The battalion was ordered to take part in an attack on the enemy's trenches to the north east of Passchendaele in the direction of Westroosebeke with the object of driving the enemy from the ridge. The objectives of the Battalion are as specified in Operation Order Number 22, a copy of which it was attached to the war diary for November 1917.

The Battalion paraded at Irish Farm at 6.55pm on the 1st December 1917 to proceed to the line. The battalion had three hot meals during the day and a final hot meal at 5.45pm. The order of march would be D, C, A, B Companies and Battalion Headquarters, at Platoon intervals of 100 yards. The leading platoon of D Company past the starting point, road junction C.21.c.3.3 at 7.10pm and proceeded to the line via at Buffs Road - road junction C.23.a.5.3 - Number 6 Track and Peter Pan Switch to Bellevue – Meetcheele – Mosselmarkt - pillboxes at road junction V.30.c.45.15 -Venture Farm - Assembly position, a distance of about eight kilometres altogether. The Battalion was led by the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel L. Lamotte, and paused at Kansas Cross for a halt of 10 minutes. The commanding officer personally guided the battalion to the "jumping off" tape and saw each section of the Battalion into its correct position and after synchronising the watches of every officer, gave to each the correct angle of advance and made certain that it was perfectly understood by the Platoon and Section commanders. The march between Bellevue and Mosselmarkt was rendered difficult owing to the congestion, but energetic measures prevailed, and plenty of time was allowed for the assembly, and every man was in his proper position by 1.20am, or 35 minutes before Zero. The Commanding Officer reported this fact to Brigade Headquarters accordingly.

Description by A Company's commander.

This company was on the right of the Battalion and left the tape in good order at zero. Second Lieutenant H. L. Brigham was wounded half an hour before Zero. He was the right platoon commander and detailed the keeping touch with the 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade on our right. Sergeant Davies then took command of his platoon; before A Company moved off they noticed the troops on our right were on the move seven minutes before Zero. The company at first, under the impression that these were hostile troops, nearly fired on them but discovered that they were the 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade advancing in northerly direction across our front. The commander of A Company (Second Lieutenant H. J. Knight) endeavoured to redirect these troops but the officer he saw became a casualty almost immediately. This caused confusion amongst A Company. The Rifle Brigade crossed the Passchendaele – Westroosebeke road at V.30.b.30.05. The enemy opened fire less than a minute after Zero; this fire appeared to come from Teale Cott, Venison Trench and Void Farm. Second Lieutenant C. P. Halliday MC, Second Lieutenant J.V. Webb (who joined the Battalion late on and night of November 30th) and the Company Sergeant-Major became casualties during the first five minutes. The company progressed in spite of this until our artillery barrage came down, causing the men to hold up. At this time it is believed the 2nd Rifle Brigade lost heavily. No. 1 Platoon, which had been told off to capture Teale Cott, had lost its platoon commander and platoon sergeant and was reduced to 7 men. Sergeant Pannett from No. 3 Platoon was detailed to do this work; only the company commander and one NCO remained to lead the Company. The enemy artillery fire was very dispersed and not in the nature of a barrage. A Company’s commander found his men closing to the right and he then tried to reorganise his men as best he could in spite of the fact that he had been severely shaken by a shell burst and was grazed above the eye by a bullet. The men at this point dig in in groups with the 2nd Rifle Brigade and remained in this position until relieved by the 8th Rifle Brigade on the night of 2nd/3rd December. Their posts were situated on the east side of the Passchendaele – Westroosebeke road and were kept under heavy machine-gun fire from Venison Trench. The Company commander states that his failure to reach his objective was entirely due to his been mixed up with 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade and the fact that he had lost all his officers and NCOs in the early stage of the advance. Owing to the troops on his right meeting before zero, the element of surprise was frustrated. He afterwards withdrew on relief. Throughout the action no report was received from this Company.

C Company, centre Company. Description by Sergeant Hayward.

C Company left the tape in perfect order. After going some 50 yards they came under a heavy machine gun fire and all the officers and senior NCOs became casualties. The fire appeared to come directly from our front and flanks. In spite of this they pushed on. Sergeant Hayward was then in command of the Company and reports that he went a distance of 500 yards(?). At one point he crossed the Passchendaele – Westroosebeke road and found some derelict field guns and shelters, the occupants of which were killed. He then found himself in front of a line of trees, which were held by the enemy in force. At dawn he could see no one near him and only having seven men with him he withdrew the party to the left rear and dug in. During the day he got in touch with the 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade and an officer came over and saw him. He was afterwards informed that he was to be relieved at night and his posts were afterwards taken over by the 8th Battalion Rifle Brigade and he withdrew his men the to Irish Farm. Note: it is extremely difficult to give the exact position to which this NCO reached and dug himself in; I am of the opinion that he crossed the Passchendaele – Westroosebeke road and dug in between Venison Trench and Teale Cott.

D Company, No3, or Left, Company. Recounted by Sergeant Horne.

D Company left the tape in perfect order and immediately came under heavy machine-gun fire. He lost 12 men before going 20 yards. He was in touch with the 16th Highland Light Infantry on his left, the right Company of which advanced across his front and the two companies became mixed up. He went forward with his few men until he reached two pillboxes. At this time he had three men of his platoon left, one being a Lewis Gunner, and he sent one man back for support but the man became a casualty. At this time he saw his company commander Captain H. R. Ford MC some distance off, when a Very Light went up and illuminated the surroundings. He was unable to reach him and never saw him again; this was some 250 yards in front of the line of tape. After this he got in touch with number 13 Platoon, commanded by Second Lieutenant J. N. Ellis, and they made an attempt to take the pillboxes but were unable to find an entrance. Here, Second Lieutenant Ellis and his platoon sergeant were killed. With the assistance of some men of the 16th Highland Light Infantry he worked round the pillboxes and, after going about 80 yards, he dug in. They had only half completed the work of consolidation when the enemy counter-attacked in force and he was driven out, taking several more casualties. He withdrew his party to a trench in rear where he found 3 officers and 20 other ranks of the Highland Light Infantry and remained with them until he had orders at night to withdraw to Irish farm at 5.30am on 3rd December, 1917.

B Company, No.4 or Support Company. Recounted by the company commander, Captain J. Hassell.

The company started off the tape in correct order. Immediately the enemy illuminated the ground and opened heavy machine-gun fire which did not impede his progress or caused many casualties to his Company, as it appeared to go overhead. He reached Hill 52 with No.5 Platoon, the other three Platoons being in front in positions from which the enemy had been driven out. The Sappers [Royal Engineers troops] who accompanied him immediately got to work and taped and sited the strong point and he set No.5 Platoon to dig. Whilst this was in progress, casualties of other companies are reported to him and he set them up to dig in. This trench was sited close to an old enemy trench, where he temporarily set up his company headquarters. Second Lieutenant Corcoran here joined him with the remains of his platoon, reporting that he had got to the objective, two pillboxes, and had been driven back by a superior numbers. The company commander placed the casualties of other companies under Second Lieutenant Corcoran and ordered him to again advance and take the two pillboxes. In the meantime consolidation was taking place at V.30.a.5.7. The Royal Engineer officer was wounded during the advance but the work was carried on by his men.

At this time a counter attack on a large scale appeared to develop to his front with the result that troops of the Yorkshire Light Infantry, Highland Light Infantry and Border Regiment passed through his line of consolidation, carrying his own men with them. He was unable to arrest the retirement until the “jumping off” tape line was reached. He here reorganised the men and discovered they consisted of every Battalion of the Brigade, with the exception of the 17th Highland Light Infantry. He attempted to get them to advance again but, failing in this, he distributed the men along a line and consolidated from V.30.a.2.6 to V.30.a.6.6. This line he held until daybreak. At about 8am he collected all the men of the Yorkshire Light Infantry in the area. In the meantime C Company of the Highland Light Infantry was collected by Captain Alexander, who moved his party to the right toward Teale Cott. Captain Hassell organised the men of the Battalion into three posts of 10 in each under one Sergeant. Two of these parties included a Lewis Gun and formed an advanced line of posts from V.30.a.1.7 to V.30.a.5.6, being in touch with Teale Cott, occupied by the 16th Highland Light Infantry on his right. At 3.30pm on the 2nd, the enemy counter-attacked and drove his advanced posts back to the original position, approximately the assembly tape. During the interim between the first retirement and the eventual withdrawal he took command between a Vocation Farm and Teale Cott assisted by two sections of the Machine Gun Company. At about 10.30am on the 2nd, he received instructions to recapture Hill 52 with the assistance of one Company of the 16th Northumberland Fusiliers. This company failed to materialise, but he advanced his line by the process of dribbling some 200 yards. Two German machine-guns were captured.

D Company: Captain H.R. Forde MC, 2/Lts J.N. Ellis, R.D. Abbiss.

The casualties amongst other ranks were as follows: Killed: 18; died of wounds 5; wounded 120; missing 41.