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Army Headquarters, Cairo,
16th February, 1915.
I have the honour to forward for the information of the Secretary
of State for War the accompanying report from Major-General A.
Wilson, C.B., Commanding the Suez Canal Defences, who has conducted
the operations to my complete satisfaction. He has been ably assisted
by Brigadier-General A. H. Bingley, C.I.E., I fully endorse what
General Wilson says of the conduct of the regimental officers
and men, both British and Indian. The French Hydroplane Squadron
and the detachment Royal Flying Corps have rendered very valuable
services. The former, equipped with hydroplanes with floats, ran
great risks in undertaking land reconnaissance, whilst the latter
were much handicapped by inferior types of machines. Notwithstanding
these drawbacks, they furnished me regularly with all information
regarding the movements of the enemy. I take this opportunity
of bringing to the notice of the Secretary of State for War the
great services rendered by the Count de Serionne and the officials
of the Suez Canal Company; they have one and all been most helpful,
and have unreservedly placed their own personal services and the
entire resources of the Suez Canal Company at my disposal. The
success of our defence was greatly assisted by their cordial co-operation.
Also Sir George Macauley, K.C.M.G., Major Blakeney and Captain
Hall, of the Egyptian State Railways. In addition to building
two excellent armoured trains, these officers worked most assiduously
in organizing and superintending the railway arrangements, both
along the Canal and in the transportation of reinforcements from
Cairo. No difficulties of any sort were made, and such difficulties
as existed were speedily overcome, and I cannot sufficiently express
my obligation to them. Also Major Liddell, late Royal Engineers,
Director of Telegraphs under the Egyptian Government. This official
was largely responsible for the excellent system of intercommunication
which prevailed throughout the Canal Defences. It is needless
for me to add that from Admiral Peirse and the ships of His Majesty's
Navy, as well as those of France under his command, most important
and valuable assistance was received.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
J. G. MAXWELL, Lieut.-General, Commanding the Force in Egypt.
Headquarters, Canal Defences, to the General Staff, Headquarters,
Cairo.
Ismailia,
11th February, 1915.
Sir,—
I have the honour to submit the following report on the recent
attack on the Suez Canal. In order to make the narrative complete,
I will preface it with a brief account of what has taken place
since I took over command of the Canal Defences.
2. I landed at Suez on the 16th November
1914, and went to Ismailia the same day, having been preceded
ten days before by Brigadier-General A. H. Bingley, my Chief Staff
Officer, who was sent from India in advance of the troops to make
preliminary arrangements for their landing and despatch to destination.
I there took over command of the Canal Defences from Colonel W.
G. Walker, Commanding 9th Indian Brigade, which had been detached
from the 3rd (Lahore) Division for temporary duty in Egypt.
3. In accordance with the instructions received from the General
Officer Commanding-in-Chief, the Canal Defences were organized
in three sections, with headquarters at Suez, Ismailia Ferry,
and Kantara, respectively, my own headquarters and the general
reserve being placed at Ismailia, with the advanced base at Zagazig
and base general hospital at Cairo. These arrangements were completed
by the 5th December 1914, when the
last units of the force arrived from India.
4. Preparations for defence.—The months of November, December
and January were devoted to a systematic development of the naturally
strong line of defence afforded by the Canal, thus completing
the work which had been initiated previous to my arrival. A number
of defensive posts were prepared on the east bank, to cover the
more important ferries and provide facilities for local counter
attacks. Trenches were dug on the west bank to cover the intervals
between posts and frustrate attempts at crossing. Communications
were improved by the construction of landing stages and removable
pontoon bridges for use at important points. A flotilla of armed
launches, manned by the Royal Navy, was organized for canal patrols.
A complete System of telegraph, telephone, and wireless communication
was installed, linking up all the posts with headquarters. A system
of defence was established for the protection of the railway,
the telegraph lines, and the sweet water canal. The detachment
of the Royal Flying Corps was organized, staffed with observers,
and equipped with accommodation for its planes.
5. The resources of the Suez Canal Company in tugs, launches,
lighters, &c., were carefully examined, so as to utilise them
for military purposes. Arrangements were made with the Railway
Administration for the collecting of rolling stock at convenient
places, in order to expedite the dispatch of reinforcements to
threatened points. Provision was also made for the organization
of the water supply of the troops and the formation of supply
depots, as well as for the rapid collection and evacuation of
the sick and wounded. A system of intelligence, censorship and
police surveillance was established, and plans were devised, in
consultation with the Canal Authorities, for the control of shipping
in the event of an attack. Last, but not least, a scheme for making
inundations, and so limiting the front over which the enemy could
attack, was carried out successfully, by the Irrigation Department
at Port Said and the engineering staff of the Canal Company at
El Cap, Kantara and Ballah.
6. During this period no active operation took place, except a
Bedouin raid made by the enemy in the direction of Kantara. A
patrol of the Bikanir Camel Corps under Captain A. J. H. Chope,
2nd Gurkha Rifles, consisting of one Indian officer and twenty
other ranks, encountered a force of some 200 Bedouins and Turks
on the 20th November 1914, near Bir-el-Nuss,
and in spite of the enemy's treacherous attack, due to the abuse
of the white flag, extricated itself successfully from a somewhat
difficult position. Our patrol, which lost one Indian officer
and twelve other ranks killed and three Sepoys wounded, inflicted
some sixty casualties on the enemy. For their gallant conduct
on this occasion, No. 1534 Sepoy Ali Khan was awarded the Indian
Order of Merit, 2nd Class, and No. 115 Sepoy Faiz Ali Khan the
Distinguished Conduct Medal.
7. General summary of events.—During the first fortnight
in January little direct news of the enemy's advance was forthcoming,
though reports of considerable preparations in Syria were constant,
and information was received to the effect that advanced posts
and depots had been formed at Khan Tunis, El Arish. El Auja, and
Kosseima. The country to the east of the Canal within the radius
of our aeroplane
reconnaissances remained clear of formed bodies of hostile troops,
though frequently visited by Bedouin patrols which, in some cases,
were accompanied by German officers in Arab dress. About 15th
January [1915], however, it became clear that hostile forces
of some strength had entered Sinai, and on the 20th the Canal
Defence troops were reinforced from Cairo by the 1st and 3rd Brigades
R.F.A., East Lancashire Division, T.F., which proceeded at once
to previously prepared positions
8. On 18th January a hostile force
of 8,000—10,000 was located near Bir-es-Saba by a French
naval hydro-aeroplane, and on 22nd a Turkish force was reported
to be at Moiya, Harab, having arrived there from Gifgaffa. This
was confirmed by aerial reconnaissance the next day, and about
the same time reports of the presence of hostile troops at Ain
Sadr were received, and our mounted troops obtained touch with
hostile patrols near Bir-el-Duiedar.
9. On the 22nd small detachments
were told off from the reserves to hold lightly the trenches prepared
along the west bank. On the 26th
forces of some 2,000—3,000 men each were located at Bir
Mabeuik, Moiya Harab, and Wadi Muksheib, and the enemy advanced
and engaged our covering troops near Kantara, retiring at 3.30
p.m. On the same day two battalions 32nd Brigade (33rd Punjabis
and 4th Gwalior Infantry) were sent to hold the trenches along
the west bank from Bench Mark post to Ballah; while G.O.C.'s of
sections reinforced the west bank trenches in their sections from
local reserves. The New Zealand Infantry Brigade arrived from
Cairo, the Otago and Wellington battalions proceeding to reinforce
Kubri, while Headquarters and the Auckland and Canterbury battalions
detrained at.Ismailia.H.M.S. "Swiftsure", "Clio",
"Ocean" and "Minerva" entered the canal, taking
station near Kantara, Ballah, El Shatt and Shalouf respectively.
10. During the 27th and 28th the
enemy was further reinforced, and established himself in an entrenched
position about five miles east of
Kantara, astride the El Arish road. On the morning of the 27th
attacks on the Baluchistan and El Kubri posts in No. 1 Section
were made at about 3 a.m. Both were beaten off without loss. On
the morning of the 28th the outposts at Kantara were attacked,
and the enemy was driven off with little difficulty. One battalion
from 31st Brigade (2nd Rajputs) was sent to reinforce Serapeum.
11. From the 29th-31st the enemy
closed towards the Canal, the largest concentration appearing
in the vicinity of Gebel Habeita. The 5th Battery, Egyptian Artillery,
was sent to Toussoum.
12. On the 1st February an advance
from the north-east towards the Ismailia Ferry post was detected,
and that post, as well as Bench Mark post, was reinforced under
the orders of the General Officer Commanding No. 2 Section. On
the 2nd February our advanced troops from Ismailia Ferry encountered
the enemy at some distance from the post, and a desultory action,
ensued. This was broken off at 3.30 p.m., and the enemy then entrenched
himself about 2 1/2 miles south-east of our defences. In the course
of the day "considerable" bodies of troops were also
seen on the move in front of El Ferdan, Bench Mark, Toussoum and
Serapeum. During the night of the 2nd-3rd some firing at El Kubri
took place, but nothing further of note occurred in No. 1 Section.
13. At about 3.30 a.m. on the 3rd a determined attempt was made
to effect a crossing some 2,000 yards south of Toussoum. The enemy
brought up a number of pontoons and rafts, several of which they
succeeded in launching, while two, if not more, actually crossed
the Canal. This attack was covered by heavy rifle and machine-gun
fire from the east bank. It was met by parties of the 62nd Punjabis
under Major Skeen and Captain Morgan, as well as by fire from
the 5th Battery, Egyptian Artillery. Several pontoons were sunk,
and all the men who crossed were disposed, of, except twenty,
who hid under the west bank and surrendered to the 2nd Rajputs
next morning.
14.. At daylight the enemy were found to have closed on the Toussoum
post, and a counter-attack pushed forward from Serapeum encountered
a large force about half a mile from camp. The enemy's attack
was not pushed closer than three-quarters of a mile from our position,
and they retired about 2p.m. after shelling our positions intermittently
up to that time. Seven officers and 280 men were taken prisoners
opposite Toussoum during the course of the fight. A large number
of the enemy's dead were found outside Toussoum post, and along
the east bank of the Canal.
15. At 4.30p.m. two battalions 31st Brigade (27th Punjabis and
128th Pioneers) arrived at Serapeum, and Major-General A. Wallace,
Commanding 11th Division, took over command of the Section from
the Great Bitter Lake to Lake Timsah. During the morning H.M.S.
"Hardinge" was struck by two 6-inch shells, her funnel
being split and forward steering gear disabled. She moved into
Lake Timsah; and later in the day to Kantara, her place being
taken by H.M.S. "Swiftsure." H.M.S."Ocean"
also moved up into this section of the defence. At Ismailia Ferry
post the enemy were found at daylight to be entrenching some 700-800
yards from the defences, and two hostile batteries opened fire
shortly afterwards. The infantry attack was not pushed home, and
no casualties occurred, though many shells burst in the camp and
in the vicinity of the town. Shipping detained in Lake Timsah
was under fire and suffered slight damage, but no loss of life.
16. Circumstances were similar at El Ferdan, where a considerable
number of shells were fired, chiefly at the Canal Gare and railway
station, both of which were damaged. No casualties occurred.
17. At Kantara the outposts were attacked between 5 and 6 a.m.,
the enemy being driven off, leaving many killed and wounded and
unwounded prisoners. Later in the day a partial attack from the
south-east was stopped some 1,200 yards from the position.
18. During the day H.M.S. "Swiftsure," "Clio,"
"Hardinge" and the French ships "Requin" and
" D'Entrecasteaux" were engaged, as were also the torpedo
boats and armed launches, all rendering valuable services. The
bulk of the fighting fell to the 22nd and 29th Infantry Brigades,
but the 28th, as well as portions of the 31st, 32nd, and New Zealand
Infantry Brigades, the Artillery and Engineers of the Lancashire
Division, T.F., and No. 3 Field Company Australian Engineers were
also engaged. Very efficient service was rendered by the detachment
Royal Flying Corps, several reconnaissances over the enemy's lines
being undertaken during the day.
19. The enemy engaged at different points along the Canal on the
3rd appeared to number some 12,000
to 15,000 men in the aggregate, and six batteries, with at least
one 6-inch gun, were located. It appears from accounts received
from prisoners that the attacking force consisted of the VIIIth
and portions of the Illrd, IVth, and Vlth Turkish Army Corps and
that Djemal Pasha was in chief command. The enemy's plan contemplated
simultaneous attacks on Kantara, Ferdan, Ismailia, Shalouf; and
Suez, coupled with the main effort to cross the Canal near Toussoum.
At the first three of the above-mentioned places their efforts,
were only half-hearted, while at Shalouf and Suez no attacks materialised,
though forces are known to have been in the vicinity of those
places. Headquarters, with the 7th and 8th Battalions, 2nd Brigade,
1st Australian Imperial Force, arrived at Ismailia during the
evening of the 3rd February.
20. On the 4th February, as some
firing had taken place from the east bank during the night, two
companies of the 92nd Punjabis were sent out at 8 a.m. to clear
that bank, and located a body of some 200 to 250 men still entrenched
there. On the approach of this detachment the enemy made signs
of surrender, but subsequently reopened fire. Supports of one
double company each of the 27th and 67th Punjabis and 128th Pioneers
were despatched under the command of Major Maclachlan, 92nd Punjabis,
who concentrated his men, opened a heavy fire, and then charged.
This time the enemy threw away their rifles and surrendered, six
officers, 251 men, and three machine guns being captured; 59 men,
including a German officer (Major von den Hagen), were found killed
at this point.
21. The trenches in front of Ismailia and Kantara were found to
have been deserted, and the Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade,
supported by infantry, moved out from the Ismailia Ferry post.
A large body of enemy, estimated at three to four brigades, were
encountered seven miles east of Toussoum, and another body some
miles to the nortih. Twenty five prisoners and ninety camels were
captured. No other incident occurred along the front. Reinforcements,
consisting of the Herts Yeomanry, 2nd County of London Yeomanry
(Westminster Dragoons), and one squadron Duke of Lancaster's Own
Yeomanry, arrived at Ismailia the same evening.
22. On the 5th instant our aeroplanes
reported that the enemy were retiring towards Katia, while those
who had been in front of No. 2 Section appeared to have concentrated
about Gebel Habeita. Mabeuik was still occupied, and a reconnaissance
from No. 1 Section encountered some of the enemy's infantry near
Gebel Murr during the day. There was no change during the 6th,
the enemy being still in strength near Gebel Habeita. A reconnaissance
by a mixed force, which had been contemplated this day, was cancelled
owing to information gathered from prisoners to the effect that
considerable reinforcements of the enemy were expected and might
be at hand about this time. On the 7th, however, our aeroplanes
found this camp deserted. Mabeuik was also found to have been
vacated, and the nearest enemy on the northern line appeared at
Bir-El-Abd. On the 9th the only enemy located were in camps at
El Rigum, Wadi Muksheib, and Moiya Harab. On the 10th instant
only some 400 men were left at Rigum camp, and these appeared
to be moving eastwards.
23. The actions at Toussoum and Kantara. — I will now supplement
the general summary of events given in the foregoing paragraphs
with a more detailed account of the fighting that took place at
Toussoum on 3rd February, and at Kantara on 28th January and 3rd
February.
24. The troops in the Toussoum—Serapeum —Deversoir
portion of No. 2 Section on the morning of 3rd February were as
follows: —
The 19th Lancashire Battery, R.F.A., T.F. (four guns), commanded
by Major B. Palin Dobson.
The 5th Battery, Egyptian Artillery (four mountain guns and two
maxims), commanded by Major I. D.E. Roberts, R.A.
1st Field Company, East Lancashire Royal Engineers, T.F. (two
sections), under Captain J. G. Riddick.
Canterbury Battalion, New Zealand Infantry (two platoons), under
Major C. B. Brereton.
2nd Queen Victoria's Own Rajputs, under Lieut.-Colonel F. P. S.
Dunsford.
62nd Punjabis, under Lieut.-Colonel E. W. Grimshaw.
92nd Punjabis, under Major T. R. Maclachlan.
2/10th Gurkha Rifles, under Lieut.- Colonel F. G. H. Sutton.
128th Pioneers (two platoons, acting as escort to 5th Battery,
Egyptian Artillery), under Lieutenant R. A. Fitzgibbon.
137th Field Ambulance, under Major R. W. Knox, I.M.S.
25. These troops were disposed as follows: —
(a) On the east bank, in the posts of Toussoum, Serapeum, and
Deversoir, a half battalion in each, furnished by the 92nd, 62nd,
and 2/10th Gurkha Rifles, respectively.
(6) On the west bank, from the entrance to Lake Timsah to Deversoir
inclusive, 12 posts, each held by two platoons. Each platoon was
allotted some 600 yards of front and found three sentry groups,
about 200 yards apart.
(c) In reserve at Serapeum, three double companies.
26. At about 3.25 a.m. on 3rd instant, the enemy were seen on
the east bank near mile 47.4. As the firing was heavy, a double
company of the 62nd Punjabis was sent from the reserve to support
this point, and this double company was subsequently reinforced
by six platoons of the 2nd Rajputs.
27. The enemy made three distinct attempts to cross the Canal
at points between miles 47.4 and 48.4. One boatload of the enemy
landed opposite mile 48.3, and were charged by a small party under
Major O. St. J. Skeen, 62nd Punjabis. All were killed or wounded.
Two more boatloads landed opposite mile 47.6, and these were promptly
attacked by Captain M. H. L. Morgan, 62nd Punjabis, who was
wounded. Six Turks were killed and four captured at this point,
and some 20 who got away and hid themselves under the west bank
were captured later by a party of the 2nd Rajputs.
28. At 8.40 a.m. Colonel S. Geoghegan, commanding 22nd Brigade,
after a personal reconnaissance of the enemy's positions, sent
a detachment consisting of four double companies drawn from the
2nd Rajputs and the 2/10th Gurkha Rifles to clear the east bank.
As this counter-attack developed, the enemy fled in large numbers
from the broken ground whence they had made their attempt to cross.
Meanwhile the enemy, from their camp at Kateid El Khel, deployed
a force estimated at two brigades with at least six guns, and
formed a line about two miles north-east of Serapeum, and facing
that post. Our troops, delivering a counterattack, now occupied
a ridge about half a mile north-east of Serapeum, and formed a
line facing the enemy with their left flank drawn back to the
Canal. They consisted of. two double companies 92nd Punjabis facing
northeast, two platoons 2nd Rajputs facing north, with six platoons
2/10th Gurkha Rifles in support. The whole was under command of
Lieut.-Col. F. G. H. Button, 2/10th Gurkha Rifles.
29. The advance northward on the east bank of the two platoons,
2nd Rajputs, was checked short of the broken ground by fire from
the enemy posted there, aided by the fire of small parties which
were still hidden at the foot of the west bank. It was here that
Captain R. T. Arundell was killed while gallantly leading his
men.
30. While this attack was in progress, the Commander of H.M. T.B.
No. 043, Lieutenant-Commander G. B. Palmes, R.N., was asked by
Colonel Geoghegan to destroy the enemy's pontoons which were lying
on the east bank. Those on shore were destroyed by shell fire,
and a party then landed from the boat to see whether there were
any others lying behind the bank. The leading party found themselves
in front of a trench full of the enemy, and on getting back to
their boat Lieutenant-Commander G. B. Palmes, R.N., and Sub-Lieutenant
C. V. Cardinall, R.N.V.R., were wounded.
31. The enemy's main attack from the north-east did not get within
1,200 yards of our line. They, however, shelled our positions
on the west bank intermittently until about 2 p.m., when their
main body retired eastwards, and our forces withdrew to the positions
held in the morning. A small party of the enemy reached the ridge
which we had vacated, but they were shelled off it by our artillery,
and soon disappeared.
32. In the attack on the Toussoum post, about 350 of the enemy
managed to establish themselves during the night in some of the
outer trenches which are only occupied by the garrison by day.
A number of this party were killed as soon, as it was light by
the fire of our machine guns, and the remainder were either driven
out or killed, and some 80 prisoners captured by a local counter-attack
which was skilfully led by Lieutenant J. W. Thomson-Glover, 92nd
Punjabis. Seven Turkish officers and 280 other ranks, with much
material, were taken on this occasion.
33. At 4.3.0 p.m. reinforcements from the 31st Infantry Brigade
began to arrive at Serapeum, and in the course of the evening
four double companies were placed in support at various points
on the west bank, and the garrison of the Serapeum post was strengthened.
The armed launches commanded by Lieutenants W. H. B. Livesay and
E. H. Daughlish, R.I.M., rendered valuable service in this section
during the day, and were frequently under fire of the enemy's
snipers.
34. On the morning of the 4th instant,
as there was no sign of the enemy's main body to the east, and
as the armed launch "Mansura" had been fired upon on
the previous evening and some sniping had taken place during the
night from the east bank, Major-General A. Wallace, who had taken
over command at Serapeum from Colonel S. Geoghegan, ordered two
double companies of the 92nd Punjabis to move north along the
east bank of the Canal to examine this locality. This party, which
was commanded by Captain L. F. A. Cochran,
got to the south edge of this area, which they found to be held
by the enemy, and then extended round to the east and north-east
to round the latter up. The enemy held up a white flag and made
signs of surrender, whereupon Captain Cochran and some of his
party advanced towards them. After three Turks had surrendered,
fire was re-opened by the enemy, and our troops had to fall back.
Major- General Wallace then ordered out reinforcements, consisting
of one double company each of the 27th and 62nd Punjabis and the
128th Pioneers, the whole under Major T. R. Maclachlan, 92nd Punjabis.
The latter collected his men and charged, and the enemy immediately
threw down their arms. The prisoners taken here numbered six officers
and 251 men, of whom 52 were seriously wounded. The enemy's killed
numbered 59, and among them was a German officer, Major von den
Hagen. Three machine guns were captured, as well as a quantity
of miscellaneous stores. It was in this second attack that Captain
Cochran was killed.
35. Turning from events at Toussoum to those at Kantara, the only
engagements that need be referred to are the attacks made by the
enemy on our outposts on the 28th January and 3rd February. In
the attack of the 28th January, the enemy advanced along the telegraph
line on one of our piquets, consisting of a detachment of the
14th Sikhs under Captain Channer, which they attacked about 2.45
a.m. The action continued for about half an hour, and the enemy
attempted to advance, but was unable to do so. Firing gradually
ceased, and by daylight the enemy had withdrawn gradually to Point
70 on the Kantara—El Arish road, from which they were driven
out by five rounds of lyddite shell fired by H.M.S. "Swiftsure."
36. The attack of the 3rd February was conducted on much the same
lines, and was directed on two of our piquets furnished by the
89th Punjabis. The enemy's advance was stopped without difficulty,
and at daylight 36 unwounded prisoners were found in our entanglements.
The enemy left 20 dead on the ground, but their casualties were
very much heavier, as they removed many of their killed
and wounded.
37. As the events described may represent but the opening phase
of the campaign, I do not propose at this stage, to mention the
staff and departmental officers who have rendered specially good
service. I, however, submit the names of the following regimental
officers whose conduct is deserving of notice:—
19th Lancashire Battery, R.F.A. (T.F.).— This battery rendered
excellent service, and was well commanded by Major B. Palin Dobson.
He was ably seconded by Captain P. K. Clapham.
5th Battery Artillery, Egyptian Army.— This battery took
a prominent part in defeating the attempts of the enemy to cross
the Canal, and its fire sank two or more pontoons. It was skilfully
commanded by Bimbashi (Major) I. D'E. Roberts, R.A. Mulazim Awal
Effendi Helmi, who was killed, showed conspicuous gallantry, and
fought his gun under a heavy fire at short range. He would have
been recommended for reward had he survived.
Imperial Service Troops.—Major A. K. Rawlins, 24th Punjabis,
and Captain G. C. W. Willis, 31st Lancers, Special Service Officers,
have displayed energy and enterprise, their reconnaissance work
being particularly valuable.
2nd Queen Victoria's Own Rajputs.—Captain R. T. Arundell
led his double company with great gallantry in the counter-attack-on
the 3rd February, in which engagement he was killed. Jemadar Partab
Singh proved himself a cool and capable leader in trying circumstances.
Jemadar Assa Singh held an exposed position throughout the day,
and the skill with which he controlled and directed a covering
fire proved of great assistance to troops crossing gullies where
they were exposed to the enemy's fire.
62nd Punjabis.- Major O. St. J. Skeen displayed great promptitude
and courage in charging the enemy when disembarking from their
pontoons on the 3rd February. His skilful leading in the attack
of the 4th February was instrumental in causing the surrender
of the enemy, upon whose trenches he brought to bear an effective
enfilading fire. Captain M. H. L. Morgan, by his exertions and
example, frustrated a very determined attempt of the enemy to
effect a landing. Though wounded early on the 3rd, he continued
in command of his double company throughout the day. Subadar Kalu
Khan and Jemadar Sher Zaman Khan supported Major Skeen very pluckily
on the 3rd, and Jemadar Sher Zaman Khan again distinguished himself
in the action of the 4th February.
92nd Punjabis.—Major T. R. Maclachlan commanded the garrison
of the Toussoum post with great ability on the 3rd February, and
showed resourcefulness and capacity for command in the final stage
of the fight on the 4th. Captain W. H. Hastings, as machine-gun
officer at Toussoum, rendered valuable service in stopping the
enemy's attempts to bring boats on to the Canal and in preventing
the retreat of the enemy when they were turned out of the trenches
which they had occupied.
Lieutenant J. W. Thomson-Glover, 35th Sikhs (attached 92nd Punjabis),
led the counter-attack at Toussoum very gallantly. Lieutenant
H. Greene took over the command of Captain Cochran's double company
after the latter was killed, and handled it very well. Subadar
Major Farman Ali led his men very gallantly and ably assisted
Lieutenant Thomson-Glover.
128th Pioneers.—Lieutenant R. A. Fitzgibbon behaved with
conspicuous gallantry. When severely wounded he ran a considerable
distance under fire with a message to the 5th Egyptian Battery.
He has since died of his wounds.
2nd Battalion, 10th Gurkha Rifles.—Captain H. E. Weekes
led his double company skilfully and displayed promptitude and
initiative in supporting the double company of the 2nd Rajputs
after Captain Arundell had been killed.
137th Field Ambulance.—Major R. M. Knox, I.M.S., and his
officers were energetic and expeditious in the disposal of the
large number of wounded on their hands.
38. I submit a list of the non-commissioned officers and men whose
names have been brought to notice for gallant conduct, with particulars
of the services they have rendered.
39. All the units engaged proved cool under fire and did their
duty in a highly satisfactory manner, the conduct of officers
and men being
all that could be desired.
40. In conclusion I desire to express my high appreciation of
the valuable work done by the pilots and observers of the French
hydroaeroplane squadron and the detachment Royal Flying Corps
in the numerous reconnaissances carried out by them previous to
and during the advance of the enemy. They were constantly under
shrapnel and rifle fire and carried out their difficult and dangerous
duties with courage, resourcefulness and success.
I have, &c.,
ALEX. WILSON, Major-General.
|
| |
DESPATCH
No. II.
:Army Headquarters, Cairo,
19th August, 1915.
Sir,—
I have the honour to forward the accompanying despatch of Major-General
A. Wilson, C.B., Commanding the Suez Canal Defences. The troops
under General Wilson's command have been on service for over eight
months, and though the actual fighting they have experienced has
not been severe, yet their work has been heavy and monotonous owing
to the large amount of patrolling necessitated the enemy's attempts
at minelaying and to cross the Canal. Owing to the withdrawal of
troops to other theatres of war, and to sickness incidental to the
hot season, this patrolling has become very arduous, especially
at night. The list of recommendations for rewards in which I concur
and forward is not, I submit, excessive, having regard to the strength
of the force, which rose in February and March to 30,000 men. A
considerable number of the officers mentioned are now serving either
in the Dardanelles, Aden or France, some have been killed and many
wounded, but, none the less, I feel it my duty to mention their
services in Egypt. It will be seen that a good many recommendations
on behalf of the administrative staff have been made, especially
the Medical Branch, but as Egypt has developed into an Intermediate
Base and Clearing Station for the Indian Forces serving in France
and in the Mediterranean, the work and responsibilities of the administrative
staff and services have greatly increased, and are consequently
specially deserving of consideration. In conclusion I would like
very specially to bring to the notice of the Secretary of State
for War the eminent services of Major-General A. Wilson, C.B., who
has commanded the Canal defences with ability, tact, and resource
since the 16th November, 1914.
I have, &c.,
J. G. MAXWELL, Lieut.-General,
Commanding the Force in Egypt.
From the General Officer Commanding, Canal Defences, to The General
Staff, Army Headquarters, Cairo.
Headquarters, Canal Defences,
Ismailia,
1st August, 1915.
Sir,—
On the 11th February, 1915, I submitted a report on the operations
which took place early in the month in the Canal zone, and also
a brief resume of events since I assumed command of the Canal Defences
on 16th November, 1914. At the time this report was made it appeared
from information at our disposal that the operations under reference
might only be a preliminary to further hostilities, and that a more
determined attack on the Canal would be undertaken in the near future.
These anticipations have, however, not been realised, and though
the enemy has continued to hold the Sinai Peninsula in some strength
and has undertaken several minor enterprises with a view to causing
damage to the Canal and the shipping using it, no further advance
in force has taken place. This result may be attributed to the fact
that the losses suffered by the enemy in the attack on the Canal
were, according to subsequent reports from Turkish sources, heavier
than had been originally estimated, while the demoralisation of
the force, consequent on its retreat across the desert, necessitated
a considerable pause for reorganization.
2. Now that the hot season is well-established, and also as considerable
forces of the enemy have been withdrawn to other theatres of operations,
it is probable that the existing state of affairs will continue
for some months: I therefore consider it a suitable opportunity
to forward a narrative of events subsequent to my last report, and
also to submit the names of officers whose services during the past
eight
months are, in my opinion, worthy of mention.
3. My last report dealt with the operations in the vicinity of the
Canal up to 10th February, 1915, by which date hostilities in its
immediate neighbourhood had ceased for the time being. On the 12th
February, in accordance with instructions from Army Headquarters,
a battalion 2/7th Gurkha Rifles, under Lieut -Colonel Haldane, embarked
at Suez on board H.M.S. "Minerva" to proceed to Tor, with
a view to dispersing a force which had been threatening that place,
for some time past. This force landed at Tor during the night of
the 12th/13th, and, in conjunction with 150 men of the 2nd Egyptian
Battalion, which had been in garrison at Tor, attacked the enemy
at dawn on the 13th. The attack was completely successful, the enemy
losing some 60 killed and 102 prisoners; our losses were 1 killed
and 1 wounded. Since this occasion no further forces of the enemy
have appeared near Tor.
4. For the remainder of February and till the 22nd March no incident
of note took place. The Imperial Yeomanry Brigade, as well as the
Australian and New Zealand Infantry, who had reinforced the troops
on the Canal, returned to Cairo. Several reconnaissances, principally
to Abu Zenima (by sea), El Haitan, Wadi Muksheib; Moiya Harab and
Katia, were pushed out, but no enemy encountered. From information
received from agents and through aerial reconnaissances, it appeared
that during this month the Turks had concentrated mainly at El Arish
and Nekhl, while considerable bodies of the beaten troops were withdrawn
to Syria, being, it was rumoured, replaced by fresh formations from
the north.
5. On 22nd March an infantry patrol
moving from Kubri Post encountered a force of some 400 men north-east
of that post at dawn. The enemy withdrew on being engaged by troops
from the nearest posts, and a subsequent aerial reconnaissance discovered
a force of some 800 infantry and 200 mounted men with guns about
10 miles east of the Canal. From the report furnished it appeared
that the Turks were entrenching and intended to stay, and, consequently,
orders were issued for a column, consisting of 2 squadrons Hyderabad
Lancers, 1/5th Lancashire Battery E..F.A. (T.F.), detachment Bikanir
Camel Corps, 51st and 53rd Sikhs, and 1/2 battalion 1/5th Gurkhas,
to move out next day to engage and drive off the enemy. This column,
under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Boisragon, V.C., moved out from
Kubri at daylight (23rd), and attacked the enemy in an entrenched
position some 10 miles east of the Canal. After some resistance
the enemy fled hastily, leaving behind a quantity of equipment and
rifle ammunition, the heavy going across the sandhills preventing
our cavalry from cutting off their retreat. Our casualties on 22nd
and 23rd were 5 killed and 19 wounded (Indian ranks). The enemy's
losses were estimated at about 50.
6. The only other incident of note during the course of the month
was the departure of the 30th Brigade for the Persian Gulf on 23rd.
Its place in No. 1 Section was taken by the 28th (F.F.) Brigade,
which in turn was relieved by the 31st Brigade from the reserve.
Towards the end of the month reports were received of a considerable
concentration of the enemy near Es Sirr, some 80 miles due east
of Ballah.
These reports were verified later by aeroplane observation, which
estimated the hostile force as some 4,000, with guns.
7. On the 7th April our mounted patrols
from Kantara encountered a hostile force, estimated at 1,200 men,
which withdrew after shots had been exchanged. On the same day an
aerial reconnaissance reported considerably fewer numbers retiring
through Dueidar. The Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade was moved
up to Kantara the same day, and on the 8th moved out in conjunction
with part of the Kantara garrison. No enemy was encountered and
the cavalry moved back to Ismailia, reconnoitring the country for
some distance east of the Canal. On the 8th April, owing to suspicious
tracks having been noticed on the east bank of the Canal between
El Kap and Kantara, the Canal was dragged and a mine discovered
and destroyed. The mine had evidently been placed in the Canal under
cover of the demonstration of the previous day. Owing to this occurrence
it became necessary greatly to increase our patrols. Intermediate
night piquets were established between Posts and a system of hourly
patrols along the east bank instituted. Arrangements were made for
a thorough search of thie Canal bank at daylight every morning,
and Officers Commanding Posts were authorized to stop shipping in
case
of any suspicious circumstances being detected.
8. On the 28th April a reconnaissance
of 90 rifles, Bikanir Camel Corps, encountered a hostile force estimated
at some 200 men, with guns, about 12 miles due east of Ismailia
Ferry Post. After a short skirmish the patrol withdrew to the Ferry
Post with the loss of 3 killed, 4 wounded, and 2 missing; the enemy
did not follow up their retirement. Later in the day an aerial reconnaissance
located a body of the enemy in bivouac near El Hawawish, and the
Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade (eight squadrons), supported by
half-battalion 27th Punjabis and one section Egyptian Artillery,
crossed the Canal after dark with a view to engaging the enemy at
his camp next morning; or, should he have moved towards the Canal
during the night, to cut off his retreat. During the night 28th/29th
a hostile party, evidently from Hawawish, opened fire on a dredger
in the Canal north of Bench Mark Post, but retired when engaged
by one of our piquets. At daylight on 29th an aeroplane found Hawawish
evacuated, but later on located the hostile force moving into Mahadat
from the southwest,
and the cavalry were directed on that place. Our column, however,
only succeeded in engaging the rearguard at about 2 p.m., by which
time the enemy had left Mahadat and was moving on Bada. The pursuit
was carried on for three to four miles, but the great exhaustion
of men and horses, owing to the heat and heavy going through the
sandhills, prevented it from being carried further. Our losses were
one British, one Indian, officer, and one sowar killed; one British
officer and seven rank and file wounded. The enemy's losses in killed
were about 20, and 13 prisoners were taken. The column returned
to Ismailia early on the 30th.
9. On 7th April, the 7th Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade left
the Canal Defences to join the Mediterranean Force, and on 26th
the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade left for the same destination,
being replaced in No. Ill Section by the East Lancashire Brigade
(Territorial Force).
10. On 1st May a half battalion 56th Rifle were despatched from
Suez to Abu Zemins owing to rumours of an attack on the Egyptian
garrison of that place. This detachment returned on 3rd, no enemy
having appeared in the vicinity. On several occasions during the
month hostile patrols were located at some distance from the Canal,
but these all retired eastwards as soon as forces moved against
them. On the 29th a small party reached the shore of the Little
Bitter Lake, and, wading out, boarded a Suez Canal pile driver,
destroying one small boat and taking prisoner an Italian employee
of the company. Pursuit was undertaken from the nearest Post as
soon as the occurrence was reported, but without result. On the
night of the 30th/31st a party of Turks
was detected trying to approach the Canal between El Ferdan and
Ballah. On being fired on they retired, leaving behind a mine, which
was discovered and brought in next morning. The next night the party
returned with the evident intention of recovering the mine, but
hastily retired on being fired on by a piquet which had been left
near the spot to deal with any such attempt. On the night of the
2nd/3rd June, parties of the enemy
opened fire on the Posts of Kantara and El Ferdan, but withdrew
hastily when engaged. Small columns from the above Posts moved out
in pursuit, but were unable to come up with the raiders, who appeared
to be all mounted men. One Turkish officer was taken prisoner.
11. Several changes in the garrisons of the Canal Defences took
place during the month of May. Early in the month the Artillery
and Engineers, as well as the East Lancashire Brigade of the Lancashire
Division (T.F.), left to join the Mediterranean Force; the 4th Mounted
Brigade and Divisional Artillery, 2nd Mounted Division, arriving
in replacement. On the 29th May orders were received for the 1/5th
and 2/10th Gurkha Eifles to reinforce the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade
with the Mediterranean Force, and these battalions left on the 31st
May and 1st June respectively. Consequent on the above changes and
reductions certain modifications in organisation became necessary,
and were carried into effect during the month. It was decided to
abolish the divisional organisation of the 10th and 11th Divisions
and to include the whole of the forces in the Canal zone in one
command with a Headquarter Staff approximating to that of a division.
These changes were brought into effect from the 1st June.
12. During the month of June there was little change in the situation.
Early in the month the 9th Bhopal Infantry and 125th Rifles arrived
from France and were taken on the strength of the Canal Defence
Force in replacement of the 1/5th and 2/10th Gurkha Rifles. On the
11th and 12th five Turkish deserters arrived at El Shatt saying
that they had deserted from a force of some 300 men who had reached
the vicinity of Mabeiuk with a view to attacking the Canal. A column
was at once organised at Kubri to deal with the threat, but nothing
materialised, the enemy withdrawing to Nekhl. A party of somewhat
similar strength was located by an aeroplane near Katia about the
middle of the month, but retired on El Arish without undertaking
any offensive. On the 30th of the month the British s.s. "Teresias"
struck a mine laid in the Naval Section of the Canal Defences, near
the South end of the Little Bitter Lake. From investigations it
appeared that a party had reached the East bank of the lake, waded
out to the main channel, and succeeded in evading the naval launches
which patrol this section and in placing a mine. Thanks to the skilful
handling of the ship and the prompt action of the Canal Company's
officials, the accident only blocked the Canal for 14 hours, and
the ship, though seriously damaged, has since been towed into Alexandria
for repair.
13. During July nothing of any note occurred. On two occasions,
owing to the reported presence of Turkish patrols in the neighbourhood
of Katia, a small column was moved out from No. Ill Section to engage
or cut them off should they approach the Canal; but on each occasion
the hostile party retired without toucli having been obtained. The
extreme heat in the desert made military operations very difficult,
and practically confined all movements to the night time. On the
8th July orders were received for two batteries R.H.A. (T.F.) and
one infantry brigade to proceed urgently to Aden, and accordingly
"B" Battery, H.A.C., the Berkshire Battery, R.H.A. (T.F.),
and the 28th
(T.F.) Brigade (51st, 53rd Sikhs, 56th Rifles and 62nd Punjabis)
left Suez on the 12th and following days. The Artillery were replaced
by the 1/15th and 1/17th Batteries, E. Lancs. R.F.A. (T.F.), while
the Derbyshire Yeomanry (dismounted) were also sent to the Canal
Zone.
14. From the foregoing it will be seen that no fighting of any importance
has taken place during the past six months, and it appears evident
that, owing to the lack of water, climatic conditions and inability
to prosecute campaigns on so many fronts, the Turks will be unable
to undertake serious operations in this region till the cold weather
arrives and a considerable change in the strategical situation takes
place. At the same time there is no doubt of their intention to
detain as many of our troops as possible on the defence of the Canal
by attempts to endanger navigation, and, if possible, to block the
Canal by sinking, a ship in the fairway. Consequently the chief
danger that has had to be guarded against, since the main attack
in February, has been that of minelaying in the Canal; and, to meet
this danger, it has been necessary to employ a large number of men
on night patrol duty, especially along the east bank. Up to date,
however, except during the actual attack, traffic has continued
practically as in times of peace.
15. During the period under review the morale and, with certain
exceptions, the health of the troops has been well maintained. During
March an outbreak of dysentery occurred in one battalion, while
one or two others were less seriously affected. A great improvement
has, however, taken place lately, and the health of the Force may
now be taken as normal for the conditions under which it is serving.
When it became apparent that a large force would have to be kept
on the Canal during the hot weather, a scheme for providing shelter
against the sun was initiated and efficiently carried out. It has
proved of great value, especially in the case of the British mounted
troops.
I have, &c.,
ALEX. WILSON, Major-General,
Commanding Canal Defences. |
| |
| DESPATCH
.No. III.
Army Headquarters, Cairo.
1st March, 1916.
My Lord,—I have the honour to submit
this report on Military Affairs in the Egyptian Command since the
Turks attacked the Suez Canal in February, 1915, which attack was
made the subject of a separate Despatch. I feel it my duty to make
this report because so much of the arduous work done in Egypt by
the Force under my Command, with the cordial assistance of the Egyptian
Government, was in connection with the operations of the Mediterranean
Expeditionary Force in the Dardanelles. So far as I am aware, no
detailed mention of the services performed has been made in any
other Despatch. The entire resources of Egypt, Military and Civil,
were unstintingly given to further the necessities of that expedition.
The operations in the Gallipoli Peninsula by threatening Constantinople
drew off the bulk of the Turkish forces belonging to Djemal Pasha's
command, which had already been beaten back from the vicinity of
the Suez Canal. It was therefore possible, whilst retaining just
sufficient force to safeguard the Canal, to move troops to other
theatres where their presence was most required. But throughout
the summer and autumn of 1915, my principal cause of anxiety was
the possibility of trouble on the Western Frontier, which might
lead to serious religious and internal disorders. The attitude of
Sayed Ahmed the Senussi was becoming more and more truculent notwithstanding
my efforts to preserve peaceful relations; everything possible was
done to avoid hostilities, and they were avoided until late in the
year, when hostile acts on his part led to the withdrawal of the
Egyptian Frontier post at Sollum and subsequent operations.
Suez Canal Zone.
The duty of guarding the Suez Canal was allotted to the Indian Expeditionary
Force " E " under the command of Major-General Sir A.
Wilson, K.C.B. This force was gradually reduced by calls on it for
other theatres; thus the 29th Brigade under Major-General Sir H.
Cox, K.C.M.G., C.B., C.S.I., was sent to Gallipoli; subsequently
the Punjabi-Mohammedan battalions of that brigade were withdrawn
from the
Peninsula and replaced by Gurkha battalions taken from brigades
on the Canal; two double companies of Sikhs from the Patiala Imperial
Service Regiment were sent to replace losses in the 15th Sikhs,
and every British and Indian officer who could be spared was sent
to replace casualties; the 30th Brigade under Major-General C. J.
Melliss, V.C., K.C.B., was sent to Basrah, the 28th Brigade under
Major-
General Sir G. Younghusband, K.C.I.E., C.B., was sent first to Aden
and then to Basrah; the force was further weakened by the exchange
of tired units from the Indian divisions in France with some of
the best battalions on the Canal.
To this force fell the tiresome and onerous duty throughout the
entire summer of exercising ceaseless vigilance over the 100 miles
of Canal front. Great credit is due for the way this duty was performed;
indifferent troops would have been demoralised. Though small bodies
of the enemy were constantly endeavouring, occasionally with success,
to place mines in the Canal or damage the railway, yet no accident
of importance occurred except that one merchant ship, the s.s. "
Teresias," struck a mine. She fortunately escaped with but
little damage. The passage of the Canal was interrupted on this
one occasion for only a few hours. A little affair, creditable to
the Imperial Service Troops engaged, occurred on the 23rd
November, when a squadron of the Mysore Lancers operating
15 miles east of El Kantara came upon a force of 60 or 70 Turks,
the advance party of a raiding party 200 strong. These they pursued
for 7 miles, killing seven, capturing 12 and wounding many others.
Amongst the dead was a Bedouin leader named Rizkalla Salim, who
was responsible for most of the raids on the Canal; since his death
they entirely ceased.
Part of 30th Squadron Royal Flying Corps, under the command of Brevet
Major S. D. Massy, I.A., with Headquarters at Ismailia, carried
out daily reconnaissances without a single important accident. The
French Naval Seaplane detachment, with Headquarters at Port Said,
under the command of Capitaine de Vaisseau de-L'Escaille, whose
services were placed at my disposal for Intelligence purposes, was
continually employed in reconnoitring the Syrian and Anatolian Coast
from the requisitioned vessels "Raven" and "Anne."
The results of their work were invaluable. The "Anne"
was torpedoed near Smyrna during an armistice while employed by
the Royal Navy, but was fortunately able to reach Mudros, where
she was patched up and returned to Port Said. I cannot speak too
highly of the work of the seaplane detachment. Lengthy land flights
are extremely dangerous, yet nothing ever stopped these gallant
French aviators from any enterprise. I regret the loss of two of
these planes whilst making dangerous land flights over Southern
Syria.
I would be failing in my duty were I not to bring to Your Lordship's
notice the valuable and whole-hearted assistance always readily
given by the Count de Serionne and his able assistants of the Suez
Canal Company. The whole of the resources of this Company were put
unreservedly at my disposal.
It is perhaps needless for me to report that His Majesty's Royal
Navy, under Vice-Admiral Sir R. Peirse, K.C.B., Commander-in-Chief,
East Indies, were always ready and anxious to help and facilitate
the duty of protecting the Canal and advising in any enterprise
that needed Naval assistance. To the Navy fell the duty of guarding
the Bitter Lakes. To the Vice-Admiral Commanding the French Syrian
Squadron I am especially indebted, in that he and the Officers and
ships under his command maintained a constant watch throughout on
the Syrian and Anatolian Coasts. They supplied me with the fullest
information of enemy movements that it was possible to obtain by
means of agents, etc. I had only to express a wish and it was at
once carried out.
I now submit my report as follows: —
OPERATIONS ON THE WESTERN FRONT [of Egypt] TO 31ST JANUARY, 1916.
Outbreak of Hostilities on the Western Front.
Early in November, during my temporary absence from Egypt to meet
your Lordship at Mudros, the situation on the Western Frontier,
which, as your Lordship is aware, had for some months been a subject
for anxiety, became suddenly acute, and a series of acts of hostility
committed against our frontier posts at Sollum and Barrani made
final rupture with the Senussi inevitable. As early as May, 1915,
signs were apparent that the steadily increasing pressure brought
to bear upon the Senussi by the Turkish party in Tripoli, under
the leadership of Nuri Bey, a half-brother of Enver Pasha, was beginnin
gto take effect. For some time, even after the outbreak of hostilities
between Great Britain and Turkey in 1914, the anti-British influence
of this party was not strongly felt, and the attitude of the Senussi
towards Egypt remained friendly. It was not until the advent of
Gaafer, a Germanised Turk of considerable ability, who arrived in
Tripoli in April, 1915, with a considerable supply of arms and money,
that this attitude underwent a change. From that moment it became
evident that the Turkish influence was gaining weight, and it was
only by means of great forbearance, and by tactful handling of a
delicate situation by .Lieutenant-Colonel Snow, commanding the Western
Desert, that a rupture was so long deferred.
The first incident of importance occurred on August
16th, 1915, when two British submarines, sheltering from
the weather near Has .Lick, on the coast of Cyrenaica, were treacherously
fired upon by Arabs under the leadership of a white officer, casualties
being suffered on either side. The incident was, however, closed
by the acceptance of the Senussi's profound apologies, and of his
assurances that the act had been committed in ignorance that the
submarines were British.
A period of quiet followed, but at the beginning of November a series
of events occurred which placed beyond all doubt the insincerity
of the Senussi's continued assurances of friendship. In the first
week of that month (November) the crews of H.M.S. "Tara"
and of H.M.T. 'Moorina," torpedoed by enemy submarines on the
5th and 7th respectively, were, on landing in Cyrenaica, captured
and held prisoners by the Senussi, who, in reply to strong representations
for their immediate release, merely feigned ignorance of these occurrences,
which he pretended to discredit. Even then a last effort was made
to preserve peace, and Sayed Mohamed el Idris was sent to arrange
negotiations whereby the Senussi should get rid of his Turkish advisers
in return for a sum of money. But before any decision could be reached
matters had got beyond control, and the negotiations collapsed.
On the 9th an Emergency Squadron of the Royal Naval Armoured Car
Division was sent to strengthen the post at Sollum, which three
days earlier had been shelled by enemy submarines, the Egyptian
Coastguard Cruiser "Abbas" being, sunk at her moorings,
and another, the "Nur el Bahr," receiving considerable
damage from shell fire.
On the night of the 14/15th two Egyptian
sentries at Sollum were rushed by Mohafizia (Senussi regulars),
and were severely handled ;and their arms carried off; the following
night the camp at Sollum was systematically sniped, though no casualties
resulted.
On the 17th the Zawia at Sidi Biarrani
(50 miles east of Sollum) was occupied by a force of some 300 Muhafizia,
and on the 18th the Coastguard Barracks at that place were twice
attacked during the night, one coastguard being killed. This was
followed on the 20th by an attack on the Coastguard Outpost at Sabil,
a small post about 30 miles south-east of Sollum, though in this
case, as at Barrani, the attack failed.
In view of these circumstances there was -learly no alternative
but to recognise a state of war and to take action accordingly.
The events recorded above had caused a spirit of great unrest to
prevail throughout the country, and the possibility of internal
disturbances was a source of greater anxiety than the external danger.
This unrest was especially evident amongst the Arab population inhabiting
the western edge of the cultivation—amounting in the Behera
Province alone to over 120,000. The religious influence of the Senussi
is great amongst these people, and their natural sympathies are
inclined towards their brethren in the Western Desert. The above
considerations made it imperative, on the one hand to keep the sphere
of hostilities as far as possible to the west of the Delta and,
on the other hand, to avoid anything in the nature of a reverse.
In pursuance of this policy it was decided to withdraw ithe Western
Frontier posts to Mersa Matruh, and to concentrate at that place
a force sufficient to deal swiftly with the situation; to secure
the Alexandria—Dabaa Railway as a secondary line of communication
by land with the railhead at Dabaa; to occupy the Wadi Natrun and
the Fayum as measures of precaution; and to watch closely by constant
and careful reconnaissance the Oasis of Moghara. This course offered
the following advantages:
(a) The advance of the enemy would be opposed at the most westerly
point at which a suitable harbour could be found, within one night's
journey by sea from Alexandria, defensible on the land front.
(b) The enemy would be met on ground generally practicable to all
arms and comparatively well supplied with water.
(c) The Egyptian Beduin of the coastal belt east of Matruh would
be protected if loyal, and coerced if disaffected.
(d) Native opinion in the Delta would be affected favourably by
an offensive policy.
(e) As more troops and transport by sea became available an opportunity
would be afforded of striking at the enemy's main lines of communications
by means of a landing at Sollum.
On the 20th November orders were issued
for the assembly of the following force at Alexandria—
In Command.—Major-General A. Wallace, C.B.
Composite Mounted Brigade. Under Brigadier-General J. D. T. Tyndale
Biscoe: —
Three Composite Yeomanry Regiments (from details 2nd Mounted Division).
One Composite Regiment Australian Light Horse (from details Australian
Light Horse Brigades).
Notts Battery Royal Horse Artillery and Ammunition Column.
Auxiliary Services.
Composite Infantry Brigade. Under Brigadier-General the Earl of
Lucan: —
1/ 6th Battalion Royal Scots (T.F.).
2/7th Battalion Middlesex Regiment (T.F.).
2/8th Battalion Middlesex Regiment (T.F.).
15th Sikhs.
Auxiliary Services.
A
Detachment Egyptian Army Military Works Department (no Royal Engineers
being available).
Divisional Train, 1st Australian Division.
The 2nd Battalion New Zealand Rifle Brigade, one Company 15th Sikhs,
a detachment of 150 Bikanir Camel Corps with an attached Egyptian
Army Machine Gun Section, and one armoured train garrisoned by the
1/10th Gurkha Rifles with two 12 pdr. guns of the Egyptian Army
Artillery were despatched on the 21st
instant to make good the Alexandria-Dabaa Railway and patrol to
Moghara Oasis.
The 1 /1st North Midland Mounted Brigade, with the Berks Battery
Royal Horse Artillery, were sent on the 29th
November to preserve order in the Fayum, and on the same
date a Squadron of Egyptian Army Cavalry and a detachment of 50
Bikanir Camel Corps occupied
the Wadi Natrun.
Finally, to provide for possible contingencies among the Arab population
of the Western Behera Province, a Composite Battalion was made up
from details of the 29th Division at Alexandria, detachments being
despatched to Hosh Isa and Damanhur on December 7th.
By November 23rd concentration was
completed, and on the night of the 23rd/24th the first detachments
of the 15th Sikhs, under Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. R. Gordon, sailed
from Alexandria, arriving at Mersa Matruh the following morning.
The presence of enemy submarines necessitated the sea journey being
performed by night only. Moreover, the depth of water over the bar
in Matruh Harbour limited the ships immediately available for transporting
troops and supplies to six trawlers and two small Coastguard Cruisers.
Four additional small steamers were obtained as soon as possible,
and a third cruiser was fitted up as a hospital ship. The mounted
troops and transport were assembled at railhead at Dabaa, and an
advanced force was sent forward to make good and develop the wells
at Abu Gerab, Baggush and Jerawla, which constitute the only watering
places on the 85 miles of desert which separate Dabaa from Mersa
Matruh. The condition of the wells at the extreme end of the dry
season only permitted of two squadrons being passed across at a
time. The concentration of the force at Mersa Matruh, less five
squadrons left at railhead on account of-insufficiency of water,
was completed on December 7th, and
on the same date Major-General Wallace moved his headquarters to
Matruh.
Meanwhile Sollum post had been evacuated by sea on the afternoon
of the 23rd November, such motor cars of the Royal Naval Armoured
Car Squadron as could be moved having been dispatched by land previously.
In the evacuation it was unfortunately found necessary to disable
and abandon three light Ford cars and the two Egyptian Army 9 c/m
Krupp guns, and to abandon an outlying post of one Egyptian officer
and fourteen other ranks which failed to reach the beach in time
to embark, and were made prisoners. The garrison of Sollum—strength,
British, five officers and twelve other ranks, Egyptian, two officers
and ninety other ranks—reached Matruh safely on November 24th.
The evacuation of the posts at Bagbag and Sidi Barrani was effected
by land on November 23rd, everything of value being removed, except
four light cars at 'the latter post, which were disabled before
abandonment. During the march, and after arrival at Matruh, a number
of desertions took place among the Egyptian Coastguard Camel Corps.
These desertions amounted in all to twelve native officers, two
cadets, and 120 other ranks, the deserters taking with them their
arms, equipment and 176 camels.
A detailed distribution of the Western Frontier Force on the 10th
December, and of troops garrisoning districts in the West of Egypt,
in which the population was mainly Arab, and therefore likely to
be affected by the invasion, is given in Appendix "A"
(not printed).
It must be acknowledged that this force, although the best available
in Egypt at the moment, was by no means well adapted for the task
which lay before it. Regiments and Staffs had been somewhat hastily
collected and were not well known to one another. The Composite
Yeomanry Brigade, to give an instance, contained men from twenty
or more different regiments. Before a really efficient fighting
force could be collected much rearrangement was necessary with the
result that the composition was constantly changing; and it was,
in fact, not until the middle of February that the conditions of
the Western Frontier Force could be considered really satisfactory.
Moreover, the lack of sufficient and suitable transport made it
necessary for General Wallace to withdraw his troops to Matruh after
each engagement. I mention these facts because it should be realised
that General Wallace had to overcome many difficulties beyond those
caused by the enemy.
On the 11th December the undermentioned
force moved out from Mersa Matruh, with orders to disperse a hostile
gathering reported in the neighbourhood of Beit Hussein and Ras
Um Rakhum, and to reconnoitre towards Unjeila:
Commander, Lieut.-Colonel J. L. R. Gordon.
15th Sikhs (350 men).
2nd Composite Yeomanry Regiment, (three squadrons with three machine-guns).
One section Nottinghamshire Battery, Roal Horse Artillery (Territorial
Force).
Detachment Royal Naval. Armoured Car Division (six armoured cars,
one wireless-car).
One section South Midland Field Ambulance, Royal Army Medical Corps
(Territorial Force).
Marching at 7 a.m., the force moved westwards by the Coast road,
and on reaching Wadi Senaab the cavalry pushed forward in advance
of the column, became engaged with the enemy holding the southern
side of the Wadi in considerable strength. Owing to the bad going
marching was difficult, and the infantry were unable to cooperate,
but, on the arrival of a reinforcement of a squadron of Australian
Light Horse in the afternoon, the enemy were finally driven out
of the Wadi with loss estimated at not less than 100 killed and
wounded. Our casualties on this day were one officer and thirteen
other ranks killed, and two officers and sixteen other ranks wounded.
Among the former I regret to report the death of Lieutenant-Colonel
Snow, killed late in the day by an Arab whom he was endeavouring
to persuade to surrender. In the death of this experienced officer
the force suffered a heavy loss.
In the action valuable assistance was rendered by the armoured cars
of the Royal Naval Armoured Car Division. After dark the column
concentrated at Um Rakhum, where the night was spent. On the 12th,
owing to the fatigue of the Yeomanry horses, nothing further was
attempted than the clearing up of the Wadi Shaifa, which resulted
in the capture of some twenty-five prisoners and a number of camels
and cattle abandoned by the enemy in his retreat. Meanwhile air
reconnaissance disclosed the presence of the enemy in some force
at Has Manaa, about thirteen miles west of Um Rakhum. The column
was accordingly reinforced by two companies of the 1/6th Royal Soots
from Matruh, and orders were issued for an advance on Ras Manaa
on the following day.
On the 13th the column moved at 8 a.m.
in the direction of Beit Hussein, but on crossing Wadi Shaifa became
engaged with the enemy,
and a sharp and somewhat critical action developed. The enemy, estimated
at about 1,200 with two guns and machine guns, attacked with considerable
vigour, but after a critical period the arrival of reinforcements
(two guns Notts Royal Horse Artillery and two squadrons Australian
Light Horse) from Matruh, turned the scale in our favour, and the
enemy were driven back about a mile with heavy loss, though dark
put an end to further pursuit. The column retired for the night
to Um Rakhum, and the following morning returned to Matruh. Our
casualties in this operation amounted to nine rank and file killed
and six officers and 50 other ranks wounded. The enemy's losses,
on the other hand, as estimated from observation and confirmed by
subsequent, reports, must have reached a total of at least 250,
of whom about 180 killed.
On the nigiht of the 14/15th December
the posts at the wells of Abu Gerab, Baggush and Gerawla were withdrawn
owing to their somewhat dangerous isolation, this operation being
carried out without incident.
From the 15th to the 23rd no operation
of importance was undertaken, the period being devoted to the further
organizing and strengthening of the force at Matruh. The experience
of the operations of the 11th and 13th December had clearly shown
that to obtain a rapid and decisive result more strength was necessary.
During the third week of December, therefore, the force at Matruh
was reinforced by the 1st Battalion, New Zealand Rifle Brigade,
two Naval 4-in. guns and "A" Battery, Honourable Artillery
Company (2nd Mounted Division), while shortly afterwards the 161st
Brigade (54th Division) relieved the 2nd New Zealand Rifle Battalion
on the lines of communication, the latter being withdrawn to Alexandria.
In the meantime the enemy was concentrating in the neighbourhood
of Gebel Medwa, about eight miles south-west of Matruh, and by December
24th his strength at that place was estimated from air reconnaissance
and other sources to have reached about 5,000 men, of whom more
than half were Mahafizia or regular soldiers, with four guns and
some machine guns, the whole under the command of Gaafer.
In Command Main Body.—Major-General A. Wallace, C.B.
Right Column.—Lt. -Colonel J. L. R. Gordon, 15th Sikhs.
Royal Bucks Hussars.
1 Section Notts Battery, Royal Horse Artillery.
1st Battalion, New Zealand Rifle Brigade.
15th Sikhs.
2/8th Battalion, Middlesex Regiment (T.F.).
Notts and Derby Field Ambulance.
Water Section, Australian Train.
Left Column.—Brigadier-General J. D. T. Tyndale Biscoe.
Brigade Staff and Signalling Troop (2nd Composite Yeomanry Brigade).
Notts Royal Horse Artillery (less 1 Section).
2 Troops, Duke of Lancaster's Own Yeomanry.
1 Troop, Derbyshire Yeomanry.
2 Troops, City of London Yeomanry.
1 Squadron, Herts Yeomanry.
Composite Regiment, Australian Light Horse (3 Squadrons).
Yeomanry Machine Gun Section.
Yeomanry Field Ambulance.
Against this concentration, on December 25th, the force detailed
above, with Major-General Wallace personally in command moved out
from Matruh. General Wallace's plan was to divide his force into
two columns: —
(i.) The right column, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon,
15th Sikhs, and comprising the bulk of the Infantry, with the Bucks
Hussars and a section of Royal Horse Artillery, to advance directly
on Gebel Medwa.
(ii.) The left column, under Brigadier-General Tyndale Biscoe, including
the remainder of the mounted troops and Horse Artillery, to make
a wide detour southward round the right flank of the enemy to deny
his retreat to the west.
H.M.S. "Clematis" to assist as occasion offered with gun
fire from the sea.
Both columns moved before daylight, and by 7.30 the Cavalry had
cleared the Wadi Toweiwa, about seven miles due south of Matruh.
Meanwhile the right column followed the Khedivial Motor Road westward,
until, at 6.30 a.m., the advance guard came suddenly under. Ere
from artillery and machine guns from the south-west. The enemy were
soon driven off, and by 7.15 a.m. the main body had crossed
the Wadi Raml and could see the enemy occupying an escarpment about
one mile south of Gebel Medwa. At 7.30 a.m. the 15th Sikhs were
ordered to attack the enemy from his right flank, the Bucks Hussars,
and 2/8th Middlesex to cooperate by a containing attack along his
front, to be delivered simultaneously with the attack of the Sikhs.
The 15th Sikhs accordingly deployed west of theroad and commenced
their advance, despatching one company to occupy Gebel Medwa in
order, to secure their right. At the same time the Bucks Hussars
moved forward, while the Middlesex Battalion, keeping to the north-east
of Gebel Medwa, sent a company to relieve that of the 15th Sikhs
occupying the hill, which thereupon rejoined the battalion. The
section Notts Royal Horse Artillery, which came into action on the
high ground near the road 2,000 yards east of Gebel Medwa, quickly
silenced the enemy's artillery, therein greatly assisting the advance
of the infantry, and at 7.45 a.m. H.M.S. "Clematis" opened
an accurate and useful fire at a range of about 10,000 yards. By
9.30 a.m. the Sikhs, reinforced by two companies of the 1st New
Zealand Rifle Brigade (from the Reserve) were still meeting with
considerable opposition, and shortly before 10 o'clock a third company
of New Zealanders was ordered up to prolong their line to the left
and to clear a Nullah running parallel to the line of advance from
which the Sikhs were suffering casualties. Before this company could
reach its position the crest in front of the Sikha was carried,
and that battalion, with the two New Zealand companies on t!he right,
pushed rapidly forward, driving the enemy into caves and small gullies,
all of which had in turn to be cleared. At 11 a.m. the western edge
of the plateau was reached, and the left column could then be seen
operating about two miles to the southwest. Signal communication
was opened, and the left column, which had been a good deal delayed
by some hostile mounted troops, then changed direction north-east,
and subsequently north, along the Wadi Majid, where it again became
engaged. By 2.15 p.m. the Nullahs at the head of tihe Wadi Majid
had been thoroughly cleared, and after an hour and a half sharp
fighting the Wadi was in our possession—over 100 dead, 34
prisoners, 80 camels, and much live stock, as well as 30,000 rounds
of small arm ammunition and three boxes of gun ammunition, falling
into our hands. At 4 p.m. the Cavalry Column joined up with the
left of the 15th Sikhs, having finally driven off the enemy, with
whom they had been engaged since 2 o'clock. Unfortunately the remnants
of the enemy had already made good their escape westwards along
the sea shore, and the approach of darkness precluded the possibility
of further pursuit. After nightfall the Cavalry returned to Matruh,
the Infantry bivouacking for the night at Gebel Medwa and returning
to Matruh the following morning. Our casualties during the day,
which amounted in all to 14 rank and file killed and 3 officers
and 47 other ranks wounded, were very light in comparison with those
of the enemy, of whom over 370 dead and 82 prisoners were accounted
for apart from the wounded—probably a considerable number—
whom they were able to get away. Amongst the booty were the office
and personal effects of the enemy's commander, Gaafer, abandoned
by him in his flight.
The energy, resolution, and initiative displayed by Lieutenant-Colonel
Gordon throughout this operation is deserving of the highest praise,
and in his difficult task he was magnificently backed up by his
own regiment, the 15th Sikhs, temporarily commanded by Major Evans,
and by the 1st Battalion New Zealand Rifle Brigade, under Major
Austen. The immediate result of the action was the retirement of
the Senussi with his Staff and the remains of his force to Unjeila
and Bir Tunis. General Wallace was now free to deal with the situation
between Matruh and Dabaa, and to this end, on 28th
December, a small column, under the command of Brigadier-General
the Earl of Lucan, was despatched from Mersa Matruh to Jerawla.
Several enemy encampments were visited, but no resistance was encountered,
and on the 30th the column returned to Matruh, having destroyed
some eighty tents and large quantities of grain, and bringing in
nearly 100 camels and 500 sheep.
During the early days of January the weather made active operations
impossible. On the 1st of the month a collection of eighty tents
was reported by aeroplane at Gebel Howimil, and a column was formed
to clear up the situation in that neighbourhood. On the 2nd, however,
torrential rain fell, which continued, with rare breaks, almost
incessantly for a week, the country becoming a sea of mud, so that
the start of the column was postponed from day to day. Finally,
on the evening of 9t!h January, the weatiher cleared, and by the
12th the roads were sufficiently passable to warrant a start being
made.
On the 13th the column reached Baggush,
and on the 14th the march was continued to Gebel Howimil, where
several small camps were
destroyed, a quantity of stores burnt, and some camels and live
stock taken; nowhere was opposition encountered. The column returned
the same evening to Baggush, having covered during the day close
upon fifty miles. Under cover of this operation the damaged telegraph
line between Matruh and Dabaa was successfully restored by the Royal
Naval Armoured Car Division, and by the evening of the 14th communication
was restored.
On 15th January the section Honourable
Artillery Company and two squadrons Australian Light Horse left
the column for Dabaa, the remainder of the force returning to Bir
Gerawla, and the following day to Matruh. Marching throughout had
been very difficult and tedious owing to the deep going and swampy
condition of the ground.
On 19th January aerial reconnaissance
discovered the presence of a considerable force of the enemy at
Hazalin, twenty-five miles southwest of Matruh, the camp comprising
at least 100 European and 250 Bedouin tents, including that of the
Grand Senussi, which was recognised by Captain Royle, the observer.
In view of the estimated strength of the enemy, General Wallace
decided, before striking, to await the arrival of a reinforcement
of one battalion of the South African Infantry Brigade, then under
orders to sail from Alexandria. This battalion reached Mersa Matruh
on the 20th and 21st, and on 22nd January, air reports showing that
the enemy's position at Hazalin was unchanged, the force shown below
set out with General Wallace in command, reaching Bir Shola (16
miles) after dark, where troops bivouacked for the night: —
1 Squadron, Royal Bucks Hussars.
1 Squadron, Dorset Yeomanry.
1 Squadron, Herts Yeomanry.
1 Squadron, Duke of Lancaster's Own Yeomanry.
1 Squadron, Surrey Yeomanry.
1 Squadron, Australian Light Horse.
" A " Battery Honourable Artillery Company (less one Section).
Notts Battery Royal Horse Artillery and Ammunition Column.
Australian Signal Section.
1st Battalion, New Zealand Rifle Brigade.
2nd South African Regiment.
15th Sikhs.
I/6th Battalion, Royal Scots (T.F.) (less two Companies).
2/8th Battalion, Middlesex Regt. (T.F.) (less two Companies).
1st South Midland Field Ambulance.
37th Indian Field Ambulance.
Royal Naval Armoured Car Division (Detachment).
At 6 a.m. on January 23rd the force
moved off, disposed as under: —
Right Column. Commander.—Lt.-Colonel J. L. K. Gordon, 15th
Sikhs.
1 Squadron, Duke of Lancaster's Own Yeomanry.
Notts. Battery, Royal Horse Artillery.
15th Sikhs.
2nd South African Regiment.
1st Battalion, New Zealand Rifle Brigade.
(Right Column on compass bearing to reported position of Senussi
Camp.)
Left Column. Commander.—Brigadier-General J. D. T. Tyndale
Biscoe.
1 Squadron, Australian Light Horse.
3 Squadrons, Royal Bucks. Hussars.
1 Squadron, Dorset Yeomanry.
1 Squadron, Herts. Yeomanry.
Mounted Brigade Machine Gun Section.
" A'' Battery, H.A.C. (less one Section).
(Left Column echeloned to the left front of the right moving parallel
to and in close touch with it.)
Reserve.—Two Troops Yeomanry. 1/6th Battalion, Royal Scots
(less half Battalion) and S.A.A., moved half a mile in rear of the
Right Column. The train, with half Battalion, 2/8th Middlesex Regiment,
remained parked at Bir Shola.
At 8.30 a.m., when the Right Column were about 7 miles from Bir
Shola, the Left Column reported that the enemy could be seen about
2 miles ahead of their advanced Squadron, and shortly afterwards
the latter (Australian Light Horse) became engaged. The Bucks. Hussars
and H.A.C. were immediately sent forward in support, and simultaneously
Colonel Gordon's Column pushed on in attack formation, the 15th
Sikhs leading. Relieved by the advance of the Infantry, the mounted
troops pressed on, endeavouring to work round the enemy's right,
and at the same time covering tJhe left flank of Colonel Gordon's
attack. The latter, spread over a front of nearly a mile and a half,
led across ground absolutely destitute of cover, while mirage in
the early stages made it impossible for a considerable time to locate
the enemy's positions. During this advance the Infantry suffered
somewhat severely from artillery and machine guns, the enemy's fire
being both rapid and accurate. Nevertheless, the enemy was gradually
pressed back, but his retirement of nearly 3 miles on to his main
positions was conducted with great skill, denying all our efforts
to come to close quarters. By 2.45 p.m. the Sikhs and South Africans,
with part of the New Zealand Battalion, on the left of the Sikhs,
had reached the enemy's main line. But in the meantime the flanks
had not made equal progressi, and bodies of the enemy were working
round both north and south, the line gradually forming the arc of
a semi-circle. Soon after 1p.m. so great was the activity of one
of these detachments on our right, or northern flank, that the reserve
Battalion (1/6th Royal,Scots) had to be put in to restore the situation,
but by 2.30 p.m. all danger from that quarter was past. On the extreme
left, however; by 3.30 p.m. the Cavalry of the Left Column had been
forced to give some ground, and with the H.A.C. guns were occupying
a position nearly 1,000 yards in rear of the Field Ambulance. Colonel
Gordon was called upon to detach 2 companies of New Zealanders to
assist the Cavalry, who were being pressed. With this reinforcement
the threat against our left rear was finally repulsed and the enemy
driven off. In the meantime the main attack by Colonel Gordon's
Column had progressed satisfactorily. By 3 p.m. the enemy had been
driven from his positions, and shortly afterwards his camp was occupied
and burnt, the work of destruction being, completed by 4.30 p.m.
As darkness was approaching, and the exhaustion of the cavalry horses
forbade pursuit, General Wallace decided to bivouac the force about
2 miles east of the captured position, where the Field Ambulance
had been placed, and whence it could not be moved owing to the deep
mud. Throughout the day this, factor—of mud—had played
an important and unfortunate part. The whole country had been converted
by the abnormal rains into a quagmire, which had hampered the operations
of the mounted troops, preventing their full co-operation with the
Infantry. Owing to the mud, again, the Infantry were deprived of
the support of the Royal Naval Armoured Car Division, intended to
co-operate against the enemy's left flank, a loss seriously felt
during the day.
The troops spent the night in considerable discomfort, as the train
was unable to proceed further than about 3 miles west of Bir Shola;
neither supplies nor blankets could be brought up, and the night
was intensely wet and cold. The enemy showed no inclination to renew
operations, and at 8.30 a.m. on the 24th
the force started for Bir Shola. The march to Bir Shola, through
deep mud, proved an arduous undertaking, all vehicles having to
be drawn by hand, but, above all, the transport of the wounded presented
the greatest difficulty. Those unable to ride had to be carried
on stretchers, a severe strain upon the troops, tired and thirsty
after a cold and sleepless night. Eventually, however, the train
was met where it had parked, about three miles west of Bir Shola,
and the infantry were relieved of their burden, the force reaching
bivouac at Bir Shola at about.5 p.m.
On the 25th the weather cleared and
the troops marched back in good spirits to Mersa Matruh, the whole
column getting in by 4.30 p.m.
Our casualties in the action of the 23rd were unfortunately heavy,
as the figures show: —
Killed. Wounded.
British Officers ... ... 1 10
British other ranks ... 11 164
Indian Officers ... ... — 3
Indian other ranks ... 19 114
Total 31 291
Nevertheless those of the enemy must have been far heavier, and,
although difficult to gauge accurately, a conservative estimate
based on observation and on the reports of prisoners places his
losses at not less than 200 killed and 500 wounded. In this action
the enemy received a very severe blow, and, if deserters are to
be believed, the effect of this reverse, following upon that at
Gebel Medwa on December 25th, has gone far to discourage the Senussi
and to shake the faith of his followers in the cause. It was unfortunate
that in this, as in previous actions, it was impossible for the
infantry to pursue their success to the full, owing to the intense
difficulties of transport experienced on every occasion. With greater
mobility, allowing of an active pursuit, particularly after the
action on Christmas Day, the success obtained would undoubtedly
have been far more complete, and would have contributed largely
to a more speedy termination of the campaign.
In the success attained on the 23rd especial praise is due to the
leading of Colonel Gordon, who commanded the main attack, and to
the gallantry of the Sikhs, the /South Africans and the New Zealanders,
who fought with invincible dash and resolution throughout the day.
It was at this stage of the campaign that General Wallace felt himself
obliged, owing to age, to tender his resignation of the command
which he had held with unvarying success for the past three months.
I had decided that the time had now come to undertake the reoccupation
of Sollum, and as General Wallace considered that the operations
involved a physical strain which, would be beyond his powers, I
appointed Major-General W. E. Peyton, C.B., C.V.O., D..S.O., in
his place. By this time the force was thoroughly well adapted and
equipped for its work. The loss of the 15th Sikhs, ordered to India,
was severe, but it and the New Zealand Battalion had been replaced
by the South African Brigade. The Composite Yeomanry Brigade had
vanished, and its place had been taken by the 2nd Mounted Brigade.
Two sections of Hong Kong and Singapore Mountain Battery had joined,
and with the necessary services this little force was complete in
every respect. Lord Lucan's Composite Brigade of three Territorial
regiments was almost all that remained of the original command.
In closing this account of the operations on the western frontier
up to the end of January, 1916, I wish again to emphasise the unvarying
and wlhole-hearted support accorded throughout by the Royal Navy.
In the onerous and often difficult task of transporting troops and
material by sea to Mersa Matruh, and in the active ico-operation
of H.M.S. "Clematis," which by her vigilant patrolling
of the coast considerably lightened the burden of the troops, and
by her effective gunnery materially assisted in the operations in
December; the assistance and the support of the Navy has been from
start to finish as ungrudging as effective.
The Western Frontier Force also owes much to the Royal Flying Corps,
whose work was, as always, of a high order. Special mention should
be made of a flight by Lieutenant Van Ryneveld to Qara, by Lieutenant
Tipton from the Fayum to Moghara, and regular flights to Banana.
The distances covered were very great, and flights of 200 miles
have become quite common.
I desire to place on record my high appreciation of the invaluable
co-operaition of all Departments of the Egyptian Government. My
relations with His Highness The Sultan, and his Ministers have been
most close and cordial, and their influence has set a tone which
has been followed by the better-class Egyptian throughout the country.
The intricacies and difficulties of martial law in a cosmopolitan
country such as Egypt have been made comparatively easy by the advice
and assistance of the advisers to the Ministry of Finance and Interior.
To Lord E. Cecil, K.C.M.G., D.S.O., Sir R. Graham, K.C.M.G., C.B.,
Sir W. Brunyate, K.C.M.G., Sir M. Macdonald, K.C.M.G. Mr. Burnett-Stuart,
of the Ministry of the! Interior, and Mr. Ward Boys, of the Ministry
of Finance, my thanks are especially due. I am also greatly indebted
to Colonel Harvey Pasha, C.M.G., and Colonel Hopkinson Pasha, C.M.G.,
the Commandants of the Cairo and Alexandria Police respectively,
for their strenuous and difficult work in keeping order under most
difficult circumstances in these large cities, and who, in addition
to their civil duties, have taken on that of Provost-Marshals at
my specia request. In fact, every branch of the Egyptian Government
has been used to the uttermost with their whole and ungrudging consent.
Consequently the resources of Egypt have been probed and developed
with a result which has surprised even those who knew them best,
and I have not only been able to carry on the administration of
my command, but also to assist materially the interests of the Mediterranean
Expeditionary Force which were centred here, and to administer Martial
Law without inconvenience and with a staff scarcely larger than
that of the small garrison maintained here before the war. I therefore
desire to bring to your Lordship's notice for favourable consideration
the names of those officials of the Egyptian Government whom I have
mentioned.
In conclusion I wish to express my gratitude or the assistance and
advice of His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner, Sir H. MacMahon,
G.C.V.O., etc., and to bring to your notice the valuable work and
assistance of Major-General H. E. Stanton, Brigadier- General in
charge of Administration, and Brigadier-General N. Malcolm, Brigadier
General Staff. I am submitting in a separate Despatch the names
of those I wish to bring to your Lordship's notice for favourable
consideration on account of the services theyhave rendered.
I have the honour to be,
Your Lordship's obedient Servant,
J. G. MAXWELL, General,.
Commanding the Force in Egypt
|
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DESPATCH
No. IV.
Army Headquarters, Force in Egypt.
Cairo, 16th March, 1916.
My Lord,—In continuation of my despatch of the 1st March,
1916, I have the honour to submit the names of officers and other
ranks whom I desire to bring to your notice: —
Part 1.—In connection with operations on the Western Front
[of Egypt].
Part II.—In connection with Administration in Egypt.
I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your most obedient Servant,
J. G. MAXWELL, General,
Commanding the Force in Egypt
[List
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