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The
seventh Despatch of Field Marshal Sir
John French, Commander in Chief of the British Expeditionary Force.
Printed in the Second Supplement to the London Gazette of 14
April 1915. The Despatch dealt with the final winter operations
and the first planned offensive undertaken by the BEF, the Battle
of Neuve Chapelle. |
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From the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, The British Army in
the Field.
To the Secretary of State-for-War, War Office, London, S.W.
General Headquarters,
5th April, 1915.
My Lord,
I have the honour to report the operations of the Forces, under
my command since the date of my last despatch, 2nd February, 1915.
1. The event of chief interest and importance
which has taken place is the victory achieved over the enemy at
the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, which was fought on the 10th,
11th and 12th of March. The main attack was delivered by
troops of the First Army under the command of General Sir Douglas
Haig, supported by a large force of Heavy Artillery, a Division
of Cavalry and some Infantry of the general reserve. Secondary
and holding attacks and demonstrations were made along the front
of the Second Army under the direction of its Commander, General
Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien. Whilst the success attained was due
to the magnificent bearing and indomitable courage displayed by
the troops of the 4th and Indian Corps, I consider that the able
and skilful dispositions which were made by the General Officer
Commanding First Army contributed largely to the defeat of the
enemy and to the capture of his position. The energy and vigour
with which General Sir Douglas Haig handled his command show him
to be a leader of great ability and power.
Another action of considerable importance was brought about by
a surprise attack of the Germans made on the 14th
March against the 27th Division holding the trenches east
of St. Eloi. A large force of artillery was concentrated in this
area under cover of mist, and a heavy volume of fire was suddenly
brought to bear on the trenches at 5 p.m. This artillery attack
was accompanied by two mine explosions; and, in the confusion
caused by these and the suddenness of the attack, the position
of St. Eloi was captured and held for some hours by the enemy.
Well directed and vigorous counter attacks, in which the troop's
of the 5th Army Corps showed great bravery and determination,
restored the situation by the evening of the 15th. A more detailed
account of these operations will appear in subsequent pages of
this despatch.
2. On the 6th February
a brilliant action by troops of the 1st Corps materially improved
our position in the area south, of the La Bassee
Canal. During the previous night parties of Irish Guards and of
the 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards had succeeded in gaining ground
whence converging fire could be directed on the flanks and rear
of certain " brickstacks" occupied by the Germans, which
had been for some time a source of considerable annoyance. At
2 p.m. the affair commenced with a severe bombardment of the "
brickstacks " and
the enemy's trenches. A brisk attack by the 3rd Coldstream Guards
and Irish Guards from our trenches west of the "brickstacks"
followed, and was supported by fire from the flanking positions
which had been seized the previous night by the same regiments.
The attack succeeded, the "brickstacks" were occupied
without difficulty, and a line established north and south through
a point about forty yards east of the " brickstacks."
The casualties suffered by the 5th Corps throughout the period
under review, and particularly during the month of February, have
been heavier than those in other parts of the line. I regret this;
but I do not think, taking all the circumstances into consideration,
that they were unduly numerous. The position then occupied by
the 5th Corps has always been a very vulnerable part of our line;
the ground is marshy, and trenches are most difficult to construct
and maintain. The 27th and 28th Divisions of the 5th Corps have
had no previous experience of European warfare, and a number of
the units composing it had only recently returned from service
in tropical climates. In consequence, the hardships of a rigorous
winter campaign fell with greater weight upon these Divisions
than upon any other in the command. Chiefly owing to these causes,
the 5th Corps, up to the beginning of March, was constantly engaged
in counter-attack to retake trenches and ground which had been
lost. In their difficult and arduous task, however, the troops
displayed the utmost gallantry and devotion; and it is most creditable
to the skill and energy of their leaders that I am able to report
how well they have surmounted all their difficulties, that the
ground first taken over by them is still intact, and held with
little greater loss than is incurred by troops in all other parts
of the line.
On the 14th February the 82nd Brigade
of the 27th Division was driven from its trenches east of St.
Eloi; but by 7 a.m. on the 15th all these trenches had been recaptured,
fifteen prisoners taken, and sixty German dead counted in front
of the trenches. Similarly in the 28th Division trenches were
lost loy the 85th Brigade and retaken the following night. During
the month of February the enemy made several attempts to get through
all along the line, but he was invariably repulsed with loss.
A particularly vigorous attempt was made on the 17th February
against the trenches held by the Indian Corps, but it was brilliantly
repulsed.
On February 28th a successful minor
attack was made on the enemy's trenches near St. Eloi by small
parties of the Princess Patricia's
Canadian Light Infantry. The attack was divided into three small
groups, the whole under the command of Lieutenant Crabbe. No.
1 Group under Lieutenant Papineau, No. 2 Group under Serjeant
Patterson, and No. 3 Group under Company Serjeant-Major Lloyd.
The head of the party got within fifteen or twenty yards of the
German trench and charged; it was dark at the time (about 5.15a.m.).
Lieutenant Crabbe, who showed the greatest dash and elan, took
his party over everything in the trench until they had gone down
it about eighty yards, when they were stopped by a barricade of
sandbags and timber. This party, as well as the others, then pulled
down the front face of the German parapet. A number of Germans
were killed and wounded, and a few prisoners were taken. The services
performed by this distinguished corps have continued to be very
valuable since I had occasion to refer to them in my last despatch.
They have been most ably organised, trained and commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel.
F. D. Farquhar, D.S.O., who, I deeply regret to say, was killed
while superintending some trench work on the 20th March. His loss
will be deeply felt.
A very gallant attack was made by the 4th Battalion of the King's
Royal Rifle Corps of the 80th Brigade On the enemy's trenches
in the early hours of March 2nd.
The Battalion was led by Major Widdrington, who launched it at
12.30 a.m. (he himself being wounded during its progress), covered
by an extremely accurate and effective artillery fire. About sixty
yards of the enemy's trench were cleared, but the attack was brought
to a standstill by a very strong barricade, in attempting to storm
which several casualties were incurred.
3. During the month of February I arranged with
General Foch to render the 9th French Corps, holding the trenches
on my left, some much-needed rest by sending the three Divisions
of the British Cavalry Corps to hold a portion of the French trenches,
each division for a period of ten days alternately. It was very
gratifying to me to note once again in this campaign the eager
readiness which the Cavalry displayed to undertake a role which
does not properly belong to them in order to support and assist
their French comrades. In carrying out this work leaders, officers
and men displayed the same skill and energy which I have had reason
to comment upon in former despatches. The time passed by the Cavalry
in the French trenches was, on the whole, quiet and uneventful,
but there are one or two incidents calling for remark.
At about 1.45 a.m. on 16th February
a halfhearted attack was made against the right of the line held
by the 2nd Cavalry Division, but it was easily repulsed by rifle
fire, and the enemy left several dead in front of the trenches.
The attack was delivered against the second and third trenches
from the right of the line of this Division.
At 6 a.m. on the 21st the enemy blew
up one of the 2nd Cavalry Division trenches, held by the 16th
Lancers, and some, adjoining French trenches. The enemy occupied
forty yards of our trench and tried to advance, but were stopped.
An immediate counter-attack by the supporting squadron was stopped
by machine-gun -fire. The line was established opposite the gap,
and a counter-attack by two squadrons and one company of French
reserve was ordered. At 5.30 p.m., 2nd Cavalry Division reported
that the counter-attack did not succeed in retaking the trench
blown in, but that a new line had been established forty yards
in rear of it, and that there was no further activity on the part
of the enemy. At 10 p.m. the situation was unchanged. The Commander
of the Indian Cavalry Corps expressed a strong desire that the
troops urnder his command should gain some experience in trench
warfare. Arrangements were made, therefore, with the General Officer
Commanding the Indian Corps, in pursuance of which the various
units of the Indian Cavalry Corps have from time to time taken
a turn in the trenches, and have thereby gained some valuable
experience.
4. About the end of February many vital considerations
induced me to believe that a vigorous offensive movement by the
Forces under my command should be planned and carried out at the
earliest possible moment. Amongst the more important reasons which
convinced me of this necessity were:—
The general aspect of the Allied situation throughout Europe,
and particularly the marked success of the Russian Army in repelling
the violent onslaughts of Marshal Von Hindenburg; the apparent
weakening of the enemy in my front, and the necessity for assisting
our Russian Allies to the utmost by holding as many hostile troops
as possible in the Western Theatre; the efforts to this end which
were being made by the French Forces at Arras and Champagne; and,
perhaps the most weighty consideration of all, the need of fostering
the offensive spirit, in the troops' under my command after the
trying and possibly enervating experiences which they had gone
through of a severe winter in the trenches. In a former despatch
I commented upon the difficulties and drawbacks which the winter
weather in this climate imposes upon a vigorous offensive. Early
in March these difficulties became greatly lessened by the drying
up of the country and by spells of brighter weather. I do not
propose in this despatch to enter at length into the considerations
which actuated me in deciding upon the plan, time and place of
my attack, but Your Lordship is fully aware of these. As mentioned
above, the main attack was carried out by units of the First Army,
supported by troops of the. Second Army and the general reserve.
The object of the main attack was to be the capture of the village
of Neuve Chapelle and the enemy's position at that point, and
the establishment of our line as far forward as possible to the
east of that place. The object, nature and scope of the attack,
and instructions for the conduct of the operation were communicated
by me to Sir Douglas Haig in a secret memorandum dated 19th
February. The main topographical feature of this part of
the theatre is a marked ridge which runs south-west from a point
two miles south-west of Lille to the village of Fournes, whence
two spurs run out, one due west to a height known as Haut Pommereau,
the other following the line of the main road to Illies. The buildings
of the village of Neuve Chapelle run along the Rue du Bois-Fauquisart
Road. There is a triangle of roads just north of the village.
This area consists of a few big houses, with walls, gardens, orchards,
etc., and here, with the .aid of numerous machine guns, the enemy
had established a strong post which flanked the approaches to
the village. The Bois du Biez, which lies roughly southeast of
the village of Neuve Chapelle, influenced the course of this operation.
Full instructions as to assisting and supporting the attack were
issued to the Second Army.
The battle opened at 7.30 a.m. on the 10th
March by a powerful artillery bombardment of the enemy's
position at Neuve Chapelle. The artillery bombardment had been
well prepared and was most effective, except on the extreme northern
portion of the front of attack. At 8.5 a.m. the 23rd (left) and
25th (right) Brigades of the 8th Division assaulted the German
trenches on the north-west of the village. At the same hour the
Garhwal Brigade of the Meerut Division, which occupied the position
to the south of Neuve Chapelle, assaulted the German trenches
in its front. The Garhwal Brigade and the 25th Brigade carried
the enemy's lines of entrenchments where the wire entanglements
had been almost entirely swept away by our shrapnel fire. The
23rd Brigade, however, on the north-east, was held up by the wire
entanglements, which were not sufficiently cut. At 8.5 a.m. the
artillery turned on to Neuve Chapelle, and at 8.35 a.m. the advance
of the infantry was continued.
The 25th and Garhwal Brigades pushed on eastward and north-eastward
respectively, and succeeded in getting a footing in the village.
The 23rd Brigade was still held up in front of the enemy's wire
entanglements, and could not progress. Heavy losses were suffered,
especially in the Middlesex Regiment and the Scottish Rifles.
The progress, however, of the 25th Brigade into Neuve Ohapelle
immediately to the south of the 23rd Brigade had the effect of
turning the sputhern flank of the enemy's defences in front of
the 23rd Brigade. This fact, combined with powerful artillery
support, enabled the 23rd Brigade to get forward between 10 and
11 a.m., and by 11 a.m. the whole of the village of Neuve Chapelle
and the roads leading northward and south-westward from the eastern
end of that village were in our hands. During this time our artillery
completely cut off the village and the surrounding country from
any German reinforcements which could be thrown into the fight
to restore the situation by means of a curtain of shrapnel fire.
Prisoners subsequently reported that all attempts at reinforcing
the front line were checked. Steps were at once taken to consolidate
the position won.
Considerable delay occurred after the capture of the Neuve Chapelle
position. The infantry was greatly disorganised by the violent
nature of the attack and by its passage through the enemy's trenches
and the buildings of the village. It was necessary to get units
to some extent together before pushing on. The telephonic communication
being cut by the enemy's fire rendered communication between front
and rear most difficult. The fact of the left of the 23rd Brigade
having been held up had kept back the 8th Division, and had involved
a portion of the 25th Brigade in fighting to the north out of
its proper direction of advance. All this required adjustment.
An orchard held by the enemy north of Neuve Chapelle also threatened
the flank of an advance towards the Aubers Ridge. I am of opinion
that this delay would not have occurred had the clearly expressed
order of the General Officer Commanding First Army been more carefully
observed. The difficulties above enumerated might have been overcome
at an earlier period of the day if the General Officer Commanding
4th Corps had been able to bring his reserve brigades more speedily
into action. As it was, the further advance did not commence before
3.30 p.m. The 21st Brigade was able to form up in the open on
the left without a shot being fired at it, thus showing that at
the time the enemy's resistance had been paralysed. The Brigade
pushed forward in the direction of Moulin Du Pietre. At first
it made good progress, but was subsequently held up by the machine
gun fire from the houses and from a defended work in the line
of the German entrenchments opposite the right of the 22nd Brigade.
Further to the south the 24th Brigade, which had been directed
on Pietre, was similarly held up by machine-guns in the houses
and trenches at the road junction six hundred yards northwest
of Pietre. The 25th Brigade, on the right of the 24th, was also
held up by machine-guns from a bridge held by the Germans, over
the River Des Layes, which is situated to the north-west of the
Bois Du Biez.
Whilst two Brigades of the Meerut Division were establishing themselves
on the new line, the Dehra Dun Brigade, supported by the Jullundur
Brigade of the Lahore Division, moved to the attack of the Bois
Du Biez, but were held up on the line of the River Des Layes by
the German post at the bridge which enfiladed them and brought
them to a standstill. The defended bridge over the River Des Layes
and its neighbourhood immediately assumed considerable importance.
Whilst artillery fire was brought to bear, as far as circumstances
would permit, on this point, Sir Douglas Haig directed the 1st
Corps to despatch one or more battalions of the 1st Brigade in
support of the troops attacking the bridge. Three battalions were
thus sent to Richebourg St. Vaast.
Darkness coming on, and the enemy having brought up reinforcements,
no further progress could be made, and the Indian Corps and 4th
Corps proceeded to consolidate the position they had gained. Whilst
the operations which I have thus briefly recorded were going on,
the 1st Corps, in accordance with orders, delivered an attack
in the morning from Givenchy, simultaneously with that against
Neuve Chapelle; but, as the enemy's wire was insufficiently cut,
very little progress could be made, and the troops at this point
did little more than hold fast the Germans in front of them.
On the following day, March 11th,
the attack was renewed by the 4th and Indian Corps, but it was
soon seen that a further advance would be impossible until the
artillery had dealt effectively with the various houses and defended
localities which held up the troops along the entire front. Efforts
were made to direct the artillery fire accordingly; but owing
to the weather conditions, which did not permit of aerial observation,
and the fact that nearly all the telephonic communications between
the artillery observers and their batteries had been cut, it was
impossible to do so with sufficient accuracy. Even when our troops
which were pressing forward occupied a house here and there, it
was not possible to stop our artillery fire, and the infantry
had to be withdrawn. The two principal points which barred the
advance were the same as on the preceding day—namely, the
enemy's position about Moulin de Pietre and at the bridge over
the River des Layes.
On the 12th March the same unfavourable
conditions as regards weather prevailed, and hampered artillery
action. Although the 4th and Indian Corps most gallantly attempted
to capture the strongly fortified positions in their front, they
were unable to maintain themselves, although they succeeded in
holding them for some hours. Operations on this day were chiefly
remarkable for the violent counter-attacks, supported by artillery,
which were delivered by the Germans, and the ease with which they
were repulsed.
As most of the objects for which the operations had been undertaken
had been attained, and as there were reasons why I considered
it inadvisable to continue the attack at that time, I directed
Sir Douglas Haig on the night of the 12th to hold and consolidate
the ground which had been gained by the 4th and Indian Corps,
and to suspend further offensive operations for the present. On
the morning of the 12th I informed the General Officer Commanding
1st Army that he could call on the 2nd Cavalry Division, under
General Gough, for immediate support in the event of the successes
of the First Army opening up opportunities for its favourable
employment. This Division and a Brigade of the North Midland Division,
which was temporarily attached to it was moved forward for this
purpose. The 5th Cavalry Brigade, under Sir Philip Chetwode, reached
the Rue Bacquerot at 4 p.m., with a view to rendering immediate
support; but he was informed by the General Officer Commanding
4th Corps that the situation was not so favourable as he had hoped
it would be, and that no further action by the cavalry was advisable.
General Gough's command, therefore, retired to Estaires.
The artillery of all kinds was handled with the utmost energy
and skill and rendered in valuable support in the prosecution
of the attack. The losses during these three days' fighting were,
I regret to say, very severe, numbering—
190 officers and 2,337 other ranks, killed.
359 officers and 8,174 other ranks, wounded.
23 officers and 1,728 other ranks, missing.
But the results attained were, in my opinion, wide and far reaching.
The enemy left several thousand dead on the battlefield which
were seen and counted; and we have positive information that upwards
of 12,000 wounded were removed to the northeast and east by train.
Thirty officers and 1,657 other ranks of the enemy were captured.
I can best express my estimate of this battle by quoting an extract
from a Special Order of the Day which I addressed to Sir Douglas
Haig and the First Army at its conclusion: — " I am
anxious to express to you personally my warmest appreciation of
the skilful manner in which you have carried out your orders,
and my fervent and most heartfelt appreciation of the magnificent
gallantry and devoted, tenacious courage displayed by all ranks
whom you have ably led to success and victory."
5. Some operations in the nature of holding attacks,
carried out by, troops of the Second Army, were instrumental in
keeping the enemy
in front of them occupied, and preventing reinforcements being
sent from those portions of the front to the main point of attack.
At 12.30 a.m. on the 12th March the
17th Infantry Brigade of the 4th Division, 3rd Corps, engaged
in an attack on the enemy which resulted in the capture of the
village of L'Epinette and adjacent farms. Supported by a brisk
fire from the 18th Infantry Brigade, the 17th Infantry Brigade,
detailed for the attack, assaulted in two columns converging,
and obtained the first houses of the village without much loss.
The remainder of the village was very heavily wired, and the enemy
got away by means of communication trenches while our men were
cutting through the wire. The enemy suffered considerable loss;
our casualties being 5 officers and 30 other ranks, killed and
wounded. The result of this operation was that an advance of 300
yards was made on a front of half a mile. All attempts to retake
this position have been repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy.
The General Officer Commanding the Second Corps arranged for an
attack on a part of the enemy's position to the south-west of
the village of Wytschaete which he had timed to commence at 10
a.m. on the 12th March. Owing to
dense fog, the assault could not be made until 4 o'clock in the
afternoon. It was then commenced by the Wiltshire and Worcestershire
Regiments, but was so hampered by the mist and .the approach,
of darkness that nothing more was effected than holding the enemy
to his ground.
The action of St. Eloi referred to in the first paragraph of this
despatch commenced at 6 p.m. on the 14th
March by a very heavy cannonade which was directed against
our trenches in front of St. Eloi, the village itself and the
approaches to it. There is a large mound lying to the south-east
of the village. When the artillery attack was at its height a
mine was exploded under this mound, and a strong hostile infantry
attack was immediately launched against the trenches and the mound.
Our artillery opened fire at once, as well as our infantry, and
inflicted considerable losses on the enemy during their advance;
but, chiefly owing to the explosion of the mine and the surprise
of the overwhelming artillery attack, the enemy's infantry had
penetrated the first line of trenches at some points. As a consequence
the garrisons of other works which had successfully resisted the
assault were enfiladed and forced to retire just before it turned
dark. A counter attack was at once organised by the General Officer
Commanding 82nd Brigade, under the orders of the General Officer
Commanding 27th Division, who brought up a reserve brigade to
support it. The attack was launched at 2 a.m., and the 82nd Brigade
succeeded in recapturing the portion of the village of St. Eloi
which was in the hands of the enemy and a portion of the trenches
east of it. At 3 a .m. the 80th Brigade in support took more trenches
to the east and west of the village. The counter attack, which
was well carried out under difficult conditions, resulted in the
recapture of all lost ground of material importance. It is satisfactory
to be able to record that, though the troops occupying the first
line of trenches were at first overwhelmed, they afterwards behaved
very gallantly in the counterattack for the recovery of the lost
ground; and the following units earned and received the special
commendation, of the Army Commander : —The 2nd Royal Irish
Fusiliers, the 2nd Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, the 1st
Leinster Regiment, the 4th Rifle Brigade
and the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry.
A vigorous attack made by the enemy on the 17th
to recapture these trenches was repulsed with great loss. Throughout
the period under review night enterprises by smaller or larger
patrols, which were led with consummate skill and daring, have
been very active along the whole line, A moral superiority has
thus been established, and valuable information has been collected.
I cannot speak too highly of the invincible courage and the remarkable
resource displayed by these patrols. The troops of the 3rd Corps
have particularly impressed me by their conduct of these operations.
6. The work of the Royal Flying Corps throughout
this period, and especially during the operations of the 10th,
11th, and 12th March, was of the greatest value. Though the weather
on March 10th and on the subsequent days was very unfavourable
for aerial work, on account of low-lying clouds and mist, a remarkable
number of hours flying of a most valuable character were effected,
and continuous and close reconnaissance was maintained over the
enemy's front. In addition to the work of reconnaissance and observation
of artillery fire, the Royal Flying Corps was charged with the
special duty of hampering the enemy's movements by destroying
various points on his communications. The railways at Menin, Courtrai,
Don and Douai were attacked, and it is known that very extensive
damage was effected at certain of these places. Part of a troop
train was hit by a bomb, a wireless installation near Lille is
believed to have been effectively destroyed, and a house in which
the enemy had installed one of his Headquarters was set on fire.
These afford other instances of successful operations of this
character. Most of the objectives mentioned were attacked at a
height of only 100 to 150 feet. In one case the pilot descended
to about 50 feet above the point he was attacking. Certain new
and important forms of activity, which it is undesirable to specify,
have been initiated and pushed forward with much vigour and success.
There have been only eight days during the period under review
on which reconnaissances have not been made. A total of approximately
130,000 miles have been flown—almost entirely over the enemy's
lines. No great activity has been shown over our troops on the
part of the enemy's aircraft, but they have been attacked whenever
and wherever met with, and usually forced down or made to seek
refuge in their own lines.
7. In my last despatch I referred to the remarkable promptitude
and rapidity with which reinforcements arrived in this country
from England. In connection with this it is of interest to call
attention to the fact that, in spite of the heavy casualties incurred
in the fighting between the 10th and 15th March, all deficiencies,
both in officers and rank and file, were made good within a few
days of the conclusion
of the battle. The drafts for the Indian Contingents have much
improved of late, and are now quite satisfactory.
Since the date of my last report the general health of the Army
has been excellent; enteric has decreased, and there has been
no recurrence on any appreciable scale of the '' foot'' trouble
which appeared so threatening in December and January. These results
are due to the skill and energy which have characterised in a
marked degree the work of the Royal Army Medical Corps throughout
the campaign, under the able supervision of Surgeon-General T.
J. O'Donnell, D.S.O., Deputy Director-General, Medical Services.
But much credit is also due to Divisional, Brigade, Regimental
and Company Commanders for the close supervision which has been
kept over the health of their men by seeing that the precautions
laid down for the troops before entering and after leaving the
trenches are duly observed, and by the establishment and efficient
maintenance of bathing-places and wash-houses, and by the ingenious
means universally employed throughout the Forces to maintain the
cleanliness of the men, having regard both to their bodies and
their clothing. I have inspected most of these houses and establishments,
and consider them models of careful organisation and supervision.
I would particularly comment upon the energy displayed by the
Royal Army Medical Corps in the scientific efforts they have made
to discover and check disease in its earliest stages by a system
of experimental research, which I think has never before been
so fully developed in the field. In this work they have been ably
assisted by those distinguished members of the medical profession
who are now employed as Military Medical Officers, and whose invaluable
services I gratefully acknowledge.
The actual strength of the Force in the field has been increased
and the health of the troops improved by a system of "convalescent''
hospitals. In these establishments slight wounds and minor ailments
are treated, and men requiring attention and rest are received.
By these means efficient soldiers, whose services would otherwise
be lost for a long time, are kept in the country, whilst a large
number of men are given immediate relief and rest when they require
it without removing them from the area of operations. This adds
materially to the fighting efficiency of the Forces. The principal
convalescent hospital is at St. Omer. It was started and organised
by Colonel A. F. L. Bate, Army Medical Service, whose zeal, energy
and organising power have rendered it a model hospital of its
kind, and this example has materially assisted in the efficient
organisation of similar smaller establishments at every Divisional
Headquarters.
8. I have already commented upon the number and
severity of the casualties in action which have occurred in the
period under report. Here once again I have to draw attention
to the excellent work done by Surgeon-General O'Donnell and his
officers. No organisation could excel the efficiency of the arrangements—
whether in regard, to time, space, care and comfort, or transport—which
are made for the speedy evacuation of the wounded. I wish particularly
to express my deep sense of the loss incurred by the Army in General,
and by the Forces in France in particular, in the death of Brigadier-General
J. E. Gough, V.C., C.M.G., A.D.C., late Brigadier-General, General
Staff, First Army, which occurred on 22nd February as a result
of a severe wound received on the 20th February when inspecting
the trenches of the 4th Corps. I always regarded General Gough
as one of our most promising military leaders of the future. His
services as a Staff Officer throughout the campaign have been
invaluable, and I had already brought his name before Your Lordship
for immediate promotion. I can well understand how deeply these
casualties are felt by the nation at large, but each daily report
shows clearly that they are being endured on at least an equal
scale by all the combatants engaged throughout Europe, friends
and foes alike. In war as it is to-day between civilised nations,
armed to the teeth with the present deadly rifle and machine-gun,
heavy casualties are absolutely unavoidable. For the slightest
undue exposure the heaviest toll is exacted. The power of defence
conferred by modern weapons is the main cause of the long duration
of the battles of the present day, and it is this fact which mainly
accounts for such loss and waste of life. Both one and the other
can, however, be shortened and lessened if attacks can be supported
by the most efficient and powerful force of artillery available;
but an almost unlimited supply of ammunition is necessary and
a most liberal discretionary power as to its use must be given
to the Artillery Commanders. I am confident that this is the only
means, by which great results can be obtained with a minimum of
loss.
9. On the 15th February the Canadian Division
began to arrive in tnis country. I inspected the Division, which
was under the command of Lieutenant-General E. A. H. Alderson,
C.B., on 20th February. They presented a splendid and most soldierlike
appearance on parade. The men were of good physique, hard and
fit. I judged by what I saw of them that they were well trained,
and quite able to take their places in the line of battle. Since
then the Division has thoroughly justified the good opinion I
formed of it. The troops of the Canadian Division were first attached
for a few days by brigades for training in the 3rd Corps trenches
under Lieutenant-General Sir William Pulteney, who gave me such
an excellent report of their efficiency that I was able to employ
them in the trenches early in March. During the Battle of Neuve
Chapelle they held a part of the line allotted to the First Army,
and, .although they were not actually engaged in the main attack,
they rendered valuable help by keeping the enemy actively employed
in front of their trenches. All the soldiers of Canada serving
in the Army under my command have so far splendidly upheld the
traditions of the Empire, and will, I feel sure, prove to be a
great source of additional strength to the forces in this country.
In former despatches I have been able to comment very favourably
upon the conduct and bearing of the Territorial Forces throughout
the operations in which they have been As time goes on, and I
see more and more of their work, whether in the trenches or engaged
in more active operations, I am still further impressed with their
value. Several battalions were engaged in the most critical moments
of the heavy fighting which occurred in the middle of March, and
they acquitted themselves with the utmost credit. Up till lately
the troops of the Territorial Force in this country were only
employed by battalions, but for some weeks past I have seen formed
divisions working together, and I have every hope that their employment
in the larger units will prove as successful as in the smaller.
These opinions are fully borne out by the result of the close
inspection which I have recentlv made of the North Midland Division,
under Major-General Hon. Montagu-Stuart-Wortley, and the 2nd London
Division, under Major-General Barter.
10. General Baron Von Kaulbars, of the Russian
General Staff, arrived at my Headquarters on the 18th March. He
was anxious to study our aviation system, and I gave him every
opportunity of doing so. The Bishop of London arrived here with
his Chaplain on Saturday, March 27th, and left on Monday, April
5th. During the course of his visit to the Army His Lordship was
at the front every day, and I think I am right in saying that
there was scarcely a unit in the command which was not at one
time or another present at his services or addresses. Personal
fatigue and even danger were completely ignored by His Lordship.
The Bishop held several services virtually under shell fire, and.
it was with difficulty that he could be prevented from carrying
on his ministrations under rifle fire in the trenches. I am anxious
to place on record my deep sense of the good effect produced throughout
the Army by this self-sacrificing devotion on the part of the
Bishop of London, to whom I feel personally very deeply indebted.
I have once more to remark upon the devotion to duty, courage
and contempt of danger which has characterised the work of the
Chaplains of the Army throughout this campaign.
11. The increased strength of the Force and the
gradual exhaustion of the local resources have necessitated a
corresponding increase in
our demands on the Line of Communications, since we are now compelled
to import many articles which in the early stages could be obtained
by local purchase. The Directorates concerned have, however, been
carefully watching the situation, and all the Administrative Services
on the Line of Communication have continued to work with smoothness
and regularity, in spite of the increased pressure thrown upon
them. In this connection I wish to bring to notice the good service
which has been rendered by the Staff of the Base Ports. The work
of the Railway Transport Department has been excellently carried
out, and I take this opportunity of expressing my appreciation
of the valuable service rendered by the French railway authorities
generally, and especially by Colonel Ragueneau, late Directeur
des Chemins de Fer,. Lieutenant-Colonel Le Henaff, Directeur des
Chemins de Fer, Lieutenant-Colonel Dumont, Commissaire Militaire,
Chemin de Fer du Nord, and Lieutenant-Colonel Frid, Commissaire
Regulateur, Armee Anglaise. The Army Postal Service has continued
to work well, and at the present time a letter posted in London
is delivered at General Headquarters or at the Headquarters of
the Armies and Army Corps on the following evening, and reaches
an addressee in the trenches on the second day after posting.
The delivery of parcels has also been accelerated, and is carried
out with regularity and despatch.
12. His Majesty the King of the Belgians visited
the British lines on February 8th and inspected some of the units
in reserve behind the trenches. During the last two months I have
been much indebted to His Majesty and his gallant Army for valuable
assistance and co-operation in various ways.
13. His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales is
the bearer of this despatch. His Royal Highness continues to make
most satisfactory progress. During the Battle of Neuve C'hapelle
he acted on my General Staff as a Liaison Officer. Reports from
the General Officers: Commanding Corps and Divisions to which
he has been attached agree in commending the thoroughness in which
he performs any work entrusted to him. I have myself been very
favourably impressed by the quickness with which His Royal Highness
has acquired knowledge of the various branches of the service,
and the deep interest he has always displayed in the comfort and
welfare of the men. His visits to the troops, both in the field
and in hospitals, have been greatly appreciated by all ranks.
His Royal Highness did duty for a time in the trenches with the
Battalion to which he belongs.
14. In connection with the Battle of Neuve Chapelle
I desire to bring to Your Lordship's special notice the valuable
services of General Sir Douglas Haig, K.C.B., K.C.I.E., K.C.V.O.,
A.D.C., Commanding the First Army. I am also much indebted to
the able and devoted assistance I have received from Lieutenant-General
Sir William Robertson, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., D.S.O., Chief of the
General Staff, in the direction of all the operations recorded
in this despatch. I have many other names to bring to notice for
valuable, gallant and distinguished service during the period
under review, and these will form the subject of a separate report
at an early date.
I have the honour to be,
Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,
J. D. P. FRENCH,
Field-Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief,
The British Army in the Field.
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| How
accurate or truthful was this Despatch? |
March
28. The GHQ despatch about Neuve Chapelle is disgraceful. It reads
as if the whole operation had been planned by GHQ. As a matter of
fact, the whole thing was worked out from the very beginning here
at First Army HQ and GHQ had nothing whatever to do with it. They
did not even get copies of the orders issued until after the battle.
C-in-C [French] has just been substituted for GOC First Army {Haig}
throughout. All the Staff are indignant. I spoke to DH [Haig] about
it today. He takes it all very philosophically. He is always contemptuous
of those who want to be "in the limelight" and says they
are not worth bothering about. All the same I think he will have
something to say to Sir J. French next time they meet.
Major John Charteris, First Army Intelligence, At GHQ, London: Cassell
& Company, London, 1931, page 83. |
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| Index
of Despatches | Sir
John French's Sixth Despatch | Sir
John French's Eighth Despatch |
| The
original printed version of this Despatch can be found at Gazettes
Online |
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