Group 1 - 4 guns - Railway I.17.a.2.9.5. Targets: Ibex Support, Iberia Reserve.
Group 2 - 4 guns - St. James Trench. Targets: Ibex Lane and Ibex Support.
Group 3 - 4 guns - Congreve Walk. Targets: Cameroon Trench, Support and Avenue.
Group 4 -3 guns - Garden Street. Targets: Cameroon Trench, Support and Reserve, and Iberia Avenue.

Objectives of each Mortar are as follows:

No 1 – I.6.c.0.9 to I.6.c.2.7.5
No 2 – I.6.c.2.9.75 to I.6.c.3.7
No 3 – I.6.a.0.5.2.25 to I.6.c.2.9
No 4 – I.5.b.9.2 to I.5.d.9.75.8
No 5 – C.29.d.7.2 to C.29.d.6.4.5
No 6 – C.29.d.6.4.5. to C.29.d.4.7
No 7 – C.29.d.4.1 to C.29.d.4.3.75
No 8 – C.29.d.4.3.75 to C.29.d.4.7

Rate of fire. The mortars will fore for 65 minutes and a steady rate will be maintained throughout. These ought to act as a guide to the raiding party. Four rounds per a gun per minute = 2080 or 260 rounds per gun.

Emplacements. On the left the disused firebays will be utilised. On the right there is an absence of any suitable cover, and sandbagged emplacements will have to be constructed to protect guns, teams, and ammunition.

Signal for withdrawal.
Six rockets will be fired from Cambridge Trench as a signal for withdrawal, at the same time the Commander of the party will sound a bugle call at his post.

Routes of evacuation.

(i) The Potijze road by wheeled and hand stretchers via New Cotts and Mill Cotts (relay post) direct to Chateau.
(ii) Haymarket communication trench for walking cases only.
(iii) A flagged route over the open (if the front holds) as far as Cambridge Trench (relay post) thence to Mill Cotts thence to Chateau ADS.

Advanced aid post I.5.b.1.4: 8 regimental stretcher bearers.
At relay post, Cambridge Trench: 8 ditto.
Advanced aid post I.5.a.9.5.8: 8 ditto.
Mills Cotts relay post: 16 RAMC.

5:30pm. Tapes for assembly in no man's land put out.
6:15pm. Concertinas removed from gaps in wire.
7:15pm. Hot drink and rum served out at Chateau.
7:30pm. Assembly in front line trenches by Haymarket communication trenches begins.
7:45pm. Assembly in front line trenches by Potijze road begins.
8:25pm. Assembly in front line complete.
Zero minus two minutes. Assembly of first and second waves in no man's land begins.
Zero minus two minutes. Barrage 50 yards short of first line trench begins.
Zero minus one minute. Artillery barrage begins to creep.
Zero. Leading waves enter German first line.
Zero plus one minute. Barrage remains one minute on support line.
Zero plus two minutes. Leading waves enter support line.
Zero plus 45 minutes. Party withdraws.
Artillery barrage drops to German front line on the “All Clear” been given.

In accordance with orders the preliminary assembly in our trenches was complete at 12 midnight. Tapes for the assembly in no man's land, and guiding tapes through gaps in the wire had all been laid out without any difficulty or trouble. The borrow-pit in front of our trenches had been bridged and the passage to the assembly tapes presented no difficulty.

At 12:15am many witnesses, both in the raiding party and also in the neighbouring trench garrison, asserts that 20 or 30 of our shells were put on to the objective area. This had the effect, as regards the right flanking party, of making them think that the barrage had already started.

At 12:23am the assembly in no man's land commenced and was carried out in good order. The right party assembly was complete in good time in no man's land, and they waited for the barrage to begin. In the centre party the assembly was complete three quarters of a minute before the barrage began. On the left, the assembly and barrage seemed almost to coincide; the length of time that they had to wait was negligible. It is not clear why it took so much longer on the left than it did on the right, but it did not lead to confusion.

The right party advanced to the attack, and the leading wave got close up to the German wire. The Sergeant, who was leading this wave, found that there was no gap immediately opposite him. He immediately moved to his left where after considerable difficulty he found a narrow gap not more than a yard wide. At this point the officer, Lieutenant Wilson, was wounded. A small party of about six men accompanied the Sergeant, and he went through this gap into the German trench, and established his bombing block luckily exactly at the communication trench where he was supposed to place it. The remainder of the party lost themselves in their endeavours to find this gap and wandered down the wire. They were however unable to get in. The party that did get in found from 5 to 10 Germans, dead and wounded, in at the front line trench almost at their point of entry, which doubtless accounted for the ease with which they got in, and another party of Germans retired in front of them down a communication trench. The bombing party blocked the trench, and threw all their bombs. Then the before mentioned German party turned on their tracks and began to bomb our party, driving them back. Having finished their bombs, they were compelled to evacuate the trench. This was probably about 14 minutes after they entered the German trench.

The centre party advanced to the Mound, and easily got in. Lieutenant Robinson leading, as arranged, and one party bombed down the sap towards the German front line. Lieutenant Robinson, however, appears to have gone right handed over the top, and got into the German front line somewhere about the junction of the tramway. This caused the remainder of the party to split up and more or less lose direction, some even passing right handed of the wire surrounding the Mound, and got into the German trench right of the junction of the tramway. This party consisted of a Lance Corporal and two men. Lieutenant Robinson endeavoured to establish touch on his right and left, but failed to do so, and on the rocket signal going up withdrew according to the programme. While advancing to the German trench they were subjected to heavy rifle fire, and immediately on their withdrawal the Germans followed them up with bombs - presumably these came from the left flank up the Mound sap. Lieutenant Robinson was hit in the leg by a German bomb and felt in to the German wire, but was assisted across to our lines by a rifleman.

The left party advanced straight to the German wire, and when three quarters of the way across, the officer in charge (Lieutenant Maclehose) was wounded, and subsequently died. This caused considerable confusion in the party, most of whom however, carried on. They arrived at the German wire, but failed to find the gaps, with the exception of a Lewis Gun team, consisting of four men, the other two having been wounded, and the extreme left bombing post which now consisted of four men also. They got on to the German parapet, and bombed down the trench towards the left, and having exhausted their bombs retired on the rocket signal going up. The remainder of the left party failed to find any gap, and never crossed the German wire. They were subjected to considerable rifle fire, both from the front line Trench, and some up allege from a second line trench.

The German artillery retaliation was moderately severe, a large number of .77s being put onto no man's land, and heavier calibres towards Cambridge Terrace, Mill Cotts and New Cotts, where also a considerable number of minenwerfer fell.

The sequence of calls for artillery support appears to have been: Golden Rain rockets as SOS, which were sent up with great persistence during the whole raid; Green rockets were also sent up but did not appear to have any effect except to cause a slight lengthening of range. We also sent up German Green rockets in our own lines in the hopes of mystifying the enemy: this, however, was not successful. Towards the latter end of the raid from 1am Double Red rockets were sent up by the Germans, the last one being seen at 1:20am, by which time at the German artillery fire had completely died down, and may have the significance that further artillery support is not wanted.

There is no doubt that the German trenches were heavily manned, and in accordance with plan had not been knocked about to any extent. Rifle fire was heavy and continuous, but there is no evidence of a machine gun having been used. A large number of Very Lights were sent up the moment are barrage opened. The counter barrage came down within three minutes, and it is clear that the enemy were very much on the alert.

The gaps cut in the German wire except at the point of the Mound were difficult to find. It seems that on the right the Germans had been able to put a considerable amount of loose concertina to fill up what may have been a large gap cut by our artillery. In front of the Mound it was well cut, and lying about in large lumps, which of course were an obstacle. The Mound and Mound Sap had been obliterated by shellfire. No machine gun emplacement was found there in and during the whole raid only two dugouts were encountered. This, however, is not to say that they were not a larger number, but it is due to the fact that no real entry in any numbers was effected.
The German trench is reported to be 5 ft wide at top, in excellent condition, reverted with the brushwood, and well floored, about 5 ft deep.

The Mound (centre) party accounted for 4 or 5 Germans, and the right party claimed 5 or 6 more, besides those dead and wounded previously mentioned, evidently caused by our shellfire.

Our casualties were severe, and caused chiefly by rifle fire whilst crossing no man's land. All four officers were hit, one killed, and 44 other ranks are casualties. Up to the present 41 of these have been accounted for. It is believed that two men, who were shot dead at on the wire on the right of the Mound, were not brought in. This is not yet certain.

A success might have been obtained had the element of surprise been present. The long drawn out wire cutting on such a limited front, and heavy bombardment, have undoubtedly put the enemy thoroughly on the alert. The problem of keeping gaps open when once made, and at the same time conducting reconnaissance is, remains to be solved. There is no doubt that two or three hours' respite give the enemy, backed by great zeal, the opportunity of mending up his wire.
No identifications were obtained.

14th February, 1917. Brigadier-General, commanding 117th Infantry Brigade.