Having moved more weight of their Armies to the East, Germany had stood on the defensive in the West since late 1914 and had strongly resisted the French offensives in the Spring of 1915. They had also broken through strong enemy positions in Galicia in May 1915. They occupied a large area of Northern France and Belgium, and intended to hold on to it until they had won in the East.

The French Army fought numerous small offensive actions between the end of the Spring Offensives, and September 1915. They suffered heavy losses and were plainly failing to make any strategic impact on the continued German possession of a large area of France. The reputation of the Commander-in-Chief, Joffre, was beginning to be questioned in political circles. Joffre himself was inspired by the German successes in Galicia, as a demonstration that given enough men and materiel, breakthroughs were still achievable. He reaffirmed his commitment to the overall strategic approach that he had decided in early 1915, aimed at breaking the German salient on French soil. It was known that the French Army would be at the summit of their strength in late 1915. Joffre's strategic plan included three major offensives, although only two attacks were eventually made at this time:

Whilst in the planning for the Spring offensives a shortage of men and munitions had limited the attack to Artois, the situation was now changed. The French Army was 200,000 men stronger than it had been in October 1914: Joffre was anxious to strike while there was a superiority of numbers against the enemy in the West. This time, the Artois attack would be renewed, along with a large Northward attack in the Champagne. The Champagne attack would be the larger of the two, aiming to seize much open country of that area, forcing the enemy back. The Artois attack would aim at the critical rail networks between Douai and Noyon that the Germans relied upon to maintain much of the front. An advance of only 20 miles would surely force a German withdrawal.

The British were asked on 4th June 1915 to take over another 22 miles of front, this time well away from the position currently held and near the River Somme. This was to release French reserves. The BEF was also invited to take part in the renewal of the Artois offensive with the French Tenth Army. Sir John French agreed, confirming that he would attack on the front between Grenay and the La Bassée Canal as suggested by Joffre. This was a few miles to the South of the May attacks at Aubers and Festubert. He ordered Sir Douglas Haig, commanding First Army, to prepare a detailed plan. The British strength on the Western Front was slowly growing, although precious troops, equipment and munitions were being consumed in the Gallipoli theatre and elsewhere.

"In the King's opinion...there would be no backbiting and unfriendly criticism of superiors if the officer at the head of the Army in the Field ... was fit for his position. He criticises French's dealings with the Press, The Times, Repington, Lord Northcliffe, etc. All most unsoldier-like and he had lost confidence in Field-Marshal French. " Sir Douglas Haig, 14 July 1915. Sir John French's desperation over the lack of munitions had led him to the Press in May 1915.

Haig quickly reported that the ground South of the Canal was quite unsuited to a large attack, despite Joffre's view that is was "particularly favourable". He recommended that the main weight should be North of the Canal, towards Violaines and La Bassée - and that this could only be of short duration, for munitions stocks were very low. Action South of the Canal should be restricted to subsidiary flank attacks. French, under continued pressure from Joffre, was forced to ignore this strong advice.

The prevailing view - confirmed by an Anglo-French Boulogne Conference of 19th-20th June 1915 - was that if an offensive was to have a reasonable chance of success it would have to be delivered on a continuous front of no less that 25 miles, by a force of not less than 36 Divisions, supported by at least 1,150 heavy guns and howitzers. As the BEF would not be in this position until Spring 1916 at the earliest, the British Staff opinion - never expressed to the French in the delicate atmosphere of needing to be seen to be a supportive ally - was that they should remain on the active defensive on the Western Front until that time.

Further requests for a change of plan, especially once knowledge of the German defensive system in the area became clearer, also proved fruitless. Foch - given overall supervision of the Artois offensive - advised against a direct frontal attack against the dense mining towns of Lens and Liévin, but insisted that the attack must be made South of the La Bassée canal.

The British Army on the Western Front - not ready for a major offensive in terms of manpower or munitions - was being committed by their Allies to a battle not of its choosing, in an area utterly unsuited to an attack, without clear objectives.