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Home > Battle Histories > Western Front > The actions of Spring 1916 > The Fighting at the Bluff
 
14th February to 2nd March 1916
British formations engaged: V Corps : 17th Division (February); 3rd Division, 17th Division (March); 172nd Tunnelling Company RE.
 
The Bluff Position

The Ypres-Comines canal, running south east from the town, cut through the front lines about 3 miles from the Cloth Hall. This was the position at the end of the First Battle of Ypres, and it was much the same by 1916, the Second Battle having not altered things here. Facing the British, the village of Hollebeke; on the left was the hotly-contested ground of Hill 60 and Zwarteleen, and on the right the hotspot at St Eloi. On the northern embankment of the canal, a curious mound - a spoil-heap, created when the canal was excavated - gave the British front an unusual observation advantage over the enemy: equally if the enemy held it, the view across the rear areas of the Salient to Hill 60, towards Ypres and down to Voormezele would have made the Salient very difficult to hold. The mound had to be held. Click here for a map...

The German front line fire trench lay some 200 yards ahead of this feature, which the British called the Bluff, and the enemy Grosse, or Kanal Bastion. British trenches ran around the forward base of the Bluff, snaking around the front of the lips of a number of mine craters that had been blown here in October and November 1915, and in January 1916. Communication trenches ran back over the Bluff itself. The canal cutting was steep sided, and over 100 yards wide. The trenches continued on the other side, with only a single plank bridge connecting the two banks.

 
The Bluff is lost: 14th February 1916

17th Division had moved to relieve 3rd Division in the canal sector between 5th and 8th February 1916, and placed 51st Brigade on a 1300 yard front at the Bluff position. It was also responsible for the south bank, and had 52nd Brigade there.

Enemy shellfire began to fall on both Brigade fronts in the morning of 14th February, intensifying on the Bluff from mid afternoon. (The enemy was also shelling 24th Division at Hooge at this time). British artillery began to retaliate, and the infantry at the Bluff stood by to meet an anticipated attack. All telephone wires were cut by the shelling, which severely affected the ability of units in the front line to call for support.

The German tunnellers blew three small mines at 5.45pm, one under the Bluff (which buried a platoon of the 10/Lancashire Fusiliers sheltering in an old tunnel) and two slightly further north, under the 10/Sherwood Foresters.

Shortly afterwards, German infantry attacked, between the canal bank and the Ravine. They entered and captured the front line trenches but were driven out of the support lines behind the front. Small local efforts to counter attack over the next two days failed. The all-important Bluff position had been lost, and it would take more than localised efforts to regain it.

A detailed account by one of the units that counter attacked - the 6th Dorsets - can be seen here.

The operations in the area of the Bluff from the start of the enemy attack to noon on 17th February cost the British 1,294 casualties.

Map
 
The Bluff regained: 2nd March 1916

Lieutenant-General H. Fanshawe, officer commanding V Corps, ordered 17th Division to not only recapture the Bluff, but improve the position by capturing the German trenches called The Bean. He placed 76th Brigade of 3rd Division, as well as an additional RFA Brigade and an RE Field Company, under the Division for the operation.

76th and 51st Brigades began an intensive exercise in training, to prepare for a frontal assault, to take place at dusk on 29th February 1916. All troops were equipped with the new steel helmets. 52nd Brigade held the line and carried out much preparation work, digging new communication and assembly trenches, burying telephone cables, and bringing up stocks of ammunition. This work was not helped by snowfalls, which showed up the new works to enemy observers, whose artillery promptly destroyed them. The severe weather and cold also forced a change of plan, to minimise the time that the assault troops would need to be in the front line before the attack went in. Even the date could be not be agreed: it would have to be "the second morning after the first day fine enough for artillery registration".

The bombardment eventually opened on 1st March, by 17th Divisional artillery plus 35 larger guns and howitzers of Second Army and Canadian Corps heavies. At 2.15am, Brigadier-General Ernest Pratt, officer commanding 76th Brigade, advised Divisional HQ that he would not require a planned extra 20 minute intensive bombardment. The leading infantry (right to left, the 2/Suffolk, 8/King's Own and 1/Gordon Highlanders) began to move at 4.15am, and the assault was launched fifteen minutes later. British barrage fire began two minutes after that. The attack achieved complete surprise, although a machine gun on the left caused heavy casualties to the Gordons. A party of 172n Tunnelling Company RE also suffered from a machine-gun burst when, having destroyed a tunnel in no man's land that led to the Bluff, every man was shot down. By 5.10am, the infantry had captured all objectives, finding many enemy without equipment. 5 German officers and 248 men were sent back as prisoners.

German artillery was curiously slow to react and only opened fire at 9.30am, intensifying at 11am, which caused problems for reinforcement and supply as the infantry consolidated the ground won. Some sporadic attempts to counter attack were made by the enemy, but British bombs were for once in plentiful supply and these attacks were beaten off.

Casualties incurred in recapturing the position amounted to 1,622.

Map
 
Eyewitness
Ralph Hamilton"Ypres, 1st March 1916: In a few minutes the battle for the recapture of the Bluff will begin, and I am now going over to take command of the battery. I have had one gun pit hit this morning, and expect we shall have a bad time at this afternoon. 10 pm. There has been a terrific bombardment - almost worse than Loos, whilst it lasted. At 5pm we started off. As the attack is not on the front of our Division, we only demonstrated ie kept up a moderate fire on the Hun trenches. We must have had a tremendous collection of big guns on our right, as the roar was absolutely continuous. Things have quietened down, but we start again at 4am tomorrow.

Ypres, 2nd March 1916: I got up at 4am and went over to the battery. It was pitch dark and I nearly broke my neck crossing the little trestle bridge over the moat. At half-past, to a second, then bombardment began with an appalling crash, hundreds and probably thousands of guns from 18 pounders up to "Grandmama", the great 15 inch howitzer, let fly it together. For the next hour the noise was simply indescribable. It was almost impossible to distinguish the report of one gun from that of another; the only thing it can be compared to is the roll of a drum. We have the ramparts of the town near us, and the noise was intensified by the continuous echo. It was quite impossible to make oneself heard, even by yelling in a person's ear. After an hour, it began to die down and by the time I came over to breakfast at 8 o'clock it was fairly quiet. The Hun, to my surprise, took it lying down - at least, as far as our area was concerned, he did not fire at all. As soon as the bombardment began, we saw the German SOS signals going up all along the zone that was threatened. There were red rockets bursting into red stars. Soon after, rockets of all colours went up - white, green, red, golden rain, and even red golden rain. I imagine these were meant to confuse us.

About 9 o'clock the wounded began to stream down the road. All those who could walk took himself to the field hospitals. Only the bad cases can be taken in the motor ambulances; these went by in streams also. Most of the men were very cheerful at the prospect of a slight wound that would take them home for a bit. They were principally men who would been hit through the arm or leg by rifle bullets. They told us they had got back our lost trenches and also has some of the old German trenches. They said they had been wonderfully supported by the artillery, whose fire had kept just in front of them as they charged. In spite of the bombardment, the German trenches were full of men, and they had to charge under very heavy rifle and machine-gun fire. The Suffolks and the Gordon Highlanders seem to have lost most. Some men of the former regiment said their battalion was wiped out; but men always say they are the sole survivors. A little later, convoys of German prisoners came through and escorts with fixed bayonets - I should think between 200 and 300 in all, no officers. They were quite a good lot of men, in the prime of life. All wore the flat round cap - no helmets. They have been trying to get into Ypres for 18 months, and now they have succeeded!"

An extract from "The war diary of the Master of Belhaven", first published by John Murray in 1924 and reprinted in 1990 by Wharncliffe Publishing Limited. The Hon. Ralph Gerard Alexander Hamilton, Master of Belhaven, was officer commanding C Battery, 108th Brigade RFA, in 24th Division at this time.

 
Learning curve
An interesting tactic was tried by Brigadier-General H. Uniacke, officer commanding V Corps artillery. A 60-pounder battery was ordered to fire a salvo on the Bluff, with a second salvo after two minutes, at irregular periods through day and night before the operation. Sure enough, when the same battery fired a salvo at the commencement of the attack, the 2/Suffolks advanced and found the enemy garrison sheltering in dugouts in the western face of one of the mine craters - waiting for the second salvo.
 

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