The Long, Long Trail

The Somme was selected for the combined Allied attack by General Joffre, largely for political purposes (see Why the British Army attacked on the Somme). For the British, it would mean bringing into the area, and continuing to supply, some 400,000 men and 100,000 horses. For doing so, Joffre could not have chosen a worse place. Every sector behind the British held line between Arras and Ypres was more suitable. Naturally, existing French army and civilian facilities would be used wherever possible, but this had been a quiet front and had not been geared up to support such an effort. Prodigious efforts would have to be made, in a short timescale and with precious few reserves available to make them. These needs placed enormous demand on British manpower, and all too often they could only be supplied by using units that were supposed to be training, or at rest.

It was reckoned that Fourth Army would when in action need 70 supply trains per day, and Third Army (only part of which was to be involved) another 58. Only two railway lines approached the front, both running into Albert. In particular, the lateral (north-south) communication was very poor, and was already very busy carrying traffic taking coal from Artois to Paris and the south of France. The line running from Albert to Arras was not useable as it ran across no man's land and into German hands in the Ancre valley.

It was decided on 1 April 1916 that a new standard gauge line would be needed, running 17 miles between Candas and Acheux. This would provide another four of five supply railheads, but would have a maximum capacity of 15 trains per day. A second new line, giving three railheads, was built on the 10-mile stretch from Daours to Contay, and a spur running from Dernancourt was extended to supply the artillery positions near Meaulte. It was eventually extended further, forming "The Loop" east of the Fricourt to Bray-sur-Somme road. Many other sidings, depots, platforms etc were also built, notably at Vignacourt, Flesselles, and Buire. In all, 55 miles of new railway track had to be laid.

Being a quiet agricultural area, the roads of the Somme were in now way suitable for sustained heavy mechanical loads. As there was no local stone suitable for road building, every ton had to be brought from other areas of France and even from Cornwall and Jersey. The supply of manpower and road stone barely kept up, and the condition of the roads even before the offensive began was giving great cause for concern. The plan to create forward dumps of stone could never be implemented due to shortage.

An example of the demand on roads: passing one point at Fricourt in 24 hours 21-22 July 1916: 26500 men on foot, 3756 horse drawn wagons, 5400 riding horses, 813 trucks, 95 buses, 330 motor ambulances, 63 guns.

Other than the Rivers Somme and Ancre, and a small stream between Vadencourt and Contay, there was no surface water near or on the battlefield, and none within the range planned for an advance. Many bore-holes had to be sunk, and miles of pipeline and pumps laid. Water refilling points were established at various points, from which the water tank wagons of each Division would supply the forward troops. Water for washing was a bare minimum.

Behind the lines, tens of thousands of tents and huts had to be provided and erected. The capacity provided was for "close billeting"; that is, providing a 6 by 2 feet space for each man. Every village between the front and Amiens became packed with troops.

For a general introduction to how the lines of supply worked, click here.

A large number of artillery ammunition dumps had to be created. The largest were at or near the railheads, where boxed ammunition was offloaded from the incoming trains. Here the ammunition passed from Lines of Communication (GHQ) "ownership" to that of the Army. Dumps were in the open. "Roads" made of timber were laid to allow the horsed transport to access the dumps. 7 trains per day brought in the artillery ammunition, and from 20 June 1916, this went up to 10. Ammunition train railheads were at Gezaincourt, Puchevillers, Contay, Corbie and Flesselles.

A total of eight days rations were accumulated between the Divisional dumps and the forward troops, and maintained.

Each Division created a number of forward dumps for bombs, small arms ammunition, and the 1001 other supplies needed to maintain troops in the battle.

For a general introduction to how the evacuation and treatment of a casualty was conducted, including a complete list of all medical facilities, click here.

Behind the planned battle front, the Royal Army Medical Corps formed eight groups, each of two Casualty Clearing Stations. These were tented, although a few huts were eventually provided. The purpose of the CCS was to treat casualties sufficiently only to send them on to the rear. They were generally located next to railway lines, where ambulance trains took the casualties to the hospitals near the coast. There were 18 permanent ambulance trains, supplemented by 15 more for the battle. Men arrived at the CCS from the battlefield either on foot, by truck or horse wagon.

The CCSs were grouped at Heilly, Corbie, Contay, Puchevillers, Vecquemont, Doullens (2 groups), Warlincourt. There was a single CCS at Gezaincourt, Beauval, St Ouen and Amiens. In addition, there were established advanced operating centres for urgent cases, at Warloy and Authie.

It seems extraordinary that after almost two years of war, civilians were still living in close proximity to the firing lines. A "forward examining line" was fixed and inhabitants living east of it were warned through the village mayors that if they wished to leave their homes they must do so within 48 hours of the beginning of the bombardment and move only by daylight. To stay they must provide themselves with 10 days food supply. If after this date they wished to leave they would not be permitted to use any transport as the roads would be full. After the second day of bombardment, they could not leave.