The Long, Long Trail

Joffre's strategic plan included three major offensives, although only two attacks were eventually made at this time:

He'd tried the same trick before...

Aircraft observation had revealed that the German defences had been massively strengthened in the area to be attacked. Not only had the front line been deepened, reinforced and equipped with many machine-gun redoubts and wide barbed wire belts, but an equally strong second and third line of defence had also been prepared. In particular, the enemy had taken time to carefully survey the area and had chosen the position of the second line such that it was on a reverse slope (out of the line of sight of the British). The 15-yard deep wire in front of the second line was stronger than that in no man's land, and was made of a new design of wire that could not be cut by the equipment carried by the British infantry. This wire was also beyond the range of the British field artillery, so unless the first line fell and the artillery could be advanced, it would remain intact. It was obvious that the Britis would need time to bring their artillery up, and the Germans would probably have time to bring reinforcements into the area. The task of breaking through in accordance with Joffre's grand plan looked formidable indeed.

The key lesson from the Spring offensive was that it was weight of shell, particularly of high explosive fired by the heaviest artillery, that destroyed enemy defences and gave the attacking infantry gaps through which they could break into the lines. The assaults were to be made across ground that was quite open, but observed from heights. It would be important for the infantry to be hidden by smoke from machine-guns that would in some cases escape even the most violent bombardment. The preliminary bombardment gave away all elements of surprise regards location of the battle, but all steps were to be taken to keep some surprise with regard to the time of the attack.

All England was buzzing with rumours of this 'Big Push' some weeks before the attack. There was little by way of strategic deception, and preparations near the battle front were all too obvious. Only the date and time of attack were unknown to the enemy.

7.00am : weather reports are not greatly favourable, but indicate a chance of a good wind for the release of gas in the morning of 25th.

Although enemy artillery has quietened, it is clear that much of the German wire entanglements and first-line defences are still intact.

7.00pm : the two weary reserve Divisions of XI Corps begin their final 7-mile march to the battle area, but are constantly delayed by road traffic and halts at level crossings. A military policeman stops some units moving through Bethune, as they were without passes.

During the day, Sir John French and selected staff of his HQ unexpectedly move to Chateau Philomel, three miles South of Lillers. He can communicate only by the public French telephone system.

9.00pm : weather reports show prospects for Westerly wind are improving; Haig issues instruction that attack orders are confirmed, and Zero hour will be notified during the night.

Unknown to the British, the German troops are so little affected by the bombardment that some units carry out a relief on the night of 24/25th September, without problems.

10.00pm : assault Brigades move up through flooded trenches into front-line positions; all reported in position by 2.30am. In some cases the most advanced troops are in Russian saps, which have been quietly joined up to form a shallow jumping-off trench, only some 200 yards from the enemy.

The Guards, 21st and 24th Divisions of XI Corps move up through the night, eventually halting on average 6.5 miles from the front.

3.00am : weather reports now show conditions are likely to be less favourable; the wind is slowing and shifting to the South, although possibly improving after sunrise. Haig issues orders for the release of gas at 5.50am, with the infantry attack timed 40 minutes later.

3.30am : German troops go onto alert in front lines, orders having been given on receipt of information from an Indian deserter.

4.00am : British shellfire increases. It is now the heaviest bombardment of the war to date.

5.15am : although wind is only slightly increasing, Haig orders units to carry on. German troops stand down from alert.

5.50am : heavy British bombardment hits German front line defences, and cloud gas is released. The gas forms a 30 to 50 feet high blanket, moving forward slowly in places (although still short of the enemy positions at 6.25am), but is virtually standing still in the British assault positions in other areas.

6.00am : the now dog-tired reserve Divisions complete their assembly at Noeux-les-Mines and Beuvry.

6.30am : all infantry units move out from front lines and move towards the enemy positions, and the artillery lifts to a second line (between the 1st- and 2nd German trenches, on communications).

Very early reports suggest good forward movement. Sir Douglas Haig requires the reserves to begin to move forward. Out of direct communication with French, he has to send an officer in a car to Chateau Philomel.

7.05am : British artillery lifts again, following a timetable, onto German communication trenches.

7.05am - noon :

IV Corps (Rawlinson)

The right-hand 47th (London) Division: In this sector the gas cloud moved well, and with thick smoke from mortar shells, the leading units captured the first German positions before the enemy were aware of what was happening. British machine-gunners located in North Maroc caught enemy troops fleeing. German machine-guns firing from Cite St Pierre caused losses, and some counter-attacks with bombs threatened the newly-taken positions. However, 1/20 Londons eventually captured the Chalk Pit, and the 140th Brigade secured the Double Crassier. The left-most battalion, the 1/19th Londons, suffered heavy casualties early on from a machine-gun firing from the area of the 15th Division, and most of it's officers were hit. The companies of the battalion were badly broken up as they advanced into the Southern buildings of Loos, and the flank defence on the Loos Crassier was not extended as planned.

15th (Scottish) Division In this sector the gas cloud hung back, causing delays and some losses to the advancing troops. Although the infantry had only 200 yards to cross from the heads of the Russian saps, the gas and smoke only covered them for the first 40 - and as men emerged into the clear, two German machine-guns swept twice across the advancing line, causing many casualties. The MG's were soon joined by enemy artillery fire from beyond Loos. However, strong parties continued the advance, cleared the German front lines and began to storm through Loos village itself. By 8.00am the village was entirely in British hands.

On the left of the Divisional front, men reached the La Bassee-Lens road by 9.15am. Reserves were ordered up to support this advance. Emerging from the village, men of many units advanced unopposed - but without clear landmarks and with few officers, they headed for the summit of Hill 70 rather than to the left which was the original plan. On the extreme right, the 1/9 Black Watch, finding that the expected flank defences of the 1/19 Londons absent, halted. The mass of infantry now on Hill 70, seeing Germans retreating in some disarray, began to advance down the far-side slope. This advance was caught by German crossfire from the 2nd line, and it was brought to a standstill by 10.30am, with men doing their best to take cover on completely open ground on the downward slope North of Cite St Laurent. Calls for artillery support were answered with a bombardment falling away to the left, on Cite St Auguste, the original objective of the Division. 200 men on the hill, now reinforced by the 7/RSF, dug in a trench behind the crest line. Although by 11.30am the enemy had reinforced his position in front of Cite St Laurent, steps had been taken to evacuate Lens, such was the threat of a further Scots advance.

The left-hand 1st Division began to advance a few minutes late, after casualties were suffered from the British gas which had drifted back into the assault trenches. On the right front of 2nd Brigade, it was discovered that the enemy wire was undamaged, having been out of direct observation over a crest line, and two German machine guns and heavy rifle fire played across the lines of advancing troops as desperate efforts were made to cut the wire. The succeeding lines of infantry could not move forward and took to ground just below the gentle crest line. By 7.30am the gas and smoke had cleared, completely exposing the pinned-down troops in no man's land. The 1st Brigade did not suffer so badly from gas, and the lead battalions (10/Gloucesters and 8/R. Berkshires, both New Army units that had replaced Guards battalions in the Division in August 1915) advanced through all objectives despite heavy casualties. By 8.00am they were in Gun Trench, an intermediate line running South of the Hulluch quarries. The Regular support battalion, 1/Camerons, pressed the advance on towards Hulluch. They waited for the 2nd Brigade to come up on their right. Further attacks by 2nd Brigade had met with the same devastating fire as the first, and was held up, with a large number of men lying out in the open, close under the German wire. At 9.10am Division gave orders to Green's Force to advance in support, but all runners were hit and the orders were not received until 10.55am. A direct frontal attack by the 1/14th London Regiment (London Scottish) and 1/9th King's at Lone Tree met with a hail of close-range bullets, and many men were hit. 2/Royal Munster Fusiliers, coming up in support, found the trenches near Le Rutoire so full of dead and wounded that they advanced above ground, and were virtually annihilated. The attack had effectively halted.

I Corps (Gough)

The right-hand 7th Division found that the gas cloud generally moved well in this sector, but local wind variations meant that not all cylinders were turned on here. Many men struggled to breathe in their gas helmets as they advanced into the cloud and removed them, consequently suffering from gas themselves. Heavy losses were incurred by the lead units of 20th Brigade in No Man's Land from German shelling, which had been opened up to try to dispel the gas and smoke cloud. The 8/Devonshire suffered heavy machine-gun casualties, the wire in front of their sector having been only partially cleared. However, the 2/Gordon Highlanders fared better and soon pushed past the German front line towards Gun Trench and Hulluch. On 22nd Brigade front, as the infantry moved ahead of the gas they were cut down in swathes, with the 1/South Staffordshire and 2/Royal Warwicks losing some 70% of their strength before they reached the German positions. However, men continued to press forward and by 7.30am the German support line had been captured. At 8.05am, two batteries of RFA were ordered up closed behind the original front, near Notre-Dame de Consolation - a wayside shrine. They were firing by 9.00am. By 8.45am the leading men were crossing the Lens Road, just to the South of the Vermelles-Hulluch road. There they caused much loss and disruption to German reinforcements moving into Cite St Elie. The support battalions of 20th Brigade, the 1/6/Gordon Highlanders and the 2/Border, came up with little loss, and helped launch an attack but this was halted by heavy fire. Parties pushed forward into the northern end of Gun Trench. Further artillery units were ordered to move up. T Battery RHA galloped up the Vermelles road into the former No Man's Land. By 9.30am, now reinforced by 2/Queens, the men of 22nd Brigade had captured the Hulluch Quarries, with patrols on the edge of Cite St Elie itself. Further advance was found to be impossible without further support, and the positions captured thus far at the Quarries were consolidated. 21st Brigade moved up from reserve in Vermelles, and split into two sets of two battalions each ordered to advance through the positions gained so far. They were also halted in and around Gun Trench and the Quarries, unable to penetrate uncut wire in front of Hulluch under fire from Cite St Elie. Divisional artillery was ordered to shell the latter and its defences until 4.00pm.

The 9th (Scottish) Division had to attack the formidable obstacle of the Hohenzollern Redoubt and Fosse 8, the high location of the main enemy observation posts looking across the whole battlefield. Preparations had included Russian saps to close the distance to be covered, and effective observed heavy shelling. The lead units of 26th Brigade suffered casualties as they cleared the gas and smoke, but advanced through well-cut wire to quickly take the front face of the Redoubt. The 7/Seaforths reached Fosse Trench - the rear of the redoubt - soon after 7.00am, and pressed on towards Fosse 8. Half an hour later they were in Corons Trench - which had been flooded by the enemy - where they halted and reorganised. On their left the 5/Camerons suffered from crossfire from Mad Point (just outside Auchy on the road from Vermelles), but pushed on to Little Willie Trench - the front face of the redoubt - and Fosse Trench which they reached by 7.10am. By 7.45am they joined the Seaforths in Corons Trench. The 8/Black Watch came up from reserve to reinforce, but suffered grievous casualties from fire from Mad Point. By now it had become clear that failure on their left meant that the Brigade could not continue, and instead it had to prepare against counterattack, while under continuous enemy shellfire. Meanwhile 8/Gordon Highlanders, moving to the South of the Dump, managed to reach the German second line - Pekin Trench - shortly after 8.05am. This was some 1000 yards further ahead than the units now consolidating the trenches of the Redoubt. 27th Brigade was ordered to support this apparent breakthrough. However its units met with mixed fortunes. 12/Royal Scots advanced with few losses and reached Pekin Trench by 8.45am. 11/Royal Scots lost direction and in correcting it ran into a deep wire entanglement, where they were caught by machine-gun fire and virtually wiped out. 10/Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders heard that Pekin Trench was already strongly held, and halted in Fosse Alley. Four guns of No 7 Mountain Battery RGA were ordered forward at 9.15am from Annequin, to a position near Hohenzollern Redoubt; they came into action at 10.30am.

The 28th Brigade, on the left of the Divisional front, ran into serious problems before the assault even began. The gas drifted behind them and hung in the trenches. It gave no cover across no man's land, and German artillery opened on the front lines that were packed with men. Gas cylinders were destroyed, releasing even more gas into the area. Men of the 6/KOSB, perhaps surprised at how little resistance the enemy showed while they advanced to his uncut wire, were soon cut down in rows as machine-guns opened up from Strong Point (a gun post in front of Little Willie Trench) and Mad Point. Men not killed or wounded were pinned down, and only some 70 men of the rear ranks made it back to cover. To their left, the first rank of the 10/HLI was annihilated by crossfire from Railway Redoubt (across the Cambrin - La Bassee road) before it had gained 20 yards; the men in succeeding ranks suffering similarly. Support units pushed into the area were also hit and pinned down. At 11.15am the Corps commander gave an order to renew the attack at 12.15pm, and a bombardment opened up - but it was clearly too light to be effective in destroying the defences in front of Auchy. The 9/Scottish Rifles and half of the 11/HLI advanced as ordered, and were shot down with considerable loss. Most men did not even reach the German wire. At 1.30pm Brigade halted further attack, and its survivors were reorganised for defence of their original lines.

The 2nd Division attack along both banks of the La Bassee canal met with no success at all, at a very heavy cost in casualties. It's role was to create a protective flank to enable the 9th Division on the right to move forward unimpeded by fire or counterattack from the canal area. The ground in front was already devastated by craters resulting from intensive mine warfare, and included the Brickstacks and the embankments of the Railway Triangle. On the front of 19th Brigade, South of the canal, two large mines were blown by 173rd Tunnelling Company, RE ten minutes before zero, which had the effect of putting the enemy on full alert. Here too the gas blew back into the trenches, and men fell. As the infantry advanced, they were forced to bunch together to avoid the craters and were mown down by concentrated machine-gun fire as they did so. The enemy were seen to stand on their parapets in order to take advantage of such an easy target.

By 9.00am it was clear that no progress was going to be made, and Brigade gave orders to withdraw to the original front lines. Men of 1/Middlesex could not from no man's land and took whatever cover the could until dark. Some men of the 2/Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders occupied an empty German trench, but only 11 returned at night, the rest having been killed or captured. On the left of this Brigade and up to the canal bank was 6th Brigade. Here an officer of the RE thought that the wind conditions were so poor for the gas he would not take responsibility for it's release. Brigade ordered him to continue, but it was 6.00am before the order came through, ten minutes behind timetable. Two mines were exploded by 170th Tunnelling Company RE, adding to the confusion. The cloud was so dense that it incapacitated 130 men of the 2/South Staffordshire before they could begin to advance. The leading waves of the 1/King's found the wire uncut, and the advance did not progress beyond the far lip of the new craters before being brought to a standstill, except for a party of the South Staffords who edged along the canal towpath to the edge of Embankment Redoubt where they were held off by German grenades.

The Divisional artillery renewed the bombardment at 9.00am for half an hour, but the battalion commandes on the spot advised that the German strongpoints were still plainly operating. At 9.45am 19th and 6th Brigades halted all further efforts to move forward.

North of the canal, 5th Brigade attacked in two 'prongs', one along the canal and one in front of Givenchy. At the canal, while gas drifted across from teh South and caused casualties among the attackers, it quickly became clear that 6th Brigade was not suppressing Embankment Redoubt. The planned capture by the 1/9th HLI of Tortoise Redoubt was going to very difficult while this was the case. The leading platoons were annihilated, and the attack called off.

The Givenchy attack was to act as a diversion, and was launched half an hour in advance of the main attack. At first, the advancing battalions moved easily past well-cut wire and into the German front trench - which they found evacuated. Approaching the second line they were assailed by machine-gun fire and forced to take cover. Shortly after, they were counter-attacked and were among the first units this day to discover that German grenades were much more effective than British ones when it came to close-quarter fighting. By 9.40am the survivors of the 2/HLI, 1st/Queens and 2/Ox & Bucks were back in their original trench, having lost around 950 men in the process of achieving nothing positive.

At 8.45am Haig sends another message to French. By now all the reserve units of I and IV Corps are deployed, and he urges XI Corps to be released to move forward. French finally signals to XI Corps at 9.30am but does not place them under First Army orders until they arrive in the trenches. By noon they are still moving up through shattered communication trenchs that are full of wounded men, stretcher bearers, and signals runners, and on tracks and roads full of traffic and under shellfire.

By 10.30am First Army had received optimistic reports, and ordered the reserve 3rd Cavalry Division forward to Corons de Rutoire in readiness to move forward as soon as Cite St Auguste fell.

Despite heavy casualties and the disappointing effect of the release of gas, there was room for optimism at noon. It was clear that enemy lines had been pierced in many places, but there was uncertainty about further German defences and reaction: few RFC reports came in due to poor flying and observation conditions, and there were precious few prisoners. The 47th and 15th Divisions had captured Loos, although they had been halted and were threatened by counterattack on Hill 70. There were clear signs of German withdrawal in this area and panic in Lens. 7th Division was on the outskirts of Hulluch, and 9th Division were working their way forward at the Hohenzollern Redoubt and Fosse 8. The attack of the left of the latter Division and that of the 2nd Division had been costly failures and all further ambitions in this area had been halted.

47th (London) Division continued to consolidate the positions it had won at the Double Crassier and Loos Crassier, and was ready as ordered to meet any counter-attack that might be delivered from the South.

15th (Scottish) Division was in some difficulty, despite having succeeded in capturing Loos itself. Men were helplessly pinned down on the forward slope of Hill 70, and the artillery support that had been called for since 10.50am was only just beginning to happen. The enemy made a determined attempt - having reinforced this area - to envelop the troops lying out in the open and to force them towards the second German line. A larger effort was made by the enemy at noon, initially near the Dynamitiere buildings near Loos, but having an energising effect on all German troops of 178 Regiment in the area of Cite St Laurent, who rushed forward and with great gallantry recaptured the height of Hill 70.

Noon. The French Tenth Army opens it's bombardment South Of Lens. 12.45am the French infantry attack - six hours after the British - between Angres and Arras.

German commanders prepare all available reserves to meet this threat, and further efforts to counterattack against the British are halted. They consolidate the hard-won position on Hill 70.

46th Brigade sends forward it's last battalion, the 6/Camerons, to support the left flank of the Division, which was exposed and weak due to the failure of the 1st Division to advance. By 12.30am they have established a line from Chalk Pit Wood to Chalet Wood, with machine-gun posts on the Lens - La Bassee road. 45th Brigade sent two battalions into Loos with a view to recapturing Hill 70, but without artillery support, and under constant German fire this ambition was impractical. They dug in at Loos. Supplies to this area were most difficult, the roads being blocked by a chaos of dead men and horsrs, and destroyed vehicles.

3.00pm 8/East Yorkshires and 10/Yorkshire of 62nd Brigade, 21st Division, are ordered forward towards Loos, to reinforce the units of 15th Division and if necessary retake Hill 70. After coming under shrapnel fire as they marched in column of fours - which destroyed their transport - these battalions lost direction and ran into intensive machine gun fire from the Southern end of Chalk Pit Copse, sustaining very heavy casualties. Other reserves of 21st Division - expected by Division to have been available at 10.30am - finally arrived at 7.30pm, and were clearly exhausted. They were ordered to reinforce the line between Hill 70 and Puits 14 bis. Around 8.30pm, the remnants of the first waves that had attacked in the morning were finally relieved on the slopes on Hill 70.

Nightfall therefore saw both Divisions in this sector in scratch positions between the old German first and second lines, consolidating their position. The enemy was in possession once again of the dominant height of Hill 70. A German attack in the night against the 7/Royal Scots Fusiliers, on the Eastern side of the Loos Crassier was repulsed.

The attack of 1st Division had met with such intensive enemy fire that by 10.55am it was effectively halted. By 1.15pm, it had been decided at Divisional HQ to leave only a screen of men holding their existing positions, and to move remaining men of 2nd Brigade (reinforced now by 1/Gloucesters) South to exploit 15th Division's success and attack the enemy from the flank and rear. 2/Welch, coming up in support at 11.00am, crossed no man's land unobserved and managed to arrive in Gun Trench with few losses. They expected to find the 2/Royal Munster Fusiliers there, but the latter had suffered heavy casualties. The Welch moved to their right, into the valley behind where the enemy was so stoutly defending against the attacks of 2nd Brigade. At this time, the enemy launched a counter-attack against 1st Brigade, but it was easily repulsed. By 2.30pm the Welch approached the Lone Tree - Hulluch track. The Germans - 400 men of 157th Regiment - now found themselves almost surrounded and surrendered. 2nd Brigade and the units that had been attached were now able to advance, but losses were such that only 1,500 men were able to do so. By 5.20pm they had reached the Lens road near Bois Hugo, in touch with 15th Division, where they dug in.

By nightfall, although 2nd Brigade was in touch with 15th Division and 1st Brigade with 7th Division, there was a gap in the line of some 1500 yards between them (although the significance of this does not appear to have concerned 1st Divisional HQ and it was not reported to IV Corps). There were insufficient men of the Division left to fill the gap, following the terrible losses that this formation suffered in the day.

At 12.40am First Army ordered the reserve 3rd Cavalry Division to advance through the infantry; the Divisional CO, Major-General Briggs had by now ascertained that the actual situation was not as favourable as Army believed, and he informed Haig that he would wait until it was. 2.35pm sees Haig ordering the two reserve infantry Divisions of XI Corps to push forward at once between Hulluch and Cite St Auguste, to secure the passages of the Haute Deule Canal. The Corps and Divisional HQ's were given no indication that the enemy was anything but defeated and breaking. It was not until 5.00pm that these orders were given to the attacking Brigades. An hour later, not all battalions were in position. At least one experienced such delay that the men went without a meal of any kind before going into battle. By now it was getting dark. First Army ordered the Brigades not to advance beyond the Lens-La Bassee road that night, but these amended orders did not reach the forward units until 2.00am - by which time many of their men were dead.

7th Division had halted in and around Gun Trench and the Quarries after it's initial advance, unable to penetrate uncut wire in front of Hulluch under fire from Cite St Elie. Divisional artillery was ordered to shell the latter and its defences until 4.00pm. Unfortunately observers reported that the damage done was not sufficient to justify continuing the attack. At 7.05pm orders were received from I Corps to consolidate.

The attack of 9th (Scottish) Division had by mid-morning succeeded in reaching and occupying the enemy trench network around the Hohenzollern Redoubt and Fosse 8, and also Pekin Trench. At 1.00pm, the 73rd Brigade of 24th Division was ordered to reinforce Fosse 8, as it was believed that any loss of position here would seriously endanger the troops ar Pekin Trench. In addition, six field batteries RFA were ordered forward to positions South-West of the Redoubt, where they came into action at 4.30pm. During the afternoon, the garrison of Pekin Trench came under heavy shellfire, and German infantry began a bombing attack, starting at the Haisnes-Auchy road and working Southwards while others worked North from Cite Trench. Despite being reinforced by the 6/Royal Scots Fusiliers, the superiority of German grenades soon told, and the position was gradually retaken. By 5.00pm, half of it had been lost, and the remaining men were ordered to withdraw in the dark. Unfortunately many returned as far as the original German front line, leaving a very confused picture around Fosse Alley, which became the new British front line. The advanced field batteries were ordered back to the positions they had left earlier in the day.

Therefore by nightfall the Division held a more or less continuous line from North of the Hulluch Quarries, where they were in touch with 7th Division, to the Fosse 8 dump, round the Corons to Pekin, and with a left flank thrown back facing Madagascar.

I Corps staff were not dissatisfied with their days work: the advance of 7th and 9th Division had in many areas broken through, and a good Division moving up from reserve had every chance of pushing through the second German line and beyond. They had been led to expect such a reinforcement, and believe that it was required as early as 9.00am.

By 9.45am 19th and 6th Brigades of 2nd Division had halted all further efforts to move forward, after suffering heavy losses and ailing to break into the German positions. The survivors of the 5th Brigade were also back in their original trench at that time. This front settled down to an uneasy period of consolidation.

The reserve 21st and 24th Divisions moved by a night march into the Loos valley. Progress was slow and exhausting (and these units had been on the move constantly for several days already). Staff were unfamiliar with the ground, communication trenches were flooded and packed with men. Roads and tracks were jammed with transport going in both directions. There were few bridges across shattered fore trenches, and wire was still stretched across wide areas. Men were carrying extra supplies, equipment, rations and ammunition. At 1.20am, the Brigadiers of 24th Division met to consider their actions for the next morning. The Guards Division suffered similar disruption on moving up, arriving at their billets in Noeux les Mines and Houchin at 8.00pm only to find them already occupied.

The opportunities that had existed from mid-morning to noon has been lost. Insufficient men had been available to exploit the areas where the assaulting Brigades had broken into the enemy's trench systems. Strong German resistance in their second line had brought further advance to a halt, despite their attaentions being drawn to the very heavy French attack a few miles to the South. The waether had closed in, and it was raining very heavily.

First Army HQ had a very incomplete picture of the front-line sitaution, especially the losses suffered. It was unaware that the Germans had reinforced the area, and uninformed as to the progress and intentions of the French Tenth Army some way to the South. Believing that the infantry had broken through the area south of Hulluch, plans were made to continue the push forward of the reserves, to exploit the situation. (As we have seen, however, the reserves were deeply fatigued and were already being pushed piecemeal into various areas to shore up the already-disjointed British defences). Orders were sent out at 11.30pm for a general renewal of the attack at 11.00am on 26th September.

First Army had issued orders at 11.30pm for a general renewal of the attack at 11.00am on 26th September. Sir John French commented to Sir Douglas Haig about the futility of pushing reserves through a narrow gap in the enemy's defences, but he allowed his Army commander to continue to plan his own tactics.

There was mist, low cloud and rain all day.

At 1.10am, the Brigadiers of 24th Division met to consider their actions for the next morning. The heavy rain had now stopped. Reports were now confirming that Hulluch was still in enemy hands, contrary to earlier messages. The officers decided to continue the general advance across the Lens - La Bassee road and through the second German line, by moonlight. They had no intelligence concerning German strength or defences.

5.00am Orders are received by 15th Division. Reinforced by 21st Division, they are to recapture Hill 70 with an attack at 9.00am. It was proving virtually impossible to move artillery forward to support this attack, and ammunition supplies were dwindling - fresh ones being held up in traffic. The attack would be supported by artilley firing from their original positions, and the second German line would barely be touched. A bombardment of two rounds per gun per minute was ordered. In confusion, some units did not receive an order to withdraw from the most advanced positions, and British shells fell on their own infantry in places. Many infantry units did not receive orders to attack until 7.00am, and in at least one case, 8.00am.

5.30am Another heavy German attack against the 7/Royal Scots Fusiliers, on the Eastern side of the Loos Crassier, was repulsed with the assistance of the 11th Motor Machine-Gun Battery.

8.00am approx. The units of 21st and 24th Divisions had moved with great difficulty throughout the night, and had reached the advanced positions facing the enemy's second line, around Bois Hugo, Chalk Pit Wood, Chalet Wood and Hill 70 Redoubt. They were informed that a general attack had been ordered for 11.00am. First Army believed they had halted as ordered on the Lens-La Bassee road, and had been resting for some time.

9.00am The weakened battalions of 45th Brigade advanced up the slope of Hill 70, just as the mist cleared. They came under immediate fire from the Redoubt at the summit, but parties entered the trenches there and hand to hand fighting took place. After suffering continued losses, and unable to get around the flanks of the Redoubt, the survivors withdrew. 10/Yorkshire and 12/Northumberland Fusiliers of 62nd Brigade, advancing behind them, suffered the same fate. By 10.00am the attack had ended, German counterattacks retaking the entire Redoubt complex.

11.00am A heavy German bombardment fell on the forward positions. Without leaders, without food and exhausted, many men fell back into Loos village.

12.00 noon First Army orders 6th Cavalry Brigade to reinforce Loos area. They send 3rd Dragoon Guards and 1st Royal Dragoons forward, dismounted.

3.30pm A general retirement from the Hill 70 position took place. This unnecessary act was the result of some confused orders, the origins of which remain uncertain to this day. At the same time, various small units were moving into the Hill 70 positions to reinforce units there! The enemey counterattacked against the Loos Crassier, which was by now consolidated and strongly held by 1/20th Londons.

8.00pm The two cavalry regiments, having rallied men of 45th and 46th Brigades who were found retiring from Loos, enter and clear the village and re-establish the position on the lower slopes of Hill 70.

11.30pm Remainder of 3rd Cavalry Division moves to Loos, and completes the relief of 15th Division during the night.

Midnight A heavy German attack against the 1/South Wales Borderers of 3rd Brigade near the Vermelles-Hulluch road was repulsed with very heavy loss to the attackers.

1.00am A heavy attack by the German 117th Division was launched against the forward units of 7th and 9th Divisions between the Vermelles-Hulluch road and Fosse 8. It achieved complete surprise, catching wiring parties and isolated sections unawares. On the right, 20th Brigade pulled all advanced units back to the protection of Gun Trench. In the centre, the most forward units were in a shallow trench a hundred yards ahead of the Quarries. Their left had no contact with the 27th Brigade of 9th Division, which was somewhere away on their left. A reorganisation of scattered and mixed-up units was underway - under shellfire that included gas shells - when the German attack hit. The enemy entered the Quarries through the undefended gap to the North, and much confused and hand to hand fighting took place. By 1.30am the British troops had lost the Quarries. Further advance was halted by concentrated fire from the 2/Yorkshire and 1/South Staffordshire. 27th Brigade - who lost their CO, Brig-General Bruce, captured in the Quarries - withdrew from Fosse Alley in good order. A hastily arranged counterattack with the intention of retaking the Quarries was delivered at 6.45am by the dog-tired 9/Norfolks of 24th Division, but it was annihilated by consolidated enemy infantry. At Fosse 8, the enemy infantry cheered as they approached the British positions 100 yards away, and fire from 26th Brigade and 73rd Brigade (placed under orders of 9th Division and just arriving after their night marches) destroyed the attack.

7.00am A composite Brigade (consisting of 1/KRRC, 1/Royal Berkshire and 2/Worcestershire, under command of Lt-Col. B. Carter and now called Carter's Force) arrives from 2nd Division, with orders to assist a I Corps attack on Cite St Elie. Corps instead sends them to recapture the Quarries. There is much delay in preparing for this attack, during which the Berkshires are detached and sent to assist 9th Division and 73rd Brigade at Fosse 8.

9.00am A German counterattack at Bois Hugo is brought to a standstill, but only after much confusion and loss to 63rd Brigade.

10.00am British artillery begin a bombardment preliminary to the renewed attack. Many batteries have by now moved up, and are in the open near Le Rutoire and Lone Tree. German artillery opens and maintains fire on the exposed gunners. Few British shells fall on the German second line, which is complete, reinforced and protected in front by masses of untouched wire.

10.05am XI Corps orders Guards Division to move to original British trenches astride Vermelles road, ready to explout the anticipated success of the attack.

10.30am The German counterattack continues and men of 63rd Brigade retire in disaay from Chalk Pit Wood. The enemy captures Chalet Wood. 6/Cameron Highlanders make repeated efforts to recapture it.

10.50am The attack orders reach the battalions of 21st Division and 24th Division. They had no specific objectives.

11.00am The remainder of the attacking units move forward from the Bois Hugo area towards the German second line. They have had little rest, and for many no food or water since yesterday. The various orders to deploy battalions piecemeal, together with the defence against counterattacks, has reduced what was intended to be an attack by 24 battalions to just 6. The 4 battalions of 72nd Brigade advanced over open ground, starting some 1000 yards West of the La Bassee road, and were in such good order that they had the effect of reinvigorating 63rd Brigade on their right. However, once again men of this Brigade lost direction and moved towards the summit of Hill 70, taking them across direct fire from Chalet Wood and Bois Hugo, both places they should have been approaching frontally. The advance of 72nd Brigade, composed now of 8/Royal West Kents and 9/East Surreys, together with half of 2/Welch, came under severe enfilade and frontal fire which included point-blank artillery. These units also reported British shellfire falling among them. 8/Buffs, 8/Queen's, 11/Essex and 9/Suffolks were all pushed into this murderous area. (The first three named all lost their Commanding Officers, killed in action here). Only a thin line reached the virtually undamaged German wire by about 1.00pm. All attempts to cut the wire failed with heavy casualties, and the remaining men took cover in long grass. At a shouted order to retire, men withdrew - many being hit by machine-gun fire as they did so. Those who did not retire were killed or captured.

11.00am Many misunderstandings and miscommunications, together with the heavy losses incurred by the units the day before, lead to a serious problems in the attempted advance of 1st Division. It made no progress.

12.20am The advance of 63rd and what is left of 64th Brigades has been broken, with survivors falling back down Loos valley. The 9/KOYLI and 10/KOYLI take up the advance (although Brigade was frantically trying to get orders to them to stop them doing so), which has the effect of rallying some of the retiring men. They are also swept by fire from Chalet Wood and Bois Hugo, and the survivors retire.

1.30pm The retirements of most units of 21st and 24th Divisions mean that there is a mass of men falling back unmolested on the entire front between The Vermelles-Loos and the Vermelles-Hulluch roads. Only isolated groups clung on to the advanced positions in long grass, in the hope of reinforcement. German medical personnel assist in providing first aid to British wounded.

2.00pm Bombardment of the Quarries begins again.

4.00pm Carter's Force finally makes it's attack on the Quarries. Progress is slow, despite the regular units using 'fire and movement' tactics. They reach a position 200 yards short of the Quarries and halt after heavy casualties. They consolidate their position. Major-General Capper, OC 7th Division, receives a fatal wound while close to the advance.

4.00pm Staff of XI Corps finally understand from reports that the attack of their Divisions has failed. Gradually the groups of men straggling rearward were brought under control, and placed in the shelter of the old British and German front lines. Coincidentally Sir Douglas Haig is present at Corps HQ. He has already requested Sir John French that the Guards Division be placed under his orders, to restore the situation. Confirmation arrives at 4.02pm.

Enemy units move out from Bois Hugo and take up positions along the Lens-La Bassee road. In so doing they surround and capture 500 men of 24th Division who are still lying out in the most forward positions.

During the evening and night, the three Brigades of Guards Division moved into the original British trenches between Loos Road redoubt and Le Rutoire. They relieved most of the units of 21st and 24th Divisions.

The men of 73rd Brigade holding the positions east of Fosse 8 are in an exhausted condition, having no food, water or sleep for 48 hours.

12.00 noon Heavy enemy shelling of Fosse 8 and tracks to the North (Trois Cabarets), begins and continues all afternoon and evening.

Mine buildings at Fosse 8 : date uncertain

This front had settled down to an uneasy period of consolidation.

The shattered units of 15th, 21st and 24th Divisions were in process of relief at Loos and Hulluch, with 3rd Cavalry and Guards Divisions taking their place. This area was relatively safe from attack, although the enemy had moved their advanced positions forward from their second line and they remained in possession of Hill 70 and the Quarries. There was concern about the condition of troops holding Fosse 8, and their ability to withstand enemy attack. Roads behind the lines remained very congested, with many units struggling to move supplies forward. Parties clearing the houses of Loos village were still finding enemy troops in hiding.

After the battle, the tracks leading to the Loos area are strewn with the devastation of destroyed British transport