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The Battles of Ypres 1917 also known as the Third Battle of Ypres or "Passchendaele"

 

Blood red Passchendaele

For obvious reasons to English speakers, "Passchendaele" - the name of a village, today spelled Passendale - invoked images of bloody sacrifice to many who were there. "Passion dale". This picture of blood red flowers was taken at the Tyne Cot Memorial to the Missing, which is located on the battlefield and which bears the names of some 35000 of those who died and who have no known grave.

 

quoteWe had been behind St Julien in the gas attack in 1915. Now I wouldn't have recognised the place. The whole area was utterly devastated, just a few bits of foundations left. There was no trace of the farms and barns that were there in 1915, nothing but this ocean of mud and dumps and a few battered pillboxes. 41217 Gunner J. J. Brown, Canadian Field Artillery

 


Why did the British Army attack at Ypres in 1917?

 

Haig plans to attack in Flanders
- with three good reasons
Haig

The British Armies in France were commanded by Sir Douglas Haig.

"The positions held by us in the Ypres salient since May 1915, were far from satisfactory. They were completely overlooked by the enemy. Their defence involved a considerable strain on the troops occupying them, and they were certain to be costly to maintain against a serious attack, in which the enemy would enjoy all the advantages in observation and in the placing of his artillery. Our positions would be much improved by the capture of the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge and of the high ground which extends thence north-eastwards for some seven miles and then trends north through Broodseinde and Passchendaele.

 

The operation in its first stages was a very difficult one, and in 1916 I had judged that the general situation was not yet ripe to attempt it. In the summer of 1917, however, as larger forces would be at my disposal, and as, in the Somme battle, our new Armies had proved their ability to overcome the enemy's strongest defences, and had lowered his power of resistance, I considered myself justified in undertaking it. Various preliminary steps had already been taken, including the necessary development of railways in the area, which had been proceeding quietly from early in 1916".


Extract from Haig's Despatch on this battle

 

Haig had been planning to attack in Flanders in order to improve the tactical situation round Ypres virtually since the day he took over as Commander-in-Chief in late 1915. As early as 7 January 1916 he instructed Fourth Army to work out a scheme. It was French commander-in-chief Joffre's preference for an attack on the Somme that year that caused Haig to shelve the Flanders plan. It was also French thinking - this time Joffre's replacement, Nivelle - that caused the British to attack at Arras in April 1917. You might speculate what might have happened had the British army avoided the tough nuts of the Somme and Arras, and advanced at Ypres in 1916, long before the German army ringed it with impregnable concrete pillboxes. But it could not have done so. Until mid 1917, Britain was the junior partner in the land war, in coalition with France. The British army had to date been squandered in battles ordered by the French. Now, other than the highly successful Messines attack, Haig was having his own way for the first time.

 

The failure of Nivelle's offensive in spring 1917 had caused terrible disappointment in France, which was becoming war weary. Many French units refused to fight other than defensively and in many units there was mutiny. Haig knew this and took responsibility for ensuring German attentions were elsewhere. Heavy German attack on the French in the summer of 1917 might have proved disastrous.

At the same time, British shipping losses to U-Boat actions were crippling and there was much pressure from the Royal Navy for the army to recapture the Belgian coast where some of the U-Boat bases were.

Haig was fully supported by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir William Robertson.

 

PM David Lloyd George unsupportive but fails to stop the enterprise
Lloyd George

The British Prime Minister was David Lloyd George. Later (his memoirs being written after Haig was dead and unable to defend himself) he said that the battle "with the Somme and Verdun, will always rank as the most gigantic, tenacious, grim, futile and bloody fights ever waged in the history of war".

 

On 19 June 1917, shortly after Second Army completed the capture of the vital Messines Ridge, Haig presented the plan for the battle to DLG and other members of the government. Lloyd George had misgivings but gave assent.

DLG's memoirs go on to say that "After its failure was beyond all reasonable doubt I did my best to persuade the Generals to call it off".
This, as much of the memoir, is not true. The War Committee (the form of Cabinet in existence under DLG at this time) failed to even discuss the battle once it was underway.

 

In May 1917, after the Nivelle offensive of which he had been such a loud proponent had failed, Lloyd George had said "We must go on hitting and hitting with all our might". Passchendaele was this attitude turned blood red and the PM shares with Haig and Robertson the blame for the cost of the battle.

 

 

Haig's plan was, like that of the Somme a year before, a confusing mix of practical, short and achievable objectives with optimism that suggested breakthrough, exploitation and winning the war. In some ways, the plan was strategic - for example, as soon as the advance from Ypres was underway there would be an amphibious landing on the coast, "Operation Hush".

 


Which British units took part?

 


Although this was a main undertaking by the British Army, fighting for the first time a major offensive without significant Allied support, twelve British Divisions did not take part in it, which is about one-fifth of the army in France at the time. 43 British, 5 Australian, 4 Canadian and 1 New Zealand Divisions did.
> Order of battle for the various phases of Passchendaele

 


What happened?

 

 

The Battle of Pilkem, 31 July to 2 August 1917

Subsequent sections will be added in due course


In the end, none of the strategic ambitions were achieved. There was no breakthrough. As on the Somme, the fight bogged down into a yard-by-yard, bitter struggle. Many said at the time that it should be halted and one of the most serious enduring criticisms of Haig remains that he pressed on too long, and at terrible human cost for both sides. By early November, Passchendaele - a matter of a few miles from the start - had been captured. A tactical position even worse than that before the battle was now bring held by the British and in April 1918 the whole area taken in 1917 was given up, virtually without a fight. For the first time, too, the morale of the British army fell.

 

“Reinforcements of the new armies shambled up past the guns with dragging steps and the expressions of men who knew they were going to certain death.  No words of greeting passed as they slouched along; in sullen silence they filed past one by one to the sacrifice”.

Aubrey Wade, "The war of the guns"

But the grinding of the German army would also have its eventual effect and there is little doubt that the losses and the tactical changes that Passchendaele wrought contributed directly to eventual victory.


Battle maps

The northern flank of the Western Front before Third Ypres

 

The Third Ypres starting line

 

Successive stages of the Third Ypres advance

 

 


Casualties

 

BritishBritish losses during the period 31 July to 10 November 1917 were reported to the Supreme War Council on 25 February 1918. The figures used at that time were 244,897 killed, wounded, missing and sick. This includes casualties of German air raids behind the fighting zone.

GermanGerman casualties have never been reported in detail. The British Official History speculates that enemy losses were about 400,000.

 


Viewpoint

 

“The British campaign in Flanders in 1917 was in no sense a pinnacle of the military art. Rather, it flew in the face of much that had already become evident about the correct conduct of the war. Nevertheless the nature of the [German] regime and the state-power against which that campaign was directed rendered persistence in fighting, if not in this manner then against this foe, not an option but a dire necessity".

Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, in "Passchendaele: the untold story" (London: Yale University Press, 2001)

 


 

Next battle

 

As Third Ypres was closing down, plans for Cambrai took shape