From Indian Expeditionary Force D
To the Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters, India.

Sir,—
I have the honour to forward a report on the operations of the Forces under my command for the period from the middle of April, 1915, up to the end of September, 1915.

1. The floods of last season, which are said to have been the highest for 30 years, formed an inland sea of water and reeds varying from two to six feet deep, which extended for 40 miles north of Qurnah, down to Basrah, and stretching from Nasiriyah in the west to Hawizeh (50 miles north-east of Qurnah) in the east. Consequently, until the subsidence of the floods at the end of July, operations in this area were of an amphibious nature.

2. During the month of April a Brigade at Ahwaz, first under Major-General Davison, and subsequently under Brigadier-General Lean, had been containing a hostile force consisting of .some eight battalions of Turks with eight guns and about 10,000 Arab auxiliaries, which had advanced from Amarah via Bisaitin and Khafajiyah (on the Kharkeh Eiver) into Persian Arabistan. At this time another British Detachment was at Qurnah, where it had been opposed since January by a Turkish force of some six battalions with 10 guns and the usual following of Arab tribesmen, which had descended the Tigris from Amarah. By the defeat of the Turks at Barjisiyah (20 miles south-west of Basrah) on 14th April the hostile forces in the vicinity of Basrah had been dispersed and driven to Nasiriyah, enabling me to take active measures against the enemy detachments on the Karun and on the Tigris. I decided to deal first with the former and placed Major-General Gorringe in command of the operation.

3. Directly the Turks had been defeated at Barjisiyah the concentration of the 12th Division up the Karun was commenced. The Turkish force near Ahwaz retreated across the Kharkeh River on hearing of the defeat of their army at Barjisiyah. General Gorringe followed in pursuit. By the 7th May the 12th Division and the Cavalry Brigade had reached Illah on the Kharkeh. This river was 250 yards wide with a rapid and deep stream, which presented a formidable obstacle to the passage of troops.

4. General Gorringe overcame the difficulties of passage and skilfully crossed his troops and guns to the other bank. The Turks continued their retreat towards Amarah on discovering that our column had crossed the river. General Gorringe now found himself under the necessity of dealing with a recalcitrant and pugnacious branch of the Beni Taruf Arabs, who had identified themselves very strongly with the Turkish cause. He advanced down the Kharkeh River operating on both banks. Major-General Melliss commanded the column on the right bank and Brigadier-General Lean that on the left bank. The occasion of the successful attack on the Arab stronghold, Kharajiyah, in extremely hot weather, when the temperature in tents was 120 degrees, was a display of dogged gallantry and devotion on the part of the troops engaged. Among other interpid deeds was the exploit of Subadar Major Ajab Khan and 20 men of the 76th Punjabis, who swam the river under heavy fire, and brought back a boat in which troops were ferried across until sufficient were collected to assault a stout mud fort which was strongly held.

5. After the defeat and dispersion of the hostile tribesmen who had molested his advance, General Gorringe, in accordance with my instructions, made a series of demonstrations with a portion of his force from Bisaitin against the Turkish force which lay between him and Amarah. This action was in co-operation with the impending advance of our detachment from Qurnah (commanded by Major- General Townshend) on Amarah. It had the desired result of preventing reinforcements from joining the Turkish forces on the Tigris in time to oppose General Townshend's advance. It was largely due to these demonstrations that the enemy's retreat up the Tigris, after their defeat on 31st May, was so precipitate, and that General Townshend was enabled to enter Amarah practically unopposed. The Turkish force opposing General Gorringe was so delayed in its march to Amarah that when it eventually reached there it was surprised by General Townshend, who was already in occupation of the town. A part of the advance guard was captured and the remainder had to seek safety in dispersion with the loss of two guns.

6. General Gorringe's operations extended over a period of seven weeks. As a result, Persdan Arabistan had been cleared of the enemy, and the Arab tribes forced to submit, thus enabling the pipe line to be repaired and normal conditions to be resumed at the Oil Fields, and most effective assistance had been given to General Townshend's advance from Qurnah.

7. I consider that General Gorringe showed marked ability and determination in conducting these operations. The successful result is due to his able leadership and to the zeal and energy displayed by all ranks under his command. The troops were compelled to undergo severe exertions, and overcame many obstacles during very hot and trying weather with undiminished resolution and zeal that was admirable.

8. While the 12th Division was advancing by the Karun and Kharkeh Rivers, preparations were in progress for an advance up the Tigris by the 6th Division under command of Major-General Townshend. Owing to the limited amount of river transport available at that time the movement and collection of troops was a slow and difficult process, and the flooded country around Qurnah presented many problems which required careful attention before operations could be commenced.

9. "Bellums"—long, narrow boats of the country—were collected and armoured with iron plates, to be used for carrying infantry to the assault of the enemy's positions; troops were trained in punting and boat work; various types of guns mounted on rafts, barges, tugs and paddlers; floating hospitals had to be improvised, and many other details of construction and equipment had to be thought out and provided for. By the end of May preparations for the advance were complete.

10. The Turkish force was entrenched north of Qurnah on islands formed where high ground stood out from the inundation which covered all lower lying country. These fortified localities were in two groups, the most southerly group forming an advanced position some two miles from the British lines; the main position being some three miles further to the north. The flooded state of the country rendered it a position of some strength, necessitating a carefully organised attack in successive phases by combined naval and military operations. General Townshend's plan was to capture the advanced position by a frontal attack combined with a turning attack against the enemy's left flank, supported by the naval flotilla and the artillery afloat, and that on land within the Qurnah entrenchments.

11. In the early morning of 31st May, after a heavy preparatory bombardment, the infantry advanced to the attack in the flotilla of improvised war "bellums," supported by admirably directed gunfire. The 17th Infantry Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Climo, 24th Punjabis, made the frontal attack. The 22nd Punjabis and the Sirmur Sappers and Miners, under Lieutenant-Colonel Blois Johnson, 22nd Punjabis, captured One Tree Hill, on the enemy's left flank, and enfiladed Norfolk Hill, the first objective of the 17th Infantry Brigade, which was carried at the point of the bayonet by the 1st Battalion, Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, after poling their boats for over a mile through thick reeds and landing waist deep in water.

12. The bold action of the mine-sweepers, which preceded the naval sloops and armed tugs, enabled the latter to keep pace with the troops, and their fire, combined with that of the Royal Artillery ashore and afloat, ensured the capture of the whole of the enemy's advanced position by noon. It was entirely due to careful preparation and organisation of artillery fire of all kinds that our casualties were very few. These operations form a good example of the co-operation of the Royal Navy with infantry and artillery.

13. An aeroplane reconnaissance on the morning of 1st June discovered that the enemy had evacuated his main position, and was in full retreat up the Tigris. The Naval Flotilla, led by H.M.S. "Espiegle" (Captain Nunn, R.N.), pushed in pursuit, followed by the shipping with troops. On the morning of 2nd June, when some 10 miles below Qalat Salih, the deeper-draught vessels could proceed no further owing to shoal water, and the pursuit was continued by the naval armed tugs. Up to this time the "Espiegle" had engaged and sunk the Turkish
gunboat "Marmaris," and had captured two steamers and a number of lighters laden with munitions and stores.

14. Qalat Salih was reached on the afternoon of the 2nd June, and after some hostile troops outside the town had been dispersed the pursuit was continued. H.M.S. "Comet" (Captain Nunn, R.N.), with General Townshend on board, and three armed tugs, occupied Amarah in the afternoon of 3rd June, capturing there some 700 troops and 40 officers. This is a most excellent instance of courage and pertinacity in pursuit, and very creditable to all who took part in it. The leading infantry (2nd Battalion, Norfolk Regiment) of the 6th Division arrived at Amarah at 6.30 a m. on , not a moment too soon, as the inhabitants were beginning to realise the size of the force which had cowed them into submission on the previous day.

15. The captures resulting from the action at Qurnah, the pursuit and the occupation of Amarah, included 17 guns, 2,718 rifles, 1,773 prisoners, four river steamers (exclusive of the gunboat "Marmaris" and another steamer, which was sunk), a number of lighters and boats, besides quantities of ammunition and stores. The weather throughout these operations was intensely hot—a sweltering sun all day, followed by still and sultry nights; but in spite of this the spirit and energy of all ranks was excellent.

16. I consider that General Townshend carried out these operations in a highly creditable manner. His prompt and vigorous pursuit is worthy of high praise, and it was largely due to his dash and enterprise that Amarah was entered unopposed. The part played by General Gorringe's force to help General Townshend's operations has been described in an earlier part of this despatch.

17. Immediately after the capture of Amarah, preparations were taken in hand for the capture of Nasiriyah, on the Euphrates, the dominant place on this flank. Its importance lies in the fact that it is the base from which a hostile force threatening Basrah must start; it is the centre from which influence can be exercised among the powerful Arab tribes which lie along the Euphrates; standing at one end of the Shatt Al Hai, it closes communication between the Tigris and Euphrates, and is thus of strategic value; and, lastly, it was the headquarters of the civil administration of a large part of the Basrah Province.

18. To General Gorringe and his troops was allotted this objective. The route from Qurnah to Nasiriyah is by water, through the low-lying valley of the Old Euphrates Channel for 30 miles to Chahbaish; across the Hammar Lake for 15 miles to its western side, thence by the Haqiqah—a tortuous channel, some 50 yards wide and 15 miles long—until the main channel of the Euphrates is reached some 25 miles below Nasiriyah. From Qurnah to Chahbaish, deep draught vessels can go up the old Euphrates; beyond this, at the time the operations commenced, on 27th June, the Hammar Lake was passable by all river steamers drawing less than 5 feet, as far as the entrance to the Haqiqah Channel. By the middle of July the channel across the lake held little more than 3 feet of water, and only the smallest steamers could cross. In many cases steamers were aground for days at a time, and the small tugs fitted as gunboats could only be taken across by removing guns, ammunition, armour plating, fuel and water, and using light-draught stern wheelers to tow them. Later, troops and stores could only be transported in "bellums," which for some distances had to be dragged over mud and water by men. The Haqiqah Channel was blocked by a solidly constructed " Bund " half a mile from its entrance to the Lake, which had to be removed before the passage could be used by shipping.

19. Above its junction with the Haqiqah the Euphrates has an average width of 200 yards. Along its banks are numerous gardens, patches of cultivation, and several small villages within walled enclosures. On the left bank, belts of date palms, with an occasional fringe of willow trees, are the prevailing features. On the right bank the country is more open. During July, except for a belt of dry ground along the river banks a few hundred yards wide, on either side the country was completely under water. Numerous irrigation channels intersect this belt of dry land at right angles to the river, presenting a series of obstacles to an advance. Such was the nature of the country where the Turks offered their main opposition to our advance on Nasiriyah.

20. On 26th June General Gorringe's Force was concentrated at Qurnah, and proceeded on the 27th June across the Hammar Lake, preceded by gunboats under command of Captain Nunn, R.N. Hostile armed launches above the Haqiqah bund were driven back. The bund was occupied, and the work of demolition commenced. During the 28th a channel 150 feet wide and 4 feet deep was made. The rush of water through the opening created a strong rapid, almost a cataract, up which parties of men were successful in hauling up the naval craft on the 29th. It was not until the 4th July that all vessels and troops were passed over the Haqiqah obstruction, and established about two and a half miles from the junction with the Euphrates. Covering this entrance, reconnaisances proved that the enemy had established themselves with guns on the right bank of the Euphrates commanding both banks of the Haqiqah, and the mine field which they had prepared about a mile down it. 21. At 4.45 a.m. on 5th July the 30th Infantry Brigade, commanded by Major-General Melliss, advanced to attack the enemy; on the left bank, the 76th Punjabis and the 24th Punjabis, the latter moving in bellums through the inundation accompanied by the 30th Mountain Battery. The 2/7th Gurkhas supported by the 1/4th Hants moved up the right bank. Considerable opposition was encountered, especially on the left bank, and it was not until 1.20 p.m. that our troops forced the enemy on the right bank of the Euphrates to hoist the white flag. The 24th Punjabis had to carry their bellums across some 60 yards of dry land before they could cross the Euphrates to take possession of the enemy's position and battery. After the right bank had been cleared our
Naval craft were able to sweep for mines, an operation rendered easier for us as a captured Turkish Officer assisted to indicate their position. By 9 p.m. the Channel was clear. The ships came up and the troops embarked.

22. The detachment of the enemy which had opposed our advance consisted of 1,000 regular Turkish troops, 2.000 Arabs, four guns and two Thorneycroft launches armed with pom poms. Four guns and 130 prisoners fell into our hands at a cost to vis of 26 killed and 85 wounded. The second phase of these operations was commenced on the morninor of 6th July by the occupation of Suk-Esh-Sheyukh by Captain Nunn, with two gunboats, and afterwards the whole flotilla moved up the Euphrates.

23. The Turks had taken up a series of positions astride the river about five miles below Nasiriyah, with both flanks resting on marshes. In front of their trenches were broad deep channels difficult to turn or assault. The ground on the right bank was devoid of cover; that on the left bank fringed by a narrow belt of palms.

24. General Gorringe established his force some two miles below the enemy's advanced positions and occupied entrenchments on both banks. Up to the 13th July continual reconnaissances were made and our entrenchments gradually extended nearer to the enemy.

25. On the night of 13th/14th an attack was made by our troops on both banks. On the right bank we secured an entrenched position within 400 yards of the Turkish trenches. A gallant attempt by the 24th Punjabis under Lieutenant-Colonel Climo, supported by four guns of the 30th Mountain Battery under Captain E. J. Nixon, to capture some sandhills behind the enemy's right flank met with unexpectedly strong opposition, and they were attacked in rear by Arab tribesmen and had to withdraw. The Mountain guns covering the withdrawal rendered invaluable support.

26. Until the 23rd, General Gorringe was perfecting arrangements for his decisive attack. Gun positions were moved forward, infantry trenches extended and communications improved. The working parties were subjected to a continual fire, but our snipers established ascendancy over those of the enemy. The heat night and day throughout was intense.

27. At 5 a.m. on 24th July the attack was launched. By 7.30 a.m. the 12th Infantry Brigade operating on the left bank of the river had occupied the enemy's advanced trenches at Miyadiyah. The 30th Infantry Brigade then pushed its attack up the right bank, covered by well-directed artillery fire, and by 9.30 a.m. had captured the advanced trenches after forcing the passage of the Mejinineh Channel. During this operation the gunboat. "Sumana," carrying bridging material, fought her way up to the entrance of the creek under a very heavy fire, and, supported by the fire from the gunboats, the 17th Company Sappers and Miners threw a bridge across.

28. The attack was continued by both banks. The main position was captured by noon, in spite of a stubborn resistance. The enemy clung to their trenches where some 500 were killed. After reorganising, the troops pushed forward to the Sadanawiyah position— the enemy's final line of defence, which was also captured. During the attack at Sadanawiyah Captain Nunn, in the " Shushan," a small sternwheeler, laid his ship alongside hostile trenches on the river bank and engaged them at close range.

29. By 6.30 p.m. the enemy was in full retreat across the marshes, and our troops bivouacked on the position they had won. Severe losses had been inflicted on the enemy, while our casualties were not heavy considering the nature of the fighting, the total number of our killed and wounded being under 600. Our captures included over 1,000 prisoners, 17 guns, five machine-guns, 1,586 rifles, and quantities of ammunition and stores. Nasiriyah was occupied on the 25th without further opposition.

30. General Gorringe conducted the task assigned to him with skill and determination, and his troops responded to the strenuous calls that were made upon them in a gallant and devoted manner. Seldom, if ever, have our troops been called upon to campaign in more trying heat than they have experienced this summer in the marshy plains of Mesopotamia. But the spirit of the troops never flagged, and in the assault of the entrenchments which the Turks thought impregnable, British and Indian soldiers displayed a gallantry and devotion to duty worthy of the highest traditions of the Service.

31. I have to place on record the excellence of the work performed by the officers and men of the Royal Flying Corps, whose valuable reconnaissances materially assisted in clearing up the situation before the battle of the 24th July.

32. And I have to express my deep appreciation of the valuable and whole-hearted co-operation of the officers and men of the Royal Navy under the command of Captain Nunn, D.S.O., Senior Naval Officer. It was in a great measure due to the excellent work performed by the Royal Navy that these amphibious operations, like those at Qurnah, at the end of May, were brought to so successful a conclusion.

33. The capture of Nasiriyah had established British control on the western side of the Basrah Vilayet, but the district lying north of the line Amara-Nasiriyah still remained outside our control, and strong Turkish forces under Nur-Ed-Din Bey were reported to be concentrating at Kut-al-Amarah, at the junction of the Shatt-al-Hai with the Tigris, the possession of which strategic centre is necessary for the effective control of the jiorthern part of the Basrah Vilayet. Nur-Ed-Din has attempted to cause a diversion by pushing strong detachments to within thirty miles of Amarah, while my principal attention was concentrated on the Euphrates. The defeat of Nur-Ed-Din and the occupation of Kut-al-Amarah became my next objective as soon as Nasiriyah was secured, and I commenced the transfer of troops towards Amarah on the following day.

34. After the month of June the Shatt al Hai ceases to be navigable for some six months, and the only line of advance by water on Kutal-
Amarah is by the River Tigris. On the 1st August a detachment from the 6th Division, accompanied by a naval flotilla, occupied Ali al Gharbi. Covered by this detachment, the concentration of the 6th Division under General Townshend for the advance on Kut-al-Amarah was carried out.

35. The transfer of troops from the Euphrates to the Tigris was a slow process, owing to the difficulties in crossing the shallow Hammar Lake during the low-water season. By the 12th September the force was concentrated at Ali al Gharbi. Thence the advance was continued by route march along the river bank, accompanied by a naval flotilla and shipping, until Sannaiyat (some eight miles below the enemy's position covering Kut-al-Amrah) was reached on 15th September. Intense heat prevailed during the period of this march, with temperatures ranging from 110 degrees to 116 degrees in the shade. The column remained halted at Sannaiyat until 25th September, receiving reinforcements during this period.

36. A few skirmishes had taken place between our cavalry and that of the enemy, and constant naval and air reconnaissances were made. Accurate information was gained regarding the dispositions of the enemy. The work performed by the Royal Flying Corps during this period was invaluable.

37. Nur-Ed-Din Bey's Army lay astride the river some seven miles N.E. of Kut and eight miles from General Townshend's Force at Sannaiyat. It occupied a line naturally favourable for defence, which, during three or four months of preparation, had been converted into a formidable position. On the right bank the defences extended for five miles southwards along some mounds which commanded an extensive field of fire. The river was blocked by a boom composed of barges and wire cables commanded at close range by guns and fire trenches. On the left bank the entrenchments extended for seven miles, linking up the gaps between the river and three marshes which stretched away to the north. The defences were well designed and concealed, commanding flat and open approaches. They were elaborately constructed with a thoroughness that missed no detail. In front of the trenches were barbed wire entanglements, military pits, and land mines. Behind were miles of communication trenches connecting the various works and providing covered outlets to the. river, where ramps and landing-stages had been made to facilitate the transfer of troops to or from ships, while pumping engines and water channels carried water from the river to the trenches.

38. Nur-ed-Din's Army held this position: one division being on each bank, with some Army troops in reserve on the left bank, near a bridge above the main position. A force of Arab horsemen was posted on the Turkish left flank; most of the Turkish regular cavalry were absent during the battle on a raid against our communications at Shaikh Saad.

39. On the 26th September General Townshend advanced to within 4 miles of the Turkish position. His plan was to make a decisive attack on the left bank by enveloping the Turkish left with his main force, but in order to deceive the enemy as to the direction of the real attack, preliminary dispositions and preparatory attacks were made with the object of inducing the Turks to expect the principal attack on the right bank.

40. On the morning of the 27th our troops advanced by both banks. The principal force, on the right bank, made a feint attack on the trenches south of the river, while the left bank detachment entrenched itself within 3,000 yards of the enemy. Meanwhile a bridge had been constructed, and under cover of night the main force crossed from the right bank and deployed opposite the enemy's left flank.

41. On the morning of the 28th September a general attack was made against the enemy on the left bank. The 18th Infantry Brigade, under Major-General Fry, with its left on the line of the river, made a pinning attack, while Brigadier-General Delamain, commanding the 16th and 17th Infantry Brigades, advanced in two columns against the enemy's left, one column being directed frontally against the flank entrenchments while the other moved wide round the flank and attacked in rear. General Delamain's right flank was protected by the Cavalry Brigade.

42. The first troops to enter the enemy trenches were the 2nd Battalion, Dorsetshire Regiment, 117th Mahrattas and 22nd Company Sappers and Miners, who made a brilliant assault, well supported by the Artillery, and soon after 10 a.m. captured a redoubt and trenches on the enemy's extreme left, inflicting heavy losses and taking 135 prisoners.

43. A combined attack by the 16th and 17th Infantry Brigades was then made, and, after hard fighting, during which the enemy made several unsuccessful counter-attacks, the whole of the northern part of the enemy's position was in our hands by 2 p.m.

44. General Delamain reorganised his troops on the captured position and gave them a much-needed rest, as they were exhausted by the great heat, the long march and hard fighting. After a brief rest General Delamain moved his column southwards to assist the 18th Infantry Brigade by attacking the enemy opposed to it in rear. Before this attack could develop strong hostile reserves appeared from the south-west, in the direction of the bridge. General Delamain immediately changed his objective and attacked the new troops, supported by his guns firing at a range of 1,700 yards.

45. The sight of the approaching enemy and the prospect of getting at him in the open with the bayonet put new life into our Infantry, who were suffering from weariness and exhaustion after their long and trying exertions under the tropical sun. For the time thirst and fatigue were forgotten. The attack was made in a most gallant manner with great dash. The enemy were routed with one magnificent rush, which captured four guns and inflicted heavy losses on the Turks. The enemy fought stubbornly, and were saved from complete destruction by the approach of night.

46. General Delamain's troops bivouacked for the night on the scene of their victory about two miles from the river, both men and horses suffering severely from want of water, as the brackish water of the marshes is undrinkable. In the morning the column reached the river, and the horses got their first water for forty hours.

47. Throughout the battle the Naval Flotilla co-operated with the land attack from positions on the river. Late in the evening of 28th, led by the "Comet" (Lieutenant-Commander E. C. Cookson, R.N., Acting Senior Naval Officer), the flotilla advanced upstream and endeavoured to force a passage through the boom obstruction. The ships came under a terrific fire from both banks at close range. The "Comet" rammed the boom, but it withstood the shock. Lieutenant-Commander Cookson was shot dead while most gallantly attempting to cut a wire cable securing the barges.

48. The Turks evacuated their remaining trenches during the night and escaped along the bank of the Tigris. On the morning of the 29th a pursuit was organised, troops moving in ships preceded by cavalry on land. The Cavalry, consisting of four weak squadrons, overtook the enemy on 1st October, but had to wait for the support of the river column, as the Turks' were making an orderly retreat, covered by a strong rearguard with infantry and guns.

49. The progress of the river column was so delayed by the difficulties of navigation due to the constantly shifting shallows in the river that it was unable to overtake the retreating enemy. When the ships reached Aziziyah on 5th October, the enemy had reached their prepared defensive position at Ctesiphon, covering the road to Baghdad, where they were reinforced.

50. The Turks lost some 4,000 men in casualties, of whom 1,153 were prisoners captured by us. In addition we took 14 guns and a quantity of rifles, ammunition and stores. Considering the severity of the fighting our casualties were comparatively small. They amounted to 1,233, including a large proportion of men only slightly wounded.

51. The defeat of Nur-ed-Din Bey completed the expulsion of Turkish troops from the Basrah Vilayet. Apart from material gains won at Kut-al-Amarah, our troops once again proved their irresistible gallantry in attack, and added another victory to British arms in Mesopotamia.

52. I am glad to place on record my appreciation of the ability and generalship displayed by Major-General C. V. F. Townshend, C.B., D..S.O., throughout these operations. His plan for turning the Turkish left was the manoeuvre whereby the position could best be captured without incurring very heavy losses.

53. Brigadier-General Delamain, who commanded the main attack, showed himself to be a resolute and resourceful commander. His leadership during the battle was admirable.

54. The troops under the command of Major-General Townshend displayed high soldierly qualities, and upheld the reputation they have earned during, this arduous campaign.

55. The conduct of the Infantry in the attack was particularly noteworthy. They were set a task involving prolonged exertion and endurance, and performed it with an alacrity and resolution which must have been most disconcertingto the enemy.

56. The Artillery has established a high reputation for good shooting. The Infantry rely on their accuracy and skill; during the attack they welcome the close support of the guns, and press forward with the narrowest margin dividing them from the curtain of bursting shells, in a manner that is a tribute to their comrades in the Artillery.

57. The services of the Royal Flying Corps, not only during the battle but also in the frequent reconnaissances which preceded the fighting, also call for notice. The Flying Officers displayed courage and devotion in the performance of their duties, which were often carried out under a heavy fire. The accurate information obtained during air reconnaissances was of the utmost value in planning the defeat of the enemy, and the remarkable skill and powers of observation displayed by Flight Commander Major H. L. Reilly, Royal Flying Corps, contributed in no small degree to the success of the operations.

58. The work of the Royal Navy fully maintained the high standard they have established in these rivers. I much regret the loss of Lieutenant-Commander E. C. Cookson, whose gallant act has already been referred to.

59. Acknowledgments are due to the excellent work done by the Commanders and personnel of the river steamers for their unremitting work in connection with operations on the rivers of Mesopotamia.

60. Accompanying this despatch is a list of officers and men whose names I wish to bring to notice in connection with the operations undertaken during the period under report. {List follows signature]

I have, etc.,
(Signed) JOHN NIXON, General,
Commanding I.E.F. " D.".