| Battle Histories > Western Front > The Battles of the Somme 1916 > Initial Tactics |
| Why did the British Army attack on the Somme in 1916? |
The
offensive campaign of 1916, initially to be a war-winning
simultaneous strike on three fronts by all Allies with maximum
force, came down to a few Divisions of the British Army,
to attack on ground not of their choosing and where there
was no possibility of strategic gain. Why
was this? |
| British military manpower is increasing... |
 When
the Allies began to agree a plan for 1916, it was done with
the knowledge that the British Army in the field was about
to be massively expanded thanks
to the early steps taken by Kitchener. By 1
January 1916, it had already
grown from the original 5 Divisions of August 1914 (4 infantry
and 1 cavalry) to 43 (38 infantry and 5 cavalry). It was
still greatly inexperienced: of the 38 infantry Divisions,
16 of them had only been involved in trench-holding. Approximately
1 million men were in France. By 30
June 1916 this would
have grown
by almost half to 1.4 million. Taking into account the
numbers of men on the lines of supply and the number of
Divisions required just to hold an inactive front, some 12-15
Divisions could be made available for an offensive by that
time. As the numbers grew, the command structure was also expanded.
Clearly, the longer the new units were given before being
committed
to
an offensive,
the better
armed,
better
trained,
better managed and more capable they would become. |
| ...although the supply of munitions yet remains a constraint |
In
comparison with the levels of supply and terrible shortages
of all sorts of munitions experienced in 1915, the flow of
guns, ammunition and other material to France as 1916 moved
on seemed
prodigious. Minister of Munitions David Lloyd George declared
on 30 January 1916 that supply
would be ample by April. In fact, his forecast was ambitious,
and supply remained a constraining factor
until 1917. As the army would soon find, the rapid gearing-up
of production had also led to an overall deterioration in
quality, with defective guns and ammunition making fatal
results for tens of thousands of men. |
| Fourth Army is formed |
 On
5 February 1916, the staff
of a Fourth British Army was formed, initially based at
Tilques near Saint-Omer. It was to be commanded
by General Sir Henry Rawlinson,
a highly respected infantryman who had commended IV Corps
at First Ypres. His chief of staff (GSO1) was Major-General
Sir
Archibald Montgomery, who had been with Rawlinson throughout
the war to date. British Commander-in-Chief Sir
Douglas Haig ordered Rawlinson to take
over the sector from the Somme to Fonquevillers, south of
Sir EDmund Allenby's Third Army. This is the area
selected on 14 February by French Commander-in-Chief Joffre
for the British part of the combined offensive. Rawlinson
moved Army HQ to Querrieu, between Albert and Amiens. At
first, three Corps were allotted to Fourth Army, but on 24
March, III Corps (Under Sir William Pulteney) also
arrived in Rawlinson's area. Haig asked Rawlinson to consider
the possibilities in the light of the overall plan to launch
a combined offensive in June or July. |
| Intelligence on German positions and strength on the Somme |
The
overall picture of the enemy position on the Somme was well
known to British command. The
Germans had occupied the position since 1914, and had not been
troubled greatly by their French opponents, who had adopted
a 'live and let live' approach. The presence and construction
of three enemy defensive lines on the Somme were understood
and well mapped. Two line systems were fully ready, protected
by deep and impenetrable belts
of wire. The third was as yet under construction. British
intelligence about enemy strengths was remarkably good. In
the event,
34 German battalions manned the defences attacked, and over
the next six days enough reserves arrived that in total manpower
the german forces used were about the same as 6 British Divisions.
The German units here were known to be of good quality, but
they
had
been
in the area for a long time and had not had recent experience
of fighting other than in opposing the increasing number
of British trench raids, designed to gain intelligence. |
| Rawlinson reports |
Fourth
Army reported back to Haig on 3 April
1916. Rawlinson said that in view of the ground and
the number of troops and guns at his disposal, he could not
tackle a front wider than 20,000 yards, with a depth of 2-5,000
yards. He recommended the front be between Maricourt and
Serre, and that it should be tackled in two steps of roughly
2000 yards each - one for the German
first line, and then after moving up the guns and fresh troops,
the enemy
second
line would be tackled once the defences had been destroyed.
In line with current French doctrine, he recommended a lengthy
bombardment
of
the enemy
positions
each time, to
destroy the wire defences and trench line positions. Much
of the bombardment would need to be in daylight, to enable
observation
of its effects before the attack went in. (Rawlinson's approach
was very much like the 'bite and hold' applied by Herbert
Plumer at Ypres in 1917). |
| Haig thinks Rawlinson too cautious, expands the plan |
Two
days later, Haig responded to Rawlinson's outline. He insisted
that the attack push on beyond
the first enemy line at the first bound. His experience at
Loos was that there would
be a period when the enemy was disorganised and demoralised
before any reserves could
arrive, and if
sufficient
British troops were moving up then there was a possibility
of exploiting the initial success. The infantry should push
on, capturing the German guns if they could. Joffre and Foch
also believed this could be done (no doubt referring to
German successes against their army at Verdun, rather than
any practical application by the French themselves). He also
wanted
a wider
(25,000 yard) front, extending the left
flank
to past
Gommecourt.
Even Noel Birch,
Haig's artillery advisor, said that this was
going too far and that the artillery would be overstretched.
Haig also wanted a shorter bombardment. he turned this criticism
into a direct order on 12 April.
Rawlinson still thought Haig wrong, but agreed that he would
carry it out as ordered. On 19 April,
Rawlinson - having conferred with his Corps commanders - replied
to Haig that he would modify
the tactical plan as ordered. The plan now would be to reach
the Pozieres - Grandcourt - Serre ridges on the first day, and
that the guns would not be moved up during this time. He pointed
out that tackling even part of the enemy's second line so soon
and without adequate gun coverage was a gamble, but that no doubt
the Commander-in-Chief was in a position to know if this was
a risk worth taking. Haig replied, saying he had considered the
question of the bombardment and was now supportive of the long
bombardment before the opening assault. |
| Fourth Army staff develops the tactical plan |
The tactical doctrine adopted by Fourth Army came from a combination of British and French experience, plus a view on the potential effectiveness of the new Divisions.
|
| Secrecy and deception |
| There was no attempt at maintaining secrecy or deceiving the enemy of Allied intent, with the exception that some preparations were made in Third Army area near Arras, that looked like the ones on the Somme. The vast preparations behind the lines, the increased raiding activity, and the registration of the artillery all served to clearly demonstrate to the enemy that an attack was forthcoming. In the Gommecourt area, where the attack was only to be a diversion, it was intended that he should see the preparations. The Allied press, and all the talk behind the lines, was of the coming "Big Push". The only surprise was the date and time of the attack, and in the event even this was clearly signalled to the enemy. |
| The tactical objectives are finalised |
South
of the Albert-Bapaume road, the British objective (red dot-dash
line) for the first phase of the attack was to
capture the first enemy trench system (shown in dark green)
but not go as far as the second. This meant that British
and French
artillery could concentrate fire to destroy the front line before
the infantry attacked. Once the objective was reached, the
guns would move up for the second phase attack on the second
enemy line. This was much as Henry Rawlinson wanted it. |
 |
From
Pozieres northward, first-phase objectives included the second
enemy line. Here the artillery would have to try to destroy
the wire and trench systems in both lines, before the infantry
assault went in. This was Haig's idea: push on while the enemy
is disorganised. |
 |
Haig's plan was to capture ground,
breaking past the first enemy line and into the second enemy
line on the first day. All possibilities to exploit enemy disorganisation
should be grasped from then on. Yet at the same time, the army
was applying rigid, inflexible, tactics as regards the way their
infantry
should conduct the attack. |
Retrospective There were serious weaknesses in the plan: the infantry would need to cover 4,000 yards to reach the initial objectives set; the artillery, much expanded as it was, would be spread too thinly over a 25,000 yard front, and would now need to try to hit some of the enemy's second line as well as the first; there was an under-estimation of the powers of recovery of the enemy defenders, and too few fresh or mobile troops if an opportunity to exploit a breakthrough was offered. Perhaps the most serious flaw was the belief that the weight of artillery would be so effective. Should Haig and Rawlinson and their staffs known these things, and done something different? It is easy in retrospect to believe that they should. But the experience and evidence they had, on which they made fateful decisions regarding the initial attack, would lead many to exactly the same conclusions. Perhaps Rawlinson should have stood his ground, and been more insistent on a 'bit and hold' approach. Perhaps the Divisional commanders should have taken more steps to shorten the distance their troops would need to cover. Perhaps the more experienced units could have been given a more flexible tactical approach to the assault. Perhaps the artillery advisors should have insisted on a more realistic view of the effect of the guns. But they did not, and as can be seen, a fundamental rethink was required in mid July 1916. |
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| What preparations had to be made? | Battles of the Somme 1916 |