Brave
Little Belgium: the Belgian Army in the Great War
> 1914:
the decisive part played by perhaps the worst-prepared army in Western
Europe
> a talk given by Chris Baker to tranches of the Western Front Association
The Belgian perspective of the belligerents
Belgium is one of those modern countries formed by political expediency. Based on the ancient provinces of the south Netherlands, Flanders and the Walloon areas of Artois, it was set up as a barrier between France, Holland and the states that became unified as Germany. Its neutrality was guaranteed by treaty, signed by all of the countries that would eventually become the chief belligerents of the Great War of 1914-1918.
In the later decades of the 19th Century, its fortunes grew. Capitalising on its position as an international trading place, and the source of natural wealth in coal and iron, its population grew and its economic well-being blossomed in the years before the war. Militarily, it was believed by the Great Powers of the time to be of no consequence, for it had virtually no army. It did not need one. It was neutral. Through all the diplomatic crises of the early 20th Century, Belgium remained aloof, concentrating on developing its recent acquisitions in Central Africa, and on making the most of the golden age. There was very little sense of impending military action, at least nothing for the Belgians to worry about.
In this cosy atmosphere, Belgian diplomatic opinion failed to alert the government to the fact that Belgian safety was weakened by relying on the traditional guarantees of neutrality. The French ambassador in Brussels was increasingly isolated, as the Belgian Foreign Ministry and high society treated the Germans with far more interest. About 1910, Germany overtook France as the most important trading partner. ‘La Belgique Moderne’, published in 1910 by Frenchman Henri Chauriaut remarked on the rapidity of German penetration of Belgian life. Above all, the Flemish Catholics became very impressed by German discipline and morality. Belgian intellectuals began to spend more time in Germany than in the Sorbonne.
Belgian politics and public opinion were, in the years immediately before the war, very pro-German. Only one category remained staunchly pro-French: the officer class. They took as a norm the French language and culture, and it was from this class that emerged the warnings - proven correct, of course - of the dangers of German influence.
The unprepared army
It was largely thanks to Kings Leopold II and Albert that Belgium had any kind of effective army in 1914. Not only were they in the position of being strong Constitutional Monarchs supported by weak successions of national government, but they were constitutionally Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces.
Leopold had been responsible, in the wake of the war of 1870 and growing German power in Europe, for both the construction of the Meuse fortresses at Liege and Namur, and a law that had decreed the growth of the army by a system of national service to 100,000 men. It was not his fault that the country failed to respond to the decree, and that a law had to be passed in 1902 entrusting the main defence to volunteers. In spite of strong Christian-Democrat support for military expansion, the ruling Catholic party vacillated. The Belgian people were not greatly militaristic, and there was little by way of internal propaganda to entice them to join up.
A further law was passed in 1909 limiting service to one son per family. By this means, and various other enticements and enforcement, which included shortening the period of service, the army now had theoretical capacity of some 33,000 men per year. The proposed length of service differed by the arm of the service, but in all cases was barely long enough to train a man, let alone give him any military experience:
· Infantry
15 months
· Artillery 21 months
· Cavalry 24 months.
All men were then kept in active reserve, up to a total service of 15 years.
In 1912, the leader of the Catholic government, Charles de Broqueville (who had joined the House in 1892 as an anti-militarist, and who in 1909 did not support the Bill on conscription) announced that a thorough military reform was necessary. It was a carbon copy of the German army expansion plan of the same year, but scaled down in size. In 1913, the single-son clause was lifted.
It was projected that it would take until at least 1918 to have available an army of 340,000 trained men, considered by some in the staff to be the minimum number required to defend the country from a serious attack.
The Belgian army in July 1914 was approximately 190,000 strong. It was organised as a field army of six divisions, plus the garrisons of the fortresses centred on Antwerp, Liege and Namur. The field army numbered some 118,000 men of all arms, of which 14,000 were regular professional soldiers, and the rest had or were serving obligatory national service, including being available in reserve. (It is interesting to note that the field army of 1839 was 100,000 men, from a population half the size). The effects of the military laws on strengthening the army can be seen in the composition of the latter group.
1913 draft 33,000
men
1912 21,000
1911 19,000
1910 17,000
1906-09 13,000 per year
Total 144,000 theoretically available
less 40,000 who did not become available in August 1914 for various reasons
makes 104,000 who served.
In addition, the fortresses were garrisoned by 5,000 regulars plus 60,000 older men of the 1899-1905 classes.
The balance of the total was made up of staff, officers, and miscellaneous support units.
The armaments of the army reflected decades of stringent financial budgeting. In all there were available only 93,000 rifles and 6,000 swords, which was bad enough, but the real problem in terms of the coming fight was the paucity of artillery. There were only 324 obsolete field guns, and a paltry 102 machine guns. A decree of 15 December 1913, being a reaction to heightening tension and the clear direction of King Albert to adopt a neutral defensive posture, placed orders for modern artillery equipment. The heavy artillery orders were placed with Krupp of Germany. Needless to say, Krupp delayed delivery and in the event, the Belgians took the field with only one type of modern light artillery weapon, and not too many of those. There was virtually no mechanised transport, the army relying on horse- and dog-power. There were also serious shortages of engineers stores, minor equipment, and even uniforms, as the administration failed to gear up for the expansion of the classes of 1913 and 1914.
In addition to the army, Belgium had a system of armed local militia, as well as a gendarmerie.
As the 1914 crisis heightened, a neutral observer, assessing the ability of the army to defend the country, would have found little cause for optimism.
Firstly, there were disagreements at the highest levels about the strategy to be adopted, although they were agreed on the overall defensive neutral posture. Of course, they faced the probability of being invaded from both Germany and France, as the two super-powers clashed using strategies that were far from secret. These disagreements still remained as late as August 1914. At the outbreak of war, not one significant decision had been taken over the deployment of the army, should Belgium be attacked from Germany or France. The government of de Broqueville clung stubbornly to neutrality, right up to the time that German troops were crossing the border. It was simply not understood what would happen when the guarantees of 1839 became valueless.
De Selliers de Moranville, in place as Chief of Staff only since 25 May, proposed centring the whole army on Antwerp, leaving Liege and Namur only as a delaying screen. De Ryckel, Adjutant-General, favoured a forward policy of strongly manning the borders, especially in front of Liege, snuffing out the intruders as they appeared, and only falling back on Antwerp if necessary. Albert settled it : the army would concentrate on the left bank of the Meuse, prepare a second line along the Gette, and be based on Antwerp. The final decisions were taken on the 2nd of August, as the Germans were rolling into Luxemburg.
Next concern was the condition of the army itself. It had never fought, and virtually all of its life had been connected with the smooth running of the fortress garrisons. Officers had never commanded large bodies of men in the field. They were also, in most cases, terribly out of touch with the men, the majority of whom spoke native Flemish, not the French of the officer class. Army orders were only given in French. More than 10% of the ordinary soldiers were illiterate.
Finally, the army was in the process of being reorganised, with many units changing brigades, divisions and staff. This state of administrative uncertainty still existed when the Germans marched on Belgium in August, 1914.
King Albert
It was said by
the King’s biographer Emile Cammaerts in 1935 that Albert’s life
was so intimately bound up with the Belgian nation that his biography was also
the history of the country in the 20th Century.
Albert was the son of Philip, second son of the Belgian King Leopold I, and
Princess Marie of Hohenzollern. His mother came from the Roman Catholic side
of the house of Hohenzollern, rather then the reigning Protestant side, but
nonetheless this made Albert, in the tangled web of European royal dynasties,
a relative of Kaiser Wilhelm II.
He received a military education, and in so doing came into contact with many
men who were to play an important part in his life. Colonel, later General,
Leman was among his teachers. So was Lieutenant Francquie, who as head of the
Comite d’Alimentation, played a major part in feeding the enslaved Belgian
population during the German occupation of 1914-18.
The Belgian Constitution imposed heavy demands on its King: the preservation
of the country’s independence and the supreme command of its army. Albert
took these future duties very seriously as a young man, and won the affection
of the Belgian people in doing so.
In 1892, Prince Albert joined the Regiment of Grenadiers, who only recruited
the tallest men in the country. He was indeed a very tall man - very noticeable
in the photographs of him.
Despite his years of military education and training, his principal interest
was the economic development of Belgium. He delighted in mechanics, and followed
all of the latest engineering developments. He felt that the condition of industrial
workers needed serious improvement, and worked hard and charitably at ensuring
that this was done.
In 1900, he married Princess Elisabeth, Duchess of Bavaria. The couple had
three children: Leopold (1901), Charles (1903) and Marie-Jose (1906). Albert
accessed to the throne on December 23rd, 1909. There is no formal coronation
ceremony in Belgium. The heir-apparent becomes King after taking a solemn oath
required by the Constitution.
Despite the brilliance of the ceremonies, Albert retained an extraordinary air of gravity. It was thought at the time that the extra weight of responsibility was on his mind, and this may well have been true, for there was every reason to worry. The reconciliation of Britain and Russia had finally divided the guarantors of Belgian neutrality into two camps. The German danger was increasing. The recent military reform was totally inadequate, and Belgium was prey to social and political dissension.
Albert commanded the Belgian army throughout the war, despite constant requests from the French and British to hand it over to them. He paid regular visits to the front line, and was closer to the ordinary soldier than any of the other commanders-in-chief. In return, he was held in great regard. His wife worked tirelessly as a nurse.
Albert died in
1934 as a result of an accident.
von Schlieffen
Belgium’s military position was inevitably dictated by its geographical and political position, caught between the two mighty super-powers.
The French military strategy in Europe was essentially driven by two forces. Firstly, a passionate desire to win back the territories of Alsace and Lorraine, which had been lost cheaply to the Germans in 1870, since when these areas had been intensively Germanised, to the revulsion of the French. They were, and still are, excellent areas of agriculture and industry. They give France access to the Rhine; German lands West of the Rhine being of immense tactical importance in providing a ready-made assembly area for troops and materiel, they were an obvious target for a French offensive.
Secondly, the French army had become obsessed with a military doctrine that
relied almost solely on the attack - especially the idea of l’attaque
à l’outrance; attack with flair, with energy, with elan. This
idea was relatively new; it had developed since 1900, driven by the teaching
of Foch and others at the Staff schools. Before that, the strategy had been
a defensive one, which had lead to the construction of the border fortresses
at Maubeuge, Belfort, Verdun, Toul, Epinal and other locations. The new doctrine
led inexorably to the French failing to arm themselves with anything resembling
defensive armament, and to an absence of training in how to deal with an enemy
which resisted or attacked in his turn. This was to cost the French dear in
the first years of the war, and never more than in the first clashes along
the frontier.
French plans therefore placed large numbers of troops in a position to assault Alsace and Lorraine, with the centre of gravity of the army facing Metz. The First and Second Armies, under Generals Dubail and de Castelnau, would go for Colmar, Strasbourg and Metz.
The French, of course, knew that the Germans would attack France when given an opportunity, and deliberately left an open channel - the Trouée de Charmes - for them to do so. A wide gap was left between the Second Army, and the Third Army under General Ruffey facing Longwy and Luxemburg. It was assumed the Germans would be enticed to enter the gap, and be held up and destroyed by the forts around Verdun.
The remainder of the army took up positions along the Belgian border as far
north as the old fortress of Maubeuge, standing on the defensive while the
First and Second Armies advanced, but ready to advance through the Ardennes.
The Belgians were right to worry as much about an attack from the West as
from the East.
French planning did not consider that the Germans could possibly advance through the Northern parts of Belgium. (It must be said, however, that Michel, Joffre’s predecessor as Commander-in-Chief, had postulated this. It was thought to be absurd, and was one of the causes of his removal from post.) The distances involved were too long to be practical, and of course, no bounder would violate the very neutrality that his country had signed up for in the first place. So only the thinnest screen of Territorials was left between Maubeuge and the coast near Dunkerque.
The French plan was one of great simplicity, and apart from tinkering with details, stood unchanged from the turn of the Century. The latest revision, 1912, was Plan XVII. German intelligence knew the broad outline of the French intentions as early as 1897.
It was in this year that von Schlieffen, Head of the German General Staff, had found the nerve to articulate the obvious military response to the Franco-Russian alliance of 1893. He could not fight and beat them both. Counting on traditional Russian incompetence and on their inability to mobilise in mass due to lack of a sufficient railway system, he had a short period of time in which to beat the French. The Germans could use the benefit of the excellent lateral railways that were being built to move masses of troops from a conquered France to the East, and then beat the Russians too. So France it was.
The Franco-German border was not ideal for a huge assault. Much of it ran through
hilly country, and the French had left a large gap in front of Verdun, too
obvious to attack. So only around 40 miles of front was ideal; this was insufficient
for a mass assault and would potentially leave too much flank vulnerable
to French counterattack. No, the answer was to move through Belgium, and
march on Paris. Politically impossible, it seemed to von Schlieffen that
the possibility of encirclement by the Alliance justified the action. Later,
as the Alliance became the Triple Entente with England, the justification
was definite. The German propaganda machine began to hint to the public,
and to those countries not yet aligned, that the French and the British would
not hesitate to use Belgium as their aufmarschgebiet, or jumping-off zone,
for an assault on Germany itself. So of course, it was only defensively that
Germany would invade Belgium.
Von Schlieffen’s
plan was thus: the army would strike hard and fast against France, in a movement
to envelope Paris and force surrender. If all went well, the army would continue
its anticlockwise movement and fall upon the bulk of the French army from
behind as it advanced into Lorraine. Only a light screen of troops would
be left south of Metz. To ensure victory, there would be three times as many
men on the German right wing as on the left. They would be unstoppable.
Von Schlieffen also planned for a strike into Holland, going via Grave, ‘s Hertogenbosch, Tilburg and Turnhout, to capture Antwerp. To counter this possibility, the Dutch army prepared all the railway bridges south of Maastricht for demolition, on 26 July. It was probably only lack of sufficient artillery and ammunition that caused von Moltke to abandon this project, although violating Dutch neutrality would deny the Germans considerable political and economic support from the North.
The plan for Belgium was simple - knock out the forts at Liege and Namur and move on. Capture the railways running from the Channel past Brussels and into Europe. Capture Antwerp as a useful additional port with access to the North Sea. There was just no possibility that the puny six divisions of the Belgian army, so poorly equipped and organised, could prove to be of any menace to the best in the world. The armies of Von Kluck, Von Bulow and Von Hausen would move swiftly ahead to capture Paris.
The Germans did not realise that the British Expeditionary Force would be present, positioned in front of Maubeuge on the left of the French screen. This is no surprise; even the British Parliament did not know about it until the eleventh hour. There was no good reason to worry even had they known. Four divisions of an army that had been taught a stiff lesson by the Boers a few years ago would be of virtually no consequence. Contemptibly small, as the Kaiser said.
As the crisis escalated through high Summer of 1914, both Plan XVII and the Schlieffen plan began to be implemented. Huge numbers of men mobilised and took up position.
On the 27 July, the precaution was taken in Belgium to recall the 33,000 men of the 1913 class, who had gone on leave on 10 July. On the 31st, general mobilisation was ordered, following the German announcement of Kriegsgefahrzustand at 1.30pm that afternoon.
Invasion
Liege: On the 2nd of August, the Germans occupied Luxemburg, without opposition. The order went out to all border posts along all Belgian frontiers, to open fire on any hostile troops attempting to cross into Belgium.On the same day, the German Ambassador in Brussels presented the Belgian Foreign Office with a letter. Or rather, an ultimatum. On the pretext that France was about to attack Belgium, the Germans demanded free passage through Belgian territory. It was briefly discussed by the Belgian Cabinet, and one hour later unanimously rejected. On the 3rd, the French commenced hostilities against Germany, and Joffre ordered the VII Corps to move forward to capture Mulhouse. (As an aside, their commander, General Bonneau, prevaricated, took two days to reach the town - it was only 15 miles from his base - neglected to reconnoitre or make defensive positions and re-lost it two days later). The Germans moved more men into Luxemburg. It was only on this day that the Belgian GHQ finally decided how to deploy their army. The 3rd Division under General Leman were ordered to Liege, and the 4th, under Michel, to Namur, to hold on to the bitter end. The 1st Division left Gent for Tienen, the 2nd went from Antwerp to Leuven, the 5th from Mons to Perwez, and the 6th moved on Wavre, from the capital.At dawn on the 4th, orders were received by advanced German units that they should execute the next step of the Schlieffen plan; the destruction or capture of Liege. Units crossed into Belgium at six different places. A telegram was sent from the small border garrison of the Belgian 34th Brigade at Gemmenich to General Leman, commanding the 3rd Division, by now at Liege. ‘Le terroire Belge avait été envahi par les troupes Allemandes!’
The fortress buildings at Liege and Namur were constructed between 1888 and 1892 under the direction of military engineer Brialmont. The town of Huy was also strengthened at that time, but was not really equipped as strongly as the two main fortresses. Liege was ringed by twelve forts, at a rough distance of 7km from the centre, six on each bank of the Meuse (Maas). Each consisted of a massive concrete crown, surrounded by a wide and deep moat. On the far side of the moat was a high earth breastwork. The defensive works were constructed of steel and concrete and for the most part were underground. The forts carried quite an armament : two 210mm howitzers, two 150mm and four 120mm cannon. Each artillery piece was behind a rotating cupola turret. There was also several smaller calibre pieces, and machine guns, beyond the moat and in the spaces between the forts, which were also wired in places. However, the spaces between the forts were the obvious targets of the advancing Germans. The Belgian troops were ordered to knock down any houses or other buildings that were in the field of fire; but little of this was achieved due to the speed of the advance.The fortresses were occupied, as has been said, by the oldest classes of soldier, in this case the 9th, 11th, 12th and 14th regiments, together with some engineer and transport units. The 3rd Infantry Division under Leman had also been ordered forward, and was taking up positions around the fortress ring. The 14th Brigade was placed in the most vulnerable position, on the right bank (to the east of the town facing Luxemburg), and a battalion was sent to defend the Meuse crossings at Visé and Argentau.
The Germans planned to knock out the forts and capture Liege inside three days. In fact, it was only on the eleventh day that the final resistance was overcome. Their strategy was one of envelopment : they would capture the forts to the North, West and South of the city. The advance units of the 2nd and 4th Cavalry Divisions first attacked Visé, where there was an important bridge over the Meuse. The 9th Cavalry moved towards the South, between Huy and Liege. Six infantry brigades, with an attached battalion of jagers (guards), plus cyclists, pioneers, artillery and other support moved on the East side. A squadron of eindeckers, and the Zeppelin Köln provided air cover and observation.
The Germans advanced cautiously, for in the wooded folds of hills, and on the
river meadows, they faced unexpectedly ferocious resistance from the Belgian
forts and 3rd Division. Gradually and inevitably, weight of numbers and fire
told on the Belgians, who began to withdraw. Some fell back to the river
banks and city. Some entered the forts. The latter had sentenced themselves
to almost certain death or captivity.
After two days, on 6th August, the city came under fire. Conditions became increasingly unsafe, and rumours went round that the Germans were already there. At 7.30am, an Army Order was given for a regrouping of the 3rd Division between Lantin and Rocourt, and the railway station at Ans. It was considered better for the weakened division to withdraw towards the Gette than to lose more men in the futile defence of Liege.
Shortly after midday, the first column withdrew to Waremme. The rest of the division followed through by next morning (7th). Lieut-Gen. Leman and his headquarters staff stayed behind, with the fortress troops.At 6am on the 7th, the German 14th Brigade entered the city. The occupation of the city was hastened by a Belgian spy, who gave a telephoned order, on the authority of Leman, to withdraw from the centre. The General on the spot did not check the authorisation, and carried out the order. The spy was one Charles Troupin. He had first been arrested at Waremme on the 7th August, when a Belgian road patrol spotted a false ‘laissez-faire’ pass. He escaped. He was finally caught, with two others, at Leuven on the 16th August, where he was sentenced to death and executed. From the Chartreuse, Ludendorff’s men turned towards the Meuse, crossed the two undamaged bridges and entered the inner town. Ludendorff travelled in the delusion that the city was already completely in the hands of his men, and rode with an adjutant to the gates of the Citadel. Shortly after, the other Brigades reached the city centre, and the final Belgian resistance halted. The guns of the forts continued to fire. Von Emmenich threatened to bomb the old town by Zeppelin. Leman continued to refuse to surrender. The news was telegraphed through to Leuven and Brussels. The Government was moved, under the orders of King Albert, to Antwerp. The intention of the Belgians to fall back on Antwerp was against the will of the French. The news from the fighting of the first days was not published or relayed back to the towns to the north. The General Staff continued to issue very upbeat communiqués. Passions high against the invader, put the flags out, was very much the order of the day, except in the shattered villages outside Liege.
Meanwhile, the cavalry of Von Marwitz tried to encircle the Belgian troops to the South and West, while the infantry under Von Einem regrouped. There was a steady flow of German troops across the border from the area of Aachen, Eupen and Malmedy towards the fortress ring. The whole of the 7th,9th and 10th Korps assembled. The German plan was to open the road to the North of the city, after which the 1st Korps would march on Brussels.Inevitably under constant and increasing fire, the forts began to fall. Fort Barchon was first. A bombardment by heavy 210mm Skoda mortars ended the resistance, and at 5pm on the 8th August the remainder of the garrison surrendered. The Germans promptly began the big engineering job of moving the mortars to a position where they could fire on Evegnee. They opened fire on the evening of the 10th, and the white flag was raised the following morning.From the 12th August, even heavier guns became available to the Germans as the first of the 420mm mortars opened up. The first shell missed its target - but when, following corrections made by observation from a balloon, the fire moved slowly onto target. Fort Pontisse fell soon after, on the afternoon of the 13th. Three quarters of the garrison of the fort died, many from smoke and concussion from the huge explosions. The same day, Embourg and Chaudfontaine fell. At the latter, hundreds died at the same moment when a heavy shell struck the munitions store.Fort Liers stood for a further day, as Belgian artillery fire from Milmort was so effective that it held the Germans at some distance. On the same day, the 14th, the garrison commander of Fort Fleron, Capt Mozin, decided that after 50 hours of continuous bombardment, his remaining men could stand no more. Fleron had provided strong resistance to German assaults for 5 days, and at the same time had provided very effective artillery support to the other forts. Boncelles fell on the same day, and the Germans now had complete control of the right bank.Leman’s HQ did not escape. The first shells fell on the 10th. From the 14th it received 420mm shells, and it finally fell on the next day when a shell blew up the magazine. All of the internal doors blew open with the pressure from the blast, and many men were hit with debris. Not a single man remained unwounded. Shortly after this, the Germans saw that the gun cupolas were no longer firing, and infantry assaulted the ramparts. Leman, and the fort commander Capt Naessens, were brought out unconscious and taken to a German military hospital.
Leman was born in January 1851, making him 63 when the battle took place. He was transported to Germany, where he remained a prisoner of war until he was repatriated to Switzerland due to ill health, in 1917. He was interned there until release at the Armistice. He died in October 1920.
Break-out to the Gete, and the Battle of the Silver Helmets
The fall of the Liege forts opened the way for the German 1st and 2nd Armies to swing through Belgium towards the French border, with the Von Schlieffen intention to encircle Paris to the North. The 3rd Army would march on Dinant, the 4th on Sedan and the 6th on Verdun.
The Belgian cavalry, which since the 4th had been stationed at Wavre, were ordered to cover troop movements to the north of Liege, and if necessary move towards Maastricht and Maaseik to hold the Germans from cutting the line of retreat. When the battle started at Liege, they moved to Hannuit, a central position from which to fire a barrage. On the 6th, General de Witte moved them to Hallogne, where contact was made with the infantry of the 3rd Division. When, on the 7th, GHQ signalled that the direction of Huy was under attack and was becoming dangerous, the cavalry moved to Warnaut. Further order, however, indicated that in fact the more critical fighting was taking place to the north and north-west. Many German troops had been reported in Limburg and to the west of Tongeren.
De Witte therefore turned around and hastened to Sint-Truiden, and by the morning
of the 8th, his troops lay to the south of the town. However, the strength
of the German advance was palpably growing, and he was ordered on the 9th
to take no risks and to fall back to the Gete line.
To the south of the cavalry, the Belgian army now held a more or less continuous line from Tienen to Jodoigne. In front, the 1st, 3rd and 5th Divisions. Behind them, the 2nd were at Leuven, the 6th at Hamme-Mille. The defence of Namur was left to the 4th Division, of which the 8th Mixed Brigade held the Meuse bridges at Huy and Andenne. When the last Liege forts fell, this Brigade withdrew, and the Germans crossed at these places on the 19th. The Armies of Von Kluck and Von Bulow had gained completely free passage at all the important Meuse bridges.
In fact, as early as the 8th, the 2nd and 4th German cavalry divisions under Von Marwitz had crossed by a temporary bridge at Lixhe, advancing to a position south of Tongeren which menaced the Liege troops from the rear. They moved on the old Roman town the next day, but a company of cyclists, with help from the burgerwacht (militia), drove off a complete Brigade of Liebeshuzaren, and they withdrew to Gothem. The German cavalry were never as bold after this shock, which had an important effect in slowing the general advance. However, a stronger German force of cavalry did take Tongeren the next day. Von Marwitz, however, realised that he was in danger of being cut off, as the Belgian defence line solidified behind him, and between him and the rest of the German armies. He moved to escape by taking a northerly rout towards Diest. His troops came into regular contact with Belgian patrols and supply columns. A serious clash took place on the 10th near Orsmal, where the 3rd Belgian Lansiers attacked. Although the fire fight was only short, 28 Belgians died, as did an uncounted number of Germans. After a days rest, Von Marwitz moved towards Haelen.
A serious clash occurred at Haelen, on the 12th August. Units of the Belgian cavalry (the 4th and 5th Lansiers, plus a company of cyclists and another of pioneer engineers) under General de Witte ambushed the advanced squadrons of the German cavalry, in what was almost certainly the last fight between mounted cavalrymen, wearing the breastplates and helmets of a different era. The battle lasted for most a the day, and drew in reinforcements from both sides. The Germans suffered a serious defeat in the village and in the surrounding farms, losing some 150 dead, 600 wounded and 200-300 prisoners. The number of dead horses was put at over 400. The Belgian losses totalled around 500. Von Marwitz withdrew, advancing days later with great caution. This battle grew in Belgian folklore as the ‘Battle of the Silver Helmets’.
A large gap existed between the Belgians and the French 5th Army, that was only ordered to be closed on the 12th August when General Lanrezac, as a result of events at Liege, took up a defensive position on the Meuse between Namur and Givet. He used the 1st Corps under Franchet D’Esprey , who took an entire week to take up their position.
‘Man hat geschossen’
As early as 6th August, the Germans were expressing outrage at the unexpected resistance of the Belgian army, and also civil resistance. With memories of the francs-tireurs of 1870, the German newspapers called for retribution. The headlines in the Kolnischer Zeitung read: ‘The beast in Belgium’; ‘From savage Belgium’; ‘Liege atrocities’. In Liege province there were 1200 victims of German retribution. In Luxembourg 842; Namur 2000; Brabant (where on 25 to 28 August the old town and library of Leuven were set aflame, to the horror of the rest of Europe) 839. In the Henegouwen, 350. Some 16,000 houses were destroyed. The terror was wild and needless, and not at all systematic. There can be no conclusion but that the German command allowed the troops their fun. Unfortunately for the Belgian people, it was just a foretaste of 4 years of severe treatment.
The Belgian retreat to Antwerp
After the Belgian victory at Haelen, there followed several days of relative calm. The Belgian army, already shattered from the loss of Liege and much of the 3rd Division, had time to catch its breath.
Irregular machine gun fire from Diest broke De Witte’s illusions of the chances of a further breakthrough, for Von Kluck had ordered the three Korps of his 1st Army to advance through central Belgium towards Diest and Tienen. A Reserve Korps followed each assault Korps, and thus an impenetrable and advancing curtain formed in front of the Belgians. The latter still faced this completely alone, for a connection with Lanrezac’s Frenchmen had not yet been made, and the small British force (of which the Belgians knew very little) was still on its way to France. Steadily, the field grey occupied Sint-Truiden, Tongeren, the gin town of Hasselt, Genk and Mol, while masses continued to stream across the Meuse bridges. Belgium had already lost much of its industrial capacity, for the Limburg area was one where much of its coal and iron working took place.
On the morning of the 18th of August, German artillery fire opened on Haelen, and the nearby villages. The German infantry moved forward, and despite resistance from two sections of cyclists and a dismounted squadron of the 5th Lansiers, they took it quite quickly. This allowed the German cavalry to cross the Gete. The entire Belgian army in front of Leuven was now threatened by encirclement.
The Belgians had no choice but to slip quietly away to the north, while they still had the chance. The next natural defensive position was to occupy the banks of the River Dijle (Dyle). In retreat, they put up stiff resistance, and units of the 3rd Division fought large scale defensive actions at Sint-Margriethe-Houthem (on the 18th) and Aarschot (19th). The action at Aarschot was notable for the violent reaction of the Germans. A single brigade of Belgian infantry, with one artillery battery, held up the German advance for several hours, but after suffering heavy losses and being attacked from three sides, they withdrew. Inevitably the Germans took prisoners, mostly wounded men. A large number were marched to the banks of the River Demer, where they were shot. Those that escaped were thrown in the river to drown. The Germans then turned on the citizens of the Aarschot. 400 houses were plundered and set on fire, and 150 people executed. During the next few days, the fury continued, and the towns of Diest, Schaffen, and Tremelo were razed.
The loss of Aarschot endangered the Dijle position. Albert decided with reluctance to move GHQ from Leuven to Mechelen. He ordered the whole army to retire to within the fortress ring of Antwerp. After a long and tense night march, the first units of the exhausted field army entered the fortress on the 20th August. Discouraged now by the fast retreat after the hopeful results of Haelen and Aarschot, they trekked through a growing stream of refugees to the harbour meadows.
The Germans capitalised quickly on the retreat. On the 19th, they took Leuven, and the German flag flew on the Stadhuis, which until just a few hours previously had housed King Albert and the General Staff of the Belgian army. On the 20th, they triumphantly entered Brussels, and watered their horses in the Grote Markt, and along the elegant boulevards of the capital.
From the 21st, the Germans began to renew their swing towards the south. They left only the 3rd Reserve Korps as a screen facing Antwerp, and they were positioned in the Vilvoorde - Haacht area to the north-east of the capital. The German high command were now of the opinion that the Belgian army was a spent force, incapable of offensive action.
It became clear
soon enough, however, that the Belgians posed a constant threat to the northern
German flank as its advance units headed for Paris. The lateral communication
lines and railways running across Belgium were an artery supplying the fighting
front with materials and men from Germany. They were all too vulnerable to a
sudden attack from Antwerp, and Von Kluck was eventually forced to strengthen
the screen standing fast in front of the six Belgian divisions.
Namur, Dinant and the swing to the South
On the 20th August, the German high command ordered the 3rd Army, in contact with the 2nd Army under Von Bulow, to march on French troops between the Sambre and Meuse. While they advanced, the Belgian 4th Division, the solitary part of the Belgian army in the area, dug in to defend Namur. In the wide gap between the French 5th and 3rd Armies, under Lanrezac and Ruffey respectively, there was only one brigade, the 45th, of French infantry, who were ordered to support the Belgian defence. They would face German opposition of at least four times their combined strength.
The first probing attacks were made on the 20th, towards Fort de Marchovelette. The next morning, the German field guns opened up on many of the forts. The super-heavy mortars were in position, and made their first registering shots, on the 21st. By dusk, all telephone lines to the eastern forts were down. Marchovelette was constantly hit, and knocked out of action. The rest would gradually follow.
The bulk of the Germans reached the area of Namur on the 23rd, the same day that they clashed for the first time with the BEF, at Mons. The day before, they had clashed with the French near Charleroi and had taken Dinant. In the latter place, German kultur executed 85 citizens on the market square after dragging the congregartion of a church from Mass. Women, children and the aged were assaulted by German troops, who also razed three quarters of the houses of the town.
Namur had fortifications similar to those at Liege. The city stands on a gentle bend of the River Meuse, at its confluence with the Sambre. It was surrounded by nine forts, at approximately five miles from the centre. The forts were linked, as at Liege, by trenches and barbed wire, although the condition of these was far from perfect. The German bombardment of the forts followed the pattern established at Liege. The eastern facing forts were systematically destroyed by the 305mm and 420mm mortars. The German 38th, 3rd Guard, and 1st Guard Reserve Divisions moved in on the town during the afternoon of the 23rd. The Belgian 4th Division was ordered to try to slip away from the holocaust during the night, and although the rearguard was finally trapped at Ermeton-sur-Biert and taken prisoner, the order was - miraculously - carried out.
After their withdrawal from Namur, the 12,000 men of the 4th Division withdrew and crossed into French-held territory. They were collected and sent to Le Havre, where they sailed up the English Channel to disembark again at Oostende in time to join up - on the 5th September - with the other 5 Divisions moving backwards into West Flanders.
Namur was formally
surrendered on 25th August.
The fortress at Antwerp
Through its important position at the head of the long estuary of the Scheldt, Antwerp plays a major role in any strategic military thinking concerning the Low Countries. It forms a natural supply base and military centre. Since 1851, the city had been fortified, originally by an entrenched line. During the heightened tensions of the 1860’s, the original line was greatly strengthened. Following the designs of the military engineer Brialmont, Forts 1 to 8, and Fort Merksem, on the right bank of the Scheldt facing the Netherlands and Germany, were constructed. On the left bank, protecting the city from a coastal attack from the direction of France or Great Britain, Forts Kruibeke, Zwijndrecht and St Marie were also built. They were extensive constructions, sufficient protection from the artillery of the day, and were largely of brick. The forts girdled the city, each 3 to 4 km from the others. However, experience of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 suggested that the ring needed to be widened if the mass armies and increasingly heavy artillery then being developed were to be withstood. At the same time, the Belgian economy was growing, and the harbour complex to the west of the city was pushing the limits of the populated areas outwards. It was, however, only in 1906 that the Belgian government agreed to a new scheme for the fortress.
The development plan featured a new defensive ring of concrete fortresses, which would be equipped with a selection of old artillery pieces to reduce the costs. The ring would be situated just forward of the natural borders formed by the Rivers Rupel and Nete, between Lier and the lower loop of the Scheldt. The plan also called for the strengthening of the old brick forts with concrete, and for the establishment of new battery positions near Doel, able to fire from the lower Scheldt to the Dutch border. Endless planning debates and budget constraints ensured that in August 1914, the fortress construction was far from complete. Much of the 1906 plan existed only on paper. Many of the fortresses were as yet no more than the gun cupolas, and some of the rotating turrets were not yet concreted in. There were gaps in the telephone and electricity supplies, and the 1859 forts were still only brick. Trenches, designed to run continuously between the forts had not been started. The old gunpowder cannons gave off so much smoke on firing that they could be seen from miles away. And there was only one of them per mile of front. To add to all of these weaknesses, the forts were garrisoned by 65,000 of the oldest classes of troops, undertrained, poorly armed and poorly supplied. The forts were known to be obsolete. Observations of the effects of shelling in the Russo-Japanese war of 1905 revealed that the concrete would not withstand even 6-inch shell bursts, let alone the size of the mortars now possessed by the Germans.
On the 8th September, General Deguise relieved the old General Dufour as military governor of the Antwerp district. He ordered immediate works on the entrenchments, including continuous wiring and head cover with tree trunks and logs (which of course provided little chance of cover against all but small arms fire). Unfortunately, the work of clearing away buildings and tress to improve the field of fire for the garrisons of the forts also allowed perfect observation from the German side of the accuracy of their artillery.
At present, only
one German Reserve Korps faced the garrison of Antwerp. This was soon found
to be wholly inadequate, as King Albert ordered the Belgians to attack the Germans,
in support of the Franco-British actions at Mons, and later, on the Marne. His
primary objective was to divert German attention from his allies. His second,
a rather more forlorn hope of breaking through into the German rear.
The sorties from Antwerp : the vulnerable German flank
The first attack - always referred to as sorties in the Belgian histories - took place on the 25th August, against the German 3rd Reserve Korps between Wolvertem and Aarschot. Four Belgian divisions took part. Only the 3rd Division, still recovering from Liege and the withdrawal to Antwerp, was held in reserve. The 4th Division was still extricating itself from Namur.
On the morning of the 25th, that planned attack was held up, as the Germans chose this time to open heavy shelling on Mechelen, one of the main assembly points of the 6th Division.
The story is quickly told. The Belgian divisions advanced several kilometers, pushing back the thin German screen, until it came against stouter resistance from the German artillery. At that time, a message was received from Joffre that the actions at Mons and on the Sambre had been beaten off, and a general retreat into central France had been ordered. Albert ordered the divisions to disengage, and to withdraw behind the outer fortress ring. The Belgians had played their part : not only were they now fighting for Belgium, they were supporting the very armies whose support they needed so desperately. In addition, they had forced the Germans to reconsider a potential thrust towards Sint Nikolaas and towards the coast, which would have completely isolated the Belgians inside Antwerp. Incredibly, the Germans never did press their advantage in this direction. Perhaps they took too seriously a rumour deliberately passed to them that a large British force was advancing from Dunkirk. They certainly sent out the Uhlans to question the Flemish peasants about this.
A tragic result of this action was that German violence on the Belgian people was renewed. Aarschot was finally completed razed. In Leuven, the 27th Landwehr Brigade panicked at the sound of shelling by a Belgian battery in Haacht. Their commander, Von Mantueffel, ordered the town to be set on fire. Hundreds of houses, St Peter’s Church and the world-famous library and university were destroyed. Civilians, fleeing the flames, were hunted down and executed. The whole area of Mechelen, Leuven, Vilvoorde was affected by the fury.
On the night of the 25th/26th August, as the Belgian troops were withdrawing from the first sortie, the first Zeppelin raid took place at Antwerp. The rather optimistic air of the last two days ended abruptly.
The German command in Flanders decided it was high time to finish off the Belgians. From the 31st August, they assembled forces for an attack on Dendermonde as a prelude to an assault on the harbour city. It began on the 4th September, as the 9th Reserve Korps advanced to the mouth of the River Leie. Four battalions of Belgian infantry resisted, but could not hold for long against overwhelming numbers. They made a fighting withdrawal in the direction of Lokeren. By mid-day, the Germans entered the old town, setting it ablaze.
At the same time, the 12th Landwehr Brigade, together with the 6th Jagers,
moved on Kapelle-op-den-Bos. They were soundly defeated, cut down by murderous
fire coming from Fort Breendonk. As at Liege and Namur before, the Germans
would not find Antwerp an easy nut to crack.
Good news from the Marne helped put the completely isolated Belgian army in a new mood. GHQ decided to make a second attack, to provide support for the allies as they moved forward towards the Aisne. This time, they would attack with five divisions, the 4th having miraculously returned. Facing them , the Germans had moved the 9th Reserve Korps to France, replacing them with the 6th Division of the 3rd Reserve Korps, and a division of marines. More heavy artillery was brought up.
The second sortie began brightly on the 9th September. De Witte’s cavalry, victors at Haelen, chased the Germans out of Aarschot and took 350 prisoners. The 3rd division, so hard to beat at Liege, crossed the Dijle in three places and steadily advanced. By the next morning, the cavalry were on the outskirts of Leuven, but the infantry advance was increasingly held up by German artillery. Stimulated by news of fresh successes on the Oise and the Aisne, Albert ordered the battle to be renewed on the 11th. However, stiffening German resistance made it a trying day : the divisions were held, and began to fall back in places. The line had been further advanced from Antwerp, but 8000 Belgians were lost in doing so.
There is no doubt that the Germans were badly hurt by the two sorties. As soon as their very heavy artillery was released after the fall of Maubeuge, it was sent to join a build-up ready for the final assault on Antwerp.
On 22nd September, a battalion of 700 Belgian cyclists, all volunteers, with the objective of attacking German communications outside Antwerp. They succeeded as far afield as in Limburg, Brabant and Hainaut provinces. Most of them returned unharmed to Antwerp, days later.
The Belgians knew well the hopelessness of their task. If their objective had been to save themselves, they would by now have moved by train west to Dunkirk. But they knew that the release of 125,000 Germans now standing before Antwerp to move on the feeble French line around Lille and the coast would have been strategic disaster for the allies. They resolved to hold firm, while their supposedly stronger allies organised a stronger defence.
The fight for Antwerp, and the Belgian escape
The Germans assault begins
The Germans had already shown at Liege and Namur that the old fortresses were no match for the heaviest artillery. However, they had begun to have a healthy respect for the Belgian artillery and cavalry in the field. They strengthened their forces in East Flanders, and placed them under the orders of Von Beseler, commander of the 3rd Reserve Korps. He had at his disposal more than the strength of five infantry divisions, plus 160 heavy and 13 super-heavy artillery pieces.
Von Beseler chose the area between Mechelen and Lier, south-east of the city, for the frontal assault. The general plan was to break through the fortress line in one place, and then extend northwards. Systematic shelling of the outer forts at Lier, Koningshoekt, St Katherine Wavre and Walem, together with the smaller shelters and posts between them, would open the way for a large infantry advance.
Meanwhile, the Belgians were planning a third sortie, to take place on 25th September, between the Dender and the Willebroek Canal. Unfortunately, by this time the fighting on the Aisne had subsided and the Germans were allowed to release more troops for Antwerp. Belgian intelligence detected this, and the sortie was postponed.
On Sunday 27th September 1914, the German attack on Antwerp began, with the 5th and 6th Reserve Divisions advancing between the Dijle and Nete. They were opposed by the Belgian 1st and 2nd Divisions, but made good progress - a result of superior artillery fire. Mechelen suffered grievously from shelling. The 13th Century cathedral of St Rombold was almost completely destroyed. Whilst the town was only some two miles from the outer fortress line, there was no military value to Mechelen. The Germans gave no notice to the civilian population that this bombardment was about to fall on them. Putte and Heist-op-den-Berg fell to the Germans, and the railway at Lier was lost to the 27th Landwehr Brigade.
The Belgians, however, still had the odd card to play against the German machine. At one point, one of the forts was seen by the Germans to explode in a sheet of flame. They rose up and moved forward, only to run into devastating fire from machine-guns and rifles in trenches outside the fort, covered in front by live electrified barbed wire. The fire had been deliberated set off by the Belgians, and they annihilated the German brigade. In similar tricks, at least two German batteries and a number of infantry battalions were destroyed in front of Antwerp.
The next day, the large mortars came into action in this area, for the first time. Shortly after mid-day, the first 420mm mortars fell on Fort St Katherine Wavre, and 305mm on Fort Walem. Within minutes, the gun cupolas were knocked out. 2m thick concrete walls were ripped apart, and the interiors of the forts devastated. At Fort Walem, the magazine exploded. Of 100 men inside the building, only 10 escaped. The largest calibre fire stopped in the early evening, but the barrage from ordinary field guns carried on throughout the night.
The morning of the 29th September found the German 4th Ersatz Division and 38th Landwehr in full advance between the Dender and the Dijle. Blaasveld was flattened by gun fire, and there was in general no let up from the previous day. The powder magazine at Fort St Katherine Wavre was hit and burned, making a black column of smoke visible for miles around. The Belgian defences were powerless against such crushing weight of artillery. The 420mm and 305mm mortars were well outside the range of counter-battery fire from the Belgian field guns, and were not spotted from the few aircraft and balloons. The attack carried on into the 30th, with the same results. Fort Walem was finally destroyed. Just behind it, shelling burst the banks of a large reservoir, drowning men in the fire trenches. The fighting line moved inexorably forward, and broke through the fortress ring.
The 1st and 2nd Belgian divisions were gradually pushed back.
The further defence of Antwerp, and the safety of the whole of the army still
inside the perimeter, looked increasingly perilous. It was essential to move
the army out and along the coastal corridor, before the Germans encircle them.
But this would all take time, and it was obvious that if any substantial part
of the army was to escape, then the fighting line must be held for another three
days at least. During the night of the 30th/1st October, orders were given to
move GHQ west along the coast to Oostende. Antwerp itself would only finally
be evacuated when the Germans were at the gates.
The British come to help
King Albert requested assistance from the French and British on the 30th September. Ever since the 4th August, both had made promises about supporting the Belgians, but precious little had actually come about. Quite the opposite: the Belgians had sacrificed themselves in the pinprick flank attacks to relieve pressure on the allies at the times of Mons and the Marne. However, both the French and British were now in a better position to do something, as the front line was stabilising, releasing troops from intensive fighting.
On the 1st October, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, called upon the British Government to provide urgent support to Antwerp. He was well aware of the strategic importance of the city, and of control of the Scheldt and the Belgian coast, to the Royal Navy. He got the necessary support, but in practical terms the help was not great. To the Belgians he cabled: ‘The importance of Antwerp justifies a further effort till the course of the main battle in France is determined. We are trying to send you help from the main army, and, if this were possible, would add reinforcements from here. Meanwhile a brigade of marines will reach you tomorrow to sustain the defence. We urge you to make one further struggle to hold out. Even a few days will make a difference. We hope that government may find it possible to remain, and field army to continue operations.’
The Belgian reply was to the effect that if no serious help were forthcoming
on three days, it would be necessary to evacuate the city, and to move the
army to Oostende.
Churchill himself came to Antwerp, arriving by special train on the 3rd. . A detachment of 2000 men of a mixed brigade, under the control of the Admiralty, arrived at Oude God, at 1am on the 4th October, taking up positions in the front line in front of Lier. It consisted of detachments of Royal Marine Light Infantry, with some Oxfordshire Hussars and Royal Engineers. What Churchill had taken care not to reveal to the Belgians was that this force consisted of 21-years service reservists. There was also a large number (about 700) of men with only a few days prior service, precious little training, and in some cases no armaments. The British Official History refers to one platoon as consisting entirely of ‘pensioner sergeants and colour-sergeants’. Many of the untrained volunteers came from Durham and Northumberland. They were moved up by train via Cassel and Lille. They were the first of 5000 others who would arrive up to the 6th October. The British also ordered six 6-inch guns to Antwerp. They played a part in the battle, but were lost as no railway was available to take them away. An armoured train, containing six 4.7-inch guns, also took part in the battle.
In addition, the British prepared the new 7th Division and 3rd Cavalry Division, even though they were not ready, to sail to Belgium. They were to come under the orders of Rawlinson, as the IV Corps of the BEF. They arrived at Zeebrugge on the 6th and 7th October, too late to save Antwerp, and were moved to Ghent. This city was certain to be the next to be attacked by the Germans after the fall of Antwerp, and there was little time or manpower to put it into any form of defensive state. There were only some burgerwacht militia, some cavalry detachments, and some small units of infantry who had been sent there to recuperate after Liege.
Joffre also realised the importance of the Belgian coastal locations to both British and German fleets, and he ordered a brigade of Marins Fusiliers, under General Ronarc’h, to move to the defence of the city. Unfortunately, they only arrived in Flanders on the 8th October, too late to make a difference.
By the end of the 1st October, the position at Antwerp was looking increasingly dangerous for the beleaguered Belgians. The first defence lines had been pierced by the German attack, and several of the forts had been destroyed and lost. The Belgian infantry had fallen back to a line behind the Nete. On the 3rd, the government left the city, and moved to Oostende. It was the beginning of the end.
However, the defence held out, under tremendous pressure on all fronts. The British 1st Marine Brigade marched to Lier on the 4th October, where the during the previous night the Germans had taken Fort Kessel, and took up positions in the firing line. It was coincidence that the Germans had chosen the area between Lier and Duffel for the next days assault.
The next day, the Germans suffered a shock at the hands of the British, as their infantry advance to was cut down by rifle fire. Nonetheless, they got four battalions across the Nete, by using a hastily-constructed trestle bridge. It is said that at one point, the Germans were able to cross by means of a bridge that had naturally formed from the bodies of their dead. Both Belgians and British fell back, as their positions were in danger of being surrounded. The Belgian 1st and 3rd divisions clung bravely on to the Nete positions until the last possible moment, but withdrawal became urgent and inevitable. The losses were heavy: the 1st division now had only 4,800 effective men. The German 1st Ersatz Brigade captured the banks of the Scheldt to the west of the city and, two days later, completed the capture of Schoonaarde. This latter position was potentially of immense importance, as it threatened the coastal corridor, and the route of the Belgian withdrawal.
Belgian GHQ, in conference with Churchill, proposed to evacuate the entire army to the west bank of the Scheldt on the night of the 7th October. A small force would be left behind to cover the retreat, consisting of the garrison of the remaining forts, units of the 2nd Division under General Dossin, and the three British brigades of the Royal Naval Division. They would hold positions at the older fortress line, now in the outer suburbs of the city, for as long as possible. The general move westwards was fraught with the danger of a German attack towards the coast cutting the army in two. There was by now only a thin corridor, 100 kilometers long, stretching towards Oostende and beyond into the Westhoek, along which the Belgians could move. The roads were narrow, and poor, built on dikes across the soft polder land. The move would be slow, and vulnerable.
The 1st and 5th divisions disengaged in the late evening of the 7th, and crossed the bridges over the wide river to the left bank. But as a consequence of the German threat from the direction of Schoonaarde, no rest was allowed and the march continued westwards. It was on this evening that the British 7th Division took up positions at Brugge, before being moved forward to hold Ghent while the Belgian retreat continued. There was still no news of the French Marins Fusiliers.
King Albert and Queen Elisabeth reluctantly left Antwerp, and moving via Eekloo and Brugge, they took up residence in the royal chalet at Oostende.
Von Beseler now believed the time had come to finish off the Belgians in Antwerp. During the evening of the 7th, he sent the Spanish military representative to General Deguise, with an order to capitulate or be destroyed. The order was rejected.
At midnight, the deliberate bombardment of the old city began. The first shell fell in the southern suburb of Berchem, killing a boy, and wounding his mother and sister. The next blew the head off a street-sweeper as he ran for shelter. Shells fell at five a minute. Most of them were shrapnel, designed to kill and frighten, rather than to destroy buildings. During the next few days, some 500,000 civilians would leave the city, in the directions of Ghent, Oostende, and Holland. Every road out of the city was solid with refugees. A war correspondent reported seeing a crowd of at least 150,000 queuing to cross to the left bank of the Scheldt by the few pontoon bridges and ferries. It was said that some unscrupulous ferry owners were charging 20 francs a head to cross.
At dawn, 8th October, the German infantry began a fresh assault, on the older fortress line. The 305mm and 420mm mortars had been moved up, and opened up on the old brick forts. Even before dawn Forts 1,2 and 4 were reported to have fallen. Approximately at the same hour, the French 87th Territorial Division detrained at Poperinge and moved forward to take up positions near Ypres. By this time, the first British marine brigade had been strengthened by the addition of two further brigades, similarly untrained and lightly equipped, making up the Royal Naval Division. They were by now positioned on the old fort line between Forts 2 and 7, and were right in the middle of the German fire.
During the evening, the brigades of the Royal Naval Division were ordered to withdraw. Not all of the units received the orders, and there was some confusion. One of the problems was the incredible congestion on the few roads heading north-west, as thousands of refugees moved in the same direction. It was impossible even for signal runners to move back and forth between headquarters and front line units. The 1st Naval Brigade suffered badly from confused orders and the chaotic condition of the roads. Eventually, they made their way to St Gilles Waes, where a train had been sent to evacuate them. Unfortunately, the Germans were attacking now at Moerbeke, just down the line. The men were in no condition to fight. They were ordered to march across the Dutch frontier, three miles to the north, where some 1,500 of them were disarmed and interned. One battalion, the Portsmouth Battalion of the RMLI, went by another route to Kemseke, the next station down the line. While there they fought with advance units of the 37th Landwehr Brigade. About half eventually got away, and finally did get a train at Zelzate. The remainder, plus some 400 Belgians, surrendered at Kemseke. Deguise ordered the remained of the 2nd Division to concentrate around Fort St Marie, to make last stand. The few remaining forts on the right bank were ordered to hold out to the last man.
The bombardment on the city increased. Countless buildings were on fire, with the local fire brigades powerless to help as the Germans had captured the city’s water pumping works at Walem some days previously. Their task was not helped by a strong wind, fanning the flames among the old buildings. On the left bank, Belgian troops set the huge oil storage tanks ablaze, to prevent the precious fluid from falling into German hands. Pitiful sights were presented as tens of thousands of the people of Antwerp fled to the west. They crossed the river by hastily erected pontoons, and on small river craft of all sizes. Many of these people had already fled from areas to the east and south, from Liege, Brussels, Leuven and Hasselt.
The last forts were overcome only as late as the 10th October, and the remnants of the Deguise’s headquarters and the 2nd Division surrendered at Fort St Marie. 25,000 Belgian troops, finding themselves isolated on the left bank and surrounded by the Germans crossed the border into Zeeuwse Vlaanderen, the part of the Netherlands south of the Scheldt, where they were interned until the end of the war.
In a final effort to round up the Belgian troops still in the city, the Germans advanced. Von Beseler triumphantly entered the city - but he received a bitter shock. For the only party that officially received him and surrendered the city was a delegation of council officials. The Belgian field army had melted away; most of the fortress troops had escaped into Holland. The Belgian army would fight another day. As Von Beseler ruefully remarked, as 60,000 German troops marched into the city, for all their effort and not inconsiderable losses in front of Antwerp, all he got was ‘ein solche Festung und kein General’.
In all, some 2,600 British troops were lost at Antwerp. Only 7 officers and 50 men were killed, but 138 were wounded, 936 became prisoners of war, and 1,479 were interned in the Netherlands.
By the 9th October, the bulk of the Belgian field army, with the remnants of the British RND, were on the west bank of the Ghent - Terneuzen canal. They desperately needed rest, and of course their position in terms of supply of food, ammunition and other supplies was dreadful. The main supply depots of the army had fallen into German hands, and the railways, apart from the coastal lines and the areas around Brugge and the Westhoek, had also fallen. Intelligence showed that the Bavarian cavalry were on the move westwards, and that a column of at least 20,000 infantry was moving on Kortrijk and Menen. Joffre requested that the Belgians move south-westwards in the direction of Deinze and Thielt. It was Foch that planned to organise French resistance on the line Menen - Ypres - Diksmuide - Nieuwpoort. The Belgians agreed to fall back on to the Yser, the last possible defence line in Belgium. The British IV Corps covered their move, and took up positions at Roeselare, before eventually forming up on a defensive line in front of Ypres.
On the 14th, Belgian engineers began to prepare
the defence line on the Yser. The Germans were never able to penetrate this
defence, and for four more years, this was the Belgian army’s calvary.
The position on the Yser : last stand
The River Yser formed a natural defensive obstacle facing
the Germans in Belgium, just as the Gete and the Nete had before. But here,
in the north-west corner of Belgium known as the Westhoek, the landscape was
totally different. The flat coastal area, known locally as ‘Bachten de Kupe’ is
woven through with a network of tiny drainage canals, for this is reclaimed
land, or polder. The water level is just below the surface, and is regulated
by the canals, and a widespread system of sluices and pumps. The head of this
system was at Nieuwpoort, where the Yser meets the sea, and where several important
transportation canals join.In the Westhoek, there were only two possible lines
of defence, which were the Yser, which is canalised for much of its length,
and the embankment of the Nieuwpoort - Diksmuide railway. The minor heights
of the canal and railway embankments gave dominance in such flat country. The
occupants could observe for many miles. The only other heights of any consequence
were the high dunes around Lombardsijde, a small rise at Klerken near Diksmuide,
and the Flemish hills, several miles to the south-west behind Ypres. The Belgians,
in holding the embankments, were in a very strong position. The weak points
in their front were the bridges over the Yser at - from north to south - St
Joris, Schoorbakke and Tervate.Diksmuide lay some twelve miles to the south
of Nieuwpoort. It was of enormous importance, as the town formed a bridgehead
on the eastern side of the river. Holding it gave the Belgians a starting point
should the allies advance. The town was typical of West Flanders, possessing
a mediaeval market square, with a beautiful 15th Century town hall and many
churches. As the Belgian divisions fell back, they took up defensive positions
on the Yser and turned to the important task of fortifying the embankments.
· The 2nd Division, under General Dossin, occupied the most northerly positions. They had advanced posts at Lombardsijde, on the Ketsbrug and at Mannekensvere.
· The 1st Division came next, occupying important positions around Schoorbakke,
with posts at Sint-Pieters-Kapelle and Zevekote.
· The 4th Division, heroes of Namur, held the Tervate bridge, and placed
posts at Keiem and Beerst.
· The 6th Division occupied the line of the Ieperlee canal, as far south
as Boesinghe. They were relieved here on the 18th October by units of the French
89th Division, and moved into reserve at Lampernisse, which is directly behind
Diksmuide. The 5th Division were also in reserve.
· The 3rd Division were held in reserve at Wulpen, on the Nieuwpoort-Veurne
canal.
GHQ and King Albert had taken up residence in Veurne, the regional capital of the intensively farmed area of the northern border with France, known for centuries as the Veurne-Ambacht.To the south, the Territorial 87th Division of the French army, occupying the canal line as far as Ypres. Beyond them, falling back from Roeselare, the British 7th Division. And also falling back from Antwerp and Ghent, the Marins Fusiliers of Admiral Ronarc’h were taking up positions outside Diksmuide. The cavalry of De Witte worked in conjunction with the French cavalry of de Mitry, in the area of Houthulst and Staden.
On the German side, an overwhelming superiority of manpower and artillery was
being amassed in front of Diksmuide and Ypres. The 22nd, 23rd, 24th and 25th
Reserve Korps were being brought up by train, forming part of the 4th Army under
Albrecht of Wurttemburg. The 6th Bavarian Reserve Korps took up positions south-east
of Ypres. The 3rd Reserve Korps, which since the 15th October had been in occupation
of Oostende, moved along the coast towards Westende.
18th October
The battle opened on 18th October, with a heavy bombardment all along the Belgian lines, followed by German infantry probing into the forward defences. The first serious clash occurred when a group of Belgian cyclists and lancers were shelled out of Sint Pieters Kapelle, lying a little east of Schore. After a fierce, two hour combat, the German infantry moved into the ruins of the hamlet.At 9am on the same morning, the Belgian 2nd Division made first contact with the attacking forces of the 3rd Reserve Korps just to the east of Westende. The attack here threatened to break through, but was brought to a shattering standstill by heavy shelling from British warships lying off the coast. For during the night of the 17th/18th October, Admiral Hood had brought up three monitors, the HMS’s Severn, Humber and Mersey. (These ships were flat-bottomed and with a very shallow draught, being originally designed for the Brazilian navy operating in the estuary waters of the Amazon. They were heavily armoured, and carried two 6-inch guns and two 4.7-inch howitzers each, in addition to machine guns. Later, when attacked by torpedo, they avoided destruction, as German torpedoes generally travelled at a depth of around twelve feet. The monitors drew only four feet.) The Germans, shocked, withdrew to Oostende. The naval shelling causes great losses among men and horses. Over the next days of the battle, the Royal Navy played a key part, keeping the coastal strip under constant fire, causing casualties and disruption to German operations. For example, on the 23rd, a Royal Navy flotilla bombarded German positions in Oostende, following an unsuccessful attempt by a German submarine on the destroyers HMS’s Wildfire and Myrmidon. A British naval balloon, moored beyond German shelling at Koksijde, directed operations.Further inland, and beyond the range of the monitors, the villages of Leke, Schore and Schoorbakke received their baptism of fire from the German heavy artillery. At Mannekensvere, the Belgian 7th Linie held on under fire all day, but were forced to withdraw in the evening. They counterattacked with the bayonet the following morning, but were brought to a halt by the weight and accuracy of the shelling.The advance posts of the 4th Division at Keiem were lost to units of the 6th Reserve Division, but the 8th and 13th Linie attacked and recovered them at the point of the bayonet. The 6th Division were ordered to thin the ranks holding out further south to provide reinforcements at Keiem, and at other posts under similar threat. The position was increasingly precarious, and the Germans threatened to engulf the Belgian positions on the right bank of the Yser, north of Diksmuide. The 4th Division committed its last reserves to assist the defence of the bridge at Tervate, and the 3rd Division were committed to strengthen the defences in front of Nieuwpoort. At this point, the French came to the assistance of the Belgians by relieving the 6th Division on the Ieperlee. The line held by the 40,000 effective men of the Belgian field army was reduced to 28km.To the south of Diksmuide, there was much better news. The right wing was firmly held by the cavalry of de Witte and de Mitry, from Kortemark to Roeselare.
19th October
On the 19th, the Germans doubled their efforts to smash the Belgians and move forward along the coast into France. The village of Schore was seen as being of immense tactical importance, as the river bend between Schoorbakke and Tervate could be attacked from the flank if it could be taken.The Belgians, incredibly enough, planned a serious counterattack. Leaving a brigade of the 3rd Division to hold the Diksmuide bridgehead, they would move the 5th Division, together with the French Marins Fusiliers, via Vladslo and Beerst, north-east towards Torhout. At the same time, the French and Belgian combined cavalry would make a daring sweep to Torhout. But it was not to be, for shortly after the infantry took up positions, Keiem fell again, and the 13th Linie had to quit Beerst (between Diksmuide and Keiem).The Marins Fusiliers, however, continued with their part of the counterattack plan. They quickly captured Vladslo and pushed the Germans back out of Beerst, with the help of two battalions of the 4th Division.To the north, Belgian pilots had spotted German pioneers making strongpoints at the St Joris bridgehead.
20th October
The Germans now began to attack the last of the forward posts. General von Beseler ordered a breakthrough between Mannekensvere and Schoorbakke. He assembled three divisions (5th and 6th Reserve, and 4th Ersatz) for the task. They, including all of their associated artillery, would face three Linie regiments, the 5th, 6th and 9th. Under this overwhelming pressure, the 9th Linie had to give up the fortified position of Bamburg farm, just east of the sluice complex at Nieuwpoort, which had held the German attempts over the last two days. Once that had gone, the German artillery turned its weight onto the canals and Lombardsijde. Gradually, the Belgian hold east of the Yser began to slip.The heavy 210mm howitzers, recently brought up from Antwerp, now opened up on the sector between St Joris and Schoorbakke. Huge columns of water went up as shells fell in the Yser, and men died, buried by tens of feet of debris, when they fell in the trenches. The German troops, massed in Mannekensvere, moved forward. They were beaten off, countless times, by spirited Belgian small arms fire. Schoorbakke held.
Diksmuide under fire
The same day, a furious battle raged outside Diksmuide. The German 44th Division, under General von Dorrer, recaptured Beerst, from where, at 8am, he opened fire on the trenches surrounding the town. The bridgehead was still held by one brigade under General Meiser, consisting of the 11th and 12th Linie. The latter, under Colonel Jacques, covered the three roads into the town, from Beerst, Esen and Woumen. Meiser had in all 71 field guns. Six weakened companies of the 11th Linie, together with two machine gun sections, formed the only reserves. The Marins Fusiliers held the trenches on the left bank of the river on both sides of the road to Kaaskerke and the coast. Admiral Ronarc’h had taken the railway station as his battle headquarters. Just on the town side of the bridge, the roof of the Minoterie gave good observation over the ruins of the town. To their left, units of the 4th Division, also occupying the far river bank and the hamlet of Oud Stuivekenskerke. (At this village, Belgian engineers had fortified the tower of a church, and its 10 feet height gave excellent observation over the river area). To the right, the 3rd Jagers.Between 9am and 10am on the morning of the 20th, the Germans of the 43rd and 44th Divisions advanced, behind an artillery barrage. The town was quickly reduced to ruins, many houses burning to the ground. A strong wind fanned the flames along the narrow streets, and the town hall and churches were badly damaged. The first fighting took place shortly after midday, in the area of the Handzamevaart canal between Diksmuide and Esen. By 4pm, the Belgian position in the bridgehead was becoming untenable, as the Germans captured the trenches around the town. Hand to hand fighting took place as the 11th Linie, later added to by the Marins Fusiliers, recaptured them. A second attack now followed, but again the 11th Linie held it off. The bridgehead held. The Germans renewed the bombardment of the town. In the dusk, the petrol tanks went up, and the horizon glowed red. The holocaust continued all through the next day, and the one after that. Colonel Jaques was wounded for the second time, and command of the bridgehead devolved on Lieut-Col Sults. The Belgians beat off countless infantry attacks, and fought trench by trench to hold on to the town. Both sides suffered very heavy casualties.On the 21st, King Albert moved GHQ to La Panne, where it was to stay until the last days of the war.
Joffre went to meet with him, and explained that the 42nd Division under General
Grossetti, that had fought on the Marne, was presently on its way to Veurne.
The French troops north of Ypres were to be formed into the Detachement d’Armee
de Belgique, under General d’Urbal.Tervate bridgeEarly
in the morning of the 22nd October, the headquarters staff of the German 6th
Reserve Division were brought startling news : ‘we’ve crossed
the Yser’!. It was true : the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 26th Reserve
Regiment of Infantry had, under cover of dark, quietly crossed by a temporary
footbridge at Tervate. Not a shot had been fired at them. They rapidly deployed
a large force into the bridgehead they had created. The Belgians organised
several counterattacks during the 22nd, but all were beaten off.Just to the
north, at Schoorbakke, the conditions remained much the same as the previous
day, with German attacks repulsed, despite strong artillery support.Belgian
attacks recovered Lombardsijde and Bamburg Farm.On the 23rd, at last, the 42nd
Division arrived to strengthen the garrison of Nieuwpoort. Fighting continued
all along the front. The Germans repeated attacks at Nieuwpoort, Schoorbakke,
and Diksmuide. They reinforced the tiny bridgehead at Tervate.
By the 24th, Belgian resistance was deteriorating due to the exhaustion of
the troops and lack of ammunition. The only reinforcements that had been forthcoming
were the French 42nd Division. On this day, there were 15 separate infantry
attacks at Diksmuide alone, and the exceptionally heavy bombardment continued
to reduce the town to rubble. But the Belgians held on. On the 26th, they were
at last reinforced by two Senegalese divisions.
The flooding of the polders
For some time, the Belgian engineers had been considering an alternative, somewhat drastic form of defence, suitable only in this low lying country. The whole area was intersected with canals and ditches : the possibility existed of artificially raising the water level, and flooding the fields to a depth to render the Germans incapable of offensive operations. (The Belgians had also prepared some of the river bank areas of Antwerp for this eventuality). The engineering operations required for such a task entailed damming the 22 culverts that ran below the Nieuwpoort - Diksmuide railway embankment, and then opening the main sluices at the canal complex at Nieuwpoort. This was a very complex plan, as it depended on the right tides, force and direction of wind, and the feasibility of opening the old sluice of Veurne. The latter consisted of two gates which needed to be held open constantly, with one set of ebb-tide doors free to move with the rise and fall of the water. At the other sluices, the doors and gates had to be operated manually (they are now electric and automatic). There was a full moon on 29th October : this was known to create the right tidal conditions for the operation, so set the timetable. The operations began as early as the 21st October, when the overflow of the Old Yser was opened. The Noordvaart - Old Yser syphon was at the same time closed to avoid flooding the area occupied by the 2nd Division.
German pressure was such that Foch briefly considered similar flooding operations east of Dunkirk, on the 25th. The next day, the first attempt to open the old sluice of Veurne failed. Two days later on the 28th, a second attempt succeeded, and the waters began slowly to rise. At 7.30pm on the 29th, the Noordvaart was also temporarily opened to take advantage of the high tides; this operation was repeated on the 30th.
While these aquatic operations were in hand, the German pressure continued. The Belgians were forced to withdraw from St George’s, over the Noordvaart, and by the 26th they had taken up positions at Ramskapelle, on the embankment south of Nieuwpoort. This withdrawal was undertaken, of course, in the knowledge that the waters were going to rise. The last troops across were moving through inches deep water. By this time, Belgian ammunition stocks were desperate: the field guns were down to their last 100 rounds. King Albert was advised by Foch to withdraw from the Yser area, to take up a position behind the Veurne - Ypres canal. This he refused to do. It is easy to speculate his rationale: it meant effectively giving up the last portion of Belgian territory; it also assumed the flooding operations were going to fail.
Despite the rising waters, the Germans advanced on Ramskapelle, and penetrated into the ruins of the village, only to be repulsed at the point of the bayonet by a mixed Franco-Belgian counterattack.
The few Belgian troops still holding the river banks quietly withdrew over
the 24th to 27th October, as the waters rose. On the 31st, the German once again
attacked at Ramskapelle, but were thwarted by strong Belgian resistance and
the sheer impossibility of operating in these conditions. Following this failure,
the Germans closed down offensive operations on the Yser, and turned their attentions
to Ypres. The Belgians still held Belgium.
The Belgian army held the Yser until the end of the war. Fighting no great offensives - other than those mentioned below - it nonetheless maintained a very aggressive stance; raids on German positions were frequent. The army, incredibly, grew in size after 1914. Belgians who were resident outside Belgium joined those escaping internment or returning from hospital, swelling the ranks to over 300,000 men at the peak. The army was fed and clothed by the French and British, who also supplied all ammunition and armaments.
In April, 1915, the Germans launched an attack on the northern sector of the Ypres salient, using for the first time poison gas. They succeeded in breaking through the French territorial and Algerian divisions holding that part of the line, and while on the right the Canadians of the BEF bravely held, on the left the Germans got as far as the canal bank at Steenstraat. The Belgians played a very significant part in ensuring that they got no further, despite desperate fighting over the next weeks. Once again, the French played little part in assisting the Belgians, failing time and again to organise counterattacks that would relieve the pressure at the canal, and which threatened the rest of the salient.
Later, in 1917 as the British pushed towards Passchendaele and Houthulst, the Belgians were in support.
In 1918, King Albert became commander of the allied armies in the north, under the unified command of Foch. He organised the blow against the Germans in the sector that forced them back beyond Brugge. It was fitting indeed that things were organised such that he could make triumphant entries into Brugge, and shortly afterwards, into Brussels itself, together with Queen Elisabeth.
Summary
The six divisions of the Belgian army, the worst-prepared of all those engaged in 1914 in the fighting in the West, had played a major part in the decisive defeat of the Germans.
The delays and losses suffered by the Germans in battling through Belgium had enormous consequences on the rest of the war, and arguably on the outcome of the war.
The delays and disorganisation created in part by the resistance at Liege, Namur, along the Gette and in the forays from Antwerp:
· allowed
the BEF to take up an advanced position at Mons, and inflict an important loss
and delay;
· allowed the defence of Paris to be organised, under Gallieni;
· created disharmony between Von Bulow and Von Kluck and lead to their
convergent move southwards
· allowed Joffre to bring together the units of Manoury’s Sixth
Army, who struck the counter-blow on the Marne.
The stiff resistance at Antwerp and on the Yser diverted German attention from breaking through the British and French at Ypres, and helped therefore to create the Salient.
The flooding of the polder country denied the Germans any possibility of a strong breakthrough along the coast, with its potential for rolling up the Allied line from the North.
Whilst the Belgians fought no major action once the lines had stabilised along the Yser, they played their part in providing diversionary actions in support of virtually every British and French attack. They held on at Lizerne during Second Ypres. And, in the advance of 1918, they broke German resistance at Houthulst and triumphantly recaptured Bruges.
The Belgian army suffered heavy casualties during the Great War. Belgium itself was shattered: its towns badly damaged, its people treated cruelly; its economic wealth almost irreparably destroyed.
Remembering the army of brave little Belgium, 1914.