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| The
Campaign on the Western Front
: 8-11
August 1918 |
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| Why
here, why now? Background to this battle |
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On
24 July 1918, while the
Second Battle of the Marne was still underway, General
Foch held
a conference at Bonbon Chateau near Melun with
Haig, Pétain and Pershing, at which he outlined a
plan to clear three railways which were vital
to lateral troop movements across the Western Front.
Two
were in the Eastern sector of the front; one the Amiens
- Paris railway which was behind the British Fourth
Army front.
At a second meeting on 26 July
that also included Generals Rawlinson and Debeney, the
plan was further discussed. Foch's idea was similar to
a suggestion that Rawlinson had already made to Haig
soon
after the Battle of Hamel: to disengage the Paris - Amiens
railway and push forward in the direction of Roye. Indeed
Haig had instructed Rawlinson to prepare detailed plans
on 17 July.
The
operation would be undertaken by the British Fourth
Army and the French First Army, the latter
coming under British command. They faced the German Second
Army under General von der Marwitz, which consisted of
14 Divisions, of which British intelligence reckoned 4
to be unfit for battle. Haig gave the distant town of
Ham as the general objective of the attack.
The
overall tactical plan was for an advance to the the
old
Outer Amiens Defence Line (which coincided approximately
with the Hangest - Caix - Harbonnieres - Méricourt
position), after which units of the Cavalry Corps with
fast Whippet tanks would pass through towards the line
Roye
- Chaulnes.
The Canadian Corps were to maintain touch with
the French and advance south-westerly; the Australian
Corps on their left would move easterly; III
Corps
on the River Somme valley would advance along it, while
their 47th Division would pin
down and neutralise German units around Albert.
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| The
British Order of Battle: Fourth
Army |
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| Cavalry
Corps : 1st, 2nd
and 3rd Cavalry Divisions
III
Corps : 12th Division, 18th
Division, 58th Division, and
the 130th and 131st Infantry Regiments
of the 33rd American Division.
Canadian
Corps : 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions, and
32nd Division
Australian
Corps : 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Australian Divisions,
and 17th Division
This
action includes the subsequent Actions round Damery, fought
by the four Canadian Divisions, on 15
- 17 August.
Note
: the American 131st Regiment transferred to the Australian
Corps on 9 August. |
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| The
enemy |
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The
German army had suffered very serious losses in its Spring
campaigns and was now being badly hurt on the Marne. 13%
of its artillery had been destroyed during July alone, and
losses from Allied air raids had also been heavy.
At
this time, Allied intelligence reckoned that the enemy
had 141 Divisions on the Western Front line of which 78
were unfit, plus 60 in reserve (28 unfit). This compares
with the 208 battle-ready Divisions the Germans had had
on 24 May. In comparison, the Allies had 120 Divisions
in the front line, with a further 55 in reserve. Of these,
39 British Divisions were in the front line and 12 in
reserve. 7 American Divisions were now in the front line
and another 11 in reserve. All British Divisions were
now considered battle-ready again after receiving reinforcements
following the battering of the Spring months. The Allies
had regained numerical advantage.

The
enemy had also deteriorated in fighting condition:
on
1 July 1918, the standard
size of a German battalion was cut from 980 to 800 as
a result of manpower shortage; 54% of reinforcements
they received in the first seven months of 1918 were
returned
wounded, and 32% were boys of the 1919 class. British
artillery by now had achieved tactical dominance over
the enemy, through plentiful ammunition and superior
counter-battery tactics. In addition, the Royal Air
Force had achieved
air superiority too. Despite all of this, the enemy remained
a formidable opponent.
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| Preparation
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Henry
Rawlinson, in command of Fourth Army, chose to employ nine
Divisions supported by 400 tanks in the initial assault.
Great efforts were made to maintain secrecy, especially
in concealing the presence of the Canadian Corps,
which had not been involved in fighting for some time. Some
Canadian units were sent to Ypres, and Canadian wireless
traffic was maintained in Flanders to deceive the enemy.
On
29 July, formal operation
orders were issued, which required the line Hangest - Caix
- Harbonnieres
- Méricourt to be achieved. The French units would operate
south of the Amiens - Roye road, the British north. The
5th
Australian Division carried out a successful minor operation
south of Morlancourt, before the Australian Corps extended
7,000 yards southward, taking over the front that would
actually be the start position for the Canadians. The latter
arrived in the rear areas by 4 August.
The strength of the Fourth Army increased to over 441,000
men. It also had the benefit of the field artillery of the
25th Division and the 5th Canadian
Division, and 13 additional Brigades of Heavy artillery.
The Tank Corps provided 342 heavy tanks, 72 Whippets and
120 supply tanks.
Behind
the Fourth Army front, immense preparations were made
on
the lines of communication, with new railways, dumps, water
supplies and many other preparations being made. Labour
work would halt at zero and all men be in readiness to
move
up behind the advance to put roads in a state of repair.
Two Casualty Clearing Stations were made available to
each
Corps, and three other for specialist cases made ready,
along with ten Ambulance Trains ready to move casualties
towards the coast. Prisoner of War cages were also built.
During
the nights when the attacking units assembled, German gas
shelling was persistent, and on 7
August 25 tanks were destroyed by a heavy enemy bombardment.
Soon after dawn on 6th August, a heavy raid on units of
the 58th and 18th
Divisions near Morlancourt led to a loss of ground 800
yards deep, with some 236 men being taken prisoner. None
gave anything away about the imminent attack. Zero hour
was fixed for 4.20am on 8 August.
The
German command received reports of additional noise of movement
and even of 100 British tanks seen in the vicinity of Moreuil,
but did nothing. On 4 August,
Ludendorff said that there was "nothing to justify
this apprehension, provided our troops are vigilant and
do their duty". |
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Battle
Tactics |
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The
artillery prepared with minimum registration, and laid
down a fearsome creeping barrage. The assaulting infantry
was deployed in great depth. Leading battalions were arrayed
into 5 waves; the first guided the tanks and moved in
two lines 30 yards apart. The leading units were supposed
to stay close to the barrage, but the fog and smoke was
so thick that in many places men could not see, only hear,
the shell explosions. The second, third and fourth moved
in single file, in small sections each thirty to sixty
yards apart. Machine-guns, trench mortars and signals
parties went with the fourth wave. At first they would
follow tapes, laid out the night before, leading up to
less than 300 yards from the front enemy positions. Behind
came battalions in larger groups, disposed in a diamond,
mopping up stragglers, neutralising strongpoints and taking
prisoners into captivity.
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| Battle
Conditions |
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| Thick
mist in the Avre and Luce valleys assisted the initial advance,
but made keeping direction difficult. It cleared in most places
by midday. |
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| How
the battle went |
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8
August 1918 Canadian
Corps: The Corps covered the area between the Amiens
- Roye road, and the Amiens - Chaulnes railway line. 3rd
Canadian
Division on the right, attacking across the ravines of
the Luce valley, achieved all objectives by 11am, despite
heavy
fighting near Hangard cemetery. Only 8 of the machines
of the 5th Battalion, the Tank Corps survived the action,
out
of 19. 1st Canadian Division on their left captured Aubercourt
before being involved in heavy fighting for Hangard Wood.
A little further on at Morgemont Wood, the enemy broke
and
ran. By 11am the Division was in Cayeux, with 11 of 18
tanks. The 2nd Canadian Division followed a 'magnificent'
barrage
and captured Marcelcave with surprising ease, and by 9.20am
was in Wiencourt. Only 4 of their tanks were lost. By noon
the Santerre plateau was quiet, with masses of men and
equipment
moving forward; the leading infantry were already beyond
the cover of their own field artillery. Few German guns
were still firing. On the extreme right, the Canadian Cavalry
Brigade moved up to cover the flank on the Amiens - Roye
road.
They captured Beaucourt but ran into resistance at Le Quesnel;
other units entered Cayeux Wood, and moved beyond Caix
and
Guillaucourt. The 4th Canadian Division moved up and passed
through the assault units, advancing the line further.
By
day's end the Corps had captured all its objectives with
the exception of ground near Le Quesnel.
Australian
Corps: The Corps covered the area between the Amiens
- Chaulnes railway, and the Somme. 2nd Division attacked
on the right,
with 23 tanks. They advanced into feeble opposition, and
had difficulty only as a result of the bad visibility.
They
reached first objectives by 7.10am, having lost 4 tanks
to mines and direct shell hits. The 3rd Division attacked
along the Somme valley, with 24 tanks, in very thick fog.
Near the river, the 11th Brigade had to move through deep
mud, reeds and other undergrowth. The advance could not
keep up with the barrage in such conditions, although this
risk was negated by good work by the tanks in quelling
enemy
strongpoints, and in feeble and wild fire by the Germans.
By 7am, the two attacking Brigades were on their objective,
having captured many hundreds of prisoners and guns. The
54th and 4th Australian Divisions passed through as planned
at about 8.20am. By 1.30am the Corps had captured all its
objectives, except at the flanks with the neighbouring
Corps.
A strong feature of the second part of the advance was
the coordination of infantry and artillery with Cavalry
units,
tanks and armoured cars. The Royal Air Force also played
a large part, especially in harassing retreating German
units.
III
Corps: The British Corps had the difficult objective
of capturing the high ground North of the Somme, to cover
the flank of the advancing Australians. In terms of distance,
this was a more modest objective than those set for South
of the river, but the ground was far more complex and difficult,
especially for tanks. All Divisions of the Corps had been
heavily depleted during the year, and were now largely composed
of young soldiers, with relatively few experienced NCOs
and officers. The 58th and 18th
Divisions attacked, and despite thick fog and the very
recent arrival in position of some of its units, at first
advanced easily. By 9.30am the 58th had captured Sailly
Lorette and had an excellent view of Chipilly, 2500 yards
over the next spur. On the left the 18th Division, attacking
without the aid of tanks, ran into strong resistance. |
| [The
details of fighting on the next days will follow soon]. |
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| Casualties |
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| The
total British casualties amounted to just over 22,200
of all ranks, killed, wounded and missing. Cavalry Corps
losses were 887 (of which 101 died); III Corps 6,250 (4,012);
Canadian Corps 9,074 (2,266), and Australian Corps 5,991
(850). German losses were approximately 74,000. |
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| Was
it worth it? |
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| 'The
Black Day of the German Army':
First Quartermaster-General Ludendorff The
material losses and ground lost would hardly seem to justify
Ludendorff's gloomy summary. However, he was referring to
the fact that whole units had surrendered to very small
forces; that officers seem to have lost control and the
confidence of their men. He 'could no more even think of
long and successful resistance in the attrition of defensive
battles'. It was the beginning of the end for Germany. |
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| Mythology |
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| Nine
assaulting Divisions; the same as 1st July 1916, on a similar
frontage. A great victory, planned and executed most professionally
and thoroughly - and all but forgotten.
By
August 1918, the British army was confident. It had defeated
the great German attacks, and it was believed that the Kaiser
had shot his bolt. The ranks were by now largely composed
of young men, mostly conscripts. After the war, it was the
Germans who composed mythology: that the 400 tanks in thick
fog had overwhelmed them.
Just
before the battle, out-of-touch British CIGS Henry
Wilson issued a memorandum on "British Military
Policy 1918-1919", in which he suggested conserving
forces for an assault to begin on 1 July 1919. But both
before and especially after this great success of 8 August
and succeeding days, it was Douglas
Haig that began to sense the possibility of victory
in 1918. |
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From
the photographic archive of the Imperial War Museum, with
permission: A crowd of German prisoners taken by the Fourth
Army in the Battle of Amiens, near Abbeville.
Photograph
by Second Lieutenant D McLellan on 27 August 1918. IWM negative
Q9271. |
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