Well researched from original sources, well ordered and well argued. The strategic, operational and tactical issues are explored. It shows Haig, Rawlinson and some Corps commanders to have been slow to learn at the very least. Using examples of actions, recorded testimony, orders, statistics and diaries, it concludes that most of our losses were the result poor planning, precipitate haste, and lack of grip.

Even allowing for the limitations of 1916 technology, the soldiers performed well and beat the Germans when they were given adequate fire support. Tragically these few occasions are shown to have often occurred by chance or in spite of interference or contrary orders from higher command.

Haig presents as a wishful thinker, who issued muddled orders and yet failed along with Rawlinson, his subordinate, to analyse the reasons for failing to achieve expectations, without resorting to blaming the soldiers. Even Horne (XV corps) is quoted as having said he could not see the value of a creeping barrage. An indictment. A scholarly work. 358 pages, maps and photos adequate.

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