This battle took place only 8 days after the repulse of the Tigris Force, rushing to the relief of the besieged troops in Kut-al-Amara, at the Wadi.

The 3rd (Lahore) Division had recently arrived in Mesopotamia, from the Western Front.

Lieut-General Sir Fenton Aylmer, OC Tigris Corps, was perplexed by the strong resistance of the Turks since the advance began. He signalled to both Sir John Nixon and Sir Charles Townshend: 'The position of affairs must be frankly faced. The enemy is blocking the entrance of the Wadi-Nukhailet Defile (the Hanna) with very strong works ... it is impossible in my opinion to take the first position without losing half of my force. It is my intention to cross the 3rd (Lahore) Division and Cavalry Brigade to the right bank and thus enfilade the enemy's position. Even by this means I do not think that progress can be anything but slow'. He also requested that fit men of Townshend's force in Kut leave the town by boat and cross to meet his proposed assembly. The sick and wounded would have to remain.

Nixon, ever optimistic, agreed with his tactics of crossing the river but forbade the action Aylmer had suggested for the besieged force.

On the 16th January 1916, Townshend signalled that the garrison now had 21 days rations left for the British troops, 17 for the Indian, and 5 days fodder. Aylmer had more time that previously thought (expectations set, of course, by earlier panic-stricken signals from Townshend).

At noon on 20th January 1916, the Turkish defences at the Hanna were bombarded for 20 minutes, and were again the next morning. The bombardment was from both banks, and from gunboats. 12,000 rounds in all were fired. Such paltry preparation would at this time have been laughable on the Western Front.

There was no attempt to deceive the Turks or any attempt at surprise. Not that there were many options, as the main assault would be on a very narrow front less than a mile across. No man's land was 600 yards deep.

The attacking units were very under-strength, as a result of the earlier fighting, and from sickness. The Meerut Division went into action with fewer than 4,000 effective men. The 21st Brigade had to be broken up, and its battalions attached to the other Brigades, the 19th and 35th.

The infantry attack went in half an hour after the last shell had fallen, in clear (but misty) daylight, at 7.45am. The Turkish troops - virtually undamaged by the shelling - rose to man their trenches and cut down the infantry in swathes. Very few men reached their trenches. Owing to wet soil, shelling and losses among the operators, the field telephone system broke down almost immediately, leaving Brigade, Division and Corps completely in the dark as to what was happening. While various commands were given to reorganise and renew the attack, in the appalling weather and with such chaos in the front lines, no further effort was made.

Next morning, Aylmer asked the Turks for a six-hour truce to collect the wounded and bury the dead. As soon as he raised a white flag, Arabs swarmed out of the Turkish lines and began to rob the dead and wounded, collecting especially rifles. Many wounded were killed by them. Eventually Turkish officers stopped this sorry episode.

Everyone knew that the failure at the Hanna spelled disaster for the garrison in Kut.

British losses in this action amounted to 2,700 killed and wounded. According to one commentator: 'In any history of sufferings endured by the British Army, the collective misery of the night of 21st January 1916 is probably without parallel since the Crimea'. There was complete breakdown of medical arrangements, due to the overwhelming number of casualties, the weather, and ground conditions.

7th (Meerut) Division of the Tigris Corps was the formation that fought this battle.

Forward into March 1916, and another attempt to relieve Kut, at the Dujaila Redoubt