General Headquarters,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force,
1st June, 1916.
Sir,—I have the honour to submit a report on the operations
of the Force under my command from the date on which I assumed
command to the 31st May, 1916.
1. On 9th January, 1916, I arrived in Cairo, and, on the following
day, took over the command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary
Force from General Sir C. C. Monro, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., who had
himself arrived from Mudros but a few days before. At that date
the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was in a state of transition
as regards its larger component, the Dardanelles Army. On the
night of the 8th/9th January this Army had completed its successful
evacuation of Cape Helles; its units were still concentrated at
Mudros and Imbros awaiting transport to Egypt, where all the Force,
excluding the Salonica Army, had been ordered to concentrate.
Meanwhile, a portion of the Force, which had been set free by
the earlier evacuation of the Suvla Bay and Anzac positions, had
already arrived in Egypt, where it had come under the command
of General Sir John Maxwell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. The concentration
of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, for instance, was
practically complete, and the 53rd Division was occupied in operations
on the Western Frontier of Egypt. General Headquarters of the
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force were temporarily established
in Cairo.
The instructions which I had received from the Secretary of State
for War placed under my command all organized formations then
in Egypt, or on their way to Egypt, with the exception of such
troops as might be considered necessary for the defence of Egypt
and the Nile Valley against attack from the west, or for maintaining
order in the Nile Valley and the Nile Delta. The function assigned
to me was that of protecting Egypt against attack from the east,
and the westward limit of my command was roughly fixed by a line
running north and south approximately five miles west of the Suez
Canal. The British Force at Salonica was also placed under my
general supervision.
2. During the period under review, in addition to the extensive
military preparations required for the defence of the eastern
front, the amount of purely administrative work thrown, on all
sections of my Staff has been extremely heavy. The exigencies
of the Gallipoli campaign had placed the Force under my command
in a state of serious disorganisation. Some units were in Egypt,
others on the sea, others in AEgean ports. It was not until the
end of February that the last units of the Dardanelles Army reached
Egypt. Every day for over six weeks ship loads of troops, guns,
animals and transport were arriving at Alexandria and Port Said.
The components of this mass had to be disentangled and forwarded
to their proper destinations; old units had to be reorganised,
new units to be created, brigades, divisions, Army Corps to be
re-formed. The British troops from Gallipoli were incomplete in
personnel and material. It was urgently necessary to bring them
up to strength, reequip them, and provide them with train and
mechanical transport on a modified scale. The Australasian troops
also needed re-equipment, and, in their case, there was the additional
problem of dealing with a mass of unabsorbed reinforcements. Further
training of officers and men was an urgent necessity. Moreover,
the embarkation of troops for service elsewhere began in February
and continued without intermission till the end of April. To this
work must be added not only the maintenance of my Force, both
in Egypt and Salonica, with animals, supplies, ordnance stores,
works material, and medical and veterinary stores, but also the
provision and despatch of ordnance stores, works material, and
supplies specially demanded for Basrah and East Africa.
The bulk of the work of disembarkation and embarkation, including
the very heavy work of railway transport, fell upon the staffs
of my Deputy Quartermaster-General and Inspector General of Communications,
to whom great credit is due. This work, together with the task
of supplying and maintaining the troops operating on the eastern,
and subsequently also on the western, front, was efficiently carried
out by the Ordnance, Supply and Transport, Remount, and Works
departments. As regards instruction, a training centre for Australasian
reinforcements was started at Tel el Kebir and continued until
it was decided that the Australasian training depots should be
transferred to England. Further, a machine gun school was formed
at Ismailia which, after producing excellent results, was merged
in the Imperial School of Instruction at Zeitoun. The latter institution,
which came under my control after 19th March, has since been increased
in size so as to train officers in all branches of warfare. Under
its commandant, Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. E. M. Colston, M.V.O.,
its work has been most valuable. Besides the ordinary courses,
for officers and non-commissioned officers, it holds machine gun,
Lewis gun, signal and telephone, artillery, Stokes gun, and grenadier
classes. Between 7th January and 31st May, 1,166 officers and
5,512 other ranks attended and passed in the various classes.
A machine gun school was also started at Salonica.
Excellent work has been done by the signal service during this
period. In the first place, it has efficiently carried out the
work of refitting the signal units from the Peninsula, reorganising
them to suit the conditions peculiar to Egypt, and training locally
officers and men to fill the gaps and meet the increased demand
for signallers and telegraphists. Ninety-four officers and 1,305
other ranks have been trained in these duties at Zeitoun and Alexandria
this year. Secondly, it has had to provide intercommunication
for troops engaged upon over 1,000 miles of front, which has involved
the development of an unusually extensive network of military
telegraphs. All the resource and ingenuity of the service has
been taxed to cope with the conditions peculiar to this field
of operations—abnormal distances, unusual means of transport,
desert, sand storms and mirage. Lastly, it has substituted a military
telegraph and telephone service for the civil system which, until
this year, had been the only available means of communication
throughout Egypt and was worked mainly by native personnel.
I would also specially mention the survey work that has been carried
out since the arrival of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force
in Egypt. In addition to the standardisation, printing and issue
of tactical maps of Sinai to the whole of the army on the eastern
front, a new survey on a large scale of the Canal zone and certain
areas east of our lines and advanced posts has been continuously
carried on by the Topographical Section of the Intelligence Branch,
working in close co-operation with the Royal Flying Corps. This
survey, which has
now been in process for nearly six months, is now approaching
Qatia. I believe that the map based on this survey is the first
map entirely constructed on this principle. The work was initiated
by Mr. E. M. Dowson, Director-General, Survey of Egypt, who placed
his resources at the disposal of the Mediterranean Expeditionary
Force. The actual direction of the work has been in the hands
of the Intelligence Branch of my General Staff, and is based on
experience, gained in Gallipoli, of the production of trench maps
from aeroplane photographs, controlled by ordinary field survey
methods. Co-operation in this survey has been part of the routine
of the Royal Flying Corps. These labours, most of which demanded
the utmost despatch in their completion, were carried out concurrently
with the conduct of more strictly military operations, to my report
on which I will now proceed.
3. When I arrived in Egypt the intentions of the enemy as regards
an attack on the Suez Canal were by no means certain. Though his
new means of communication in southern Syria and Sinai, commenced
with this end in view, were still in a backward state, he undoubtedly
had at his disposal the troops, amounting to 250,000 men or more,
necessary for such an attack. The adequate defence of the Canal
was, therefore, a matter of serious importance. The outline of
a scheme of defence had already been prepared; certain works were
being constructed, railways and pipe-lines and roads commenced,
and troops were being concentrated in the three sections of the
Canal defences, which were based on Suez, Ismailia and Port Said
respectively. A satisfactory agreement was arrived at between
Sir John Maxwell and myself regarding the delimitations of our
respective spheres of command and the troops to be allotted to
him. On 22nd January [1916] General
Headquarters opened at Ismailia. My chief concern was now the
defence of the Canal. The work on the stationary defences was
backward. Difficulties of water supply on the east bank were increased
by shortage of piping; labour troubles had delayed the progress
of roads and railways. Guns had still to be emplaced, and no part
of the front defence line was actually occupied by troops. Nevertheless,
as there were no signs of an imminent advance on the part of the
enemy, the question of the stationary defences caused me no serious
anxiety, though everything possible was done to hasten on their
completion.
The organisation of the offensive defence, which time has proved
to be paramount, was, however, a pressing matter hitherto untouched.
Practically nothing had been done towards the organisation of
mobile forces. The collection of a large number of riding and
transport camels had to be undertaken at once and a plan of campaign
to be devised. Moreover, time was short, for it was plain that
any offensive on a large scale by the enemy must be commenced
before tihe middle of March. For the force under my command the
only possible line of advance was along the northern line from
Qantara towards Qatia and El Arish, and the task was at once taken
up of examining the possibilities of an offensive on this line
and solving the problem of maintaining a considerable force at
Qatia during the summer months. The result of these investigations
is to be seen in my memorandum of 15th February addressed to the
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, in which I stated that the
first step towards securing the true base for the defence of Egypt
was an advance to a suitable position east of Qatia and the construction
of a railway to that place.
Up to the middle of February aeroplane reconnaissance was the
only active military operation possible, owing to the need for
reorganising the units of the Force and for pushing on the work
of laying roads, pipe-lines and railways to enable an adequate
force to be maintained on, and beyond, the front lines. The magnitude
of the latter task may be judged from the fact that, during the
period covered by this despatch, 114 miles of road, 154 miles
of pipe-lines, and 252 miles of railway were laid. The work of
the Royal Flying Corps, most actively and gallantly pursued, enabled
me to keep the enemy's posts at Hassana, Nekhl and El Arish under
close observation, and neither their reports nor those of the
equally gallant and efficient Naval Air Service, which observed
by seaplane the garrisons of southern Syria, showed any concentration
of enemy troops for a big attack on the Canal.
On February 16th the Russian Army
entered Erzerum, inflicting a heavy defeat on the Turkish Army
opposed to it. It seemed likely then that all the enemy's schemes
for attacking the Canal in force must, for the present, fall to
the ground, and such has proved to be the case. The garrisons
in Syria were gradually reduced, until it was estimated that not
more than 60,000 men were available for an attack on Egypt. During
the latter half of February the work of reconnaissance beyond
the front line began in earnest, especially in the northern section,
where the 15th Corps patrolled as far as Bir El Nuss and Hod Um
Ugba, establishing the fact that the country was all clear and
practically deserted. At this period, too, a reconnaissance was
undertaken from Tor. This post, and that of Abu Zeneima, both
on the Sinaitic coast south of Suez, were then garrisoned by a
battalion of the Egyptian Army— subsequently by the 14th
Sikhs—and had, by arrangement with General Maxwell, come
under my direction. The reconnaissance from Tor was undertaken
against a concentration of a small body of the enemy at Wadi Ginneh,
some miles distant from the coast. This minor operation was in
every way successful, though the enemy had fled before their camp
was reached, leaving behind their baggage, which was destroyed.
The troops then returned without further incident.
4. From March onwards, the rapid embarkation of troops for France
depleted my forces considerably. During this month the military
operations on the eastern front, if not momentous, were satisfactory.
On 6th March a very gallant and successful
attack on Hassana was made by the Royal Flying Corps, which resulted
in the destruction of the pumping station. Bomb attacks were made
on Nekhl and other places in Sinai, and on 24th March Hassana
was again attacked in force with bombs. In the northern sector,
the preliminary steps were being taken for the advance to Qatia.
Week by week permanent posts were pushed further ahead, special
reconnaissances were made with a view to testing the water supply,
and the broad gauge railway from Qantara to Qatia was being carried
forward as fast as possible.
5. On 11th March I received instructions
from the late Secretary of State for War that the command of the
troops in Egypt was to be reorganised, and that I was appointed
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief all the Imperial forces in
this country, which added to my original command the command held
by General Sir John Maxwell. The preliminary details for carrying
this change into operation were fixed at a Conference with General
Maxwell held on 13th March, and on 19th March I formally took
over the whole command in Egypt, thus ending a system of dual
control which had of necessity been unsatisfactory, especially
from the point of view of economy. By this change I not only became
responsible for the administration of martial law in Egypt and
the maintenance of order throughout the Nile Valley and Delta,
but I also succeeded to the direction of the operations against
the Senoussi on the Western Frontier, which had very appropriately
been brought to a triumphant period by General Maxwell by his
victories which led to the occupation of Sollum on 14th March,
the capture of Gaafer, the dispersal, with the loss of all his
guns, of Nuri's force, and the recapture from the enemy of 90
British prisoners taken by hostile submarines. The unification
of the command in Egypt made large economies in staff possible,
and these were carried out at once. The Levant Base also ceased
to exist, General Sir Edward Altham, K.C.B., remaining as Inspector-General
of Communications. The work of reorganising the forces and staffs
for the Delta and Western Frontier Force was pushed on as fast
as possible. I decided to keep General Headquarters at Ismailia,
and to establish at Cairo a General Officer Commanding the Delta
District, who would also act as Commander of L. of C. Defences.
For operations on the west I formed a Western Frontier Force,
divided into two sections, a north-western and a southwestern,
divided by a line drawn east and west through Deirut. These staffs
and forces were definitely established and at work by 1st April.
The whole force under my command now took the name of Egyptian
Expeditionary Force.
Towards the end of March, at the request of the Sirdar, I undertook
the responsibility for the defence of the reach of the Nile between
Assouan and Wadi Haifa. Captain F. H. Mitchell, R.N., D.S.O.,
was sent for this purpose to make all arrangements for an armed
naval patrol of this reach. On 18th March, Captain H. R. H. the
Prince of Wales took up his duties as Staff Captain on my Staff,
remaining till his departure from Egypt on 1st May.
6. As soon as the conduct of operations on the Western Frontier
devolved upon me, I took steps, in consultation with the various
officers who were then best acquainted with the situation, to
estimate the size of the hostile forces with which I should have
to deal, and to determine the policy along this front of over
800 miles by which the Nile Valley could best be protected. It
appeared from the information placed at my disposal that the Senoussi
forces, spread over the whole Western desert, did not exceed 3,000,
and it was certain that the
enemy's moral had been severely shaken by Sir John Maxwell's recent
successful operations. The chief dangers, therefore, against which
I had to guard were enemy raids upon the Nile Valley, the stirring
up of native tribes that were inclined to be well-disposed towards
the Senoussi, and the creation of unrest in the Nile Valley and
Delta among disaffected or nervous elements of the population.
The chief end to be held in view was to prevent any local success
on the part of the Senoussi.
On 15th April the Kharga Oasis, which
had previously been reported by aerial reconnaissance and resident
agents to be clear of the enemy, was occupied without incident.
The movement of troops was effected by the existing light railway,
and by the 18th April a force numbering 1,660 of all ranks was
concentrated in the Oasis.
On the 27th April the small oasis
of Moghara was occupied. A strongly entrenched post has been constructed.
The occupation of this post has materially assisted in preventing
the passage of foodstuffs from the Nile Valley to the west, and
denies the water to any enemy
force attempting to move in the contrary direction.
During April frequent raids and reconnaissances, chiefly with
a view to capturing concealed depots of ammunition, were undertaken
on the Western Front; in these enterprises our armoured and light
motor cars have been of inestimable value. On 7th April a detachment
of four armoured cars, accompanied by the machine-gun section
of the 2/7th Middlesex Regiment, conducted a raid from Sollum
upon an ammunition depot at Moraisa, eighteen miles north-west
of Sbllum. After a very slight resistance from the guard of thirty
Muhafzia, twenty-one boxes of 8.9 centimetre Mantelli gun ammunition
and 120,000 rounds of small arms ammunition were taken and destroyed.
On 11th April a motor car reconnaisance
found and removed eleven rifles and 7,000 rounds of small arms
ammunition some twenty miles west of Sollum. On 23rd April an
armoured car reconnaissance from Sollum discovered and brought
in 140,000 rounds of small arms ammunition from a concealed depot.
On the 30th April a further 20,000 rounds were discovered and
brought in to Sollum. During this month, also, four prisoners,
including a Turkish officer, were captured sixty miles west of
Minia, and two small camel convoys were captured near El Alamein.
The light car patrols were responsible for all these captures.
7. During the month of April reconnaissance was active all along
the Eastern Front, with the result that by the middle of the month
all water supplies of any importance within thirty miles of the
Canal were patrolled by our troops, and mobile columns were ready
to go out and deal with enemy parties approaching them, or, in
the event of serious threat, to demolish the rock cisterns. In
No. 1 Section, on 20th April, a patrol
from Bir Mabeiuk came in contact with an enemy patrol, fifty strong,
on the sand hills near the mouth of the Wadi Hamatha, som eeighteen
miles W.S.W. of Suez. A squadron and fifty rifles endeavoured
to cut the enemy off, but he at once retired and scattered among
the hills. Our casualties were two men killed.
On 23rd April and the following days
four columns, each composed of mounted troops and infantry, carried
out reconnaissances of the approaches from the west to Ain Sudr
and Sudr El Heitan. The columns returned to their respective posts
on 26th April. In No. 2 Section, on 27th March, the 2nd Australian
and New Zealand Army Corps came into existence on the departure
of the 1st Australian and New Zealand Army Corps to France. The
Corps was commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Alexander Godley,
K.C.M.G., C.B., and consisted of the 4th Australian Division,
commanded by Major-General Sir H. V. Cox, K.C.M.G., C.B., C.S.I.,
the 5th Australian Division, commanded by Major-General Hon. J.
MacCay, V.D., and the Anzac Mounted Division, commanded by Major-General
H. G. Chauvel, C.B., C.M.G. (attached). In this section, the wells
at Moiya Harab and Wadi Um Muksheib having been brought into the
regular patrolling area, a very successful reconnaissance to Jifjaffa
was carried out between 11th and 15th April. The troops for this
enterprise were a squadron of the 9th Australian Light Horse Regiment,
accompanied by a detachment of Bikanir Camel Corps, and commanded
by Major Scott, D.S.O., 9th Australian Light Horse. The objective
was fifty-two miles from the starting point, and a jumping-off
place for the attack, eight miles south-west of the objective,
was reached at 2.30 a.m. on 13th April. From here an attack was
launched by three troops upon the enemy's position at 9 a.m. The
enemy, cut off in their attempted retreat by the right flanking
party of the attack, stood at bay on one of the hills above the
village, and lost six men killed and five wounded before surrendering.
One Austrian lieutenant of engineers and thirty-three other prisoners
were captured, our own casualties being one man and one horse
killed. The destruction of the enemy's camp was thoroughly carried
out, a quantity of correspondence was taken, and the elaborate
well-boring plant, which had been at work for five months, was
completely demolished. The manner in which this operation was
carried out was most creditable, both to the commander of the
column and to all ranks composing it.
In conjunction with this reconnaissance, a mounted column was
sent out in No. 1 Section to reconnoitre Bir el Giddi and the
roads leading east from it. This force satisfactorily accomplished
its mission, and, after an encounter with a hostile patrol, captured
unwounded three armed Arabs.
In the Qatia District, where alone there is sufficient water supply
to maintain a large body of troops, preliminaries to the accomplishment
of our ultimate aim—the permanent occupation of the well-watered
zone radiating 15 miles east and south-east of Qatia—were
steadily pushed on. On 2nd April,
a squadron of the Gloucestershire Hussars under Lieut.-Colonel
Yorke, with a detachment of Bikanir Camel Corps, reconnoitred
Bir el Abd, some 15 miles east of Qatia, met with no resistance,
and burnt some tents and stores belonging to the enemy. On the
following day, Bir Mageibra, 10 miles south-east of Qatia, was
reconnoitred by the Worcestershire Yeomanry. On the 6th
April Brigadier-General E. A. Wiggin, commanding the 5th Mounted
Brigade, took command of the Qatia District, and was made responsible
direct to the headquarters of No. 3 Section. On 9th April, a further
reconnaissance of Bir el Abd was undertaken by a squadron of Worcestershire
Yeomanry. This time a strong party of enemy were found in possession
of a ridge north-east of Bir el Abd. A sharp skirmish ensued when
the Yeomanry attacked, and the enemy was driven eastwards from
his position, but, owing to the heaviness of the sand, it was
impossible for our cavalry to keep up the attack, and, after easily
fending off an attempt at a flank attack, they withdrew unmolested.
On 12th April, on orders being received for General Horne to proceed
to France, Major-General The Hon. H. A. Lawrence took over the
command of No. 3 Section.
By the 21st April, the railway towards
Qatia had reached a point upon which a serious advance to hold
the whole district could be based, as soon as the necessary dispositions
could be made. On the 23rd, however, the enemy attempted to forestall
any such advance by making a sudden raid in force upon Qatia.
This operation, though comparatively small forces were engaged,
produced the severest fighting yet experienced by the force under
my command.
8. On 21st April, the 5th Mounted Brigade were disposed as follows:
—The Worcestershire Yeomanry at Qatia, the Warwickshire
Yeomanry, less one squadron, at Hamisah, 3 miles S.S.W. of Qatia,
and Brigade Headquarters and the Gloucestershire Yeomanry at Romani,
6 miles N.W. of Qatia. General Wiggin, commanding the Brigade,
had received orders to dispose his Brigade in the Qatia District
in such a manner as to protect all railway, topographical and
water survey parties, with special attention to the exploitation
of the
water supply; also to observe the route eastwards towards Bir
el Abd, but not to take any serious offensive measures without
further orders. It had also been impressed on General Wiggin by
the General Officer Commanding No. 3 Section that, since it would
take two days to reinforce him with infantry, he was, in the event
of a heavy attack, to manoeuvre back upon Dueidar, 13 miles from
Qantara on the Qatia road, or upon the railhead near El Arais
some 7 miles N.W. of Qatia. On the evening of the 21st one squadron
of Worcestershire Yeomanry moved into bivouac at Oghratina, 7
miles E.N.E. of Qatia, to cover an R.E. party detailed to prepare
wells. On
the 22nd another squadron of Worcestershire Yeomanry proceeded
to Oghratina, being replaced in Qatia by a squadron of Gloucestershire
Yeomanry, pending the arrival of one regiment of the Anzac Mounted
Division, which had been ordered up from Salhia so as to reach
Qatia on the 24th. The remainder of the 2nd Australian Light Horse
Brigade was marching to arrive at Qantara on the 23rd.
In Qatia the squadron of Gloucestershire Yeomanry was covered
by good trenches for some 50 or 60 men, and a number of smaller
shelters afforded good covers. Their horses were picketed close
to their camp. The Officer Commanding the two squadrons of Worcestershire
Yeomanry at Oghratina had been told to push on entrenchment as
far as possible, and it was General Wiggin's intention that these
squadrons, if attacked in force, should retire on Qatia and thence,
if necessary, on Romani, with their left flank covered by the
Gloucestershire Yeomanry and their right by the Warwickshire Yeomanry
from Hamisah. On the morning of the 23rd, both posts stood to
arms at 4 a.m., and I have ascertained that patrols had gone out
by that hour, though those at Oghratina were probably much hampered
by a thick fog.
On the 22nd April the Royal Flying
Corps reported to No. 3 Section that new bodies of enemy troops
were at Bir el Bayud, 15 miles E.S.E. of Qatia, and Bir el Mageibra,
10 miles S.E. of Qatia. Upon receipt of this information, General
Wiggin obtained leave from General Officer Commanding No. 3 Section,
to attack the enemy at Mageibra that night, reporting that he
intended to use two squadrons
of Warwickshire, and the one remaining squadron of Worcestershire
Yeomanry. General Wiggin, with Lieut.-Colonel Coventry, commanding
the Worcestershire Yeomanry, accompanied the raid to Mageibra.
Finding very few enemy, they destroyed the camp and returned to
Hamisah about 9 a.m. on the 23rd with six Turkish prisoners. In
the meantime the post at Oghratina was attacked at 5.30a.m. This
attack was repulsed. No further information was received from
the Officer Commanding at Oghratina until 7 a.m., when he reported
that he was again heavily attacked on all sides. This attack carried
the post, all the garrison of which were either killed, wounded,
or captured. No details of the fighting have, therefore, been
obtainable. Qatia itself was attacked about 9.30 a.m. Lieutenant-Colonel
Coventry was detached with one squadron of Worcestershire Yeomanry
from General Wiggin's Force to operate towards Qatia. Unfortunately,
this squadron became involved in the unsuccessful resistance of
the Qatia garrison, and, with the exception of some 60 men and
one officer who were able to disengage themselves, fell with it
into the hands of the enemy. I have therefore been able to gather
no detailed information of the actual fighting at Qatia. General
Wiggin and Colonel Yorke, commanding the Gloucestershire Yeomanry
at
Romani, both showed great judgment in dealing with the situation,
and did all that was possible with their small forces against
the enemy force of about 2,500, with four guns of small calibre.
General Wiggin pushed forward from Hamisah north-east against
the enemy's left, south of Um Ugba, and drove him back for about
a mile; the advance was slow owing to the nature of the ground
and the determined resistance encountered. Colonel Yorke after
hearing that Dueidar was safe, moved his whole force at 10 a.m.
to attack the enemy's right advancing on Qatia. He skilfully drove
the Turkish right back to El Rabah, and caused their guns to shift
their position further east. The enemy gave ground slowly, and,
since by 3.30 p.m. it was evident that Qatia had fallen, General
Wiggin determined to fall back: he himself retired on Dueidar
by way of Hamisah, Colonel Yorke on Romani; neither were followed.
Meanwhile, at 5.30a.m. a Turkish force, 1,000 strong, with onegun,
advancing from the south, attacked Dueidar, the most advanced
defensible post, which was held by 100 men of the 5th Battalion,
Royal Scots Fusiliers, under the command of Captain Roberts, 5th
Battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers. This officer, who throughout
showed conspicuous skill and ability, succeeded in repelling two
determined attacks on the position at 6.30 a.m. and 8.30 a.m.
respectively. Both attempts cost the enemy dear.
At 9.30 a.m. reinforcements of two companies 4th Royal Scots Fusiliers,
under the command of Major Thompson, 4th Battalion, Royal Scots
Fusiliers, who had been despatched from Hill 70, seven miles away,
on the first news of the attack, arrived at Dueidar. The various
posts were strengthened, and a counter-attack, delivered at 12.30
p.m. with great spirit, forced the enemy to retire, leaving 30
prisoners in our hands and 70 dead. The Turks were pursued in
their retreat by the 5th Australian Light Horse, who had only
arrived at Qantara at 1p.m., and by aeroplanes, thereby suffering
further loss. Besides the three and a half squadrons of Yeomanry
and details lost at Qatia and Oghratina, our casualties on the
23rd were two officers and 18 men killed, four officers and 21
men wounded. Aeroplane reconnaissance on the evening of the 23rd
established the fact that the enemy force, which included a large
body of picked Turkish regular troops, was already retiring.
At dawn on the 24th eight machines
of the 5th Wing, Royal Flying Corps, made a bomb and machine gun
attack from a low altitude on the enemy troops left in Qatia,
causing very heavy casualties and completely destroying the camp.
One machine also located and attacked a large body of enemy at
Bir el Abd, and located another party retiring on Bir el Bayud.
On the morning of the 25th further bomb and machine gun attacks
were made by the Royal Flying Corps on enemy forces at Bir el
Abd and Bir el Bayud. Both attacks were extremely successful,
working great havoc among men and animals. I cannot speak too
highly of the admirable work done by the 5th Wing, Royal Flying
Corps, during these few days. The strain thrown on pilots and
machines was very heavy, and the former displayed the utmost gallantry
and resource on all occasions. Chiefly through their efforts the
enemy was made to pay a very heavy price for his partially successful
raid.
The general situation in front of No. 3 Section was not affected
by these operations. Our Cavalry continued to patrol the Qatia
district, which was now practically clear of the enemy, while
our infantry posts at Dueidar and Romani were strengthened, and
the railway towards Romani was pushed on with all speed.
9. After 16th January, when General
Sarrail assumed supreme control of the operations of the Allied
Forces at Salonica, the British Force there commanded by Lieutenant-General
Sir B. T. Mahon, K.C.V.O., C.B., D.S.O., only remained under my
control for administrative purposes. From the beginning of January
to the end of April no active operations of importance took place.
The general line of defences remained practically unaltered. Some
200 miles of deep trenches, including communication trenches,
710 emplacements for guns, 230 reduits or strong posts, 160 miles
of obstacles (barbed wire), and 1,300 miles of telegraph cable
have been completed; and the defences as a whole are now quite
ready for occupation should the situation demand it. As in Egypt,
so in Salonica, the administrative work has been extremely heavy.
At the outset tne state of the communications was very unsatisfactory.
There were only two metalled roads leading to our lines, both
in a shocking state of repair; the few existing tracks soon became
impassable in wet weather for everything except pack animals.
The construction and repair of roads had, therefore, to proceed
simultaneously with the preparation of the defences. Roads in
the forward area were all begun by the troops themselves, and
all ranks worked admirably, the men thoroughly recognising the
importance of the matter. Later, it was found possible to organise
local civilian labour companies, who have largely been employed
to complete and maintain the road work begun by the troops. Altogether
about 90 miles of new metalled cart roads have been constructed,
and 105 miles of mule tracks, besides some 60 miles of repairs
to previousl yexisting roads and tracks. Railway extensions leading
to the various depots on the Monastir road, with the necessary
sidings, have been constructed, and Decauville lines laid within
the depots themselves. Preparations have been made for further
extensions. Another great difficulty, that of insufficient wharfage
accommodation, has been met by the construction of new piers in
the bay itself and at Skala Stavros. These have reduced the congestion
to an appreciable extent and fully justified the labour and expense
involved. The supply system, though hindered at first by the state
of the communications and by the fact that the equipment of the
force with a special scale of transport was only in process of
gradual completion, has worked with uninterrupted success. The
health of the troops has been excellent, all ranks having benefited
by hard physical work in good climatic conditions. In view of
the approach of summer, when malaria is likely to prevail in certain
districts through which our line passes, special precautions have
been taken for the protection of the troops and, where possible,
alternative positions prepared.
Throughout the period the importance of training the troops has
been insisted upon. At first one day weekly was devoted to training,
as opposed to road-making or work on the defences. This proportion
has gradually risen to four days weekly, excluding one day of
rest. On 9th May, under orders from the War Office, Lieut.-General
G. F. Milne, C.B., D.S.O., succeeded Lieut.-General Sir Bryan
Mahon, K.C.V.O., C.B., D.S.O., in command of the Salonica Army.
General Mahon sailed on the same date to take up command of the
Western Frontier Force in Egypt.
10. In Egypt during the month of May there was no major operation
to record. Intelligence received earlv in the month showed that
the Turks had materially increased their numbers in Sinai, doubtless
with the view of detaining troops in Egypt. The enemy's main concentrations
were too far away for me to strike at them, and I was in hopes
that hemight be induced to cross the barrier of hills which extends
from north to south some sixty miles from the Canal: he would
then have been exposed to attack with the denies behind him. However,
he made no such advance, and, during the hot weather in the middle
of May, there were indications that he was drawing in his advanced
posts. On the 8th and 21st May enemy
aircraft attacked Port Said with bombs, doing no material damage.
On the first occasion three civilians were wounded; on the second
two civilians were killed, five soldiers and thirteen civilians
were wounded. In each case the attack was answered by prompt and
successful retaliation by the Royal Flying Corps. In all sections
of the Eastern front reconnaissances were frequent, particularly
in No. 3 Section, to which were now allotted three brigades of
the Anzac Mounted Division. During the month the Mahemdia-Romani
district has been occupied in some force, and at a conference,
held on 17th May, at which General Lawrence, commanding No. 3
Section, was present, further decisions regarding the occupation
of the Qatia district were arrived at.
During the month several successful reconnaissances to the east
were made by the Anzac Mounted Division, which proved itself a
unit upon which I could absolutely depend to display energy, resource
and endurance. On the 8th May, starting early from Oghratina,
the 2nd Light Horse Brigade reconnoitred to Bir el Abd with patrols
pushed out to Hod Salmana. On the 16th May, a day of intense heat,
the same brigade, starting from Hod el Sagia, five miles E.S.E.
of Qatia, reached Hod el Bayud, 15 miles on in the same direction,
at 7 a.m. Camels and dismounted men were seen making off in a
north-easterly direction. The enemy's camp was destroyed, and
one prisoner, 36 camels, and a quantity of ammunition were brought
in. The reconnaissance returned to Qatia, having covered 60 miles
in 30 hours. During this time the Canterbury Mounted Rifles went
out to Bir Abu Afein, covering 40 miles in 30 hours. On the 18th
May a very successful bombardment of El Arish from the sea and
the air was carried out. A sloop and two monitors of His Majesty's
Navy bombarded the town, reducing the fort S.W. of the town to
ruins and damaging the aerodrome. The seaplanes of the Royal Naval
Air Service then attacked with bombs, being followed later by
6 machines of the Royal Flying Corps, who had orders to attack
any enemy aircraft that appeared and to bomb the enemy's camp
and troops. The camps were effectively bombed, and three bombs
exploded in the middle of a body of a thousand men who were on
the march south of the town. A close reconnaissance of El Arish
from the air was made, and many valuable photographs taken at
the same time. All ships and aircraft returned safely.
On 22nd May the Royal Flying Corps
carried out a highly effective bombardment of all enemy camps
on a 45 mile front roughly parallel to the Canal, during which
severe damage was done to the waterworks at Rodh Salem and to
buildings at El Hamma and Bir Mazar.
On 23rd May the 2nd Australian Light
Horse Brigade reconnoitred Hod el Gedaidia, 15 miles east of Qatia,
where shots were exchanged with a patrol of 40 men on camels,
who retired.
Finally, on 31st May, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade,
one regiment of Australian Light Horse, and a sub-section of the
Ayrshire Battery R.H.A., attacked the enemy's post at Bir Salmana,
20 miles E.N.E. of Qatia. The post was surrounded before dawn,
and an enemy post on the Ganadil road was rushed, while a camel
detachment was seen making off to the south-east. The enemy lost
15 men killed and 2 men captured. Our cavalry pursued till 8 a.m.
when the pursuit was taken up by aeroplanes which bombed scattered
parties with effect, killing 20 camels and 8 more men. The force
returned, having covered 60 miles in 36 hours besides fighting
an engagement. The only casualties were two men slightly wounded.
On the Western Front [of Egypt] during May preliminary measures
for the occupation of the Baharia Oasis have been in progress.
A line of blockhouses has been established along the Darb el Rubi
which runs due west from Samalut on the Nile. Four blockhouses
were completed and occupied by 23rd May. Work on the two remaining
blockhouses has been postponed till the railway has reached a
point where it can materially assist in the supply of stores:
this should be about the end of June. From the most advanced blockhouse
it is now possible to reconnoitre as far as the Mohariq sand dunes,
some 80 miles west of Samalut. The difficulty of maintaining such
a line in a waterless desert subject to frequent and severe sand
storms has not been small, but all ranks have worked well and
with great keenness. The enemy has a small body of troops, under
the command of Nuri, collected on the Libyan side of the frontier
west of Sollum, but as yet he has not openly displayed his intentions.
Two battalions of Italian troops landed at Moraisa during the
month and have occupied Bardia. The relations between the Italian
and British commanders on the frontier are excellent. The area
between Sollum and Barrani has been cleared of the Bedouin population,
and, though it has been impossible entirely to prevent communication
between the Bedouins and Siwa, the energy of our patrols, according
to numerous reports, is successfully restricting the entry of
food supplies into Siwa. By means of patrols of Imperial Camel
Corps and motor cars, communication between the oases occupied
by the enemy and the Nile Valley and Delta has been rendered almost
impossible. In particular, the camel patrolling from Kharga towards
Dakhla and Beris has been carried out most efficiently by No.
1 Imperial Camel Company under especially trying conditions. The
Farafra, Baharia, Mognara and Wadi Natrun fronts have also been
controlled with great vigilance. The Aulad Ali tribes in Egyptian
territory are now all west of Barrani, except for a receiving
camp at Sollum. Markets have been established for the sale of
food at Sollum, Mersa Matruh, Dabaa, El Hamman and Wadi Natrun,
where they are allowed to purchase what is necessary for their
daily needs. This restricts indiscriminate movement to the west
or to the Delta.
In spite of the occupation, during very hot weather, of so many
advanced posts in the desert or on its edge, I am glad to report
that the health of the troops has been remarkably good. I much
regret, however, that General Sir Bryan Mahon, shortly after his
arrival in this country to take up the command of the Western
Frontier Force, had to be invalided home owing to severe sunstroke.
In the meantime, Major-General A. G. Dallas, C.B., has continued,
with great ability, in temporary command of that force.
11. I beg to acknowledge with great respect the valuable assistance
I have received from His Highness the Sultan of Egypt. He has
with great kindness placed at my disposal his unrivalled knowledge
of affairs affecting his country. To His Excellency the High Commissioner,
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir A. H. McMahon, G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., C.S.I.,
and to the Government of Egypt, I owe a deep debt of
gratitude for whole-hearted co-operation and help. I am very greatly
indebted to Vice-Admiral Sir R. E. Wemyss, K.C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O.,
and the naval forces under his command for constant assistance
and active co-operation.
The construction of Roads, Waterworks, and kindred tasks in connection
with the Canal Defences, which I have described to you, owe their
accomplishment in a very large measure to the admirable services
of Colonel Sir Murdoch Macdonald, K.C.M.G., of the Public Works
Department of Egypt. His wide experience and capacity have been
an indispensable asset to me in dealing with these important problems.
I am particularly indebted to the Railway Department, under Colonel
Sir George Macauley, K.C.M.G., R. of O., Royal Engineers, for
the highly successful manner in which Railway communication has
been carried on under great difficulties. The movement of a large
number of troops and impedimenta of an Army has severely taxed
the capacity of the railway, and has put a great strain on its
staff. That it never failed to accomplish what was desired is
due to the high efficiency this Department has attained, and to
the personal exertions of Colonel Sir George Macauley.
I wish to bring to your notice the very responsible and important
duties that have fallen to my Director of Army Signals, Brigadier-General
M. G. E. Bowman-Manifold, D.S.O., R.E., and to the admirable way
in which he has discharged them. Military operations on the two
fronts have been spread over a very wide front, amounting to close
on 1,000 miles in the west and 90 miles in the east. Prompt and
reliable inter-communication has been a matter of vital importance.
In the successful achievement of this I beg also to bring to your
notice the services of the Egyptian Telegraph Department under
Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Liddell, D.S.O., Royal Engineers, and
to express my thanks to the Eastern Telegraph Company and the
Telephone Company of Egypt, who have given my Director of Army
Signals unceasing valuable help.
I beg to bring to notice the valuable services rendered to the
Canal Defences by the representative and principal officer of
the Suez Canal Company, Charles Comte de Serionne, Agent Superieur
de la Compagnie du Canal de Suez, and by the staff of that company.
The arduous and important work of the care of the sick and wounded
in the Hospitals has been considerably lightened by a large amount
of voluntary aid. I wish specially to mention the work of the
British Red Cross Society and Order of St. John of Jerusalem under
Sir Courtauld Thomson, C.B. The Nursing services, both English
and Australian, have done admirable work, and the voluntary aid
of the Sisters of Notre Dame de la Delivrance, working at the
Austrian Hospital at Alexandria, have been specially brought to
my notice.
Finally, and in conclusion, I wish to bring to notice the admirable
services of my Chief of the General Staff, Major-General A. L.
Lynden-Bell, C.B., C.M.G., my Deputy Quartermaster-General, Major-General
W. Campbell, C.B., D.S.O., and my Deputy Adjutant-General, Major-General
J. Adye, C.B. No Commander-m-Chief has ever been more loyally
served, and no staff has ever worked with less friction. I have
other names to bring to notice for distinguished and gallant service
during the operations under review, and these will form the subject
of a separate communication.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient Servant,
A. J. MURRAY, General,
Commander-in-Chief,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
