influenced by considerations
other than those of the local military situation, had envisaged
-the necessity to consolidate our hold on the districts actually
occupied by our troops and to defer the further and inevitable
advance and
occupation of El Fasher until later on in the year. But the state
of the local water supplies, coupled with the information we had
gained of the enemy's dispositions, necessitated a careful reconsideration
of the matter and an immediate decision. The pros and cons to
the question were summarised in my telegraphic despatch of the
24th April, 1916, wherein I stated
that the sole advantage to be gained by delay consisted in the
greater certainty of success that might be afforded by the employment
of a considerably larger force than was permitted by the existing
(dry weather) conditions of water supply and transport. The question,
briefly, was whether under these existing
.conditions, which enabled us to pin the enemy down to his chosen
place of concentration, we could bring up a sufficient force of
all arms (and supply it from rail-head 400 miles distant) to defeat
the Sultan's army and to occupy his capital, without risk of a
reverse or an
inconclusive battle, which might entail a rapid and disastrous
retreat. After full consideration, and with the entire concurrence
of Colonel Kelly, I decided that an advance on El Fasher during
the full moon in May offered a reasonable prospect of the rapid
attainment of our aims, and fully justified the risks inseparable
from the enterprise. My opinion was further strengthened by the
knowledge, which was communicated to me shortly afterwards, that
the French military authorities in Wadai would be prepared to
co-operate to the full extent of the limited means immediately
at their disposal, an undertaking which was very amply discharged
by the French occupation of Dar Sula, which was effected soon
after the entry of our troops into El Fasher.
The early days of May were spent
in reconstituting the line of communications, the garrisons on
which were for the most part drafted to the front and partially
replaced by reinforcements from Khartoum; in assembling the supplies
and transport services for the advance from Abiaol, and in concentrating
the striking force at the latter place.
On May 5th the garrison at Abiad
beat off an attack by an enemy force estimated at 500; on the
9th the telegraph line was raided three miles to the east of the
post, but was repaired immediately. On the 12th an aeroplane reconnaissance
dropped a number of proclamations over the town of El Fasher,
whence the Sultan's army apparently showed no inclination to move.
By the evening of the 14th May all preparations were completed,
and the following force was ready at Abiad for the advance upon
the capital: — 60 Mounted Infantry Scouts, 8 Guns, 14 Maxims
(Artillery and British sections), 4 Companies Camel Corps with
two maxims, 8 Companies Infantry (13th and 14th Sudanese, and
Arab battalion), with Field Hospital and details.
Colonel Kelly decided, owing to watering difficulties, that this
force should leave Abiad in two parties—a slow-moving column
"A" and a mobile column "B"—which should
reunite 40 miles west of Abiad and 28 miles short of Meleit. The
latter place, where an ample water supply was known to exist,
was held by a small enemy garrison, and was the first objective,
whence the final attack on El Fasher would be made. At 4.15 a.m.
on the 15th a small party of our Mounted Infantry Scouts, under
Mulazim Awal (Lieutenant) Suleiman Effendi Omar, skilfully cut
off a mounted enemy observation post, cleverly sited on a ridge
two miles distant from the camp, and captured all but two individuals,
who escaped on foot. It was subsequently ascertained that by this
smart piece of work, which was typical of the excellent service
rendered by these Mounted Infantry Scouts throughout the operations,
information of the movement of our troops did not reach El Fasher
before the latter were within striking distance of Meleit. Columns
"A" and " B " left Abiad on the mornings of
the 15th
and 16th respectively, and after extremely hot and trying marches,
reached the point of concentration on the 17th. That morning an
aeroplane reconnaissance over Meleit dropped bombs on the village,
whence some shots had been fired at the machine by a force of
about 500 of the enemy. On the morning of the 18th the combined
force reached Meleit, which the enemy had evacuated hastily on
the previous evening, leaving a quantity of stock, which fell
into our hands. An aeroplane reconnaissance on the following day
reported the country clear of the enemy for 15 miles, but, owing
to the exhaustion of the troops, the further advance was postponed
until the 21st, when our scouts kept touch with small parties
of the enemy throughout the day.
On May 22nd Camp was struck at 5.30
a.m. and large parties of enemy horsemen and camelry were encountered
from the outset. The country traversed consisted in a succession
of low, broken sandhills, with many depressions and much concealed
ground; scattered bush made it difficult to see for more than
a few hundred yards in any direction, and at times one portion
of the square would be on high ground and the other portion entirely
lost to view. Scouting was both difficult and dangerous, and a
company of Camel Corps and 4 (British) Maxims were therefore pushed
to the front to support the Mounted Infantry if necessary. At
10.30 a.m. the enemy were observed to be occupying a strong position
about 2,000 yards away, which was shelled by our batteries and
the occupants driven from their advanced trenches. Enemy horsemen
were also engaged on our left, and " A " and No. 2 batteries
had an opportunity of shelling them at about 1,600 yards with
good effect. The square now advanced about 800 yards to a better
position, where they entrenched, whilst the Mounted Infantry,
" A " battery, No. 2 battery, British R.G.A. Maxims
and one company of Camel Corps were sent to occupy an elevated
position, south-west of the square, on our right front. At the
same time enemy cavalry continued to threaten our left flank,
to meet which eventually a company of Camel Corps, with one Maxim
section, were ordered to some high ground on the left. Some 500
yards in front of the square was situated the village of Beringia,
about 600 yards south of which, and extending for about 1,000
yards east and west, was the main entrenched position occupied
by the enemy. Their left formed a semi-circle, only a portion
of which could be seen and reconnoitred by our scouts, and their
right was thrown back with the flank resting on a Khor (valley
or depression). Colonel Kelly decided to attack forthwith and
to clear up the situation. Whilst, however, he was making the
necessary dispositions, the company of Camel Corps, who had been
acting as escort to the Artillery and Maxims on the right front
of the square, entered Beringia, and a few individuals boldly
pushed right through the village to the southern crest, where
they immediately came under a very heavy fire and commenced to
withdraw. Seeing this, a number of the enemy emerged from their
entrenched position in close pursuit, thus exposing themselves
to the flanking fire of No. 2 battery from the right of the square,
and forming a good target for '' A " battery, from the left
of the square. The enemy now debouched with great rapidity from
the whole of their position and advanced in great strength.
At this time there were actually in the firing line on the south
face of the square (from right to left) No. 2 battery; 3 companies
Infantry; "A" battery; 1 company Infantry, with 1 section
British Maxims: then, after a gap of 150 yards, another company
of Infantry, with the remaining section British Maxims, these
latter units facing east. Colonel Kelly, fearing the enemy might
envelop the flanks of the square, saw no immediate necessity for
reinforcing the southern face until matters developed further;
but, shortly afterwards, 2 sections of No. 6 Maxim battery were
moved to the right of No. 2 battery, and 1 company of the Arab
Battalion was pushed forward to a better position slightly in
advance of the right of the southern face. The assault was delivered
with great desperation— many of the attackers falling within
ten yards of our firing line—but after the square had been
in action some 40 minutes the enemy's ranks were seen to waver,
and at this moment Colonel Kelly ordered the "advance "
to be sounded. Our counter-attack was executed in a most orderly
manner, but with great dash, our Infantry being well supported
by the Artillery, whilst the Maxims advanced with the line. In
a short while the enemy were broken and fled in disorder, leaving
our troops in undisputed possession of the field.
A careful estimate of the Fur casualties which was made subsequently,
gave the total losses at over 1,000; 231 dead and 96 seriously
wounded were counted within 500 yards of our position immediately
after the battle. From parade states discovered at El Fasher it
appeared that the enemy's force on this occasion consisted of
3,600 riflemen, besides a number of spearmen and auxiliaries.
Colonel Kelly pays a warm tribute to the admirable manner in which
the various units engaged on this occasion were handled by their
commanders, and to the steadiness and discipline of the troops,
who throughout were most skilfully supported by the guns. To these
factors he ascribes the credit for this signal victory won over
a numerically very superior force, in what was distinctly a "soldiers"
battle.
Our casualties were: —
Officers.
Captain H. C. Maydon, 12th Lancers, Mounted Infantry, severely
wounded.
El Mulazim Awal (Lieutenant) Mohammed Effendi Yusri, Artillery,
slightly wounded.
El Mulazim Tani (2nd Lieutenant) Ahmed Effendi Mohammed Zahran,
14th Sudanese, slightly wounded.
Rank and File.
Killed 2
Died of wounds 3
Wounded 18.
The force resumed the march to El Fasher at 4.0 p.m. the same
evening, and went into bivouac, which was strongly entrenched
for the night, a few miles outside the capital. Here, at 3.0 a.m.
next morning (23rd May), they were
attacked by what, in the light of our star shell and magnesium
flares, appeared to be a force of about 500 horsemen and 300 infantry.
This attack was driven off with the loss to the force of one artilleryman
wounded. At 6.0 a.m., when the troops were about to advance, some
hundreds of the enemy to our left flank were dispersed by artillery
and maxim fire and bombed by aeroplane. At 10.0 am. Colonel Kelly,
with the mounted troops, entered El Fasher, which was found to
be almost deserted except by women. Sultan Ali Dinar, on receipt
of the news of the crushing defeat at Beringia, made a final effort
to rally the remainder of his army to the attack in the early
morning of the 23rd, and subsequently fled with some 2,000 men,
who were bombed as they emerged from the south end of the town
by Lieutenant J. C. Slessor, Royal Flying Corps, in the course
of a gallant and successful flight. The Sultan is now in the neighbourhood
of Jebel Marra with a greatly reduced following, and is unlikely
for the moment to give further trouble.
The booty taken at El Fasher included four guns, 55,000 rounds
S.A.A., and the whole of the local plant for the manufacture of
gunpowder, and upwards of 4,000 rifles were captured or handed
in within a few weeks of our occupation of the town.
On the 9th June I was able to report
that the greater portion of the local population had already returned,
and that amongst the numerous individuals who had surrendered
since the battle were included nearly all the Sultan's lieutenants
and Darfur notables who were not previously accounted for.
I am well aware that these operations are insignificant in importance
as compared with the tremendous conflicts now being waged in Europe
and Asia; but I have described them at some length inasmuch as
they constitute, in themselves, a military feat of some distinction.
It will be realised that a most careful and comprehensive organisation
was required to convey some 3,000 men, with stores, guns, aeroplanes
and other bulky equipment of a modern expeditionary force, from
the base at Khartoum (500 miles by rail from the nearest seaport)
to rail-head 428 miles distant, and thence across a desolate tract
of roadless country, almost barren of food supplies and served
by half a dozen local water centres, for nearly 400 miles, and
there to occupy a stronghold defended by a numerically superior
and fanatical enemy, armed with modern rifles and of no mean fighting
spirit. That this was accomplished without a hitch or set-back
of any kind is due to the excellence of the preliminary staff
arrangements, to the fine qualities of leadership possessed by
Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly and his subordinate commanders, and to
the splendid fighting spirit and endurance shown by all ranks
of the expeditionary force under the very arduous conditions inseparable
from a campaign during the summer months in the Sudan.
Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly's sound judgment and correct appreciation
of the military situation have been frequently shown in his admirable
conduct of the expedition. He pays a tribute, which I gladly endorse,
to the loyal and unfailing support he has received from the commanding
and subordinate officers of the units of his force. In particular
he acknowledges the great assistance afforded to him at all times
by Major C. W. Spinks, Royal Artillery, Commanding the Artillery,
by Major C. H. Little, his Chief Staff Officer (who also was responsible
for much of the early preparation for the expedition), and by
Major H. J. Huddleston, O.C. Camel Corps, and Major W. H. M.
Cowan, Cameron Highlanders, Commanding Arab Battalion, and Major
E. A. T. Bayly, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, Commanding 13th Battalion,
Sudanese Infantry. Of the work of (temporary) Captain H. A. MacMichael,
the Political and Intelligence Officer, Colonel Kelly speaks in
the highest terms. It is satisfactory to know that Captain MacMichael's
remarkable knowledge of Darfur and its natives, and his capacity
for incessant work, will be fully utilised in connection with
the future administration of the 150,000 square miles of new territory
which this successful expedition has regained to the Sudan.
I have included the remainder of Colonel Kelly's mentions of individual
officers and men who have performed specially meritorious services
in the list submitted at the end of my despatch.
I desire also to bring to notice the valuable contribution to
the success of these operations which has been rendered by certain
corps and units whose work could not conveniently be described
in the foregoing summary.
Royal Flying Corps.
The flight of the Royal Flying Corps, which was generously placed
at my disposal for the Darfur operations by the Commander-in-Chief
in Egypt, more than justified the high expectations I had formed
of its utility and of the great moral effect of its first appearance
in Darfur. The transport of machines, hangars, repair shops and
other necessary equipment from Suez to Eahad (on the Kordofan
railway), and thence over; the rough motor track to Nahud, which
had been cleared by the Public Works Department, proved a most
difficult and laborious undertaking. The petrol supply was affected
by a temperature which sometimes reached 120° F. in the shade,
lorries were marooned for whole days in sand up to the axles,
and success was only attained by the excellent organisation and
the untiring efforts of Major V. W. R. C. Groves and the personnel
of the flight. Amongst the most noteworthy flights may be mentioned
that by Lieutenant F. Bellamy, on the 12th May, from Jebel el
Hella to El Fasher and back, landing at Abiad on the out and return
journeys; that by Captain E. J. Bannatyne, on the 17th May, to
find Bir Meleit, a flight of over eight hours—a very remarkable
performance under local flying conditions— during which
his propeller was hit by a bullet when flying at a low altitude;
and Lieutenant J. C. Slessor's flight over El Fasher on the morning
of the 23rd May, which also brought the first news of the victory
at Beringia, and in the course of which he was slightly wounded.
The conduct and efficiency of this flight throughout its period
of service in the Sudan fully upheld the splendid reputation of
the Royal Flying Corps.
Transport and other Services.
Two outstanding difficulties, largely interdependent one on the
other, were connected with the transport service and water supply.
The northern (Dudia) road between El Obeid nd Nahud proved impracticable
owing to the absence of water along it. Between Nahud and Um Shanga,
a distance of over 100 miles, the only reliable water supply was
that stored in the Tebeldi trees. These are hollow trees of great
girth which, from time immemorial, have served the natives of
the region as reservoirs for the storage of water which is collected
during the rains against the needs of the dry season. The trees
supplied sufficient water for a small force, but required constant
refilling, which involved the employment of special camel-convoys
and considerable manual labour. Between Um Shanga and El Fasher
wells are more frequent, but during the advance they were found
to be usually over 200 feet in depth, very narrow, and requiring
constant repair. At all -posts the men were on continuous fatigue
duty drawing water. At Um Kedada and at Abiad, before the final
advance on El Fasher, work on the wells never ceased by day and
night for four days, during which time 1,800 transport and riding
camels were watered and over 12,000 gallons drawn for carriage
with the force. This work, was carried out at all times with the
greatest good will, and the men of the Camel Corps, who are well
acquainted with the local conditions, set a particularly fine
example, and were invaluable in this respect.
The 3-ton lorries with the detachment of Army Service Corps Mechanical
Transport, which were lent from Egypt, did excellent work under
Lieutenant S. W. Carty, Army Service Corps, between El Obeid and
Nahud; and the mechanical transport services organised by the
Director of Public Works were also of great assistance on several
occasions; whilst the Ford Ambulances, supplied from England by
the Director-General, Army Medical Service, worked with great
efficiency and despatch between Nahud and El Obeid.
The great bulk of the transport service and all transport with
the troops in Darfur, however, was carried out by camel; and very
great credit is due to Major S. E. H. Giles, Army Service Corps,
and his subordinates, as well as to Major J. J. B. Tapley, D.S.O.,
and Captain R. S. Audas, Army Veterinary Corps, whose powers'
of organisation and improvisation were put to a high test. I am
also greatly indebted to the Managing Director for the loan of
several Inspectors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate for work
in connection with the transport services. In normal times it
is possible to hire almost any number of camels, with their drivers,
for service in the Sudan, but at the time of mobilisation the
country had been so depleted of transport animals by the requirements
of the British forces in Egypt that it was necessary to organise
and equip at once 10 Army transport companies, each of about 260
camels, with the necessary personnel. To add to Major Giles' difficulties
there was a shortage of pack saddles, which had also been supplied
in relatively large numbers to the forces in Egypt. Nevertheless
one transport company was ready to accompany the independent mounted
troops from Nahud on March 15th, and two more companies accompanied
the main body four days later. Camels had actually to be employed
putting water into Wad Banda for the use of the personnel of the
transport working between Nahud and Jebel el Hella, to which post
the transport had to work direct from Nahud owing to lack of water
at Um Shanga; and even after the arrival of the force at Jebel
el Hella all the transport companies were kept working at high
pressure bringing up stores, material for the telegraph extension
and for the construction of hangars for aeropanes. The transport
was re-allotted for the final advance on El Fasher to enable each
unit to leave Abiad with 15 days' rations, 5 days' forage, and
4 days' water for personnel and horses, thus bringing the number
of camels actually with the force to a total of 1,800.
Line of Communications.
The work executed on the line of communications was very considerable,
and the thanks of all those engaged in the military operations
are due to the very efficient assistance rendered by Captain R.
V. Savile, Governor of Kordofan province, Messrs. E. N. Corbyn,
F. Atterbury, R. A. Bence-Pembroke, J. A. Gillan, and other members
of the province staff. Their contribution, especially in connection
with the provision of transport camels; was a very valuable one.
Much excellent work was also carried out in the improvement of
existing tracks for mechanical transport work by personnel of
the Public Works Department under temporary Captain H. Claxton,
who is now in charge of the larger scheme devised by Captain M.
R. Kennedy, C.M.G., D.S.O., for the construction of a motor-road
from the railway to El Fasher. Good work was also done by the
Military Works Department, and particularly in connection with
the building, at very short notice, of aeroplane sheds at Jebel
el Hella.
Telegraphs.
Much credit is due to Captain R. Chenevix Trench, Royal Engineers,
and Mr. S. Dennett for the prompt extension of the telegraph line
westwards from Nahud. In anticipation of the advance, Mr. Dennett
pushed the head of the ground wire to Wad Banda on March 14th,
and it reached Jebel el Hella on the 24th idem, 48 hours after
the arrival of the independent mounted troops. The further extension
of the wire to Abiad was completed on the 22nd April, and was
of the greatest service to the force.
Railways.
The arrangements made by Captain E. O. A. Newcombe, Traffic Manager,
Sudan Government Railways, for transporting the expeditionary
force to railhead—involving journeys varying from 430 to
600 miles—worked without a hitch, at a time when the calls
on the railway for other transport, particularly the camels and
other requirements for the British forces in Egypt, were exceptionally
heavy, and the General Manager has brought to my notice the names
of several subordinate officials who performed excellent work
in this connection. The railways administration is also to be
congratulated on the remarkable despatch with which the aeroplane
flight was conveyed from Port Sudan to Rahad (877 mifes), and
the provision of facilities at the latter place whereby aeroplanes
which were disembarked at Port Sudan on the 24th April were unloaded
at Rahad on the 27th idem and erected immediately.
The constant solicitude and keen interest displayed by His Highness
the Sultan in all that pertains to the welfare of the Egyptian
Army has always been of the utmost value, and I desire to repeat
here my respectful appreciation of the whole-hearted efforts of
His Highness to further the well-being of the troops and to give
his gracious encouragement to all those taking part in our military
operations.
Since the declaration of war I had occasion from time to time
to seek the advice of the former Sirdar and Governor-General of
the Sudan, the late Field-Marshal Earl Kitchener of Khartoum,
and in most gratefully acknowledging the powerful aid he invariably
extended to his successor in this country desire, on behalf of
all British officers and officials serving in the Sudan, the officers
and men of the Egyptian Army and the inhabitants of the Sudan,
to express our heartfelt sorrow and regret at the loss to our
King and Country oT the services of this great Officer of State,
whose keen sympathy for all that concerned the welfare of the
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and its scattered garrisons continued unabated
to the end.
In conclusion I desire to pay a warm tribute to the valuable work
of the officers of the Egyptian Army and the officers and officials
of the Sudan Government during the past strenuous and eventful
two years. All in their various fields of activities, military
and administrative, have contributed to the successful results
achieved, and deserve the greatest credit for work well and conscientiously
performed. The greater burden has inevitably fallen upon the British
personnel, and of the patriotic and unselfish manner in which
these have discharged their duties in this country, under trying
climatic conditions and at a time when all those of military age,
and particularly seconded officers and non-commissioned officers
on the active list of the British Army, were eager to play their
part in other and more important theatres of war, I can speak
in the highest terms of praise and gratitude. They have indeed
deserved well of the Empire.
During the whole period under review I have received most loyal
support and efficient assistance from Colonel W. H. Drake, C.M.G.
(Adjutant-General and Chief Staff Officer), and from Lieutenant-Colonel
L. O. F. Stack, C.M.G. (Civil Secretary). These two senior officers,
with the co-operation of Colonel The Honourable M. G. Talbot,
Lieutenant-Colonel C. E. Palmer (Commandant of Artillery and Director
of Ordnance), Captain M. R. Kennedy, C.M.G., D.S.O. (Director
of Public Works), and temporary Captain C. A. Willis (Assistant.Director
of Intelligence), with Captain The Honourable B. A. Forbes (Deputy
Assistant Adjutant-General) as Secretary, constitute a Permanent
Committee of Defence which has proved of much value, and I am
glad to place on record my warm appreciation of the excellent
services continuously rendered by them and by the respective Military
and Civil Headquarter Staffs. To E. Bonham Carter, Esq., C.M.G.,
Legal Secretary, I am indebted for much valuable advice on legal
and other matters.
I have received most loyal and unfailing support from all members
of my Personal Staff. Major G. S. Symes, D.S.O. (Private Secretary),
has made a special study of the all-important Arab questions,
in which the Moslems of the Sudan and the neighbouring countries
are so closely concerned; his general capacity and powers of sustained
effort have been of the greatest assistance to me. Major R. Rees-Mogg
(Military Secretary) and Major F. W. L. Edwards (Deputy Assistant
Adjutant-General and Aide-de-Camp) have worked indefatigably and
in the best interests of the combined administrations.
I should be failing in my duty were I to omit a reference to the
loyal, and whole-hearted assistance rendered to the cause of civilisation
and good government by many of the native chiefs and notables,
whose influence upon their fellow-countrymen his been most salutary
and whose experience and valuable advice have been proffered unhesitatingly
to the Administration. Their contribution affords perhaps the
most striking testimony to the general recognition by; the native
population of the benefits conferred qn their country by British
rule, of which they have now some seventeen years experience.
Finally, I have the honour to append a list of names of officers,
officials and others whose work in connection with military operations
and
the situation in the Sudan created by the war is deserving of
special notice and commendation.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your Obedient Servant,
REGINALD WINGATE, General,
Sirdar and Governor-General of the Sudan.
[List follows]
