The Long, Long Trail

The decision to attack in Flanders

Haig had entertained the idea of a strategic attack in Flanders for a considerable time but was unable to do anything while the French-influenced Somme and Arras took precedence in 1916 and spring 1917. The French army was in poor shape by mid 1917 but it is not true to say that there was French pressure to launch a Flanders attack in order to deflect German attention. France did, however, continually pressurise Britain to take more of the workload on the Western Front regardless of the shape it took and ultimately this may have been the deciding factor in David Lloyd George giving assent to the offensive. Strictly, the decision was taken by the War Policy Committee which consisted of Lloyd George, Andrew Bonar Law and Lords Curzon and Milner. The chief military adviser to the Committee was the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir William Robertson. The latter was not keen on a great strategic attack in Flanders but was utterly opposed to Lloyd George's fanciful alternative idea of a campaign in Italy.

 

Decision for an offensive in Flanders
Haig: presses for opportunity for a British offensive in Flanders	Lloyd George : does not trust Generals; notions of campaign in Italy	Robertson : does not trust DLG; reluctantly sides with Haig

The War Policy Committee, faced with Haig's plan for a grand offensive designed to break out of the Ypres salient and to capture the entire Belgian coast, demurred. They gave assent only to the first phase: as long as that succeeded, they would endorse continuation. In the event, Lloyd George and the War Policy Committee failed to monitor progress or question what was happening closely enough. It was not that they approved or halted subsequent phases; they did nothing at all until it was far too late.

 

---

Strategic plan for the battle

Planning for a Flanders campaign had initially been undertaken by Second Army under Herbert Plumer as long ago as November 1916. "Daddy" Plumer and his chief of staff Charles "Tim" Harington were popular with Divisions that came under their command. They were methodical in planning and took few risks. They had also been in occupation of the Ypres area since 1915 and knew every feature. (Their "magnum opus" at Messines in June 1917 was a triumph and typical of their approach. But this was in the future). Plumer submitted a detailed plan for the capture of the Messines and Pilkem ridges, essential first steps to a greater attack. Haig was disappointed: this would not achieve the clearance of the enemy from Belgium. He asked Fourth Army commander Henry Rawlinson to consider the task on the basis that he would be in charge of the northern part of the attack with Plumer to the south. Rawlinson, another proponent of a cautious "bite and hold" approach, could not come up with a better plan. Both Plumer and Rawlinson called for just about every piece of heavy artillery the BEF had in France even to achieve these limited objectives. Haig appointed a member of his own staff, Colonel Macmullen, to look at it. His plan was more ambitious. He wanted to attack Messines, Gheluvelt and Pilkem at once but faced with insufficient artillery recommended that Gheluvelt could be left til later and attacked by tanks. A study showed this was not feasible as the Menin road area on the way to Gheluvelt was wooded and impassable for tanks.

 

 

The plan of attack and choice of command
Plumer: excellence in planning and knowledge of Ypres: proposes limited objectives	Rawlinson : Somme experience and caution: broadly agrees with Plumer	Gough : a disliked "Thruster" selected by Haig to take on the job

At a meeting of his army commanders in April 1917, Haig sprang a surprise. Explaining that the main British effort would now switch from Arras to Flanders, he outlined that Plumer would capture the Messines ridge on 7 June and that the capture of Gheluvelt and Pilkem would follow some weeks later. The change of mind from a simultaneous attack, or one separated by only a few days as suggested by Plumer and Rawlinson, has never been fully explained. Haig outlined that to make the Germans think that the Messines operation was a limited one and not the first step in a strategic thrust, he would also continue attacking at Arras. So much for his doctrinal adherence to "decisive force at the decisive point". If it was a deception plan, it was poor and in the event one that inexorably led to failure. But we can not pin this entirely on Haig: the intelligence and advice given by his GHQ staff was also culpable.

 

In April too, Henry Rawlinson was told that he would be in command of a coastal operation, to land forces on the Belgian beaches at Ostende and to advance from the Nieuport bridgehead along the coast, once the main force had broken out of Ypres. Haig selected Hubert Gough, an unpopular man and the least experienced of the army commanders, to command the Ypres operations once Plumer's attack had succeeded. There is little to commend this decision other than Gough was known as a "thruster", a cavalry man who would "harroosh" his way through Belgium.

On 7 June 1917, Plumer's Second Army captured the Messines ridge. All was set.

 

Gough plans the Ypres attack

Hubert Gough moved his Fifth Army HQ to La Lovie Chateau near Poperinge on 1 June and there began to plan the Ypres operation in detail.

The task was to break a German defensive complex facing Ypres that was over ten miles deep:

• the front line
• the second line running from Bixschoote, along the rear slope of the Pilkem Ridge and down to the Menin road
• a third line 2000 yards further on, from Langemarck to SGraventafel to Glencorse Wood
• the Steenbeek, the largest of several rivers or wide streams running across the British front
• the Flandern I line, running in front of Passchendaele and behind Polygon Wood, some six to seven miles from the British start line. This would shelter the Eingriff Divisions ready to counter attack should the first lines gave way
• the Flandern II line, under construction from Passchendaele down to Menin
• the Flandern III line, also under construction east of Passchendaele

A significant proportion of the concrete and barbed wire that the BEF would face was laid in the interval between Messines and the opening of the attack.

British intelligence correctly suggested that the enemy had 5 Divisions in its front line, 4 in close reserve and 4 further back ready to counter attack. Gough arranged for 9 British Divisions to make the attack.

Opening bombardment

Gough decided that the attack would be preceded by a long artillery bombardment, lasting from 16 to 25 July (the originally intended day of attack). This was conventional practice at the time. It was believed that a heavy and long bombardment was necessary to sufficiently damage the enemy's defences - but it gave away all element of surprise.

Length of front to be attacked

Gough decided that the flanks of his attack would be Houthulst Forest on the north side (meaning that two French Divisions, placed on the left of the British front, would have to take part) and Klein Zillebeke on the south. Plumer's Second Army on Gough's right would not play a part in the opening attack. The length of front to be attacked was about eight miles.

Initial objective

Plumer and Rawlinson has both suggested a limited advance of about 1500 yards, after which the guns could be brought up for another attack. And that was before the enemy greatly added to their defences. Gough, ever the "thruster", planned a much more ambitious 5000 yards for the first day, to be achieved in four steps. The objective would be Langemarck - Polygon Wood - Broodseinde. He was in possession of good intelligence that described the enemy's defensive position quite accurately. The plan meant that the opening bombardment would be spread much more thinly and the infantry had an awfully long way to go. But it was still a "bite and hold": even Gough was not thinking of rushing cavalry through to sweep on to the Belgian coast but like Haig, he had hopes.

Haig's head of Operations at GHQ, John "Tavish" Davidson, was sceptical. He pointed out that the further objective would dilute the effectiveness of the artillery and recommended a Plumer-like 1750 yards. Haig did not listen. Gough's plan was the only one that came near to giving even a prospect of a breakthrough. He was concerned that Gough had underestimated the effort needed to capture the southern part of his front, the Gheluvelt area, but did not interfere with Gough's dispositions.

Weight of artillery

752 heavy and 1422 field guns moved quietly into the Ypres area and registered by firing a few observed ranging shots. It is a lot of guns - but nowhere near the number required, based on previous calculations of the rate and weight of fire needed, as had been so successful at Messines. The bombardment programme also gave less attention to the barbed wire than had previously been the case.

The build up and training of the assaulting forces went on in the fields of the rear areas around Poperinge during June and July.

Preparation for the coastal attack disrupted by enemy pre-emptive strike

On 10 July 1917, the German army carried out a highly successful attack against the British force assembled under Rawlinson at Nieuport: Operation Strandfest

Bombardment extended and attack delayed until 31 July 1917

The bombardment opened as planned on 16 July and was originally intended to lead to an attack on 16 July. But some British heavy artillery was late in arriving and bad weather hampered the programme. The zero day was moved to 31 July. By then, 4.3 million shells had ben fired at the enemy's defences. It was to prove insufficient: 64 pillboxes with their machine guns were still active in the German front line alone. The effect of the shellfire was much better on the left and in the centre. The defences on the British right, in front of the Gheluvelt plateau, were least worried by it. The baleful effects of this imbalance would soon be felt.

On 27 July 1917, a patrol sent out from the Guards Division, which at the time was standing on the west bank of the Ypres canal north of the town, discovered that the enemy had evacuated its front line due to the effect of the bombardment. The Division hurriedly moved across the canal and occupied the enemy position.

At 3.50am on 31 July 1917, the infantry went over the top.

31 July 1917: British attack, described from right (south) to left

Before the attack is described in detail it is necessary to point out that from the afternoon onwards it rained - it rained in torrents. This was after several days of poor weather. Shell holes, useful shelter in an attack, soon filled with water. The ground quickly became sodden. Every stream became a wide barrier. Guns and equipment began to sink and rifles clogged with mud.

Second Army: operations on the southern flank of the main attack

II ANZAC Corps

New Zealand Division carried out raids at La Basse Ville

3rd Australian Division carried out an attack using 11th Brigade against outposts north of La Douve River

IX Corps

37th Division carried out an attack using 63rd Brigade. During the day, the Brigade captured June Farm but lost July and Rifle Farms to a counter attack. These positions are north east of Wambeke.

19th (Western) Division used 56th Brigade to attack Junction, Tiny and Spider Farms. These positions, all of which are mid way between Hollebeke and Wambeke, were successfully captured.

(II ANZAC and IX Corps are not officially considered to have taken part in the main battle)

X Corps

41st Division attacked on both banks of the Ypres-Comines canal with 122nd Brigade to the south and 123rd Brigade to the north of the waterway. The direction of their advance was south east. 122nd Brigade captured Hollebeke by 11.30am and consolidated in the ruins, just 100 yards short of their objective. Later that night, the 12th East Surrey came up and pushed on to Forret Farm. 123rd Brigade attack was slowed by flooded ground and they fell behind the protection of the creeping barrage. They eventually reached their second objective, the Green Line, but were held up by undamaged pillboxes north of Hollebeke Chateau.

Fifth Army: the main attack

South of the Menin Road

II Corps

24th Division was ordered to form a defensive flank, to prevent German attack against the main body and movement of enemy reserves from the Messines area. It attacked at zero hour with all three brigades. 17th Brigade on the right advanced but came under heavy fire from Lower Star Post and Tower Hamlets. 73rd Brigade attacked through Shrewsbury Forest where they were held up but did finally reach Jehovah Trench and Groenenburg Farm. Fire from Lower Star Post held up a further advance. On the left, 72nd Brigade also suffered from fire from Lower Star Post in reaching Bodmin Copse.

30th Division, with 53rd Brigade of 18th (Eastern) Division in support, attacked through Sanctuary Wood in the direction of Stirling Castle. 21st Brigade was unable to leave its assembly position on time due to heavy German shellfire and without protection of its own protective barrage became mixed up in the tangle of the wood as they approached Jar Row trench. Some men of the 18th King's veered off left and got mixed up with other units on the Menin road at Clapham Junction. 90th Brigade also lost direction and 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers signalled that they had taken Glencorse Wood, but in fact had only reached Chateau Wood. 53rd Brigade, whose job was to take the advance on from Glencorse Wood, were surprised to find the wood in enemy hands. Despite being reinforced by five tanks, the brigade was held up by heavy fire.

North of the Menin Road

II Corps

8th Division, attacking astride the Menin road in a north easterly direction through Hooge and Bellewaarde, used two brigades in its assault. 24th Brigade, despite losing the barrage and being delayed by the shattered Chateau Wood beyond Hooge, advanced well until held by fire from Glencorse Wood on its right and from the Hanebeek valley ahead. It consolidated in the lee of the Westhoek Ridge, just short of the hamlet of Westhoek. 23rd Brigade, having crossed the Bellewaarde crater field, found much the same and took up a similar position, having along the way captured Kit and Kat pillboxes.

XIX Corps

15th (Scottish) Division attacked from positions just east of the Cambridge and Oxford (Wieltje-Hooge) roads in a north easterly direction. They advanced steadily, finding the barbed wire well cut, capturing Verlorenhoek and Frezenburg before suffering heavy casualties from fire coming from pillboxes at Square Farm, Pommern Castle, Beck House and Borry Farm. Square Farm, on the Division's left flank, was eventually captured by units of 55th Division.

55th (West Lancashire) Division also advanced to their objective, although having to deal with troublesome fire coming from Square Farm on the right, Bank Farm, Spree Farm, Pond Farm and Pommern Castle. All of these points had been successfully dealt with by the time the forward units dug in.

XVIII Corps

39th Division reached the Blue Line (first objective) easily enough, capturing Hampshire Farm and Mousetrap Farm. It moved on to the second and third objectives, taking Juliet Farm, Kitchener's Wood and Regina Cross. 116th Brigade on the right captured St Julien. On the left, 117th Brigade got across the fast-rising Steenbeek beyond Regina Cross and Hugel Hollow. 118th Brigade, starting from behind the others at 8am, came up through the attacking brigades to carry the advance on to the final objective. It got as far as Tirpitz Farm but found it was on its own, 55th Division not having got as far. Heavy machine-gun fire caused casualties particularly to the 1/1st Hertfordshire and a counter attack forced the brigade back through St Julien and the remnants of 116th dug in on the south and west of the village.

In 51st (Highland) Division the 152nd Brigade advanced steadily to within 100 yards of the Steenbeek, where they encountered machine gun fire and dug in near Ferdinand Farm. 153rd Brigade had a similar experience and also dug in along the line of the Steenbeek. Parties crossed the river but after fighting off counter attacks the small bridgehead was abandoned.

XVIII Corps

38th (Welsh) Division attacked using two brigades. 114th Brigade on the right moved steadily past Mauser Cott and 5 Chemins and on past Iron Crossroads. Like 113th Brigade on their left, they went beyond their objective and dug in on the bank of the Steenbeek facing Au Bon Gite and Langemarck. 113th Brigade, with their left on the Ypres-Langemark-Staden railway line, captured the village of Pilkem during their advance.

The most northerly of the British assault force, the Guards Division, moved quickly and relatively easily through to their objective. 2nd Guards Brigade, with their right on the Ypres-Langemark-Staden railway line, reached the beyond the original objective and dug in on the Steenbeek and around Ruisseau Farm, facing the Wijdendrift lane. 3rd Guards Brigade on their left dug in echeloned back to the Iron-Cross-Vulcan Crossing-Kortekeer Cabaret road near Fourche Farm. The Division had achieved its objective by 10am.

French on the northern flank

Assisted by the heavy bombardment which appears to have been more effective in the Pilkem area than elsewhere, two French Divisions advanced to and beyond their objectives with relatively few casualties - under 2000 in all.

Summary of the first day

On the whole, Fifth Army had cause for some congratulation. 18 square miles of ground had been captured. Casualties were some 27000, about half of the number lost on 1 July 1916 for a territorial gain some six times larger. As it turned out, enemy losses were about the same. The northern part of the attack had achieved its objectives and stood on the line of the Steenbeek. In the centre, the advance had been equally encouraging although strong counter-attacks had caused the loss of some ground and strong points (that would take weeks and thousands of lives to re-capture). The only worrying area was on the Menin road and the Gheluvelt plateau, where Claude Jacob's II Corps had taken heavy losses in the tangle of woods. The failure to capture this area would have dire consequences. More worrying that that was the heavy rain, which along with battle exhaustion brought the offensive to a more or less complete standstill. It was also clear that the Germans, badly shaken, would fight for every inch. Haig's sweep to the coast already seemed somewhat unlikely.

1-3 August 1917

No major offensive action was undertaken, while the artillery began to move forward. The rain continued. German counter attacks took place against 8th Division and 15th (Scottish) Division, 39th and 55th (West Lancashire) Divisions but in each case were dealt with by British artillery and stubborn defence. 51st (Highland) Division pushed across the Steenbeek and established a number of posts.

The assault Divisions were gradually relieved, with fresh formations taking over the front.

8th Division was relieved by 25th Division; 30th Division by 18th (Eastern) Division; 15th (Scottish) Division by 16th (Irish) Division; 55th (West Lancashire) Division by 36th (Ulster) Division

Senior officer and other notable casualties

Back to the summary of Third Ypres