War Office, 6th July, 1917.
The Secretary of State for War has received the following despatches
from General Sir Archibald Murray, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., Commander-in-Chief,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force: —
General Headquarters,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force,
1st March 1917.
MY LORD,—
I have the honour to submit a report on the operations of the
Force under my command from 1st October, 1916, to 28th February,
1917.
1. During the months of October and November and the first half
of December there were no important operations upon my Eastern
front, though a successful reconnaissance against the enemy positions
at Gebel El Rakwa and Maghara, 65 miles east of Ismailia, was
carried out between the 13th and 17th October
by a small force of Australian Light Horse, Yeomanry and Camel
Corps. This operation not only needed careful preparation, but
entailed two night marches over exceedingly difficult sand dune
country, the difficulties being increased on the second night
by the presence of a thick fog. On the early morning of the 15th
the enemy was located holding a strong position on the high precipitous
hills of Maghara. The force, attacking in two columns, dislodged
the enemy from his advanced position, capturing a few prisoners.
At the same time the enemy's camp was repeatedly bombed by our
aeroplanes, which furnished invaluable assistance throughout the
operation. After an engagement lasting two hours the force withdrew
unmolested, and reached Bayud on the 17th without the loss of
a single camel. The operation was well carried out, and valuable
information was obtained regarding the enemy's dispositions and
the nature of the country.
With this exception all was quiet on the Eastern front. The unexpected
evidence of our mobility given to the enemy by the successful
reconnaissance against Mazar, which I recorded in my last despatch,
and the losses suffered by the Turks during this affair, had given
the enemy sufficient uneasiness to induce him to withdraw altogether
from Mazar, and towards the end of October his nearest troopswere
in the neighbourhood of Ujret El Zol and Masaid, about seven and
four miles west of El Arish respectively. The enemy also maintained
various small posts in the neighbourhood of Maghara, with small
garrisons further south at Hassana and Nekhl. About the same time
the railway towards El Arish, which had been making steady and
uninterrupted progress, was in the neighbourhood of Bir Salmana,
some four miles east of Bir el Abd. The Australian and New Zealand
mounted troops, with a force of Yeomanry attached, liad advanced
from Romani, and were covering the advance and the railway construction
east of Salmana with brigades thrown out to their flanks and rear.
2. On the 23rd October, in order
to be in closer touch with the civil authority, I moved my General
Headquarters from Ismailia to Cairo, and at the same time the
new Headquarters of the Eastern Force came into existence at Ismailia
under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Dobell, K.C.B.,
C.M.G., D.S.O. At the same time the headquarters of the Inspector-General
of Communications, which had always been in Cairo, were merged
in General Headquarters, and on the lapse of his appointment Lieutenant-General
Sir E. A. Altham, K.C.B., C.M.G., to my great personal regret,
returned to England.
3 The first half of November was mainly occupied in making the
necessary arrangements for pressing forward our advance towards
El Arish. In the south a small column under Brigadier-General
P. C. Palin, C.B., marched on Sinn Bisher and Bir um Gurf, 30
miles south-east of Suez, on the 15th and
16th November, and attacked and drove off some enemy posted
in the hills. During the latter part of the month the cavalry
gradually pushed forward in advance of the railway, which by November
26th reached Mazar. Reconnaissances by mounted troops were pushed
forward to within 8 miles of El Arish by 17th November, when the
enemy's outposts were located at TJjret el Zol; on November 28th
a mounted patrol was pushed through to Bir el Masmi, little more
than 3 miles south-west of El Arish; and from this time our patrols
were constantly in touch with the enemy's position at El Arish-Masaid.
Throughout the month the enemy's aircraft showed considerable
activity, attacking the railhead and the bivouacs of our advanced
troops with bombs. Little damage, however, was done, and our own
aircraft retained complete superiority in the air. The Royal Flying
Corps in this month visited Maghdaba, Sheikh Zowaid and Khan Yunis
for reconnaissance purposes, and on the 11th
November made very successful bomb attacks on Bir Saba
and Maghdaba. At Bir Saba special attention was paid to the aerodrome
and the railway station, both of which were damaged. Presumably
in retaliation for the air raid at Bir Saba one hostile aeroplane
dropped bombs on Cairo on the 13th, causing some casualties among
the civil population and killing one private; no other damage
of a military nature was done. The Royal Flying Corps promptly
replied by heavily bombing the enemy's camp at Maghdaba by moonlight
on the same night. On the 17th November the enemy's camps at Masaid
were heavily bombed by four machines in reply to the appearance
of a hostile machine at Suez
the same morning.
By the 1st December the railway was east of Mazar. During the
first week of December constant patrols were sent out by the cavalry,
and the country was thoroughly reconnoitred in the area Mazar-Risan
Aneiza—Bir Lahfan— Bir el Masmi. In the meantime the
enemy maintained his position of El Arish and Masaid, and in order
to afford him no inducement to withdraw until such time as I should
be ready to strike, mounted patrols were ordered to be as unostentatious
as possible.
4. On the 7th December Lieutenant-General
Sir P. W. Chetwode, Bt., C.B., D.S.O., assumed command of the
Desert Column, shortly afterwards moving his Headquarters from
Bir el Abd to Mazar. Since January the force had gradually pushed
right across the Sinai desert, fighting when necessary, organising
and constructing incessantly in the heavy sand and hot sun. The
pressure on the enemy in other theatres and our success at Romani
were undoubtedly contributing factors to this advance, but the
main factor—without which all liberty of action and any
tactical victory would have been nugatory—was work, intense
and unremitting. To regain this peninsula, the true frontier of
Egypt, hundreds of miles of road and railway had been built, hundreds
of miles of water piping had been laid, filters capable of supplying
1,500,000 gallons of water a day, and reservoirs had been installed,
and tons of stone transported from distant quarries. Kantara had
been transformed from a small canal village into an important
railway and water terminus, with wharves and cranes and a railway
ferry; and the desert, till then almost destitute of human habitation,
showed the successive marks of our advance in the shape of
strong positions firmly entrenched and protected by hundreds of
miles of barbed wire, of standing camps where troops could shelter
in comfortable huts, of tanks and reservoirs, of railway stations
and sidings, of aerodromes and of signal stations and wireless
installations,
by all of which the desert was subdued and made habitable, and
adequate lines of communication established between the advancing
troops and their ever receding base. Moreover, not only had British
troops laboured incessantly through the summer and autumn, but
the body of organised native labour had grown.
The necessity of combining the protection and maintenance, including
the important work of sanitation, of this large force of workers,
British and native, with that steady progress on the railway,
roads and pipes which was vital to the success of my operations,
put the severest strain upon all energies and resources. But the
problem of feeding the workers without starving the work was solved
by the goodwill and energy of all concerned. Moreover, organisation
kept pace with construction.
The equipment of the fighting units with camel transport, which
had reached its first stage of completion at the time of the Romani
battle, had been perfected by the middle of December, the allotment
of camels to units having been worked out with the minutest precision.
A large number of additional camels were provided for convoying
supplies and water from the railhead to the front. The striking
force was now completely mobile, and the troops had grown skilful
in meeting the special problems of desert campaigning.
5. But no organisation could entirely overcome the chief difficulty
which had faced us all through the year, the adequate provision
of water for the troops. In fact, during this final period this
difficulty was accentuated by the rapid advance of ... and railway
with which the water supply could not keep pace. Moreover, my
troops had passed out of the water-bearing Qatia basin, and had
reached a tract in which local water was almost non existent.
From Romani to Bir el Abd the local water, though generally somewhat
brackish, had been always employed for the horses, mules and camels,
and it had been found that, if the necessary precautions were
taken, it had no ill effect upon our troops, at all events for
a limited period. East of Bir el Abd the situation is altogether
different. Water is found in comparatively few and widely separated
localities. Such as exists is generally too brackish for human
consumption, and the wells east of the water line are so widely
separated and are of so small capacity that it is a matter of
great difficulty—sometimes a complete impossibility—
to water any large number of animals. This latter fact greatly
restricted the employment of mounted troops. During the first
half of November, also, the pipe-line was not yet delivering water
at Romani, and the water for the advanced troops had therefore
to be brought up by rail in tank trucks and stored in improvised
tanks at railway sidings made for that purpose. Since the railway
had reached kilo. 109, considerable strain was thrown on its resources
for this period owing to the necessity for maintaining the rate
of construction, for forwarding material for the construction
of the pipe-line, for supplying the troops, and for undertaking
the long haulage of great quantities of water in addition. By
the 17th November, however, the water
situation was somewhat relieved by the delivery of water through
the pipe-line at Romani. Thereafter the water difficulty again
increased as the railway advanced, until the pipe-line delivered
water at Bir-el-Abd, thereby again reducing the distance over
which rail-borne water had to be carried. But, as the month advanced,
the water question presented itself more insistently than ever.
Every tactical preparation for the offensive had been made, naval
co-operation planned, and arrangements made for the landing of
stores and construction of piers as soon as El Arish was in my
possession. But the difficulty of water supply, even with my advanced
railhead, was immense. The enemy was so disposed as to caver all
the available water in the neighbourhood of El Arish and Masaid.
Between his position and ours, and south of his position, no water
could be found; nor had search in the Wadi-el-Arish, south of
the town, by parties sent in by night, proved more successful.
The enemy was disposed in depth covering all the water in the
area—there being about four miles between his outpost line
and his third line of defence. If, therefore, lie should be able
to force us to spend two days in the operation of driving him
from his position, it would be necessary to carry forward very
large quantities of water on camels for the men and animals of
the formations engaged. This entailed the establishment of a very
large reserve of water at railhead, and the preparation of elaborate
arrangements for the forwarding and distribution of water.
The Turkish garrison at El Arish consisted of some 1,600 infantry
in all, in a strong entrenched position. Between the 9th
and 14th December increased activity was shown by the Turks,
and our aircraft and mounted patrols reported the construction
of new works, while the enemy camps at Magdhaba and Abu Aweigila
were reported to have increased in size. On these indications
of a probable reinforcement to the enemy, the final preparations
were pushed on with most strenuous determination. Had rain only
fallen, an earlier move could have been made, but as it was, the
water supply for the striking force was not adequately secured
till 20th December.
6. The swiftness of our final preparations was rewarded, but not
immediately, by a successful engagement. We had been too quick
for the enemy, but he had recognised it, and, knowing that reinforcements
would arrive too late, had hurriedly withdrawn his troops from
Masaid and El Arish. This retirement was reported by the Royal
Flying Corps on the 20th December,
and the Australian and New Zealand mounted troops and Imperial
Camel Corps were ordered to move on El Arish the same night. Scottish
troops were to move in support of the mounted troops. Accordingly,
after a skilfully conducted march of twenty miles in the moonless
night, the Australian Light Horse and the Imperial Camel Corps
surrounded the enemy's position. Light Horse patrols reached El
Arish about sunrise, and found it unoccupied. By 7.20 a.m. the
Light Horse were east of El Arish, the Imperial Camel Corps south
of the town, another party of Light Horse was about Masaid, and
the New Zealand Mounted Rifles were at Masmi.
During the day our aircraft reported about 1,600 of the enemy
on the march in two columns in the neighbourhood of Magdhaba and
Abu Aweigila. Sheikh Zowaid and Rafa appeared to be clear of the
enemy. Maghara had been evacuated, and the enemy was apparently
in process of withdrawing from the neighbouring posts. By the
night of the 21st December, therefore,
the re-occupation of El Arish had been effected, and the enemy
was evacuating, or had evacuated, his positions west of a north
and south line through that place, except those at Nekhl and Hassana.
The aircraft, moreover, reported that the garrison of the latter
place seemed also to be reduced.
On the 22nd December the Scottish
troops were about El Arish and Bittia. Minesweeping operations
were at once commenced in the roadstead under the direction of
Captain A. H. Williamson, M.V.O., R.N., while the erection of
a pier was taken in hand. In forty eight hours the roadstead was
cleared of mines, and the supply ships from Port Said began unloading
stores and supplies on the 24th. Supplies were also hastened to
El Arish by camel convoy, since it was of the utmost importance
to accumulate at once a sufficient amount to give our mounted
troops a further radius of action. Our aircraft were exceedingly
active during the day a successful attack was made on the railway
bridge at Telel iSharia, north of El Arish, El Auja and Bir Saba
were effectively bombed, and two battalions of Turkish, troops
located by the Royal Flying Corps at Magdhaba, some 20 miles south
of El Arish, were attacked with bombs by thirteen
of our aeroplanes and suffered many casualties.
In order to emphasise the capture of El Arish, in the Southern
Canal area a column assembled near Bir Mabeiuk on the 22nd December,
and on the following days advanced through the Mitla Pass and
by the Darb el Haj as far as Sudr El Heitan, more than half-way
to Nekhl. This column destroyed various enemy posts and entrenchments,
but, finding no enemy, returned on the 25th.
7. The enemy having temporarily succeeded in eluding us, it was
of the utmost importance to strike any of his forces that remained
within our reach. I had always anticipated that, should the enemy
choose to abandon El Arish, his line of retreat would be through
Magdhaba and Abu Aweigila towards El Auja. These anticipations
were confirmed by the report of the Royal Flying Corps that an
enemy force of about two regiments was at Magdhaba. It appeared
likely that this force consisted of the 1,600 infantry which had
composed the garrison of El Arish, and that it was preparing to
hold Magdhaba as a rearguard. Orders were given that a mounted
force should push forward with all haste against the enemy, and
arrangements were made accordingly by General Sir Charles Dobell
for the move of most of the Australian and New Zealand mounted
troops, with the Imperial Camel Corps, against Magdhaba and Abu
Aweigila on the night of the 22nd-23rd. Major-General Sir H. G.
Chauvel, K.C.M.G., C.B., was in command of the column.
8. Starting at 12.45 a.m. on December 23rd,
the flying column halted at 4.50 a.m. in an open plain about four
miles from Magdhaba, whence the enemy's bivouac fires could plainly
be seen. General Chauvel, with his staff and subordinate commanders,
immediately undertook a personal reconnaissance of the enemy's
position, and soon after 8 a.m., by which time the first aeroplane
reports had been received, the attack was set in motion. The enemy
had taken up a position on both banks of the Wadi el Arish, and
was very strongly posted in a rough circle of from 3,000 to 3,500
yards diameter. Five large closed works, exceedingly well sited,
formed the principal defences, and between these works was a system
of well-constructed and concealed trenches and rifle pits. General
Chauvel's plan of attack was as follows: —
The New Zealand Mounted Rifles and Australian Light Horse, both
under the command of Brigadier-General E. W. C. Chaytor, C.B.,
were to move to the east of Magdhaba and to swing round to attack
the enemy's right and rear. The Imperial Camel Corps were to move
direct against Magdhaba to attack the enemy in front—that
is, from the north-west. Other Australian mounted troops were
at the outset in reserve. Between 8.45 a.m. and 9.30 a.m. the
attack developed, and at the latter hour General Chaytor moved
a Light Horse Regiment
and part of a Machine Gun Squadron on a wide turning movement
round the rear of the enemy's position with orders to come in
from the south. A little later two regiments of the New Zealand
Mounted Rifles were despatched in more or less the same direction,
though making a less wide detour, with orders to move on 'Magdhaba
from the east. In the meantime the Imperial Camel Corps wore making
progress, though somewhat slowly.
At 10 a.m., the aircraft reports indicated the possibility that
the enemy might try to escape. Thereupon General Chauvel ordered
the mounted troops in reserve, less one regiment, to push in from
the north-west. The troops moved forward at a trot, and, coming
under shrapnel fire, increased the pace to a gallop. The enemy
then opened a very heavy rifle and machine gun fire, whereupon
the force swung to its right and gained cover in the Wadi where,
dismounting, it began an attack against the left of the enemy
position. Between noon and 1.30 p.m., the enemy's position was
practically surrounded, but for some little time it had been found
increasingly difficult to make progress. The horse artillery batteries
had been greatly hindered by the mirage and the difficulty of
getting forward observation, the ground round the enemy's position
being absolutely flat and devoid of cover. In the meantime reports
were received from the Field Squadron that no water could be found.
Unless Magdhaba could be taken during the day, therefore, it was
probable that our troops would have to withdraw, as none of the
horses had been watered since the evening of the 22nd, and the
nearest water, except that in the enemy's position, was at El
Arish.
General Chauvel reported the situation to the Desert Column accordingly,
and received orders to maintain the attack. But before this communication
arrived the situation had begun to improve. Some Australian mounted
troops, pressing on against the enemy's left, captured a work
on the west of the Wadi, taking about 100 prisoners. At 2 p.m.
two regiments of the Australian Light Horse coming in from the
north-east, were within 200 yards of the position, in close touch
with the Imperial Camel Corps advancing from the north-west. A
quarter of an hour later the attack of a third regiment of this
force was pressing heavily on the enemy from the south. By three
o'clock the New Zealand Mounted Rifles were within 600 yards of
the enemy's trenches on the east.
From this time forward the pressure on the enemy increased from
all sides. Before half past three the force from the Wadi and
the Imperial Camel Corps attacked the second line of the enemy's
trenches, and at four o'clock the former carried one of the main
redoubts, taking 130 prisoners, including the Turkish Commander.
Immediately after this, part of a Light Horse Regiment charged
in from the south, mounted and with fixed bayonets, and by half-past
four all organised resistance was over, and the enemy was surrendering
everywhere. The total number of prisoners taken in this fine action
was 1,282, including some 50 wounded. A large number of the enemy
were buried by our troops on the position. Four mountain guns,
one machine gun and 1,052 rifles were captured, and 200 more rifles
were destroyed.
Our own casualties were 12 officers and 134 other ranks killed
and wounded. It was possible to give every attention to our wounded
before moving them back to El Arish, owing to the fact that the
enemy had a permanent and well equipped hospital at Magdhaba,
to which they were taken as soon as the action was over. The troops
marched back to El Arish during the night of December 23rd-24th.
9. On 27th December the Royal Flying
Corps reported that an entrenched position was being prepared
by the enemy at Magruntein, near Rafa. Work on this position was
continued during the following day, and it was occupied by a garrison
equivalent to about two battalions with mountain guns. It was
not at the moment possible for me, owing to difficulties of supply,
to push on and occupy Rafa permanently. Since, however, the enemy
had striking distance of my mounted troops, I determined, if possible,
to repeat the success at
Magdhaba by surrounding and capturing the Magruntein position
also.
On 7th January I communicated this
decision to General Dobell, who entrusted the operation to Lieutenant-General
Sir Philip Chetwode, Bt., C.B., D.S.O., commanding the Desert
Column, who .set out from El Arish on the evening of the 8th-9th
with a force consisting of Yeomanry, Australian and New Zealand
mounted troops, and the Imperial Camel Corps, with a battery of
artillery attached. So efficiently and swiftly was the approach
march carried out that the enemy was completely surprised, and
by dawn on 9th January his position was almost entirely surrounded
before he became aware of the presence of any large forces in
his vicinity. The position, however, was a formidable one. It
consisted of three strong series of works connected by trenches,
one series facing west, one facing south-west, and one facing
south and southeast. The whole was dominated by a central keep
or redoubt, some 2,000 yards southwest of Rafa. Moreover, the
ground in front of these works was entirely open and devoid of
cover, and in their immediate neighbourhood was almost a glacis.
The guns, with which aeroplanes were cooperating, started to register
at 7.20 a.m.
The main attack, to be carried out by Major-General Sir H. G.
Chauvel, K.C.M.G., C.B., General Officer Commanding Australian
and New Zealand Mounted Troops, was timed for 10 a.m., with the
New Zealand Mounted Rifles on the right, attacking from the east,
some Australian Light Horse on their left, attacking from the
east and south-east, while the Imperial Camel Corps attacked the
works in their front from the south-east. A body of Australian
Light Horse were in reserve and the Yeomanry in column reserve.
Shortly after 10 a.m., parties of Turks, who were attempting to
leave Rafa by the Khan Yunus road, were met and captured by the
New Zealand Mounted Rifles, who galloped the Police barracks and
Machine Gun post, capturing six Germans (including one officer),
two 'Turkish officers, and 163 other ranks. Before 11 a.m., Rafa
was occupied, and two regiments of the troops in reserve were
advanced against the works on the left of the troops attacking
from the east and south-east.
Some Australian Light Horse and the Camel Corps were ordered to
press their attack on the works facing south-west, and about the
same time the remainder of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles, with
a body of Light Horse, galloped an open space south of the Police
post, and established themselves 300 yards east of the nearest
enemy work. The Yeomanry were also ordered to deploy against the
western works and to attack in conjunction with the Camel Corps.
The encircling movement was now practically complete, save for
a gap in the north-west between the New Zealand Brigade and the
Yeomanry. At 12.20 p.m. one of the Horse Artillery batteries moved
forward some 1,500 yards to support the attack of the Yeomanry.
By 1 o'clock our troops were within 600 yards of the southern
and western trenches, which were being shelled with good effect
by our artillery.
By 2 p.m. the right of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles had licked
up with the left of the Yeomanry, and was pressing its attack
on the rear of one of the enemy's works. General Chetwode now
issued orders for a concerted attack on the "Redoubt,"
or central keep, by the New Zealand Mounted Rifles, and all other
available troops of the Australian and New Zealand mounted force,
to commence at 3.30 p.m. The Yeomanry was ordered to co-operate
against the rear of the work. By 3.15 p.m. two of the enemy's
works had been captured and further prisoners had been taken.
While the attack on the central redoubt was developing, information
was received, both from patrols and from the Royal Flying Corps,
that an enemy relieving force was marching from Shellal on Rafa.
This force was attacked frequently with bombs, and machine gun
fire by our aeroplanes with success. General Chetwode did not
allow this threat, which complicated his situation, to affect
the execution of his purpose. He at once gave orders for the attack
to be pressed with vigour. The troops, admirably supported by
the artillery, advanced with great gallantry, and at 4.45 p.m.
the New Zealand Mounted Rifles captured the redoubt with brilliant
dash, covering the last 800 yards in two rushes, supported by
machine gun fire. By this achievement they were able to take the
lower lying works in reverse, and these soon fell to the Camel
Corps, the Yeomanry, and the Australian Light Horse. By 5.30 p.m.
all organised resistance was over, and the enemy's position with
all its garrison was captured, while a detachment of the Australian
Light Horse, which had come in contact with the force marching
from Shellal, drove off the enemy without difficulty.
Our troops now withdrew, taking with them all prisoners, animals
and material captured; one regiment and a light car patrol, which
were left to clear the battlefield, withdrew unmolested on the
following day. In this fine action, which lasted for ten hours,
the entire enemy force, with its commander, was accounted for.
More than 1,600 unwounded prisoners were taken, including one
German officer and five German non-commissioned officers. In addition,
six machine guns, four mountain guns, and a number of camels and
mules were captured. Our casualties were comparatively light,
amounting to 487 in all, of which 71 were killed, 415 wounded,
and one was missing.
10. The result of these successful operations was that the province
of Sinai, which for two years had been partially occupied by the
Turks, was freed of all formed bodies of Turkish troops. The destruction
of his rearguard at Magdhaba compelled the enemy to withdraw from
Maghara, Hassana and Nekhl, all of which were clear by the 31st
December, and the victory at Magruntein had driven him over the
frontier at Rafa, which he did not attempt to reoccupy. For this
achievement I am greatly indebted to Lieutenant-General Sir Charles
Dobell, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., and his Staff for their unremitting
efforts during the whole period to make our advance, as it was,
rapid and decisive. To them are mainly due the excellent organisation
and dispositions which ensured success without delay, and, above
all, the perfection of arrangements for maintaining the troops
in a waterless district far ahead of the railway, without which
the dash and endurance of our troops would have been of no avail.
The foresight, rapid decision and excellent arrangements of General
Sir P. Chetwode and the Staff of the Desert Column, the skilful
leadership of General Chauvel, the cheerful endurance by the troops
concerned of the fatigue and hardships entailed by the Magdhaba
operations, and their gallantry and dash at Magruntein, are also
worthy of the highest praise.
During the actions the work of the Royal Flying Carps in co-operation
with the mounted troops was admirable. Not only were the enemy
harassed with bombs and machine gun fire throughout, but the aircraft
reconnaissance was as reliable as it was untiring. General Chauvel
and General Chetwode were kept constantly and accurately informed
both of the enemy's movements and of the progress of their own
widely dispersed troops, and the co-operation of the aircraft
with the artillery was excellent. During the engagement at Magruntein
the Royal Flying Corps, besides attacking the entrenched enemy
and his relieving column, made a very successful raid on Bir Saba.
11. As a result of the action near Rafa the enemy immediately
began to concentrate his forces near Shellal, west of which place
he began rapidly to prepare a strong defensive position near Weli
Sheikh Nuran, wfth the object of coveringi his lines of communication
and supply along the railway running into Bir Saba from the north,
and along the Jerusalem —Hebron—Bir Saba road. The
preparation of this position has continued up to the present date.
During the earlier portion of January considerable activity was
shown by the enemy's aircraft, both in reconnaissances and small
bombing raids. On the other hand, the effect of our recent success
on his moral was proved by the very marked increase in the number
of deserters who came into our lines.
In the meantime arrangements had been progressing with a view
to the concentration of additional troops towards El Arish. In
general, the period following the action at; Magruntein was, on
my eastern front, devoted to preparations for a further advance.
Invaluable work was done during this period by the Royal Navy
in transporting and landing supplies from the sea at El Arish.
The coast is exceptionally unfavourable for operations of this
kind, owing to strong currents, a shelving and shifting beach
and heavy surf. Nevertheless, owing to the whole-hearted co-operation
of Vice-Admiral Sir R. E. Wemyss, K.C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O., and
those under him, a large amount of stores and supplies was landed.
Before the end of the month the railway station at El Arish was
completed.
12. During the month of February,
on the eastern front, the railway, in spite of many difficulties,
owing to the heavy sand, was gradually pushed out along the coast.
The period generally was devoted to the perfection of the El Arish
position, and to energetic training of the troops. Our cavalry
patrols kept the country up to and beyond Rafa continuously under
observation, and steps were taken to bring in the local Bedouins.
On 23rd February, information having
been received that Khan Yunus had been evacuated, a reconnaissance
was carried out against that place by the New Zealand Mounted
Rifles. The column, arriving at dawn, found the position strongly
held, and, after manoeuvring the enemy out of his front line of
defence and capturing prisoners, withdrew without difficulty.
Continuous pressure maintained by our troop sin this neighbourhood,
however, induced the enemy to withdraw the garrison of Khan Yunus,
which was entered by our cavalry without opposition on 28th February.
During the month also a successful minor operation was carried
out in the interior of the Sinai Peninsula. Information having
been received that the enemy had re-established small posts at
Hassana and Nekhl, with the object of regaining his prestige in
the eyes, of the Bedouins, I ordered a combined operation, against
those two places to be undertaken by three mobile columns of cavalry
and camelry one column starting from El Arish against Hassana
and two starting from Serapeum and Suez respectively, against
Nekhl. The advance was so timed that all the columns should arrive
at their destinations at dawn on 18th February. The column from
El Arish surrounded Hassana by daybreak on, the 18th. The garrison
of three officers and nineteen other ranks at once surrendered
without resistance. The town was searched, and a few camels, twenty-one
rifles and 2,400 rounds of small arms ammunition were found. The
northernmost of the Nekhl columns, leaving Zogha (some twenty-three
miles east of the Great Bitter Lake), which was its point of concentration,
marched through the Baha Pass to Themada, twenty-five miles north-west
of Nekhl, where it arrived on the 16th. On the following day a
patrol sent forward towards the Nekhl-Hassana road was fired on
from the hills, and in the afternoon it was further reported that
the road was clear and that men could be seen leaving Nekhl in
an easterly direction. The advanced patrol captured four of the
enemy and ten camels, but was prevented from crossing the plain
east of Nekhl by rifle fire from about fifty of the enemy who
had temporarily halted in the foothills on the Nekhl-Akaba road.
Nekhl was entered that evening by a squadron of the Australian
Light Horse, who captured two Bedouins and one Turk, the town
being otherwise empty. Further pursuit of the enemy was impossible
owing to darkness, and the remnants of the garrison were able
to make good their escape eastwards along the waterless road towards
Akaba. The main body entered Nekhl at dawn on the 18th, and the
Southern Column from Suez reached the town at 9 a.m. The latter
column, which included detachments of Indian infantry, had marched
from Abu T'if (20 miles south-east of Suez) through the difficult
Bir Abu Garad Pass to Ain Sudr, and thence to Nekhl. The total
captures at Nekhl were eleven prisoners, one field gun, a number
of rifles, 16,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 250 rounds
of gun ammunition, and a quantity of stores and explosives. These
well-executed and carefully organised operations gave one more
proof to the enemy of the mobility of our mounted troops, .and
of their power to strike over considerable stretches of waterless
desert. The excellent arrangements for the Nekhl operation reflect
great credit on Brigadier-General P. C. Palin, C.B., and his staff.
13. During most of the period under review the Western Front [of
Egypt] has been quiet. My advance to the Baharia and Dakhla Oases
was accomplished without opposition, and the subsequent task on
that front was that of policing its large area and guarding against
the possibility of further raids on the part of the Senussi. On
4th October Major-General W. A. Watson,
C.B., C.I.E., took over the command of the Western Force. By this
date a column had already been concentrated at Shusha, three miles
west of Samalut, for the purpose of conducting operations in the
Baharia Oasis. A few days later, however, reliable intelligence
was received to the effect that Sayed Ahmed, who had already left
the Dakhla Oasis for Baharia, had left Baharia for Siwa on 9th
October, the majority of his force preceding him, the rearguard
following on the next day. It is probable that the news of my
impending advance and the sickness and lack of food in the oasis,
which impaired the moral of his troops, were deciding factors
in determining his retreat.
An immediate endeavour to intercept the enemy's rearguard was
made by concentrating all available light armed cars west of Baharia,
but the distance to be covered and the sandy nature of the country
prevented the success of the attempt. Small mobile columns were
at once pushed into the oases of Baharia (110 miles west of Samalut)
and Dahkla (75 miles west of Kharga), and all the enemy who had
not accompanied the retreat, some 300 in number, were captured
with little resistance. The Harra wells on the edge of the Baharia
Oasis were captured by a detachment of the Imperial Camel Corps
on the 17th, and on the 19th a detachment of the same corps entered
the oasis and took possession of the villages of Harra, Mendisha,
Bawitti, and Kasr. This oasis was soon completely in our possession,
and the Baharia railway commenced receiving traffic. A Light Car
Patrol and a detachment of Imperial Camel Corps, starting
from Kharga, covered 70 miles of desert and occupied Tenida, in
the Dakhla oasis, by the 17th. The light cars pushed on to Budkulu,
capturing a tabur of 45 men and ten camels, and on the 19th the
Camel Corps detachment reached Bir Sheikh Mohammed, five miles
west of Kasr Dahkla, and captured 40 more prisoners.
From the 20th to the 22nd a thorough
"drive" was made of the oasis, with a systematic search
of the villages, which resulted in the capture of 50 more of the
enemy, besides many political prisoners. By the end of the month
the oasis was entirely clear of the enemy.
During the following month permanent garrisons were established
in these two oases. The Baharia garrison marched out on 6th November
and encamped on the escarpment at Legalit Gate, where a very healthy
site has been found. The inhabitants, who were undoubtedly glad
to be rid of the Senussi, all turned out to welcome the troops,
and so far throughout the oasis the latter have always been well
received. General Watson himself visited the oasis on 16th November
and held a durbar on the 17th at Bawitti, which was attended by
the Omdas, Sheikhs and principal inhabitants. The Union Jack was
hoisted in the presence of a guard of honour. On 15th November
a patrol left Legalit to reconnoitre the Farafra Oasis. The town
of Fa-rafra was entered on the 19th. All Senussi followers were
separated from the inhabitants, and a search made for arms, with
the result that 18 Senoussi prisoners and 12 rifles were taken.
The patrol left Farafra on the 20th.
During December General Watson visited Dakhla and held a durbar
on the 19th. The task of re-instituting civil administration in
both the Baharia and Dakhla Oases has now been taken over by the
civil authorities, to the gratification of the inhabitants, and
trade is being encouraged as much as possible.
In the other sections of the western front the work done by the
light and armoured cars, owing to the dash and enterprise of their
officers, has been uniformly excellent. They are the terror of
all the ill-disposed in the Western Desert, and to them, as much
as to any, is due the satisfactory state of things which exists
throughout from the coast down to the Fayum. The geographical
information obtained by these patrols is also invaluable.
14. During October, under the direction of the Italian authorities,
a combined British and Italian naval reconnaissance was carried
out at Ageila, thirty-two miles west of Tobruk, where a large
camp of followers of Idris and Nuri, with guns and a quantity
of ammunition, was reported. The camp was shelled, serious casualties
being inflicted. On 27th October
a light armoured car patrol, accompanied by Lieutenant Tescione,
of the Italian Army, reconnoitred an enemy camp at Zowia Jansur,
the Muhafzia holding the camp being driven off into the sand dunes
by machine gun fire.
During, November and December much valuable information of the
desert routes in the Coastal Section was obtained by patrols.
In the Moghara Section several attempts were made by the light
car patrols to find a practicable route to the El Qara Oasis,
but the boggy ground and high sand dunes on each occasion defeated
the attempt. Towards the end of November an interesting and useful
reconnaissance was made from Aswan through the Kurkur Oasis to
Beris, on the southernmost end of the Kharga Oasis. The total
distance covered was 336 miles.
15. During the month of January I received intelligence that Sayed
Ahmed, the Grand Senussi, with his Commander-in-Chief, Mohammed
Saleh, whose force amounted to some 1,200 men, were making preparations
to depart from the Siwa Oasis and to retire to Jaghbub. With the
intention of capturing Sayed Ahmed if possible, and of inflicting
as much loss as possible on his followers, I gave orders on the
21st January that operations were to be undertaken against the
Siwa and Girba Oases at the earliest possible moment by
a mixed force, to consist of Imperial Camel Companies and armoured
cars. Preparations for the march of such a force, however, over
the 200 miles of waterless desert between Mersa Matruh and Siwa
would have taken at least one month, and the expenditure of so
much time was put out of the question by a reliable report received
towards the end of the month that Sayed Ahmed and his followers
were on the point of leaving Siwa. I therefore ordered an immediate
reconnaissance of the Siwa and Girba Oases to be undertaken by
a column consisting entirely of armoured motor cars, and supplied
by motor transport based on Mersa Matruh, with the object of verifying
the above report, and of inflicting as much loss as possible on
such part of the enemy forces as might be met with. Command of
this column was entrusted to Brigadier-General H. W. Hodgson,
C.V.O., C.B., whose plan was to attack the enemy camp at Girba
with his main body, and to detach two armoured motor batteries
to block the pass at Garet-el-Munasib—the only pass bet-ween
Siwa and Jaghbub practicable for camels—so that should Sayed
Ahmed, as was probable, take to flight, casualties might be inflicted
on his retreating column by the detached batteries, and his march
be deflected into the waterless sanddunes.
16. The fighting force of three light armoured batteries and three
light car patrols was concentrated at Mersa Matruh by the evening
of the 29th January. Owing, however, to a severe sandstorm, some
of the heavy lorries of the heavy supply column did not arrive
there from Dabaa till the 31st. The light supply column moved
out from Mersa Matruh on the same day, and the fighting force
moved out early the following morning. The column, having halted
for the night on the road, moved to the point of concentration
halfway between G-ebel Lamlaz and Neqb el Shegga Pass, 185 miles
from Matruh. This long march over the desert track was carried
out in good time, and all units reached the point of concentration
on 2nd February. After a reconnaissance
towards the Siwa Oasis, orders were given for an advance on Girba—at
the western end of the Siwa Oasis— on the following day,
and for the move of the detachment allotted to block the Munasib
Pass. By 9 a.m. on 3rd February all units had successfully descended
the pass north-east of Girba and moved off to the attack, the
advanced guard being divided into three parties of two armoured
cars each, one of which was to attack each of the three enemy
camps already located. The enemy was located in rough ground close
under the rocky escarpment; he was completely surprised by the
arrival of the armoured cars, and thrown into considerable confusion.
Brisk fire was opened on the enemy, who at once took to the cliffs
and rocks beyond the camps and returned our fire. The advanced
guard was now reinforced, but, owing to the very rough nature
of the country, it was impossible for the cars to approach nearer
than a distance of 800 yards from the enemy without serious risk
of getting stuck. As the action progressed, it became evident
that the enemy, who was engaging the armoured cars with two guns
and two machine guns, was in considerable force and did not intend
to retire without a fight. Information obtained from deserters
showed that the strength of the enemy at Girba was 850, while
Sayed Ahmed, Mohammed Saleh, and some 400 or 500 men were at Siwa.
As afterwards appeared, Mohammed Saleh left to take command at
Girba at the beginning of the engagement, while Sayed Ahmed and
his force made off to the westward. General Hodgson, who made
skilful arrangements for extricating his force, in case of a threat
directed by the Siwa party on his left flank and rear, continued
the action all day. The light armoured cars, though unable to
get closer than 400 yards from the enemy's position, kept the
enemy under an accurate fire, inflicting some casualties. Towards
evening the enemy's fire died down, though occasional bursts were
fired from his machine guns during the night. At 5 a.m. on the
4th February the enemy fired four final rounds from his guns and
several bursts of machine gun fire. Fires were seen beyond his
camp, movements of men and animals could be distinguished, and
the sounds of small arms ammunition being burnt were heard. By
dawn he had completely evacuated his position. The rest of the
day was spent in destroying the enemy's camp, reconnoitring towards
Siwa and resting the troops, and on the following morning, 5th
February, the column entered Siwa without opposition.
A parade, at which the local sheikhs were assembled, was held
before the court-house, and a salute of nine guns fired with a
Krupp gun that had been brought from Matruh in a motor lorry.
Arrangements were then made for the collection of all rifles and
for the repair of the passes leading down to the escarpment. The
reception given to our troops by the inhabitants of the oasis
was friendly, and reports from them confirmed the fact that the
enemy had incurred considerable casualties. The column left the
town on the same afternoon, and reached the point of concentration
on the following day.
Meanwhile, the Munassib detachment, consisting of armoured cars
and a light car patrol, had reached its position on the evening
of the 3rd February. It was found impossible to get the armoured
cars down the steep escarpment, and they were forced to remain
at a point 18 miles north of Munassib during the operations. The
light car patrol and one car managed to get down the escarpment
and take up a position at Munassib. On the 4th this detachment
captured a small convoy of mailbags proceeding east to Siwa, and
on the 5th it was able to intercept and cut up the leading parties
of the enemy retreating from Girba. Subsequently, the enemy established
a post out of reach of the cars, and warned all subsequent parties
of the enemy to turn into the sand-dunes before reaching the pass.
The detachment was therefore ordered to return to the point of
concentration, as there was no chance of further successful action.
The whole column returned to Matruh on the 8th February, having
sustained no casualties to personnel beyond three officers slightly
wounded, or to material besides the loss of one tender with broken
springs. The enemy's losses were 40 killed, including two Senussi
officers, and 200 wounded, including five Turkish officers; 70
rifles were brought in and 150 destroyed; 3,000 rounds of small
arms ammunition were brought in and 2,000 destroyed, besides what
was burnt by the enemy; 40 of the enemy's camels were killed,
and a large number of shelters and tents were burnt.
17. Though the capture of Sayed Ahmed and Mohammed Saleh was wanting
to the complete success of the operations, the fighting troops—supported
most admirably by the supply column working under extremely arduous
conditions—accomplished all that was possible under the
circumstances, and great credit is due to General Hodgson and
his staff. The expedition which, at my request, was accompanied
by Captain Caccia, the Italian Military Attache, dealt a rude
blow to the moral of the Senussi, left the Grand Senussi himself
painfully making his way to Jaghbub through the rugged and waterless
dunes, and freed my western front from the menace of his
forces.
On 14th February No. 2 Light Armoured
Car Battery left Sollum to reconnoitre the road to Melfa. During
this reconnaissance two enemy caravans were met and destroyed.
18. The outstanding features of the period covered by this despatch
have been, on the railways, and on the western front the work
of the armoured cars. For the speed at which the railway has been
pushed out along the desert to El Arish and beyond, the greatest
credit is due to Colonel Sir G. Macauley, K.C.M.G., C.B., Director
of Railways, the officers of his staff, and the officers and men
of the railway companies. In spite of endless difficulties owing
to heavy sand and lack of water, they maintained by their strenuous
efforts a rate of advance which was not far behind that of the
fighting troops, and were largely instrumental in enabling the
latter to keep the enemy under a continual pressure.
I have already referred to the excellent work of the armoured
cars and light car patrols on the western front. Their mobility,
and the skill and energy with which they are handled, have made
them an ideal arm for the western desert, where the sand is not
so heavy as on the east. It is not too much to say that the .successful
clearance of the western oases and the satisfactory state of affairs
which now exists
on the western front is due more to the dash and enterprise of
the armoured car batteries and the light car patrols than to any
other cause, and the enemy has found many times to his cost that
their range of action is far beyond that of any troops mounted
on horses or camels.
The work of the Imperial Camel Corps has been excellent throughout.
This corps includes Australian, New Zealand and Imperial units,
and the efficiency of the camel companies is largely due to the
efforts of the instructional staff at the headquarters of the
corps at Abbassia, which has been continuously engaged in their
training. A.great deal of the work of supplying the troops on
both fronts has been done by the Camel Transport Corps, a unit
which has been raised in this country since the commencement of
operations, and which has invariably carried out its duties with
the utmost efficiency.
The execution of the enormous amount of work necessitated by our
advance on the eastern front would have been quite impossible
had it not been for the Egyptian Labour Corps, which began to
be recruited in this country early in 1916. The officers of this
Corps have been
largely found among gentlemen who are resident in this country
and are familiar with the language and customs of the population.
My relations with the High Commissioner, General Sir F. E. Wingate,
G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., have always been most cordial,
and I should like to express my gratitude for his ready assistance
and valuable advice which have always been at my disposal.
I also wish to express my grateful appreciation of the services
of all the officers employed as King's Messengers. The risks involved
were
not small, as is proved by the fact that one officer was drowned
and another, when his ship was torpedoed, was forced to sink his
despatches; nevertheless, this duty has always been faithfully
and efficiently performed.
I have, in a former despatch, referred to the admirable work of
the Red Cross and Order of St. John in this country, under the
direction of Sir Courtauld Thomson, C.B. I desire now to express
my obligation to those ladies and gentlemen who have given voluntary
aid in connection with these institutions, and who lave worked
with a devotion deserving of the highest praise, in the interests
of the sick and wounded. Not only have they earned the gratitude
of the individuals they looked after, but also they deserve the
thanks of their country, as they have materially contributed towards
the rapid convalescence and, therefore, to the maintenance of
the fighting efficiency of the forces under my command.
Tlhe operations which I have had the honour to describe in this
despatch, and which have resulted in the freeing of Egyptian territory
of all formed bodies of the enemy, could not have been successfully
carried out by the forces in the field but for the devotion, energy
and skill of the Headquarters Staff and Heads of the Administrative
Services. I have on previous occasions expressed my appreciation
of the able manner in which Major-General A. L. Lynden Bell, C.B.,
C.M.G., Chief of the General Staff, has discharged his duties.
I wish again to bring this officer prominently to notice for his
admirable work during the period under review.
The abolition of the Inspector-Generalship, Lines of Communication,
has thrown upon my Deputy Quartermaster-General, Major-General
W. Campbell, C.B., D.S.O., and my Deputy Adjutant-General, Major-General
J. Adye, C.B., the whole of the work previously performed by the
Inspector-General of Communications, and these duties they have
had to discharge in addition to the normal work in connection
with an Army in the Field. The Eastward advance has also now lengthened
the lines of communication to something like 200 miles. I wish,
therefore, specially to acknowledge the excellent work done by
these two officers, and I shall have the pleasure of bringing
before you the names of a number of Officers of the Administrative
Services in this connection.
I wish to bring to your notice the excellent manner in which my
Assistant Military Secretary, Lieutenant-Colonel S. H. Pollen,
C.M.G., has performed the exceptionally heavy work of his department.
A list of those Officers, Non-commissioned officers and men whom
I desire to bring to your special notice in connection with these
operations will be forwarded at an early date.
I have the honour to be,
Your Lordship's most obedient servant,
A. J. MURRAY,
General, Commander-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
