Home > Battle histories > Despatches > Douglas Haig's Despatch on the German Spring Offensive of 1918
MONDAY, 21 OCTOBER, 1918.
War Office,
21st October, 1918.
The following Despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, K.T., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., Commanding-in-Chief, British Armies in France: —
General Headquarters,
20th July, 1918.
My Lord,
I have the honour to submit the following report upon the operations of the Forces under my command during the period following the actions in the vicinity of Cambrai in the first week of December, 1917.
General Situation.
(1) The broad facts of the change which took place in the general war situation at the close of 1917, and the causes which led to it, have long been well known, and need be referred to but shortly. The disappearance of Russia as a belligerent country on the side of the Entente Powers had set free the great bulk of the German and Austrian divisions on the Eastern front. Already at the beginning of November, 1917, the transfer of German divisions from the Russian to the Western front had begun. It became certain that the movement would be continued steadily until numerical superiority lay with the enemy. It was to be expected, moreover, that large numbers of guns and munitions formerly in the possession of the Russian Armies would fall into the hands of our enemies, and at some future date would be turned against the Allies. Although the growing Army of the United States of America might be expected eventually to restore the balance in our favour, a considerable period of time would be required to enable that Army to develop its full strength. While it would be possible for Germany to complete her new dispositions early
in the new year, the forces which America could send to France before the season would permit active operations to be recommenced would not be large.
Transition from an Offensive to a Defensive Policy.
(2) In view of the situation described above, it became necessary to change the policy governing the conduct of the operations of the British Armies in France. Orders accordingly were issued early in December having for their object immediate preparation to meet a strong and sustained hostile
offensive. In other words, a defensive policy was adopted, and all necessary arrangements consequent thereon were put in hand with the least possible delay.
Extension of the British Front.
(3) Since the month of September, 1917, pursuant to a decision taken by the British Government towards the end of that month, negotiations had been proceeding with the French authorities regarding the extension of the front held by the British Armies. After considerable discussion on the subject, it was
finally decided that the British should relieve the French troops on my right as far as the vicinity of the village of Barisis, immediately south of the River Oise. The additional front to be taken over by me amounted to over twenty-eight miles. This relief, which was to have taken place in December, was delayed until January in consequence of the further development of the Cambrai battle. In the meantime, the French
forces which had co-operated so successfully on the left of the British in Flanders had been withdrawn, and French troops again assumed responsibility for the coastal sector at Nieuport. By the end of January, 1918, the relief of the French as far as Barisis had been completed without incident. At that date the British Armies were holding some 125 miles of active front.
Man-power and Training.
(4) The strenuous efforts made by the British forces during 1917 had left the Army at a low ebb in regard both to training and numbers. It was therefore of the first importance, in view of the expected German offensive, to fill up the ranks as rapidly as possible and provide ample facilities for training. So far as the second of these requirements was concerned, two factors materially affected the situation. Firstly, training had hitherto been primarily devoted to preparation for offensive operations. Secondly, the necessity for maintaining the front line systems of defence and the construction of new lines on ground recently captured from the enemy had precluded the development of rear line systems to any great degree. Under the new conditions the early construction of these latter systems, involving the employment on every available man on the work, became a matter of vital importance. In consequence, it was difficult to carry out any elaborate course of training in defensive tactics. On the other hand, in the course of the strenuous fighting in 1916 and 1917, great developments had taken place in the methods of conducting a defensive battle. It was essential that the lessons learned therein should be assimilated rapidly and thoroughly by all ranks. At the same time a change took place in the organisation of the forces. Under instructions from the Army Council, the reorganisation of divisions from a 13 battalion to a 10 battalion basis was completed during the month of February. Apart from the reduction in fighting strength involved by this reorganisation, the fighting efficiency of units was to some extent affected. An unfamiliar grouping of units was introduced thereby, necessitating new methods of tactical handling of the troops and the discarding of old methods to which subordinate commanders had been accustomed. The difficulties with which we were faced were accentuated by the increase in the British front described in the preceding paragraph. Meanwhile, in marked contrast to our own position, the large reserves in the Western theatre, which the enemy was able to create for himself by the transfer of numerous divisions from the East, enabled him to carry out extensive training with units completed to establishment.
Preparations for Defence.
(5) Orders issued early in December, as stated above, had defined the defensive policy to be adopted and the methods of defence. A vast amount of work was required to be done in the construction of defences, old systems had to be remodelled and new systems created. The construction of new communications and the
extension of old, more especially in the area South-East of Arras which the enemy had devastated
in his retirement last year, involved the building of a number of additional roads and the laying out of railways, both narrow and normal gauge. Work of this nature was particularly necessary on the Somme battle field and in the area recently taken over from the French. All available men of the fighting units, with
the exception of a very small proportion undergoing training, and all labour units were employed on these tasks. Though the time and labour available were in no way adequate if, as was suspected, the enemy intended to commence his offensive operations in the early spring, a large portion of the work was in fact
completed before the enemy launched his great attack. That so much was accomplished is due to the untiring energy of all ranks of the fighting units, the Transportation Service and the Labour Corps.
Arrangements for Co-operation with the French.
(6) In addition to our own defensive schemes, completion of arrangements for the closest possible co-operation with the French was recognised to be a matter of great importance and urgency. A comprehensive investigation was undertaken into the various problems connected with the co-operations of the two allied forces. Plans were drawn up in combination with the French military authorities and were worked out in great detail to meet the different situations which might arise on different parts of the allied front. Measures were taken to ensure the smooth and rapid execution of these plans. Among the many problems studied by the Allied Staffs, those involved by a hostile offensive on the line of the Somme River and the passage of that river by the enemy had been worked out. The plans applicable to such a situation had been drawn up and were ready to be put into execution when required.
Operations during the Winter.
(7) In order to ensure the greatest possible concentration of effort upon training, reorganisation and defences, and also in order to allow my divisions the maximum amount of rest after the continuous fighting of 1917, only such minor enterprises were undertaken by the British forces during the winter months as were essential to keep us informed regarding the dispositions and intentions of the German forces opposed to us. Special attention was directed to disposing our forces in line in such manner as would best promote economy in men and reduce casualties. On the enemy's side, some little activity continued until the end of the year, and local attacks were made by him both on the Cambrai front and in the Ypres sector; resulting in certain small modifications in the line held by us. In these engagements, the policy followed by me was to avoid involving troops in struggles for non-essential positions, and subordinate commanders were instructed accordingly. The first of the enemy's minor attacks took place on the 12th December in the neighbourhood of Bullecourt, and after sharp fighting led to the loss of point of the salient held by us East of that village, with a consequent shortening
of our line. Other local attacks on the 14th and 22nd December at Polderhoek Chateau and astride the Ypres-Staden Railway also resulted in small and unimportant withdrawals of portions of our outpost line in these localities. On the 30th December a somewhat more serious attempt was made by the enemy against our positions on Welsh Ridge, on the Cambrai front. The attack, made in the early morning on a front of over two miles from La Vacquerie northwards towards Marcoing, was delivered in considerable strength and elaborate precautions were taken by the enemy to effect surprise. South of Marcoing, the enemy gained possession of a somewhat isolated trench sited on the northern slopes of Welsh Ridge, compelling our troops to fall back to a sunken road lying across the base of the salient, where they organised a successful resistance. At the southern end of the ridge near La Vacquerie the enemy's attack succeeded in overrunning not only our forward posts but also the trench
line on the crest of the ridge, with all its advantages of observation. During the afternoon, however, an admirably executed counterattack by two companies of the 63rd Division drove the enemy from the crest of the ridge and regained all the essential parts of our former positions.
On the 5th, and again on the 8th January, the enemy made two other local attacks east of Bullecourt, both of which were unsuccessful. Early in March there was a recrudescence of hostile activity in the northern sector. Following upon an unsuccessful attack on the Belgian advanced positions north of Dixmude on the 6th March, two local attacks were made by the enemy two days later on the British front, the one south and north of the Menin Road, and the other on a front of over a mile south of
Houthulst Forest. Both these attacks were repulsed after sharp fighting and our line maintained
or re-established by counter-attacks. During the whole of this period hostile raiding parties displayed greatly increased activity, but the vigilance of our troops prevented them from achieving any success in more than a small proportion of instances. On our side, during the earlier part of the winter, raiding activity was deliberately cut down to the lowest limits consonant with the maintenance of an adequate
knowledge of the enemy's dispositions. In the three and a half months extending from the morning of the 8th December, 1917, to the opening of the German offensive, some 225 raids were attempted by the enemy. Not more than 62 of these were successful in obtaining any identification from our lines, while in 67 cases his raiding parties left prisoners or dead in our hands. During the same period some 125 raids were carried out by us, 77 of which were successful in obtaining prisoners or identifications;
while in 31 other cases the enemy's trenches were found to have been evacuated. Besides raids, considerable patrolling activity took place on both sides. In this form of warfare our troops maintained a marked superiority over the enemy on almost all occasions and secured many prisoners, in addition to inflicting frequent casualties on hostile patrols and working parties.
Indications of the Coming Attack.
(8) Towards the middle of February, 1918, it became evident that the enemy was preparing for a big offensive on the Western front. It was known from various sources that he had been steadily increasing his forces in the Western theatre since the beginning of November, 1917. In three and a half months 28 infantry divisions had been transferred from the Eastern theatre and 6 infantry divisions
from the Italian theatre. There were reports that further reinforcements were on their way to the West, and it was also known that the enemy had greatly increased his heavy artillery in the Western theatre during the same period. These reinforcements were more than were necessary for defence, and, as they were moved at a time when the distribution of food and fuel to the civil population in Germany was rendered extremely difficult through lack of rolling stock, I concluded that the enemy intended
to attack at an early date. Constant air reconnaissances over the enemy's lines showed that rail and road communications were being improved and ammunition and supply dumps increased along the
whole front from Flanders to the Oise. By the end of February, 1918, these preparations had become very marked opposite the front held by the Third and Fifth British Armies, and I considered it probable that the enemy would make his initial effort from the Sensee River southwards. As the 21st March approached it became certain that an attack on this sector was imminent, and counter-preparation was carried out nightly by our artillery on the threatened front. By the 21st March the
number of German infantry divisions in the Western theatre had risen to 192, an increase of 46 since the 1st November, 1917.
British Dispositions to Meet the Enemy's Offensive.
(9) In making the necessary distribution of the forces under my command to meet the threatened German attack, the enemy's possible objectives and the relative importance of ground in the various sectors had to be taken into consideration. These objectives and their bearing on the distribution of the troops are set forth below:—
(i) In the northern portion of the British area lie the northern Channel ports of Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne, the security of which necessitated the maintenance of sufficient troops in the neighbourhood. Little or no ground could be given up on this front, and therefore the necessary reserves must be kept in close proximity. Although, as a rule, the state of the ground would preclude a general offensive in this sector early in the year, the weather had been exceptionally dry, and reparations for an attack by the enemy astride the Menin Road were known to be in an advanced
state.
(ii) In the central portion lie the northern collieries of France and certain important tactical features which cover our lateral communications. Here also little or no ground could be given up, except in the Lys Valley itself.
(iii) In the southern portion of the British area south-east of Arras, in contrast to the central and northern portions, ground could be given up under great pressure without serious consequences, the forward area of this sector consisting chiefly of a wide expanse of territory devastated by the enemy
last spring in his withdrawal.
As shown in paragraph (8) it was evident that the enemy was about to make a great effort south of Arras. An attack on this front would undoubtedly have as its object the separation of the French and British armies and the capture of the important centre of communications of Amiens. To meet this eventuality more than half my available troops were allocated to the defence of this sector, together with the whole of the cavalry. In addition, as previously stated, arrangements had been made for the
movement of a French force to the southern portion of the British area north of the River Oise in case of need.
(iv) Arrangements were made in detail for the rapid transport by rail or bus of a force of such British divisions as could be held back in reserve to meet any emergency on any sector of the British front.
The Situation on the Eve of the Attack.
(10) On the 19th March my Intelligence Department reported that the final stages of the enemy's preparations on the Arras-St.Quentin front were approaching completion, and that from information obtained it was probable that the actual attack would be launched on the 20th or 21st March. On our
side our dispositions to meet the expected offensive were as complete as the time and troops available could make them. The front of the Fifth Army, at that date commanded by General Sir H. de la P. Gough, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., extended from our junction with the French just south of Barisis to north of Gouzeaucourt, a distance of about forty-two miles, and was held by the III., XVIII., XIX. and VII. Corps, commanded respectively by Lieut.-General Sir R. H. K. Butler, K.C.M.G., C.B., Lieut.-General Sir I. Maxse, K.C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O., Lieut.- General Sir H. E. Watts, K.-C.B., C.M.G.,
and Lieut.-General Sir W. N. Congreve, V.C., K.C.B., M.V.O. Over 10 miles of this front between Amigny Rouy and Alaincourt were protected by the marshes of the Oise River and Canal, and were therefore held more lightly than the remainder of the line but on the whole front of the Army the number of divisions in line only allowed of an average of one division to some 6,750 yards of front.
The Third Army, under the command of General the Hon. Sir J. H. G. Byng, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., M.V.O., held a front of about 27 miles from north of Gouzeaucourt to south of Gavrelle with the V., IV., VI. and XVII. Corps, under the respective commands of Lieut.-General Sir E. A. Fanshawe, K.C.B., Lieut.-General Sir G. M. Harper, K.C.B:, D.S.O., Lieut.-General Sir J. A. L. Haldane,
K.C.B., D.S.O., and Lieut.-General Sir C. Fergusson, Bt., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., M.V.O., D.S.O. The average length of front held by each division in line on the Third Army front was about 4,700 yards.
The general principle of our defensive arrangements on the fronts of these Armies was the distribution of our troops in depth. With this object three defensive belts, sited at considerable distances from each other, had been constructed or were approaching completion in the forward area, the most advanced of which was in the nature of a lightly held outpost screen covering our main positions. On the morning of the attack the troops detailed to man these various defences were all in position. Behind the forward defences of the Fifth Army, and in view of the smaller resources which could be placed at the disposal of that Army, arrangements had been made for the construction of a strong and carefully sited bridgehead position covering Peronne and the crossings of the River Somme south of that town. Considerable progress had been made in the laying out of this position, though at the outbreak of the enemy's offensive its defences were incomplete.
The Enemy's Dispositions.
(11) From the information at my disposal, it was expected that the enemy's heaviest attack would fall between the Sensee River and the neighbourhood of the Bapaume-Cambrai road, and on this front of some 16,000 yards eighteen German divisions are known to have been employed in line and in immediate reserve on the 21st March. It was correctly anticipated that the Flesquieres salient itself
would not be directly attacked in strength, but that the attack would be continued in great force from the southern flank of the salient to St. Quentin. On this front of some 48,000 yards, from Gouzeaucourt to the Oise River at Moy, forty German divisions were set in motion on the first day.
An event which, having regard to the nature of the ground, was not considered probable, was that the enemy would be able to extend the flank of his attack in any considerable strength beyond Moy. The rapid drying of the marshes, due to an exceptionally dry spring, in fact enabled the enemy to attack
this lightly held front with three fresh divisions, in addition to the three divisions already in line.
Comparison of Forces Engaged.
(12) In all at least sixty-four German divisions took part in the operations of the first day of the battle, a number considerably exceeding the total forces composing the entire British Army in France. The majority of these divisions had spent many weeks and even months in concentrated training for offensive operations, and had reached a high pitch of technical excellence in the attack. To meet this assault the Third Army disposed of eight divisions in line on the front of the enemy's initial attack, with seven divisions available in reserve. The Fifth Army disposed of fourteen divisions and three cavalry divisions, of which three infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions were in reserve. The
total British force on the original battle front, therefore, on the morning of the 21st March was twenty-nine infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions, of which nineteen infantry divisions were in line.
Launched on a front of about fifty-four miles on the 21st March, the area of the German offensive spread northwards on the 28th March, until from La Fere to beyond Gavrelle some sixty-three miles of our former line were involved. On this front a total of seventy three German divisions were engaged during March against the Third and Fifth Armies and the right of the First Army, and were opposed
in the first place by twenty-two British infantry divisions in line, with twelve infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions in close reserve. As soon as it became evident that the enemy had thrown practically the whole of his striking force against this one battle front, it became both possible and necessary to collect additional reserves from the remainder of my front, and hurry them to the battlefield.
Plans previously drawn up to meet such an eventuality were put into execution at once, and before the end of March, by which date the principal German effort had been broken, afurther force of eight British divisions was brought south and sent into the fight. Prior to the 9th April four other British divisions were engaged, making a total of forty-six British infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions employed on the Somme battle front.
The Attack Opened.
(13) Shortly before 5 a.m. on the 21st March, a bombardment of great intensity, with gas and high explosive shell from all natures of artillery and trench mortars was opened against practically the whole fronts of the Fifth and Third Armies from the Oise to the Scarpe River, while road centres and railways as far back as St. Pol were engaged by high velocity guns. Violent bombardments were opened also on the French front in wide sectors east and north-east of Reims, and on portions of the Britisih front between the Scarpe River and Lens. Our positions from south of the La Bassee Canal to the River Lys were heavily shelled with gas, and battery areas between Messines and the Ypres-Comines Canal were actively engaged. Dunkirk was bombarded from the sea. The hour of the enemy's assault varied in different sectors, but by about 9.45 a.m. a general attack had been launched on a battle front of fifty-four miles between the Oise and the Sensee Rivers. Later in the day, as visibility improved large numbers of low-flying aeroplanes attacked our troops and batteries. Favoured by a thick white fog, which hid from our artillery and machine gunners the S.O.S. signals sent up by our outpost line, and in numbers which made loss of direction impossible, the attacking German infantry
forced their way into our foremost defensive zone. Until 1 p.m. the fog made it impossible to see more than 50 yards in any direction and the machine guns and forward field guns which had been disposed so as to cover this zone with their fire were robbed almost entirely of their effect. The detachments holding the outpost positions were consequently overwhelmed or surrounded, in many cases before they were able to pass back information concerning the enemy's attack. The attack being expected, reserves had been brought forward and battle stations manned. On all parts of the battle front garrisons of redoubts and strong points in the forward zone held out with the utmost gallantry for many hours. From some of them wireless messages were received up to a late hour in the day, giving information of much value. The losses which they were able to inflict upon the enemy were undoubtedly very great and materially delayed his advance. The prolonged defence of these different localities, under conditions which left little hope of any relief, deserves to rank among the most heroic actions in the history of the British Army. So intense was the enemy's bombardment that at an early hour our communications were severed, and so swift was his advance under the covering blanket of the mist that certain of our more advanced batteries found the German infantry close upon them before they had received warning from their own infantry that the expected attack had been launched. Many
gallant deeds were performed by the personnel of such batteries, and on numerous occasions heavy losses were inflicted on bodies of hostile troops by guns firing over open sights at point blank
range.
Ronssoy Captured.
(14) During the morning reports were received that the enemy had penetrated our front line opposite La Fere, and had also broken into our forward positions north of the Bapaume-Cambrai road, and opposite Lagnicourt and Bullecourt. The first indication that the progress made by him was developing a serious aspect was the news that at noon German infantry were entering Ronssoy.
This meant that in this sector the attack had already reached and penetrated a considerable
distance into the second defensive belt which constituted our battle positions. The enemy's success at this point was followed up vigorously. Templeux-le-Guerard fell into his hands shortly afterwards, while the villages of Hargicourt and Villeret, attacked simultaneously in flank and rear, were practically surrounded, and were entered about midday. Thereafter the enemy was held up by the
resistance of our troops in the rear defences of the battle zone, greatly assisted by the very gallant action of the 24th Division in Le Verguier and the 21st Division at Epehy, on the two flanks of his advance. Both these divisions, under command respectively of Major-General A. C. Daly, C.B., and Major-General D. G. M. Campbell, C.B., held out throughout the day against repeated attacks delivered in great strength, and killed large numbers of the enemy. In this fighting parties of German troops who had entered Peiziere on the northern outskirts of Epehy were driven out by our infantry, with the assistance of Tanks, which on this and many subsequent occasions did valuable and gallant work.
The Situation at Midday.
(15) At midday the enemy's infantry had reached the first line of our battle positions in strength on practically the whole front of his attack, except at the Flesquieres salient, where his assaults were not pressed with the same weight as elsewhere. Save in the neighbourhood of Ronssoy, however, and at certain other points in a less serious degree, our battle positions themselves had not been entered, while at numerous localities in front of them fierce fighting was taking place around strong points
still occupied by our troops. Assisted by the long spell of dry weather, hostile infantry had crossed the river and canal north of La Fere, and south of St. Quentin had penetrated into the battle zone between
Essigny and Benay. At Maissemy also our battle positions were entered at about noon, but the vigorous resistance of the 61st and 24th Divisions, assisted by troops of the 1st Cavalry Division, prevented the enemy from developing his success. On the Third Army front also the attack had succeeded by midday in breaking into the battle zone at certain points, and heavy fighting was taking place all along the line from the Canal du Nord north-westwards to the Sensee river. Astride the canal the enemy was held up by the 17th Division, under command of Major-General P. R. Robertson, C.B., C.M.G., and made no progress. Farther west he had entered Doignies and had taken Louverval. In Lagnicourt and to the south of it the 6th Division, under command of Major-General T. O. Marden, C.M.G., were still maintaining a gallant fight for the possession of the first line of their battle positions; but beyond that village the battle zone had been entered at Noreuil, Longatte, and Ecoust St. Mein, all of which places had fallen into the enemy's hands.
The Struggle for the Battle Zone.
(16) Fighting in and in front of our battle positions continued with the greatest intensity throughout the afternoon and evening. Except for certain small gains, the enemy was held by our defence, and even driven back in places by our counter-attacks. Reports received from all parts of the front testified to
the unusual severity of his losses. The most serious progress made by the enemy during this part of the struggle was on the right, south of St. Quentin. At Fargnier, having reached the eastern portion of the
village by 4 p.m., during the remainder of the day his troops pressed on to the Crozat Canal and captured Quessy. North of this point the 18th Division, under command of Major-General R. P. Lee, C.B., reinforced by troops of the 2nd Cavalry Division, still held their battle positions intact, though threatened on both flanks by the enemy's progress at Quessy and at Benay, and successfully restored the situation in the neighbourhood of Ly-Fontaine by a counter-attack. Many of the strong points in the forward zone on the front of this division were also holding out, though surrounded. Wireless messages from their gallant defenders were received as late as 8.30 p.m., and rifle fire was heard in their vicinity until midnight. Between the neighbourhood of Benay and the Somme Canal, the enemy by the evening had forced back our troops, after heavy fighting, to the rear line of their battle positions. Parties of our infantry, however, were still holding out east and north-east of Essigny, and certain of our troops in front of this line were still intact.
About Roupy and Savy all hostile attempts, in which tanks were used, to break into the battle positions of the 30th Division, under command of Major-General W. de L. Williams, C.M.G., D.S.O., were repulsed with the heaviest losses, our troops carrying out a number of successful counter-attacks. In this sector, the advancing German infantry frequently bunched together and offered good targets to our artillery and machine guns. On the remainder of the Fifth Army front our battle positions still held, the 9th Division, under command of Major-General H. H. Tudor, C.B., C.M.G., retaining also nearly the whole of their forward positions, having twice retaken by counter-attack the important local feature on their right flank known as Chapel Hill.
On the Third Army front, our line in the Flesquieres salient had not been heavily attacked, and was substantially intact. Beyond this sector, fierce fighting took place around Demicourt and Doignies, and north of the village of Beaumetz-les-Cambrai. In this area the 51st Division, under command of Major-General G. T. C. Carter-Campbell, D.S.O., was heavily engaged, but from noon onwards practically no progress was made by the enemy. A counter-attack carried out by two battalions of the 19th Division, Major-General G. D. Jeffreys, C.M.G., commanding the division, with a company of tanks recovered a portion of this ground in the face of strong resistance, and secured a few prisoners, though it proved unable to clear the village of Doignies. Lagnicourt fell into the enemy's hands during the afternoon, and heavy attacks were made also between Noreuil and Croisilles. At one time, hostile infantry were1 reported to have broken through the rear line of our battle positions in this sector in the direction of Mory. By nightfall the situation had been restored; but meanwhile the enemy had reached the outskirts of St. Leger and was attacking the 34th Division, under command of Major-General C. L. Nicholson, C.B., C.M.G., about Croisilles heavily from the south-west. A strong attack launched at 5 p.m. against the 3rd Division, under command of Major-General C. J. Deverell, C.B., north of Fontaine-les-Croisilles on the left bank of the Sensee River, was broken up by machine-gun fire. At the end of the first day, therefore, the enemy had made very considerable progress but he was still firmly held in the battle zone, in which it had been anticipated that the real struggle would take place. Nowhere had he effected that immediate break-through for which his troops had been training for many weeks, and such progress as he had made had been bought at a cost which had already greatly reduced his chances of carrying out his ultimate purpose.
The First Withdrawals.
(17) In view of the progress made by the enemy south of St. Quentin, the thinness of our line on that front, and the lack of reserves with which to restore the situation in our battle positions, the Fifth Army Commander decided on the evening of the 21st March, after consultation with the G.O.C., III. Corps, to withdraw the Divisions of that Corps behind the Crozat Canal. The movement involved the
withdrawal of the 36th Division, on the right of the XVIII. Corps, to the line of the Somme Canal.
The enemy's advance south and north of the Flesquieres salient rendered a withdrawal by the V. Corps and by the 9th Division on its right necessary also. Orders were accordingly issued to the Divisions concerned for a line to be taken up, as a first stage, along the high ground known as Highland Ridge, and thence westwards along the Hindenburg Line to Havrincourt and Hermies.
These different withdrawals were carried out successfully during the night. The bridges
across the Crozat and Somme Canals were destroyed, though in some cases not with entire
success, it being- probable that certain of them were still practicable for infantry. Instances
of great bravery occurred in the destruction of these bridges. In one case, when the electrical
connection for firing the demolition charge had failed, the officer responsible for the destruction
of the bridge personally lit the instantaneous fuse and blew up the bridge. Many of the
bridges were destroyed in the close presence of the enemy. As by this time it had become clear that practically the whole of the enemy's striking force had been committed to this one battle, my plans already referred to for collecting reserves from other parts of the British front were put into immediate execution. By drawing away local reserves and thinning out the front not attacked, it was possible, as pointed out above, to reinforce the battle by eight divisions before the end of the month. Steps were taken also to set in operation at once the schemes previously agreed upon with the French for taking over a portion of the battle front.
The Second Day of the Battle.
(18) On the morning of the 22nd March the
ground was again enveloped in thick mist,
under cover of which the enemy renewed his
attacks in great strength all along the line.
Fighting was again very heavy, and short-range
fire from guns, rifles, and machine guns caused
enormous losses to the enemy's troops. The
weight of his attack, however, combined with
the impossibility of observing beforehand and
engaging with artillery the massing of his
troops, enabled him to press forward.
The Fight for the Crozat Canal.
(19) In the south the enemy advanced
during the morning as far as the line of the
canal at Jussy, and a fierce struggle commenced
for the passage of the canal, his troops bringing
up trench mortars and machine guns, and
endeavouring to cross on rafts under cover of
their fire. At 1.0 p.m. he succeeded in effecting
a crossing at Quessy, and made progress
during the afternoon in the direction of Vouel.
His further advance in this sector, however,
was delayed by the gallant resistance of troops
of the 58th Division, under command of Major-General A. B. E. Cator, D.S.O., at Tergnier,
and it was not until evening, after many costly
attempts and much sanguinary fighting, that
the enemy gained possession of this village.
During the afternoon hostile infantry crossed
the canal also at La Montague and at Jussy,
but in both cases were counter-attacked and
driven back by troops of the 18th Division and
2nd Cavalry Division, Major-General T. T.
Pitman, C.B., commanding the 2nd Cavalry
Division.
Le Verguier and Epehy Lost.
(20) In the centre of the battle front the
enemy made a strong and determined effort to
develop the success gained at Tenrpleux-le-Guerard on the previous day, and in the early
morning captured Ste. Emilie and Hervilly.
Hervilly was retaken by troops of the 1st
Cavalry Division (under command of Major-General R. L. Mullens, C.B.), assisted by
tanks, at 9.0 a.m. At mid-day, after heavy
fighting in the neighbourhood of Roisel, the
66th Division, under command of Major-General N. Malcolm. D.S.O., still held their
positions in this sector, having for the time
being definitely stopped the enemy's advance.
To the south and north, however, the
progress of the German infantry continued.
Constantly attacked from almost every direction,
Le Verguier fell into the enemy's hands
at about 10.0 a.m., after a most gallant
defence. On the left bank of the Cologne
River the capture of Ste. Emilie was followed
by the fall of Villers Faucoif, and both Roisel
and Epehy were threatened with envelopment
from the rear. Accordingly, our troops about Roisel were
withdrawn during the afternoon under orders,
the enemy making no attempt to interfere, and
were directed to reorganise behind the line of
our third defensive belt between Bernes and
Boucly, which was already manned by the 50th
Division, temporarily commanded by Brig.-General A. F. TJ. Stockley, C.M.G. Later in
the afternoon the troops of the 21st Division in
Epehy also fell back under orders, though with
more difficulty, as parties of hostile infantry
were west of the village. To the north the 9th
Division held their battle positions practically
intact until the late afternoon, when they were
withdrawn under orders to the rear line of
defence between Nurlu and Equancourt. This
retirement also was made with great difficulty.
The Battle on the Third Army Front.
(21) The divisions holding the Flesquieres
salient were not seriously involved during the
morning of the 22nd March, but in the evening
strong attacks were made both at Villers
Plouich and at Havrincourt. All these
attacks were repulsed with great slaughter.
Farther north fighting was severe and continuous
throughout the day. Shortly before
noon the enemy attacked Hermies strongly
from the north-west, and repeated his
attacks at intervals during the remainder of
the day. These attacks were completely repulsed
by the 17th Division. Heavy losses
were inflicted on the German infantry in the
fighting in this area, the leading wave of a
strong attack launched between Hermies and
Beaumetz-les-Cambrai being destroyed,by our
fire.
In the neighbourhood of Beaumetz the
enemy continued his assaults with great determination,
but was held by the 51st Division
and a brigade of the 25th Division until the
evening, Major-General Sir E. G. T. Bainbridge,
K.C.B., commanding the 25th Division.
Our troops were then withdrawn under
orders to positions south of the village. Very
severe fighting took place at Vaulx Wood and
Vaulx Vraucourt, as well as about St. Leger
and north of Croisdlles, which latter village
our troops had evacuated during the night.
At Vraucourt the enemy broke through the
rear line of the battle zone and penetrated into
the village. There he -was counter-attacked by
infantry and Tanks, and driven out. Further
west, after heavy fighting, his troops forced
their way into our positions along the line of
the Croisilles-Henin-sur-Cojeul road. On
the left of this attack troops of the 34th Division
maintained themselves in St. Leger until
the afternoon, -when they fell back to a line of
trenches just west of the village. To the north
the 3rd Division brought back their right flank
to a line facing south-east, and in this position
successfully beat off a heavy attack.
Break Through at St. Quentin.
(22) With Maissemy already in the enemy's
hands, the fall of Le Verguier greatly
weakened the defence of the centre of the Fifth
Army. The rear line of our battle positions
was held during the morning, in spite of
unceasing pressure from large hostile
forces, but as the day wore on the
great concentration of German divisions
attacking west of St. Quentin had its effect.
During the early afternoon our troops east of
Holnon Wood were forced to withdraw from
their battle zone trenches; while after repulsing heavy attacks throughout the morning, the
50th Division were again attacked during the
afternoon and evening and compelled to give
ground. Our troops, fighting fiercely and continuously,
were gradually forced out of the
battle zone on the whole of this front, and
fell back through the 20ith Division, under
command of Major-General W. D. Smith,
C.B., and the 50th Division holding the third
defensive zone between Happencourt, Villeveque
and Boucly, in the hope of reorganising
behind them.
In this fighting the action of the 1st Battn.
Royal Inniskilling, Fusiliers, 36th Division, deserves
special mention. This battalion held a
redoubt in the forward zone near Fontaine-les-Clercs throughout the whole of the first day
of the battle, and on the following day, after
the troops on their right had withdrawn in
accordance with orders, still maintained their
position, although surrounded by the enemy.
After a magnificent fight, in which all the
enemy's attacks were repulsed with great loss,
at 3 p.m. the officer commanding the battalion
sent back a small party of troops, who succeeded
in getting through to our lines. The
remainder of the battalion continued the fight
to the end.
By 5.30 p.m. the enemy had reached the
third zone at different points, and was attacking
the 50th Division heavily between Villeveque
and Boucly. Though holding an extended
front of some 10,500 yards, the division
succeeded in checking the enemy's advance,
and by a successful counter-attack drove him
temporarily from the village of Coulaincourt.
At the close of the engagement, however, the
troops of the 50tih Division about Poeuilly had
been forced back, and by continued pressure
along the south .bank of the Omignon River the
enemy had opened a gap between their right
flank and the troops of the 61st Division, under
command of Major-General C. J. Mackenzie,
C.B., and of the 20th Division farther south.
At this gap, during the late afternoon and
evening, strong bodies of German troops broke
through the third defensive zone about Vaux
and Beauvois.
All available reserves at the disposal of the
Fifth Army had already been thrown into the
fight, and except for one French division and
some French cavalry in the III. Corps area, no
f urther support was within reach of the fighting
line. There remained, therefore, no
course open but to fall back on the bridgehead
positions east of the Somme.
The Withdrawal to the Somme.
(23) Accordingly, at 11 p.m. on the 22nd
March, orders were issued by the Fifth Army
Commander that the troops of the XVIII
Corps should fall back during the night behind
the line of the Somme south of Voyennes, in
touch, with the III. Corps on their right;
while the XIX. .and VII. Corps endeavoured
to secure the main Peronne bridgehead on the
line Croix Molignaux—Monday Lagache—
Vraignes, and thence northwards along the
third zone of defence to the junction with
the Third Army about Equancourt.
These withdrawals were carried out under
constant pressure from the enemy, covered by
rearguards of the 20th, 50th and 39th Divisions
(Major-General E. Feetham, C.B.,
C.M.G., commanding the last-mentioned Division),
which were continually in action with
the German troops.
On the Third Army front also, certain necessary readjustments of our line were carried out during the night. On the right, the evacuation of the Flesquieres salient was continued, our troops withdrawing to a line covering Equancourt and Metz-en-Couture in touch with the Fifth Army about Equancourt. In the centre, the troops still in advance of the third defensive zone, were brought back to that system. On the left, our troops withdrew from the remainder of their forward positions south of the Scarpe, taking up the rear line of their battle positions between,Henin-sur-Cojeul and Fampoux.
As on the southern portion of the battle
front, the enemy followed up our troops closely,
except on the left, where for a time he was
unaware of what we had done. Elsewhere,
more or less continuous fighting took place
throughout the night, and in the early morning
parties of the enemy succeeded in finding a gap
in our new line about Mory.
The Decision to Abandon the Peronne Bridgehead.
(24) Reports that the enemy had forced the
line of the Crozat Canal, combined with the
loss of the Vaux-Poeuilly positions, and information
obtained by the Air Service that
the German front as far back as Mont
D'Origny was packed with advancing troops,
led the Fifth Army Commander to reconsider
his decision to offer battle afresh east of the
Somme. Considering that if involved in a
general engagement his tired troops might be
exposed to a decisive defeat before help could
arrive, and that the situation might then be
exploited by the enemy to a disastrous extent,
he decided to continue the withdrawal at once
to the west bank of the Somme.
On the morning of the 23rd March, therefore,
confirming instructions previously given
by telephone, orders were issued by the Fifth
Army to the XIX. Corps to carry out a
gradual withdrawal to the line of the Somme.
The VII. Corps was directed to conform to this
movement and to take up a position on the
general line Doingt-Nurlu.
This order involved the abandonment of the
main Peronne bridgehead position. It greatly
shortened the time available for clearing our
troops and removable material from the east
bank of the river, for completing the necessary
final preparations for the destruction of the
the river the divisions which had suffered most
in the previous fighting, and generally for
securing the adequate defence of the river line.
The Crozat Canal Crossed.
(25) Meanwhile, the enemy had recommenced
his attacks. The footing obtained by
him on the west bank of the Crozat Canal was
gradually increased, in spite of counter-attacks
by British and French troops at Tergnier and
at other points. During the morning, he forced
the passage of the canal at Jussy, where he was
reported to have employed tanks east of the
canal. Shortly afterwards hostile infantry
crossed at Mennessis, though suffering great
loss from the fire of a machine-gun detachment
of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade. By midday
our troops had been pressed back from the line
of the canal to the wooded ground to the west,
where fierce confused fighting continued
throughout the afternoon about Noureuil, Faillouel
and Cugny, infantry and cavalry offering
a most resolute resistance to the enemy's advance
and performing many gallant actions.
The Crossing at Ham.
(26) In the course of the withdrawal to the
Somme on the previous night, a gap occurred
in our line in the neighbourhood of Ham, and
the enemy, following closely upon our troops,
entered the town during the early morning.
Before midday bodies of German infantry,
though at first only in small numbers, succeeded
in crossing the river about Ham and
Pithon, where the bridges had not been completely
destroyed. In the afternoon these
forces increased in strength, gradually pressing
back our troops, until a spirited counter-attack
by troops of the 20th and 61st Divisions about
Verlaines restored the situation in this locality.
To the east of this point, heavy fighting took
place around Ollezy which the 36th Division,
under command of Major-General O. S. W.
Nugent, C.B., D.S.O., regained and held until
a late hour, and around Aubigny and Brouchy,
both of which villages, however, fell into the
enemy's hands before night.
Farther north, the withdrawal to the west
bank of the Somme was carried out successfully
during the morning and early afternoon,
effectively covered by troops of the 50th Division.
By 3.15 p.m. all troops were across the
river, and the bridges for the most part
destroyed.
All bridges over the canals and rivers in the
Fifth Army area had been carefully listed
early in February and reconnoitred for demolition.
The necessary explosives were stored in
the neighbourhood of each bridge, and a
definite party of Royal Engineers detailed for
its destruction. As has been seen, however,
owing to the effects of the enemy's artillery
fire, which blew up some of the charges and cut
the leads of others, the destruction of the
bridges was in certain cases incomplete.
None the less, the situation on the Somme
front north of Ham was for the tme being
not unsatisfactory. In the course of the afternoon,
strong attacks at -Offoy and Bethencourt
were repulsed with heavy loss by rifle and
machine-gun fire. In the evening, the enemv's
attempts to come down ithe open slopes on the
east bank of the river were heavily punished
by artillery fire, as they were on several subsequent
occasions. It is believed that north of
Ham none of the enemy succeeded in crossing
the river before nightfall.
Continued