War Office,
10th July, 1917.
The Secretary of State for War has received
the following despatch addressed to the Chief
of the General Staff, India, by Lieut.-General
Sir Stanley Maude, K.C.B., Commander-in-
Chief, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force: —
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
MESOPOTAMIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.
10th April, 1917.
SIR,—
1. I have the honour to submit herewith a
report on the operations carried out by the
Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force for the
period extending from August 28th, 1916, the
date upon which I assumed command of the
Army, until March 31st, 1917, three weeks
after the fall of Baghdad.
2. The area over which the responsibilities
of the Army extended was a wide one, embracing
Falahiyeh, on the Tigris; Ispahan exclusive)
in Persia; Bushire, on the Persian
Gulf; and Nasariyeh, on the Euphrates.
Briefly put, the enemy's plan appeared to be
to contain our main forces on the Tigris, whilst
a vigorous campaign, which would directly
threaten India, was being developed in Persia.
There were indications, too, of an impending
move down the Euphrates towards Nasariyeh.
To disseminate our troops in order to safeguard
the various conflicting interests involved
would have relegated us to a passive defensive
everywhere, and it seemed clear from the outset
that the true solution of the problem was a
resolute offensive, with concentrated forces, on
the Tigris, thus effectively threatening
Baghdad, the centre from which the enemy's
columns were operating. Such a stroke pursued
with energy and success would, it was
felt, automatically relieve the pressure in
Persia and on the Euphrates, and preserve
quiet in all districts with the security of which
we were charged.
This then was the principle which guided the
subsequent operations, which may be conveniently
grouped into phases as ollows: —
First: Preliminary preparations, from
August 28th to December 12th.
Second: The consolidation of our position on
the Hai, from December 13th to
January 4th.
Third: The operations in the Khadairi Bend,
from January 5th to 19th.
Fourth: The operations against the Hai
salient, from January 20th to February
5th.
Fifth: The operations in the Dahra Bend,
from February 6th to 16th.
Sixth: The capture of Sannaiyat and passage
of the Tigris, from February 17th
to 24th.
Seventh: The advance on Baghdad, from
February 25th to March 11th.
Eighth: The operations subsequent to the
fall of Baghdad, from March 12th to
31st.
PRELIMINARY PREPARATIONS : AUGUST 28TH TO
DECEMBER 12TH.
3. It was of paramount importance, in view
of the approach of the rainy season, that no
undue delay should take place in regard to the
resumption of active operations, but before
these could be undertaken with reasonable
prospect of success it was necessary: —
(a) To improve the health and training of
the troops, who had suffered severely from
the intense heat during the summer months.
(b) To perfect our somewhat precarious
lines of communications.
(c) To develop our resources.
(d) To amass reserves of supplies, ammunition
and stores at the front.
It was therefore considered desirable to retain
General Headquarters at Basrah till the
end of October, in order to systematise,coordinate
and expand (b) and (c), whilst (a)
and (d) continued concurrently and subsequently.
4. Steady progress was made on the lines so
carefully designed and developed by my
predecessor, Lieut.-General Sir Percy
Lake, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., to whom my
warm thanks are due for the firm foundations
which had been laid for the
ensuing winter campaign. Th growth of
Basrah as a military port and base continued,
and the laying of railways was completed. The
subsidence of the floods and the organisation
of local and imported labour removed obstacles
which had hitherto hindered development,
although conversely the lack of water in the
rivers and consequent groundings of rivercraft
gave rise to anxiety from time to time. The
Directorate of Inland Water Transport was
created, and accessions of men and material
arrived from overseas, as well as additional
rivercraft; whilst the influx of adequate and
experienced personnel for the Directorates of
Port Administration and Conservancy, Works, Railways, Supply and Transport
and Ordnance
enabled these services to cope more
adequately with their responsibilities in maintaining
the field Army. Hospital accommodation
was reviewed and still further expanded,
whilst the Remount and Veterinary Services
were overhauled and reconstituted. Changes
were also made in the organisation of the
Army, the grouping of formations and units
was readjusted, and alterations were made in
the system of command. The line of communication
defences were recast and additional lines
of communication units for administrative purposes
were provided. Establishments for all
units, whether on the various fronts or on the
L. of C., were fixed, whilst the provision of
mechanical transport and an increase in animals
and vehicles enabled the land transport with
the Force to be reconstituted.
5. During the latter part of October the
Army was fortunate in receiving a visit from
the incoming Commander-in-Chief in India,
General Sir Charles Monro, G.C.M.G.,
K.C.B. His Excellency made an extended tour
of the theatre of operations, and his advice and
comments on various matters were of the
greatest value to myself personally, whilst the
Army hailed his visit with the liveliest satisfaction,
feeling that he would assume his office
with first-hand and sympathetic knowledge of
our needs and difficulties.
6. Matters had by this time developed so
satisfactorily that during His Excellency's
visit General Headquarters were moved to the
front at Arab Village. Before joining there
myself I carried out short tours of inspection
on the Karun front at Ahwaz, proceeding as
far as the Oilfields, so as to make further provision
for their local security, and on the
Euphrates front at Nasariyeh. At both places
satisfactory conditions prevailed.
By the end of November preliminary preparations
were well advanced. A steady stream
of reinforcements had been moving up the
Tigris for some weeks, and drafts were joining
their units, making good the wastage of the
summer. The troops hadshaken off the ill effects
of the hot weather, and their war training
had improved. Stores, ammunition, and
supplies were accumulating rapidly at the
front, our communications were assured, and
it seemed clear that it was only a matter of
days before offensive operations could be justifiably
undertaken. Training camps which had
been formed at Amarah were broken up, and
the general concentration upstream of Sheikh
Sa'ad was completed.
7. At the beginning of December the enemy
still occupied the same positions on the Tigris
front which he had occupied during the
summer. On the left bank of the Tigris he
held the Sannaiyat position, flanked on one
side by the Suwaikieh Marsh and on the other
by the river. In this position he had withstood
our attacks on three occasions during the
previous April. Since then he had
strengthened and elaborated this trench
system, and a series of successive positions extended
back as far as Kut, fifteen miles in the
rear. The river bank from Sannaiyat to Kut
was also entrenched.
On the right bank of the Tigris the enemy
held the line to which he had withdrawn in
May when he evacuated the Sinn position.
This line extended from a point on the Tigris
three miles north-east of Kut in a southwesterly
direction across the Khadairi Bend to
the River Hai, two miles below its exit from
the Tigris, and thence across the Hai to the
north-west. There was a pontoon bridge across
the Hai near its junction with the Tigris which
was protected by the trench system in that
vicinity. These defences also covered the approaches
from the east and south to another
pontoon bridge which the Turks had constructed
across the Tigris on the eastern side
of the Shumran peninsula. The enemy occupied
the line of the Hai for several miles below
the bridgehead position with posts and mounted
Arab auxiliaries. On the left bank of the Tigris our trenches
were within 120 yards of the Turkish front line
at Sannaiyat. On the right bank our troops
were established some eleven miles upstream
of Sannaiyat, with advanced posts about two
miles from those of the Turks opposite the Khadairi Bend,
and some five miles from his position on the Hai.
In the positions outlined above desultory
warfare, with intermittent artillery and aerial
activity, had continued for some months.
Strategically we were better situated than
the enemy. The withdrawal of the bulk of his
troops from the right bank of the Tigris left
him with his communications in prolongation of his battle
front. If we established ourselves
on the Hai it would mean that we should be
able to strike at those communications, or at
least at the point of junction between his field
units and his communications. On the other
hand, we were exposed to no such danger. The
Suwaikieh Marsh, although it protected the
northern flank of the Sannaiyat position, also
formed an obstacle which necessitated a wide
detour through a district at times marshy, at
others waterless; to reach the river line behind
us. Again, our troops were suitably disposed
to meet any attempt from the Hai to turn our
left flank, and thus strike our communications —a movement which would have involved long
marches, with difficulties as regards water and supplies.
It was decided therefore to operate as
follows:—First, to secure possession of the
Hai; secondly, to clear the Turkish trench
systems still remaining on the right bank of
the Tigris; thirdly, to sap the enemy's strength
l)y constant attacks, and give him no rest;
fourthly, to compel him to give up the Sannaiyat
position, or in default of that, to extend
his attenuated forces more and more to counter
our strokes against his communications; and
lastly, to cross the Tigris at the weakest part of
his line as far west as possible, and so sever his
communications. In carrying out this programme
our extended line offered good opportunities
for making successful feints to cover
our real intention.
'THE CONSOLIDATION OF OUR POSITION ON THE
HAI : FROM DECEMBER 13TH TO JANUARY 4TH.
8. By the 12th the concentration of our
troops upstream of Sheikh Sa'ad was complete.
To the force under Lieut.-General A. S. Cobbe,
V.C., K.C.B., D.S.O., was assigned the task of holding the
enemy to his positions on the
left bank of the Tigris and of piqueting the
right bank as far as Sinn Banks, while the
cavalry and the force under Lieut.-General
W. R. Marshall, K.C.B., were, by a surprise
march, to secure and entrench a position on
the Hai.
During the night of the 12th-13th [December 1916] Lieut
-General Marshall's force completed its concentration
in the forward area on the right bank.
On the 13th General Headquarters moved
forward to Sinn, whilst Lieut.-General Cobbe bombarded the
Turkish trenches on the left bank, so as to give the impression
that an
attack on Sannaiyat was intended.
On the night of the 13th-14th the cavalry
and Lieut.-General Marshall's force marched
westward to the Hai, and at 6 a.m. crossed
that river at Basrugiyeh and Atab respectively.
The enemy was surprised, and the force, pivoting
on its right, moved up the left (or eastern)
bank of the Hai, whilst the cavalry cleared the
right (or western) bank, driving the enemy's
advanced troops back on to the Hai bridgehead
position, which was strongly held. Two
pontoon bridges were thrown across the Hai
at Atab, the right flank of the force under
Lieut.-General Marshall was secured by linking
up its old front line defences with its new position
on the Hai, and Lieut.-General Cobbe continued
to demonstrate against Sannaiyat.
During the night of the 14th-15th our aeroplanes,
flying by moonlight, bombed the
Turkish bridge over the Tigris east of the
Shumran peninsula, which the enemy was endeavouring
to move further upstream, and the
pontoons, breaking adrift, were scattered. By
the 18th the enemy succeeded in re-establishing
this bridge to the west of Shumran.
Between the 15th and 18th Lieut.-General
Marshall extended his hold northwards and
westwards, and pressure against the enemy's
Hai bridgehead position was continued, whilst
bombardments destroyed his bridge and sunk
several of his pontoon ferries. Except for some
patrolling and sniping, the enemy showed no
offensive enterprise; but he worked hard at his
defences every night.
On the 18th we interposed between the two
Turkish trench systems on the right bank of the
Tigris opposite Kut, thus severing the enemy's
lateral communications on this bank, and giving
us command of the river upstream of the Khadairi
Bend. The extent of river line to be
watched by Lieut.-General Cobbe was now extended
up to this point.
9. The remainder of the month and the first
part of January were devoted to consolidating
our position on the Hai. Communications were
improved by making additional bridges and by
the construction of roads, and the light railway
was pushed forward to the Hai. Operations
were hampered^by heavy rain which fell during
the last week in December and the first week in
January, flooding large tracts of country, and
by a sudden rise in the river which occurred
early in the new year. The single-line light
railway and the land transport were materially
affected, and only sheer determination on the
part of those concerned enabled them to carry
on their functions under these trying conditions.
Where the ground was not too sodden by rain
and floods our cavalry was constantly engaged
during this period in reconnaissance, in harassing
the enemy's communications west of the
Hai, and in raids, capturing stock and grain.
For example, on the 18th the cavalry, with a
detachment of infantry, operating west of
Shumran, drove the enemy from his trenches
and shelled his bridge and shipping, and on the
20th, while a similar raid was being made
against the Shumran bridge area and bombardments
were being carried out around Kut and
at Sannaiyat, a column of all arms essayed to
bridge the Tigris four miles west of Shumran.
But as our arrival there had been anticipated
by the enemy, and the further bank was found
to be strongly entrenched, the troops were
ordered to withdraw after some gallant attempts
to launch pontoons had been made, and
after some Turks found on the right bank had
been taken prisoners
As the result of our occupation of the Hai, we
had: —
(a) Secured a position whence we could
control that waterway and directly threaten
the enemy's communications west of Shumran;
(b) Rendered Nasariyeh safe
against a hostile
movement from the Tigris down the Hai;
(c) Increased the possibility of obtaining
supplies from the prosperous districts on the
middle Hai, and rendered it correspondingly
difficult for the enemy to supply himself from
there;
(d) Interposed between the Turks and their
adherents at Shattra.
THE OPERATIONS IN THE KHADAIRI BEND :
JANUARY 5TH TO 19TH.
10. It was evident that the enemy intended
to maintain his hold on the right bank of the
Tigris, and preparations were accordingly made
to reduce these trench systems. His position in
the Khadairi Bend was a menace to our communications
with the Hai, for in the event of a
high flood he could inundate portions of our
line by opening the river bunds. It was
therefore decided to clear the Khadairi Bend in
the first instance, and this operation was assigned
to the force under Lieut.-General Cobbe.
The enemy held a well-prepared line some 2,600
yards long, facing east. The ground in front
was flat and bare, except for a belt of low
brushwood along the river bank on the northern
flank. At the southern end, 200 yards from
the river and parallel to it, was a double row
of sandhills, on which the enemy had constructed
a strong point with covered-in machine
gun emplacements. The front of the position
was swept by fire from both flanks from the left
bank of the river. There was a second line in
the rear, at distances varying from 500 to
1,000 yards from the front line, whilst between
the two were trenches and nalas prepared for
defence. The southern portion of the second
line, and some sandhills 400 yards behind it,
formed a last position, and the garrison had
communication with the left bank by means of
ferries, which, owing to the conformation of
the river bend, were protected from direct rifle
and machine-gun fire so long as this retired
position was held.
Our troops drove in the Turkish advanced
posts, but progress was slow, as many of the
trenches had to be made by sapping. On the 7th our trenches were within 200 to 350
yards of the enemy, the rain had ceased, and as the
ground was beginning to dry, preparations for
the assault were made. This preliminary stage
had involved digging some 25,000 yards of
trench under trying conditions—constant rain
and exposure to enfilade, as well as direct fire.
On the 7th and 8th bombardments were carried
out. On the 9th a successful assault was
delivered with small loss on a front of 600
yards against the southern end of the Turkish
line, but a thick mist hindered further artillery
support and facilitated counter-attack by the
enemy. Severe hand-to-hand fighting ensued,
but the Gurkhas and Mahrattas on the left
reached the river bend, having inflicted severe
casualties on the enemy. On the right our
troops continued to gain ground along the
trenches and nalas, until a heavy counterattack,
made under cover of the mist, temporarily
checked its progress. This counterattack
was defeated with heavy loss by the
resolute resistance of the Manchesters, a frontier
Rifle Regiment, and a detachment of Sikh
Pioneers. The ground gained was consolidated
during the night.
Prior to the attack on the 9th, raids had been
made into the enemy's front line at Sannaiyat.
Simultaneously a diversion was carried out by
Lieut.-General Marshall against the Hai
bridge-head, whilst other intended operations,
west of the Hai by the cavalry and a detachment
of Lieut.-General Marshall's force were
necessarily abandoned on account of the mist.
12. On the 10th the attack was resumed
in foggy weath'er, and the enemy was pressed back
trench by trench till, by nightfall, he had fallen
back to his last position.
Ori the 11th an unsuccessful attack was
made on this position. Our troops reached
their objective, but were driven back by a
strong counter-attack & further counterattack,
which attempted to recover trenches
which we. had taken on the previous day, suffered
heavily from our artillery and machine guns
during its retirement. On this occasion a battalion
of Sikhs specially distinguished themselves.
On the same day the cavalry occupied Hai
Town and remained there several days. A
considerable quantity of arms, ammunition and
supplies was captured, and on our withdrawal
an attack made on our troops as they retired
received well-merited punishment, a Jat Lancer
Regiment executing a brilliant charge.
13. Owing to the open nature of the ground
now confronting our troops, and in view of
the fact that it was commanded at close range
from both flanks from across the river, it was
decided to construct covered approaches and
trenches in which to assemble the troops under
cover prior to the assault.
By the 17th the forward trench system was
completed, and one by one the enemy's advanced
posts had been captured. A strong
point, which would enfilade the attack, only remained.
On the night of the 17th/18th our
troops captured and lost this redoubt twice.
They retook it again on the 18th and held it.
The final assault was fixed for the 19th, but
during the night of the 18th/19th the enemy,
under cover of rifle and machine-gun fire, retired
across the river.
During these operations the fighting had been
severe, and mainly hand-to-hand, but the
enemy, in spite of his tenacity, had more than
met his match in the dash and resolution of
our troops, and had learnt a lesson which was to
become more deeply ingrained on subsequent
occasions. The enemy's losses, judging from
the number of dead found by us, were very
heavy, and we captured many prisoners and a
considerable quantity of war stores.
THE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE HAI SALIENT :
FROM JANUARY 20TH TO FEBRUARY 5TH.
14. On the 11th, while Lieut.-General Cobbe
was still engaged in clearing the Khadairi
Bend, Lieut.-General Marshall commenced
preparations for the reduction of the Hai
salient—the extensive trench system which the
Turks held astride the Hai river near its junction
with the Tigris, and for a fortnight we
gained ground steadily in face of strong opposition,
until on the 24th our trenches were within
400 yards of the enemy's front line.
15. On the 25th the enemy's front line
astride the Hai was captured on a frontage of
about 1,800 yards. On the eastern (or left)
bank our troops extended their success to the
Turkish second line, and consolidated and held
all ground won in spite of counter-attacks
during the day and following night. The enemy
lost heavily, both from our bombardment
and in violent hand-to-hand encounters.
On the western (or right) bank, the task was a severe one. The trench
system attacked was
elaborate and offered facilities for counterattack.
The enemy was in considerable
strength on this bank, and guns and machine
guns in skilfully concealed positions enfiladed
our advance. Our objective was secured, but
the Turks made four counter-attacks. The
first was repulsed; the second reached the captured
line, and was about to recapture it when
a gallant charge across the open by the Royal
Warwicks restored the situation; the third was
broken up by our artillery fire; the fourth,
supported by artillery and trench mortars,
forced our infantry back to their own
trenches. As it was now late, further attack
was postponed till the following morning.
On the 26th the assault was renewed by
two Punjabi battalions with complete success, and
the captured trenches were at once consolidated.
Subsequently our gains were increased by
bombing attacks and with the bayonet in face
of stubborn opposition, and a counter-attack in
the afternoon was repulsed by our artillery.
Meanwhile our troops had considerably increased
their hold on the enemy's position east
of the Hai by bombing attacks, though their
progress was hampered by the battered condition of the trenches and
by the numbers of
Turkish dead lying in them. On this bank the
first and second lines, on a frontage of 2,000
yards, were captured by the 27th, and on
the following day the whole of the front line had
been secured on a frontage of two miles and to
a depth varying from 300 to 700 yards, the
enemy withdrawing to an inner line.
On the 27th and 28th our troops penetrated
further into the Turkish defences west of the
Hai by bombing, attacks supported by
artillery barrage, and consolidated their position
in the first four lines of trenches on a
frontage of 600 yards. On the 29th they
secured more trenches by means of infantry
raids supported by artillery.
16. The movements of the cavalry had
meanwhile been restricted by the waterlogged
state of the ground. It had been intended to
move the Division via Bedrah and Jessan
against the enemy's rear, so as to synchronize
with Lieut.-General Marshall's attack, and reconnaissance
showed that the proposal was
feasible, but soon after the movement had commenced
a heavy thunderstorm burst over the
district, and the flooding of the Marsh of
Jessan and its neighbourhood rendered progress
impracticable, and the attempt was
abandoned. The work done by the cavalry
in man-handling guns and vehicles on this
occasion was especially commendable.
17. After a short pause to readjust our dispositions,
the centre of the enemy's third line on the eastern (or left)
bank of the Hai was
successfully assaulted by the Cheshires on
February 1st. Bombers pushed rapidly east
and west until the whole trench had been
secured from the Tigris to the Hai on a front
of about 2,100 yards, and an attempted
counter-attack was broken by our artillery.
The enemy's casualties were heavy, and many
prisoners were taken. On the western (or right)
bank the two Sikh Battalions captured the
enemy's position on a front of 500 yards, but
our troops—especially the left of the attack—
were subjected to artillery and machine gun
fire in enfilade. The trench system was complicated
and difficult to consolidate, and it was
not long before the Turks delivered a counterattack
in strength. The most advanced parties
of our infantry met the enemy's charge in brilliant
style by a counter charge in the open, and
casualties on both sides were severe. The preponderance
of weight was, however, with the
enemy, and our troops, in spite of great gallantry,
were forced back by sheer weight of
numbers to their original front line.
Owing to foggy weather on the 2nd, which
hampered artillery registration, a renewal of
the attack was deferred until the 3rd, but meanwhile
Lieut.-General Marshall extended his
left north-westwards towards the Tigris at
Yusufiyah, with a view to enclosing the Dahra
Bend ultimately.
18. On the 3rd the Devons and a Gurkha
Battalion carried the enemy's first and second
lines, and a series of counter-attacks by the
Turks, which continued up till dark, withered
away under our shrapnel and machine gun fire.
Our troops east of the Hai co-operated with
machine gun and rifle fire, and two counterattacks
by the enemy on the left bank of the
Hai during the day were satisfactorily disposed
of. In"the evening there were indications
that he was contemplating withdrawal to
the right bank, and by daybreak on the 4th,
the whole of the left bank had passed into our
possession. That night there was heavy rifle
fire on our front ug to midnight, when it gradually
died away. Patrols before dawn
encountered little opposition, and the enemy
was found to have fallen back to the Liquorice
Factory and a line east and west across the
Dahra Bend.
During this period the splendid fighting
qualities of the infantry were well seconded
by the bold support rendered by the artillery,
and by the ceaseless work carried out by the
Royal Flying Corps. These operations had
again resulted in heavy losses to the enemy, as
testified to by the dead found, and many prisoners—
besides arms, ammunition, equipment
and stores—had been taken, whilst the Turks
now only retained a fast vanishing hold on
the right bank of the Tigris.
THE OPERATIONS IN THE DAHRA BEND :
FEBRUARY 6TH TO 16TH.
19. The 6th to the 8th were days of preparation,
but continuous pressure on the enemy was
maintained day and night by vigorous patrolling
and intermittent bombardment, and many
minor enterprises were undertaken whereby
losses were inflicted and advanced posts wrested
from him. An assault on the Liquorice Factory
would have been costly; therefore it was decided
to deal with it by howitzer and machine gun
fire, so as to render it untenable—or at least
prevent the garrison from enfilading our troops
as they moved north.
On the 9th the Liquorice Factory was bombarded
and simultaneously the King's Own
effected a lodgment in the centre of the enemy's
line, thereafter gaming ground rapidly forward
and to both flanks. Repeated attacks by the
enemy's bombers met with no success, and two
attempted counter-attacks were quickly suppressed
by our artillery. Further west the
Woroesters, working towards Yusufiyah and
west of that place, captured some advanced
posts, trenches and prisoners, and established a
line within 2,500 yards of the Tigris at the
southern end of the Shumran Bend.
On the 10th our infantry in the trenches
west of the Liquorice Factory, who had been
subjected all night to repeated bombing attacks,
began early to extend our hold on the enemy's front line. This movement
was followed by a
bombardment directed against machine guns located at Kut and along
the left bank of the
Tigris, which were bringing a galling fire to
bear against our right. During this, The Buffs
and a Gurkha Battalion dashed forward and,
joining hands with the King's Own on their
left, the whole line advanced northwards. As
communication trenches did not exist, any
movement was necessarily across the open, and
was subject to a hot fire from concealed
machine guns on the left bank, but in spite of
this, progress was made all along the front to
depths varying from 300 to 2,000 yards, our
success compelling the enemy to evacuate the
Liquorice Factory. Artillery observation was
much hindered by a high wind and dust storm.
20. The operations of the 10th and the information
obtained by patrols during the night
of the 10th/11lth made it clear that the enemy
had withdrawn to an inner line, approximately
two and a half miles long, across the Dahra
Bend, with advanced posts strongly held.
Weather conditions rendered aerial reconnaissance
impracticable, and some re-adjustment of
our front was necessary before further attack
upon his trenches could be justified, but on the
11th our infantry established a post on the Tigris south-east of the
Shumran peninsula,
and on the following day extended our hold on
the right bank. The enemy was finally enclosed
in the Dahra Bend by the 13th.
An attack against the enemy's right centre
offered the best prospects of success, and this
involved the construction of trenches and
approaches for the accommodation of troops
destined for the assault. The foreground was
however occupied by the enemy's piquets, and
the dispersal of these necessitated a series of
minor combats between our patrols and the
enemy's covering troops, as well as some
severe fighting on the 12th. Opposite our
right an important point was brilliantly captured
by assault across the open on the 12th
by an Indian Grenadier Battalion, and retained,
in spite of heavy fire during the advance
and two counter-attacks launched subsequently.
This success not only deprived the enemy of a
point from which he could enfilade most of his
own front, but enabled us to force the withdrawal
of his advanced gosts in the eastern
section of his position.
During the four days of preparation,
although there were indications that the enemy
intended to stand and fight, the most likely
ferry points were bombarded every night lest
transfers of men and stores across the Tigris
might be in progress.
21. Early on the 15th the Loyal North
Lancashires captured a strong point opposite
our left, which enfiladed the approaches to the
enemy's right and centre, the retiring Turks
losing heavily from our machine-gun fire. An
hour later the enemy's extreme left was subjected
to a short bombardment and feint attack.
This caused the enemy to disclose his barrage
in front of our right, and indicated that our
constant activity on this part of his front had
been successful in making him believe that our
main attack would be made against that part
of his line.
Shortly after the Royal Welsh Fusiliers and
South Wales Borderers carried the enemy's
right centre in dashing style on a front of 700
yards, and extended their success by bombing
to a depth of 500 yards on a frontage of 1,000
yards, taking many prisoners. Several halfhearted
counter-attacks ensued, which were
crushed by our artillery and machine guns, and
it became evident that the enemy had
strengthened his left and could not transfer
troops back to his centre on account of our
barrage. A little later the enemy's
left centre was captured by The Buffs
and Dogras, and pushing on in a north-easterly
direction to the bank of the Tigris they
isolated the enemy's extreme left, where about
1,000 Turks surrendered. By nightfall the only
resistance was from some trenches in the
right rear of the position, covering about a
mile of the Tigris bank, from which the enemy
were trying to escape across the river, and it
had been intended to clear these remaining,
trenches by a combined operation during the
night, but two companies of a Gurkha battalion,
acting on their own initiative, obtained
a footing in them and took 98 prisoners. By
the morning of the 16th they had completed
their task, having taken 264 more prisoners.
The total number of prisoners taken on the
15th and 16th was 2,005, and the Dahra Bend
was cleared of the enemy.
Thus terminated a phase of severe fighting,
brilliantly carried out. To eject the enemy
from this horsehoe bend, bristling with
trenches and commanded from across the river
on three sides by hostile batteries and machine
guns, called for offensive qualities, of a high standard
on the part of the troops. That such
good results were achieved was due to the
heroism and determination of the infantry, and
to the close and ever-present support rendered
by the artillery, whose accurate fire was
assisted by efficient aeroplane observation.
Very heavy rain fell on the,night of the 15th/16th, and torrential
rain during the afternoon
and night of the 16th, bivouacs and trenches
being flooded out.
22. The enemy had now, after two months of
strenuous fighting, been driven entirely from
the right bank of the Tigris in the neighbourhood
of Kut. He still held, however, a very strong
position defensively, in that it was protected
from Sannaiyat to Shumran by the
Tigris, which also afforded security to his communications
running along the left bank of that
river. The successive lines al Sannaiyat, which
had been consistently strengthened for nearly
a year, barred the way on a narrow front to an
advance on our part along the left bank, whilst
north of Sannaiyat the Suwaikieh Marsh and
the Marsh of Jessan rendered the Turks immune
from attack from the north. On the other
hand we had, by the application of constant
pressure to the vicinity of Shumran,
where the enemy's battle line and communications
met, compelled him so to weaken and
expand his front that his attenuated forces
were found to present vulnerable points if
these could be ascertained. The moment then
seemed ripe to cross the river and commence
conclusions wvtii the enemy on the left bank.
To effect this it was important that his attention
should be engaged about Sannaiyat and
along the river line between Sannaiyat and
Kut, whilst the main stroke was being prepared
and delivered as far west as possible.
THE CAPTURE OF SANNAIYAT AND PASSAGE OF
THE TIGRIS : FROM FEBRUARY 16TH TO 24TH.
23. While Lieut.-General Marshall's force
was engaged in ttie Dahra Bend, Lieut.-General
Obbbe maintained constant activity along the
Sannaiyat front, and as soon as the right bank had been cleared orders
were issued for Sannaiyat
to be attacked on the 17th.
The sodden condition of the ground, consequent
on heavy rain during the preceding day
and night, hampered final preparations, but
the first and second lines, on a frontage of
about 400 yards, were captured by a surprise
assault with little loss. Before the captured
trenches, However, could be consolidated, they
were subjected to heavy fire from artillery and
trench morlars, and were strongly counterattacked
by the enemy. The first counterattack
was dispersed, but the second regained
for the enemy his lost ground, except on the
river bank, where a party of Gurkhas maintained
themselves until dusk, and were then
withdrawn. Although we had failed to hold
the trenches won, considerable loss had been inflicted
on the enemy, especially during the
counter-attacks, and the operations had served
their purpose in attracting the enemy to the
Sannaiyat front.
The waterlogged state of the country and a
high flood on the Tigris now necessitated a
pause, but the time was usefully employed in
methodical preparation for the passage of the
Tigris about Shumran. Positions for guns
and machine guns to support the crossing were
selected, approaches and ramps were made, and
crews were trained to man the pontoons. In
order to keep our intentions concealed it was
necessary that most of the details, including
the movement of guns, should be carried out
under cover of night. Opposite Sannaiyat,
where it was intended to renew the assault,
artillery barrages were carried out daily, in
order to induce the enemy to expect such barrages
unaccompanied by an assault as part of
the daily routine. Minor diversions were also
planned to deceive the enemy as to the point
at which it was intended to cross the river.
On the 22nd the Seaforths and a Punjabi
battalion assaulted Sannaiyat, with the same
objective as on the 17th. The enemy were
again taken by surprise, and our losses were
slight. A series of counter-attacks followed,
and the first three were repulsed without difficulty.
The fourth drove back our left, but
the Punjabis, reinforced by an Indian Rifle
battalion and assisted by the fire of the Seaforths,
who were still holding the Turkish
trenches on the right front, re-established their
position. Two more counter-attacks which
followed were defeated. As soon as the captured
position had been consolidated two frontier
force regiments assaulted the trenches still
held by the enemy in prolongation of and to
the north of those already occupied by us. A
counter-attack forced our right back temporarily,
but the situation was restored by the
arrival of reinforcements, and by nightfall we
were in secure occupation of the first two lines
of Sannaiyat. The brilliant tenacity of the
Seaforths throughout this day deserves special
mention.
Feints in connection'with the passage of the
Tigris were made on the nights' of the 22nd/23rd opposite
Kut and at Magasis respectively.
Opposite Kut preparations for bridging the
Tigris opposite the Liquorice Factory, under
cover of a bombardment of Kut, were made
furtively in daylight, and every detail, down
to the erection of observation ladders, was provided
for. The result was, as afterwards ascertained,
that the enemy moved infantry and
guns into the Kut peninsula, and these could
not be re-transferred to the actual point of
crossing in time to be of any use. The feint at
Magasis consisted of a raid across the river,
made by a detachment of Punjabis, assisted by
parties of Sappers and Miners and of the Sikh
Pioneers. This bold raid was successfully
carried out with trifling loss, and the detachment
returned with a captured trench mortar.
The site selected for the passage of the Tigris
was at the south end of the Shumran Bend,
where the bridge was to be thrown, and three
ferrying places were located immediately downstream
of this point. Just before daybreak on
the 23rd the three ferries began to work. The
first trip at the ferry immediately below the
bridge site, where the Norfolks crossed, was a
complete surprise, and five machine guns and
some 300 prisoners were captured. Two
battalions of Gurkhas, who were using the two
lower ferries, were met by a staggering fire
before they reached the left bank, but in spite
of losses in men and pontoons, they pressed on
gallantly and effected a landing. The two
down-stream ferries were soon under such heavy
machine-gun fire that they had to be closed,
and all ferrying was subsequently carried on
by means of the up-stream ferry. By 7.30
a.m. about three companies of the Norfolks
and some 150 of the Gurkhas were on the left bank. The enemy's
artillery became increasingly active, but was vigorously engaged
by ours, and the construction of the bridge
commenced. The Norfolks pushed rapidly upstream
on the left bank, taking many prisoners,
whilst our machine guns on the right bank,
west of the Shumran Bend, inflicted casualties
on those Turks who tried to escape. The
Gurkha battalions on the right and centre were
meeting with more opposition and their progress
was slower. By 3 p.m. all three battalions
were established on an east and west line one
mile north of the bridge site, and a fourth
battalion was being ferried over. The enemy
attempted to counter-attack down the centre of
the peninsula, and to reinforce along its western
edge, but both attempts were foiled by the
quickness and accuracy of our artillery. At
4.30 p.m. the bridge was ready for traffic.
By nightfall, as a result of the day's operations,
our troops had, by their unconquerable
valour and determination, forced a passage
across a river in flood, 340 yards wide, in face
of strong opposition, and had secured a position
2,000 yards in depth, covering the bridgehead,
while ahead of this line our patrols were
acting vigorously against the enemy's advanced
detachments, who had suffered heavy losses,
including about 700 prisoners taken in all. The
infantry of one division were across and
another division was ready to follow.
25. While the crossing at Shumran was proceeding,
Lieut.-General Cobbe had secured the
third and fourth lines at Sannaiyat. Bombing
parties occupied the fifth line later, and work
was carried on all night making roads across
the maze of trenches for the passage of artillery
and transport.
26. Early on the 24th our troops in the
Shumran Bend resumed the advance supported
by machine guns and artillery from the right
bank. The enemy held on tenaciously at the
north-east corner of the peninsula, where there
is a series of nalas in which a number of machine
guns were concealed, but after a strenuous
fight lasting for four or five hours, he was
forced back, and two field and two machine
guns and many prisoners fell into our possession.
Further west our troops were engaged had been cleared orders were issued
for Sannaiyat
to be attacked on the 17th.
The sodden condition of the ground, consequent
on heavy rain during the preceding day
and night, hampered final preparations, but
the first and second lines, on a frontage of
about 400 yards, were captured by a surprise
assault with little loss. Before the captured
trenches, However, could be consolidated, they
were subjected to heavy fire from artillery and
trench mortars, and were strongly counterattacked
by the enemy. The first counterattack
was dispersed, but the second regained
for the enemy his lost ground, except on the
river bank, where a party of Gurkhas maintained
themselves until dusk, and were then
withdrawn. Although we had failed to hold
the trenches won, considerable loss had been inflicted
on the enemy, especially during the
counter-attacks, and the operations had served
their purpose in attracting the enemy to the
Sannaiyat front.
The waterlogged state of the country and a
high flood on the Tigris now necessitated a
pause, but the time was usefully employed in
methodical preparation for the passage of the
Tigris about Shumran. Positions for guns
and machine guns to support the crossing were
selected, approaches and ramps were made, and
crews were trained to man the pontoons. In
order to keep our intentions concealed it was necessary that
most of the details, including the movement of guns, should be carried
out
under cover of night. Opposite Sannaiyat,
where it was intended to renew the assault,
artillery barrages were carried out daily, in
order to induce the enemy to expect such barrages
unaccompanied by an assault as part of
the daily routine. Minor diversions were also
planned to deceive the enemy as to the point
at which it was intended to cross the river.
with strong enemy forces in the intricate mass
of ruins, mounds and nalas which lie to the
north-west of Shumran, and rapid progress was
impossible, but towards evening the enemy had
been pushed back to a depth of 1,000 yards,
although he still resisted stubbornly. While
this fighting was in progress, the cavalry, the
artillery, and another division crossed the
bridge. The cavalry attempted to break
through at the northern end of the
Shumran Bend to operate against the
enemy's rear along the Baghdad road,
by which aeroplanes reported hostile
columns to be retreating, but strong
Turkish rearguards entrenched in nalas prevented
them from issuing from the peninsula.
That evening the troops closed up ready to
advance early next morning. There was every
indication that the enemy was in full retreat
and that the force which had opposed us all day
was a strong and very resolute rearguard, which
would probably withdraw by night. During
this day's fighting at Shumran heavy losses had
been inflicted on the enemy, and our captures
had been increased in all to 4 field guns, 8
machine guns, some 1,650 prisoners, and
a large quantity of rifles, ammunition,
equipment and war stores. The gunboats were
now ordered up-stream from Falahiyeh, and
reached Kut the same evening.
27. While these events were happening at
Shumran, Lieut.-General Cobbe cleared the
enemy's sixth line at Sannaiyat, the Nakhailat
and Suwada positions, and the left bank as far
as Kut without much opposition.
The capture of the Sannaiyat position, which
the Turks believed to be impregnable, had only
been accomplished after a fierce struggle, in
which our infantry, closely supported by our
artillery, displayed great gallantry and endurance
against a brave and determined enemy.
The latter had again suffered severely. Many
trenches were choked with corpses, and the
open ground where counter-attacks had taken
place was strewn with them.
Tks ADVANCE ON BAGHDAD: FROM FEBRUARY
25TH TO MARCH 11TH.
28. Early in the morning on the 25th,
the cavalry and Lieut.-General Marshall's force
moved north-west in pursuit of the enemy,
whose rearguards had retired in the night. The
gunboats also proceeded up-stream. Our troops
came in contact with the enemy about eight
miles from Shumran, and drove him back, in
spite of stubborn resistance, to his main position
two miles further west, where the Turks,
strong in artillery, were disposed in trenches
and nalas. Our guns, handled with dash, gave
valuable support, but were handicapped in this
flat country by being in the open, whilst the
Turkish guns were concealed in gun pits. After
a severe fight, our infantry gained a footing in
the enemy's position and took about 400
prisoners. The cavalry on ihe northern flank
had been checked by entrenched infantry, and
were unable to envelope the Turkish rearguard.
The Royal Navy on our left flank cooperated
with excellent effect in the bombardment
of the enemy's position during the day.
On the 26th, one column, following
the bend of the river, advanced to force any position
which the enemy might be holding on the left
bank of the Tigris, whilst another column of
all arms marched direct to the Sumar Bend in
order to intercept him. His retreat proved,
however, to be too rapid. Stripping themselves
of guns and other encumbrances, the
Turks just evaded our troops, who had made a •forced
march across some eighteen miles of arid plain. Our cavalry came
up with the enemy's
rear parties and shelled his rearguard,
entrenched near Nahr Kellak.
29. The gunboat flotilla, proceeding upstream
full speed ahead, came under very heavy
fire at the closest range from guns, machine
guns and rifles, to which it replied vigorously.
In spite of casualties and damage to the vessels
the flotilla held on its course past the rearguard
position, and did considerable execution
among the enemy's retreating columns.
Further up-stream many of the enemy's craft
were struggling to get away, and the Royal
Navy pressed forward in pursuit. The hostile
vessels were soon within easy range, and several
surrendered, including the armed tug "Sumana," which
had been captured at Kut
when that place fell. The Turkish steamer "Basra," full
of troops and wounded, surrendered when brought to by a shell which
killed and wounded some German machine
gunners. H.M.S. "Firefly," captured from
us during the retreat from Ctesiphon in 1915
kept up a running fight, but after being hit
several times she fell into our hands, the
enemy making an unsuccessful attempt to set
fire to her magazine. The "Pioneer," badly
hit by our fire, was also taken, as well as some
barges laden with munitions. Our gunboats
were in touch with and shelled the retreating
enemy during most of the 27th, and
his retirement was harassed by the cavalry until after
dark, when his troops were streaming through
Aziziyeh in great confusion.
30. The pursuit was broken off at Aziziyeh
(50 miles from Kut and half-way to Baghdad),
where the gunboats, cavalry and Lieut.-General
Marshall's infantry were concentrated during
the pause necessary to reorganise our extended
line of communication preparatory to a further
advance. Lieut -General Cobbe's force closed to
the front, clearing the battlefields and protecting
the line of march. Immense quantities of
equipment, ammunition, rifles, vehicles and
stores of all kinds lay scattered throughout the
80 miles over which the enemy had retreated
under pressure, and marauders on looting intent
did not hesitate to attack small parties
who stood in their way.
Since crossing the Tigris we had captured
some 4,000 prisoners, of whom 188 were
officers, 39 guns, 22 trench mortars, 11
machine guns, H.M.S. "Firefly," "Sumana"
(recaptured), "Pioneer," "Basra," and
several smaller vessels, besides ten barges, pontoons,
and other bridging material, quantities
of rifles, bayonets, equipment, ammunition
and explosives, vehicles and miscellaneous stores
of all kinds. In addition, the enemy threw
into the river or otherwise destroyed several
guns and much war material.
31. On the 5th, the supply situation
having been rapidly re-adjusted, Lieut.-General
Marshall marched to Zeur (eighteen miles),
preceded by the cavalry, which moved seven
miles further to Lajj. Here the Turkish
rearguard was found in an entrenched
position, very difficult to locate by reason
of a dense dust storm that was blowing
and of a network of nalas, with which the
country is intersected. The cavalry was hotly
engaged with the enemy in this locality
throughout the day, and took some prisoners.
A noticeable feature of the day's work was a
brilliant charge made, mounted, by the Hussars
straight into the Turkish trenches. The
enemy retreated during the night.
The dust storm continued on the 6th, when
the cavalry, carrying out some useful reconnaissances,
got within three miles of the Dialah
river, and picked up some prisoners. The
Ctesiphon position, strongly entrenched, was
found unoccupied. There was evidence that
the enemy had intended to hold it, but the
rapidity of our advance had evidently prevented
him from doing so. Lieut.-General
Marshall followed the cavalry to Bustan (seventeen miles),
and the head of Lieut. -General Cobbe's column reached Zeur.
On the 7th our advanced guard came in contact
with the enemy on the line of the Dialah
river, which joins the Tigris on its left bank,
about eight miles below Baghdad. As the
ground was absolutely flat and devoid of cover it
was decided to make no further advance
till after sunset. Our gunboats and artillery,
however, came into action against the hostile
guns.
32. Measures for driving the enemy's infantry
from the Dialah were initiated on the night
of the 7th/8th. It appeared as though the
enemy had retired, but when the first pontoon
was launched it was riddled by rifle and
machine-gun fire. A second attempt was made
with artillery and machine-gun co-operation.
Five pontoons were launched, but they were
all stopped by withering fire from concealed
machine guns.. They floated down-stream, and
were afterwards recovered in the Tigris river
with a few wounded survivors on board, and
further ferrying enterprises were for the time
being deemed impracticable. It now became
evident that, although the line of the Dialah
was not held strongly, it was well defended by
numerous guns and machine guns skilfully
sited, and the bright moonlight favoured the
defence. To assist in forcing the passage a
small column from the force under Lieut.-General Marshall was ferried across
the Tigris
in order to enfilade the enemy's position with
its guns from the right bank of that river.
During the night of the 8th/9th, after an intense
bombardment of the opposite bank, an
attempt was made to ferry troops across the
Dialah river from four separate points. The
main enterprise achieved a qualified success,
tihe most northern ferry being able to work for
nearly an hour before it was stopped by very
deadly rifle and machine-gun fire, and we
established a small post on the right bank.
When day broke this party of seventy
of the Loyal North Lancashires had
driven off two determined counter-attacks,
and were still maintaining themselves in
a small loop of the river bund. For
the next twenty-two hours, until the passage
of the river had been completely forced, the
detachment held on gallantly in its isolated
position, under constant close fire from the surrounding
buildings, trenches and gardens, being
subjected to reverse as well as enfilade fire
from distant points along the right bank.
33. On the 8th a bridge was constructed
across the Tigris, half a mile below Bawi, and
the cavalry, followed by a portion of Lieut.-
General Cobbe's force, crossed to the right bankin order to drive the enemy from
positions
which our aeroplanes reported that he had
occupied about Shawa Khan, and north-west of
that place, covering Baghdad from the south
and south-west. The advance of our troops
was much impeded by numerous nalas and
water-cuts, which had to be ramped to render
them passable. During the forenoon of the
9th Shawa Khan was occupied without much
opposition, and aeroplanes reported another
position one and a half miles to the north-west,
and some six miles south of Baghdad, as
strongly held. Our attack against this
developed later from the south and southwest
in an endeavour to turn the
enemy's right flank. The cavalry, which
at first had been operating on our left
flank, withdrew later, as the horses needed
water, but our infantry were still engaged before
this position when darkness fell, touch
with the enemy being kept up by means of
patrols, and the advance was resumed as soon
as indications of his withdrawal were noticed.
On the morning of the 10th our troops were
again engaged with the Turkish rearguard within
three miles of Baghdad, and our cavalry
patrols reached a point two miles west of
Baghdad Railway Station, where they were
checked by the enemy's fire. A gale and blinding
dust storm limited vision to a few yards,
and under these conditions reconnaissance and
co-ordination of movements became difficult.
The dry wind and dust and the absence of
water away from the river added greatly to the
discomfort of the troops and animals. About
midnight patrols reported the enemy to be retiring.
The dust storm was still raging, but
following the Decauville railway as a guide our
troops occupied Baghdad Railway Station at
5.55 a.m., and it was ascertained that the
enemy on the right bank had retired up-stream
of Baghdad. Troops detailed in advance occupied
the city, and the cavalry moved on Kadhimain,
some four miles north-west of Baghdad,
where they secured some prisoners.
34. On the left bank of the Tigris Lieut.-
General Marshall had, during the 9th, elaborated
preparations for forcing the passage of the
Dialah. At 4 a.m., on the 10th, the crossing
began at two points a mile apart and met with
considerable opposition, but by 7 a.m. the
East Lancashires and Wiltshires were across
and had linked up with the detachment of
Loyal North Lancashires which had so heroically
held its ground there. Motor lighters
carrying infantry to attack the enemy's right
flank above the mouth of the Dialah grounded
lower down the river, and took no part in the
operation. The bridge across the Dialah was
completed by noon, and our troops pushing
steadily on drove the enemy from the riverside
villages of Saidah, Dibaiyi and Qararah—the
latter strongly defended with machine guns—
and finally faced the enemy's last position
covering Baghdad along the Tel Muhammad
Rddge. These operations had resulted in the
capture of 300 prisoners and a large quantity
of arms, ammunition and equipment, whilst
severe loss had been inflicted on the enemy in
killed and wounded, over 300 of his dead being
found by our troops.
During the night of the 10th/11th close
touch with the enemy was maintained by
patrols, and at 1.30 a.m. on the 11th it was
reported that the Turks were retiring. The
Tel Muhammad position was at once occupied,
and patrols pushed beyond it, but contact with
the enemy was lost in the dust storm. Early
on the 11th Lieut.-General Marshall advanced
rapidly on Baghdad and entered the city amid
manifestations of satisfaction on the part of
the inhabitants. A state of anarchy had existed for some hours, Kurds and Arabs
looting
the bazaars and setting fire indiscriminately at
various points. Infantry guards provided for
in advance were, however, soon on the spot,
order was restored without difficulty, and the
British flag hoisted over the city. In the
afternoon the gunboat flotilla proceeding upstream
in line ahead formation anchored off
the British Residency, and the two forces
under Lieut.-Generals Marshall and Cobbe provided
for the security of the approaches to the
city, being disposed one on either bank of the
river. For over a fortnight before we entered
Baghdad the enemy had been removing stores
and articles of military value, and destroying
property which he could not remove, but an
immense quantity of booty, part damaged,
part undamaged, remained. This included
guns, machine guns, rifles, ammunition,
machinery, railway workshops, railway material,
rolling stock, ice and soda water plant,
pipes, pumps, cranes, winches, signal and telegraph
equipment, and hospital accessories. In
the Arsenal were found among some cannon
of considerable antiquity all the gains' (rendered
useless by General Townshend) which
fell into the enemy's hands at the capitulation
of Kut in April, 1916.
THE OPERATIONS, SUBSEQUENT TO THE FALL OF
BAGHDAD: FROM MARCH 12TH TO 31ST.
35. With the near approach of the flood
season it was now necessary to obtain control
of the river bunds upstream of the city, and
Yahudie and Kasirin on the left bank of the
Tigris, 20 and 28 miles respectively above
Baghdad, were consequently occupied on the13th and 14th.
On the right bank of the Tigris the retreating enemy had entrenched a
strong position south of Mushaidie Railway
Station some 20 miles north of Baghdad.
Lieut.-General Cobbe was entrusted with the
mission of securing the bunds on this bank,
and on the night of the 13th/14th a column
marched from Baghdad and reached Tadjiye
Station by daybreak on the 14th. The Turkish
position was some seven miles in extent, extending
from the river in a north-easterly
direction towards the railway which runs due
north and south. The western flank rested on
successive lines of sandhills, which lie on both
sides of the railway line, whilst east of the
railway the defensive system centred in two
dominant heights, linked to each other and to
the river by a series of trenches, nalas and
irrigation cuts. In front lay a bare flat plain,
whilst undulating ground behind gave the
enemy concealment for manoeuvre and cover
for reserves. It was decided to attack the
Turkish right flank with the whole force, as
such a movement aimed directly at the enemy's
railhead and general reserve would turn the
main position east of the railway.
Our troops advanced on both sides of the
railway supported by artillery barrage, whilst
the Cavalry operating on the western flank took
the enemy's position in enfilade and in reverse
with rifle and machine gun fire. Communication
was maintained with our gunboats, which
co-operated by shelling points in the Turkish
line. Ridge after ridge was captured in spite
of infantry and artillery fire, which was sometimes
intense, until the Black Watch and
Gurkhas by a brilliant charge carried the main
position, inflicting severe casualties on the
enemy. Fighting continued after nightfall,
and at Mushaidie Station the enemy made his
last stand, but the Black Watch and Gurkhas
rushed the station at midnight and pursued
the enemy for half a mile beyond.
The enemy's flight was now so rapid that
touch was not obtained again, and on the 16th our
aeroplanes reported stragglers over a depth of 20 miles, the nearest being 25
miles north of
Mushaidie. These operations had involved
continuous marching and stiff fighting, almost
without a break, for two nights and a day, in
which our troops displayed fine endurance and
determination.
36. On the 14th a post was established on
the right bank of the Dialah, opposite
Baqubah, 30 miles north-east of Baghdad,
which was held by the enemy. On the night
of the 17th/18th a column effected a surprise
crossing over the Dialah five miles below
Baqubah, and our troops entered the town the
following morning, inflicting some casualties on
the Turkish detachment, and capturing some
prisoners and stores. Baqubah is the centre of
a district rich in supplies, and its occupation
was essential as a preliminary to further operations
to assist our Russian Allies, who were
advancing through Persia by way of
Kermansnah and Kasr-i-Shirin, with the 13th
Turkish Corps falling back on Kifri before
them.
37. On the 19th our troops occupied Feluja,
35 miles west of Baghdad, on the Euphrates,
driving out the Turkish garrison, which retired
up the right bank of the Euphrates. The
occupation of Feluja, with Nasariyeh already
in our possession, gave us control over the
middle Euphrates from both ends.
38. T!he arrival of our Allies at Khanikin
was now momentarily expected, and a column
was concentrated at Baqubah with the object
of holding the enemy's retreating columns to
their ground till such time as the Russians
could come up, or alternatively of inflicting loss
on them should they weaken their front and
endeavour to cross the Dialah. This column
moved out on the 20th and occupied Shahraban
on the 23rd, the enemy having retired on
the previous night. A few prisoners and large
supplies of grain were captured. Five miles to the north-east of Shahraban lies
a commanding
ridge of Jebel Hamrin, where the enemy held
a strong position covering Kizil Robat and the
road to Khanikin, and here our troops were
actively engaged with him from the 24th until
the end of the month.
On the right bank of the Dialah the enemy
also held a position along the Jebel Hamrin
about Deli Abbas and Lambaral covering the
approaches to the Kifri road. The cavalry
was instructed to work up the right bank of the
Dialah, so as to co-operate with our troops on
the left bank in obstructing the retirement of
the Turkish forces.
On the left bank of the Dialah our progress
was slow, owing to the difficult nature of the
country, which is intersected by canals and
deep nalas, some of them full of water, but on
the night of the 24th/25th part of the force
moved forward to test the strength of the
enemy in our front. By daybreak our infantry
had established itself in the foothills, and the
advance to the main ridge began. Hostile
piquets were driven in, and the lower crest of
the hills was gained, but beyond this another
crest rose 2,500 yards away, and the intervening
country was much broken with hillocks and ravines. The advance continued
towards the line held by the nemy about
1,000 yards north of the captured crest, but as
he now began to show considerable strength, it
was deemed inadvisable to press the advance
further. The subsequent withdrawal of the
column was followed up closely by the enemy,
but several strong attacks were beaten off, and
an attempted charge against our right flank by
his cavalry was dispersed by rifle and gun fire.
During the withdrawal the enemy, who necessarily
came out into the open, suffered heavily,
and the offensive enterprise of his infantry
slackened visibly as the day wore on. The
Manchesters specially distinguished themselves
by their gallantry and steadiness on this
occasion.
The advance of our Allies had been delayed
in a difficult pass east of Khanikin, mainly
owing to weather conditions, and in consequence
up to the close of the period under
review we had not gained touch with them, but
our column still maintained its position,
harassing the Turkish retreat and securing a
number of prisoners.
39. About the 26th there were indications
that a converging movement was being made
by part of the 13th Corps down the right bank
of the iDialah from Deli Abbas, and by the
18th Corps along the left bank of the Tigris
from Shatt El Adhaim against our troops in
the vicinity of Deltawa, apparently with the
intention of assisting the withdrawal of the
13th Corps from before the Russians. A
column was accordingly concentrated at Khan
Nahrwan to deal with the Shatt El Adhaim
force, whilst the cavalry contained the Deli
Abbas force. On the 27th the enemy made a
determined attempt to move down the right
bank of the Dialah towards Deltawa, but our
cavalry, skilfully handled in some difficult
ground, resisted the enemy's advance from successive
positions, inflicting severe losses, and
finally checked the forward movement that
evening. Next day the enemy fell back towards
Deli Abbas followed up by our cavalry.
The Turkish force from Shatt El Adhaim
held an entrenched position between Dogameh
and Himma, and during the night of the
28th/29th our troops deployed for attack
in suitable positions. The attack was well pressed
from the east and north till about midday,
when the mirage became so bad that artillery
support was impracticable. Later in the
evening it was renewed, and in spite of fierce
counter-attacks we secured the greater part of
the enemy's position, although he still held a
few trenches when darkness fell. His losses
had evidently been severe, as we buried over
190 bodies, and we took many prisoners, whilst
the enemy retired during the night behind the
Shatt El Adhaim.
The total number of prisoners taken during
the period December 13th to March 31st was
7,921.
OPERATIONS ON OTHER FRONTS : AUGUST 28TH
TO MARCH 31ST.
40. The period with which this despatch
deals was devoid of important incidents on
the Karun and Bushire fronts. On the
Euphrates front in the early part of September
guerilla warfare was commenced against
our camps and patrols round As Sahilan.
Immediate steps were taken to crush this hostile
concentration before it became formidable,
and on September 11th a column moved
out from Nasariyeh which destroyed the towers
and fortifications of As Sahilan. Our comparatively
small column was opposed by some
5,000 enemy irregulars, who fought boldly,
but the steady behaviour of our troops gave
them no opening, and before mid-day the
enemy withdrew, having lost, as it was afterwards
ascertained, 436 killed and some 800
wounded. This prompt lesson had an excellent
effect round Nasariyeh, and no further
hostilities of any importance occurred during
the period under review. The only Turkish
Regular detachment on the Euphrates was a
small one at Samawa, and when Baghdad fell
this detachment retreated to Feluja, whence
it was subsequently ejected by our troops from
Baghdad.
41. On the lines of communications during
the same period the daily routine of our
defence troops was only occasionally broken by
raids, which were suitably dealt with by our
posts and mobile columns.
42. Owing to the attention drawn to the
Tigris front by the severe fighting in progress
there, the situation had remained comparatively quiet. Considerable
progress, however,
was made in many ways. This was especially
the case at Nasariyeh, where much was done to
develop the administration of the town and
the surrounding country, whilst at Ahwaz
various projects were carried into effect which
placed our position in that neighbourhood on a
more satisfactory basis. Considerable credit
is due to the commanders on the Euphrates,
Karun and Bushire fronts and on the lines of
communication defences for the manner in
which they maintained peaceful conditions in
their neighbourhood and the efficiency of their
troops.
SUMMARY.
43. The above is a brief record of the operations
carried out during seven months by the
army in Mesopotamia—the first three and a
half months a period of preparation, the last
three and a half months one of action. During
the latter the fighting has been strenuous and
continuous, and the strain imposed upon all
ranks, both at the front and on the lines of
communication, severe. But they have
responded whole-heartedly to every call that
has been made upon them, and their reward
has been the measure of their success. The
nature of the operations has been as varied as
it has been complex, and the training of the
troops has been tested, first in the fierce hand-to-hand fighting
in trench warfare round Kut
and Sannaiyat, and later in the more open
battles which characterised the operations in
the Dahra Bend, the passage of the Tigris, the
advance on Baghdad, and the subsequent
actions. From this ordeal they have emerged
with a proud record, and have dealt the enemy
a series of stinging blows, the full significance
of which will not be easily effaced. British
and Indian troops working side by side have
vied with each other in their efforts to close
with the enemy, and all ranks have been
imbued throughout with that offensive spirit
which is the soldier's finest jewel.
The operations have involved long hours and
strenuous work, as well as great responsibilities,
for commanders and their staffs, but
by sheer hard work and a determination to
succeed they have risen superior to every
obstacle and compelled success. As regards the regimental commanders
and the regimental Officers, Warrant and Noncommissioned
Officers and men, it is not easy
to do justice to their sterling performances.
In spite of the youth and consequent lack of
training and experience among some of their
officers and non-commissioned officers, leadership has never faltered, whilst all ranks, by
their heroism, endurance and devotion to duty,
have almost daily affirmed their superiority
over their opponents in the bitterest struggles.
Each difficulty encountered seemed but to steel
the determination to overcome it. It may,
then, be truly said that not only have the
traditions of these ancient British and Indian
regiments been in safe keeping in the hands of
their present representatives, but that these
have even added fresh lustre to the records on
their time-honoured scrolls. Where fighting
was almost daily in progress it is difficult to
particularise, but the fierce encounters west of
the Hai, the passages of the Tigris and Dialah,
and the final storming of the Sannaiyat position
may perhaps be mentioned as typical of
all that is best in the British and Indian
soldier.
For the success achieved the fighting spirit of
the troops has been mainly responsible, but the
dash and gallantry of individuals and units
have been welded into a powerful weapon by
that absolute sympathy which has existed between
both services and all branches.
To the Royal Navy the thanks of the Army
are due for the thorough way in which they
carried out somewhat restricted but none the
less important duties during the earlier part
of this period. The fact that the enemy barred
the way at Sannaiyat necessitated their work
being at first limited to assisting in the protection
of our water communications, cooperating
with our detachment on the
Euphrates front and occasionally shelling the
enemy's position at Sannaiyat, where the
Naval Kite Balloon Section rendered good service
in observation work. Their opportunity
came later, when after the passage of the Tigris
they pressed forward in pursuit and rendered
the brilliant and substantial services described
above.
The work of the Cavalry has been difficult.
The flat terrain intersected with nalas obstructed
movement without providing cover,
and the state of the country after heavy rains
made progress even for short distances
laborious. The absence of water, too, away
from the river limited its radius of action.
Nevertheless its reconnaissance work and the
blows delivered against the enemy's communications
helped in no small way to bring about
that dissipation of his forces which was so essential
to our success, and the pressure applied
after the passage of the Tigris to the retreating
enemy was instrumental in completing his final
rout.
The unison in which Artillery, Infantry,
Machine-Gun Corps and Air Service worked
has been admirable. The combination of irresistible
gallantry and devotion to duty evinced
by the Infantry and Machine-Gun Corps was
equalled by the determination of the Artillery
to render their comrades the closest support.
Batteries were pushed forward to points within
effective range of the enemy's riflemen, and the
forward observing officers and their detachments,
in order to obtain the best results for
their guns in this flat and difficult country, were
always to be found with the leading lines of
infantry. The intense but methodical fire of
our guns formed a screen of shells under which
our infantry advanced boldly, whilst the accuracy
of our gun fire was largely assisted by
the excellent observation work done by the
Royal Flying Corps. The activity of the latter
throughout the operations was unbounded in
co-operation with artillery, air combats, reconnaissance,
raiding, bombing, and photography.
The R.F.C. at the outset wrested the command
of the air from the enemy, and subsequently by
skill and ceaseless energy maintained its superiority,
in spite of the heavy strain thrown on
personnel and machines.
Closely allied to the Infantry throughout
the fighting and especially during the period
of trench warfare were the Field companies,
Sapper and Miner companies and Pioneer battalions.
Their work was as daring as it was
tireless and was of inestimable value in planning,
supplementing and improving by their
technical knowledge the work done by the
Infantry.
Owing to the conditions under which fighting
has taken place a heavy strain has been placed
upon the Signal Service and Telegraph Department,
and especially during the rapid advance
after the passage of the Tigris. That the communications
of the Army were so well maintained
testified to the efficiency and high sense
of duty among all ranks in both branches.
Their work, especially in the case of those with
advanced formations, was frequently carried
out under conditions of considerable danger, in
which conspicuous gallantry was frequently
needed and displayed.
The zeal and scientific knowledge evinced by
the Field Survey Department is best exemplified
by the fact that since the commencement
of the campaign accurate surveys of an area of
over 13,000 square miles of country have been
produced, which have been of the greatest value
to the Army.
44. One of the features peculiar to this
campaign is the length of the lines of communications
which we have necessarily had to adopt.
In consequence the difficulties by which the
Administrative Services and Departments, both
in the field and on the lines of communications,
have been confronted have been exceptional.
The success or failure of the operations has so
largely depended upon their efficiency that a
substantial measure of credit is due to the
Directors and their Assistants and all ranks of
those Services and Departments who by capable
methods and unwearied energy have surmounted
all obstacles and regularly met the
needs of the fighting troops with ample supplies,
munitions and stores, and have been the means
of providing every comfort obtainable for the
sick and wounded.
As in the case of the fighting troops, the
interdependence of these Services and Departments
has necessitated the closest co-operation,
and equally successful has been the result. We
have relied upon three classes of transport—
river, rail and road, the latter being further
sub-divided into motor and animal transport.
The work in all cases has been peculiarly heavy.
The newly formed Inland Water Transport
Directorate had first to fill its ranks and then
develop its organisation and provide for its
many indispensable requirements, but the personnel,
making light of these very real obstacles
to rapid progress, worked unceasingly, with the
result that night and day an endless chain of
rivercraft passed up and down the river, thereby assuring the maintenance
of the troops
at the front.
The rainy season was one of continuous
anxiety for the railways (especially as regards
the light line between Sheikh Sa'ad and Atab)
and the road transport. Every ingenuity possible
was, however, brought to bear on the problem,
and vigour and determination on the part
of all concerned once more carried the day.
To the Directorate of Port Administration
and Conservancy much credit is due for the
development of the Port of Basrah on an efficient
basis and for the method and smoothness
with which the vast fleet of steamers which
has served this expedition has been handled,
as well as for the provision of many facilities
in connection therewith. The monthly tatistics
bear eloquent testimony to the efficiency of
this Department.
The excellent work done by the Director of
Sea Transport and his assistants also deserves
more than passing recognition in view of the
amount of shipping involved.
Our long line of communications has complicated
the delivery of supplies and ordnance
stores at the front considerably. Although
large stocks of foodstuffs, munitions and stores
were available at the Base early in the autumn,
accurate calculations and ceaseless activity on
the part of all ranks were required to ensure
their delivery to the troops punctually and in
due proportion. Difficult as the problem was
whilst the Army was sedentary in the vicinity
of Sannaiyat and Kut, it became more and
more complex as the advance proceeded. The
strain on the personnel was increasingly severe,
and the fact that throughout this period the
troops at the front were well maintained in all
respects constitutes a fine record for the Supply
Service and Ordnance Department.
In dealing with the problems at the Base and
on the Lines of Communication, the responsibilities
of the Works Directorate have been
very heavy, but the many problems have been
resolutely handled with that resourcefulness
and success which are so characteristic of the
Royal Engineers. Road-making, water supply,
and building and reclamation work at the Base
alone have reached vast dimensions, and have
demanded constant attention and thorough
organisation.
Since the termination of the hot weather the
health of the troops has been uniformly good,
and our well-equipped hospitals have been more
than adequate to meet the calls made upon
them by sick patients. Throughout the operations
the evacuation of the wounded was
carried out on model lines, and the arrangements
made for the comfort and rapid transfer
of patients from the field units to the hospitals
on the Lines of Communication reflect much
credit on those concerned. Whilst those on
the Lines of Communication have done their
share efficiently, the work of the Medical Services
at the front has maintained its high reputation.
During the operations the strain
thrown upon all has been heavy, and the
courage and devotion to duty displayed by the
personnel on the battlefield has only been
equalled by the zeal and energy of those in the
field units. In this connection the valuable
services rendered by the consulting surgeons
and physicians demand special mention, whilst
the thanks of the Army are due to the Nursing
Sisters for their indefatigable services in tending
the sick and wounded. These ladies have
by their devoted work under difficult conditions
of climate and surroundings set an example of
which they may well be proud.
The wastage of horses during continuous
operations under trying conditions has necessarily
been large, but the Remount Department
has, though assisted by few facilities and faced
by many obstacles, by practical methods, foresight
and adaptability, successfully met the
demands made upon it.
Sickness and battle casualties have placed a
strain upon the resources of the Veterinary
Department which has been met by wise anticipation
and considerable efficiency.
The chaplains—always to the fore where
danger calls—have been untiring in their attention
to the spiritual needs of the troops and
in their ministrations to the sick and wounded,
not only in the field ambulances and hospitals,
but also on the battlefield.
The Postal Service has been handicapped by
the long distances to be covered and by the fact
that other articles requiring carriage claimed
precedence in order of urgency. It has had
heavy mails to deal with and its duties have
been well carried out.
45. I should like further to express my
thanks to those individuals and organisations
which, though not strictly military, have rendered
valuable services to the Army. Foremost
among these I would mention the British
Red Cross Society, which has worthily maintained
its splendid record throughout this
campaign. The sterling work performed by
its personnel, and its bountiful provision of
motor launches, motor ambulances and gifts,
have been the means of alleviating much suffering.
The ceaseless labours of the organisers and
committees of the various war-gift societies,
both in England and India, and the liberality
of the subscribers to these funds, have contributed
largely to the comfort and well-being of
the troops, especially in regard to their recreations,
and our heartfelt gratitude is due to
them all.
The officials and personnel of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company have displayed
courtesy
and willingness to assist, and have given us
facilities which have beefrof great value to our
troops.
The Young Men's Christian Association has
been indefatigable in its exertions to enliven
and improve the surroundings of the troops,
and has with my approval opened additional
branches throughout the country, which have
been immensely appreciated.
46. The thanks of the Army are due for the
prompt manner in which our necessarily large
demands have been sent overseas from England,
India and Egypt. This factor has contributed
in no small measure to the successes
achieved.
47. During the operations the Commanders
have had great responsibility, and have justified
fully their selection for the posts they
hold.
Lieut.-General W. R. Marshall, K.C.B.,
has commanded his troops with determination
and judgment. His quiet, imperturbable
manner, his coolness and decision inspire confidence
among his subordinates, whilst his bold
methods and intelligent appreciation and rapid
execution of orders have been of the greatest
value.
Lieut.-General A. S. Cobbe, V.C., K.C.B.,
D.S.O., has commanded with marked ability.
Always methodical and thorough in his plans, complete
knowledge of the details of his profession.
These qualities, added to a thorough
grasp of the possibilities and limitations of the
various arms, have enabled him to make the
most of his opportunities. wherever severe
fighting has been involved.
48. To my Staff at General Headquarters
and on the lines of communication (including
the lines of communication defences), as well
as to the technical advisers attached, my
warmest thanks are due for the whole-hearted
and vigorous support which I have received
from them throughout, and for the efficient
manner in which they have discharged their
functions.
Major-General A. W. Money, K.C.B.,
C.S.I., Chief of the General Staff, has carried
out his responsible duties most competently.
He has not spared himself in giving me every
assistance, and his knowledge of Indian, and,
indeed, Eastern conditions, has frequently
been of great value to me.
Of Major-General G. F. MacMunn, K.C.B.,
D.S.O., Inspector-General of Communications,
it is not too much to say that his responsibilities
have been immense. The repeated calls made
on him by me during these protracted operations
have never once failed to elicit a satisfactory
response, and the thoroughness and elasticity
of his organisation was never better
exemplified than in the efficiency maintained
on the lines of communication during the rapid
advance on Baghdad, and subsequent to our
arrival at that city. Optimistic by nature, he
readily brushes aside obstacles, whether
imaginary or real.
49. This despatch would not be complete
without a reference to the valuable services
rendered to the Army by Lieut.-Colonel Sir
Percy Cox, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., and the political
officers working under his direction. His
advice has been invaluable to me on many
occasions, and the tranquil state of the country
from Baghdad to Basra at the present time is
in itself an additional testimony to his already
well-established reputation.
50. A list giving the names of those Officers,
Warrant and Non-commissioned Officers and
Men whose services are deemed deserving of
special mention will follow.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
F. S. MAUDE,
Lieutenant-General:
Commanding-in-Chief,
Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force.
|
The
Despatch of Lieutenant-General
Sir Stanley Maude, Commander in Chief, Mesopotamian Expeditionary
Force. Printed in the Supplement to the London Gazette of 10
July 1917 .
The Despatch dealt with the period from August 1916 when he relieved
Sir Percy Lake as British commander in the theatre, to just after
the fall of Baghdad.